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The European Union (EU) is a voluntary organisation based on the Treaties 
which have been democratically approved by the Member States (MSs). The MSs 
have willingly committed themselves to progressive integration by eliminating 
barriers to fundamental freedoms in order to build an ‘ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’. However, in order to address other strong conflicting interests 
and commitments at the national level, the governments of the MSs have raised 
barriers to fundamental freedoms called Golden Shares (GSs). Due to conflicts of 
supranational and national interests, the MSs have resisted removing GSs, so the 
matter has been brought to the highest legal authority of the EU – the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU has assessed the compatibility of 
GSs with EU law on a total of sixteen occasions, which has resulted in fifteen 
condemning judgments. Following the Court’s ruling, the MSs are obliged to 
comply, as non-compliance with a judgment is a serious infringement which 
signifies that the MSs are crossing the red line by severely disregarding the limits of 
their discretion under their voluntarily supranational commitments. Despite the 
significant compliance obligations and the growing GS case-law, little is known 
about whether the EU enforcement system succeeds in ensuring timely and effective 
compliance with GS-related judgments. This study seeks to close this gap. It 
evaluates national post-judgment compliance procedures in order to demonstrate 
how and under what conditions MSs comply and whether a decision to keep GSs 
post-judgment could be seen as an unsuitable compliance strategy leading to non-
compliance. This study is a fact-finding mission aimed at solving the empirical 
puzzle about whether the MSs deliberately resort to post-judgment actions and 
strategies aimed at limiting or containing the effects of the GS rulings. It seeks to 
reveal whether such a compliance strategy is in line with supranational obligations 
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Table 1. Case C-463/00: Overview of the Companies and Relevant  
Golden Shares Regimes 111 
 






AEM Azienda Elettrica Municipale Società per Azioni 
AG Advocate General 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
AktG Aktiengesetz 
BAA British Airports Authority 
BGBl Bundesgesetzblatt 
BOE Boletín Oficial del Estado 
BSCH Banco Santander Central Hispanoamericano Sociedad 
Anónima 
CEM Control Enhancing Mechanism 
CIMPOR Cimentos de Portugal Sociedade Anónima 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
CMLR Common Market Law Reports 
CGD Caixa Geral de Depositos 
CPR Commission Press Release 
DL Decree-Law 
Do Diário da República 
DPCM Decree of the President of Council of Ministers 
EAP Economic Adjustment Programme 
EC European Community 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECR European Court Reports 
EdF Electricité de France Société Anonyme 
EdP Energias de Portugal Sociedade Anónima 
EEC European Economic Community 
Elf Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine 
ENI Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica Società per Azioni 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GALP Galp Energia, SGPS, Sociedade Anónima 
GS Golden Share 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
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KonTraG Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich 
KPN Koninklijke KPN Naamloze vennootschap 
LQP Lei Quadro das Privatizaçoes 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
MSs Member States (of the EU) 
OJ Official Journal of the European Communities 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PT Portugal Telecom SGPS Sociedade Anónima 
SOE State-Owned Enterprise 
TEC Treaty Establishing the European Community 
TEU Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TI Telecom Italia Società per Azioni 
UK The United Kingdom 




Obstructionist national protectionism in the EU: qualitative 
analysis of Member States’ compliance with the CJEU’s judgments in 
“Golden Share” cases. 
 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
This introductory part seeks to provide a general overview of the fundamental 
issues related to the main question of this thesis: is the EU enforcement system 
effective in ensuring compliance with GS judgments? Due to the number and 
breadth of the subjects concerned with the question of compliance with EU law in 
general and given the multiplicity of issues and interests surrounding the GS topic in 
particular, it is necessary to specify not only what this study is about but also what it 
is not about. Sections 1 and 2 of this introduction address this important question. 
Section 3, in turn, considers the multiplicity of issues and interests related to the GS 
topic while reflecting on the interplay between unity and diversity within the EU. 
This section reviews the very complex scenario that links conflicting values and 
interests at both European and national levels. It problematises the setting of this 
study by contrasting the predominantly neoliberal ideas behind the single market 
project and the conflicting desire of the MSs to protect public interests in strategic 
industries via GSs. Section 4 explains what GSs are and how the protectionist aims 
of these measures could be achieved without imposing barriers to free movement 
and without having to resort to non-compliance post-judgment. This clarification is 
crucial to demonstrate that the decision to maintain GSs post-judgment could be 
seen as a matter of political choice which is inconsistent with voluntary 
commitments, both at supranational and national levels, and could be seen as 
particularly grave misconduct given the availability of legitimate alternatives to 
achieve the stated public policy aims. Section 5 contrasts the overall compliance 
trends with EU law and with the judgments on GSs. It then discusses the literature 
on compliance and demonstrates how this study contributes to it. Section 6 
introduces the main research hypotheses and theorises on factors that could 




The CJEU is the highest legal authority of the EU. It is regarded as the 
principal guarantor of the rule of law within the Union. The EU enforcement system 
aims to bring erring MSs before the CJEU in order to guarantee due compliance 
with supranational obligations (Adams et al 2013: 2; Alter 2001). The CJEU is seen 
as being the most influential international body (Alter 1999) and the most effective 
supranational judicial body in the history of the world (Stone Sweet 2004). Despite 
the pivotal role that compliance with the CJEU’s judgments plays for the Union to 
attain its aims and objectives, the effects of the rulings beyond the courtroom remain 
unclear. Indeed our knowledge of MS compliance is like a black hole (Weiler 1991: 
2463). The said black hole also applies to the post-adjudicative compliance of MSs 
with judgments on the so-called Golden Share cases. The GS-related case-law 
reveals a deeply entrenched conflict between the promotion of supranational 
interests and the protection of diverging national interests. Hence, an analysis of 
compliance with GS rulings could provide an invaluable insight into the 
effectiveness of the EU enforcement system when it is applied to the policy area 
where the MSs have to balance the obligation of compliance with supranational 
obligations against the countervailing obligation to protect national interests. 
The GS-related jurisprudence has a substantial impact on the development of 
EU law and on the interpretation of the Treaty provisions on capital movement. It is 
seen both by the Commission and scholars as path-breaking, significant, historic and 
as a landmark. It is frequently addressed by academics who approach this body of 
judicially inspired EU law from different perspectives. However, despite the 
importance of the GS-related jurisprudence for the development of EU law, the 
Court’s adjudicative success has never been tested. The Court’s jurisprudence on 
GSs has never been the subject of a contextual study
1
 which methodically explores 
this body of case-law through the prism of the MSs’ post-adjudicative compliance. 
Little is known about how MSs address GSs judgments, and which actions they take 
(and how soon they undertake them) in order to comply. What is missing is a 
narrowly focused qualitative contextual analysis revealing how the CJEU’s 
judgments on GSs are applied and enforced in typical practice across the MSs. This 
study aims to close this gap. 
                                                 
1
 The necessity for such contextual research assessing post-judgment compliance was frequently 
identified in academia, e.g., BÖRZEL (2003: 220); BÖRZEL (2001; 820); STONE SWEET (2010). 
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This study sets out to explore whether the general enforcement mechanism 
enshrined in the TFEU is effective and adequately suited to guarantee prompt 
compliance with GS rulings. This study is a fact-finding mission that approaches 
post-judgment compliance as a narrative of events, in order to establish how MSs 
comply, what the ultimate outcome of the enforcement action is, and if a pattern can 
be distinguished in compliance behaviour which emerges in relation to GS-related 
judgments. This study is an attempt to understand the content and motivation for 
national compliance actions and the difficulties for EU law enforcement which could 
arise during this process. This research considers whether the offending 
governments are determined to legislate in a manner aiming to keep the overruled 
GSs. The study aims to demonstrate whether the GS-related jurisprudence could be 
one of the policy areas characterised by particular compliance dynamics and whether 
non-compliance might remain a significant problem. 
Here, it is pertinent to emphasise that defining and measuring post-judgment 
compliance is a challenging task. It is difficult to apply empirical evidence to a 
theoretical framework in order to arrive at definitive conclusions since numerous 
issue-related factors and dependent variables are involved in the assessment. 
Therefore, the present study has a narrow focus on the MSs’ practice in complying 
with GS rulings to reveal specific dynamics of compliance characteristic solely of 
this body of case-law. GSs are a very specific subject, and this study seeks to reveal 
whether some MSs tend to behave very differently when it comes to compliance 
with CJEU’s judgements. 
The European Union is a supranational organisation founded in law with the 
ultimate aim of building an ‘ever closer union among the Peoples of Europe’.2 Its 
MSs committed themselves democratically and voluntarily to join the EU. 
Membership obliges the MSs to progressively achieve integration by eliminating 
barriers to the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties in order to meet the 
Union’s aims and values. At the same time, the MSs could be characterised as 
having significant diversity of national economic and societal traditions, coupled 
with significant and persistent differences in corporate law and in national policies 
related to strategic industries (such as energy and public services). All this diversity 
produces a range of interests and values which the MSs are obliged to protect, such 
as the protection of strategic public interest and public security. To accommodate 
                                                 
2
 Preamble to the Treaty of Rome 1957. 
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this ‘value diversity’, the Treaties provide for ‘a broad leeway to safeguard national 
interests’ (Lenaerts 2013: 29), allowing the MSs to avoid compliance with 
fundamental freedoms in order to protect legitimate interests. Consequently, as the 
EU strives for unity while acknowledging the existing national diversity, some 
‘misfit’ between existing European and national law is unavoidable. Simply put, 
non-compliance with EU law could to a certain extent be acceptable. However, too 
much diversity would undermine the aim of unity that underlies the Union 
(Howarth, Sadeh 2010: 922; Townley 2014: 3), so despite their profound diversity 
the MSs have voluntarily committed themselves to embrace the overarching aims of 
the Union and a core nucleus of shared values while striving for ‘ever closer’ unity. 
In order to resolve the conflict of national and EU interests and values, the 
MSs have delegated the task of monitoring and enforcing compliance with 
supranational law to the EU Commission (e.g. Moravcsik 1998; Pollack 2003; 
Tallberg 2002a). The Commission is the force committed to integration, pressing the 
MSs towards attaining the Union’s objectives of unity. The democratically elected 
governments of the MSs have substantial powers to bargain with the non-elected and 
sometimes bureaucratic Commission in its pursuit of ‘more Europe’ and not to 
conform to some of its compliance demands. In cases where MSs resist removing 
barriers, which damage the core nucleus of shared EU values, the Commission could 
employ the enforcement system provided for in Article 258 TFEU. The procedure of 
Article 258 TFEU is a lengthy multi-stage negotiation process, based on compliance 
bargaining, which basically aims to talk the erring MS into conformity by giving it 
sufficient time to reach a friendly, out-of-court settlement with the Commission and 
adjust national laws so that they are compatible with or ‘fit’ EU rules. Given that 
only around 10% of all infringement cases are referred to the CJEU,
3
 it could be 
maintained that generally MSs strive to comply in order to avoid facing the Court. 
When the hard cases of non-compliance reach the judicial stage of the procedure, the 
CJEU strives to accommodate diverse national interests as far as possible and, ‘in so 
far as there are no national measures producing a protectionist effect (or having 
protectionist intent)’, MSs enjoy broad discretion for the protection of national 
interests (e.g. Lenaerts 2013: 29). However, in the area of the core nucleus of shared 
EU values, the Court must ensure uniformity, and so the conflict between the MSs’ 
                                                 
3
 European Commission COM(2007) 502 final, ‘A Europe of Results – Applying Community Law’, 
5/9/2007, Brussels, p.4. 
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desire to protect national interests and the fundamental freedoms of the EU has 
usually been solved by the CJEU in favour of the latter (ibid). 
After the case is referred to the Court, formal compliance bargaining between 
the democratically elected government and the Commission generally comes to an 
end, yet it can continue in parallel to the judicial discourses (Panke 2010: 38). 
However, all the bargaining ceases once the condemning judgment is issued and the 
‘misfit’ confirmed, since the MS is legally bound to comply with the judgment and 
remedy the breach which has been upheld by the highest legal authority of the EU. 
The MSs’ general duty to comply is enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, the so-
called ‘loyalty to the EU’ or ‘sincere cooperation’ principle. Pursuant to Article 4(3) 
TEU the EU institutions and the MSs have to ‘assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaties[…] take any appropriate measure, general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or 
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union [and] refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.’4 The duty 
to comply with judgments of the CJEU is enshrined in Article 260(1) TFEU which 
states that MSs are explicitly obliged to take all the necessary measures and comply 
with binding judgments. The CJEU has no jurisdiction to oblige MSs to comply in 
any particular way or within a specified period of time,
5
 yet the MSs are obliged to 
initiate a compliance process immediately and comply fully as soon as possible.
6
 
Hence, the MSs have accepted that the EU legislation that furthers integration of the 
single market ‘could be passed against their will, and yet be binding upon them’ 
(Lenaerts 2013: 16). If, despite the compliance obligations and sincere cooperation 
principle, the breach is not promptly remedied following the judgment, the 
Commission’s last resort to ensure compliance is to initiate a second round of 
infringement procedure under Article 260 TFEU, which foresees the imposition of 
financial penalties for non-compliance with a judgment issued under the first round 
procedure of Article 258 TFEU. 
It is true that the CJEU’s judgments that identify a ‘misfit’ could hardly be 
sufficient to promote a wider domestic policy change single-handedly, particularly 
in cases where strong adaptation pressure is necessary to ensure compliance (ibid: 
                                                 
4
 Previously Article 10 TEC, Article 5 EEC Treaty. 
5
 Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxemburg [1996] ECR I-03207. 
6
 Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-05047, para.82; Case C-278/01 Commission v 
Spain [2003] ECR I-14141, para.27. 
17 
 
113; Conant 2002: 15; Graziano 2012; Panke 2010). The compliance pressures for 
greater change in domestic policy could come as a result of pressures from societal 
compliance proponents and interest groups which lead to reputational and electoral 
losses while also threatening to bring further legal actions in both national and EU 
courts (Börzel 2006; Panke 2010; Blauberger 2012). In addition, interested actors 
could foster policy change through the argumentative reframing of the relevant issue 
at stake (Panke 2010). In contrast to the actual dynamics of a greater change in 
domestic policy, a particular judgment addressed to the MS must formally be 
respected by the national government in its role of a voluntary signatory to the 
Treaty. 
Given the voluntary and democratic basis of EU membership, non-compliance 
with a binding judgment of the highest legal authority of the EU constitutes a 
manifest and grave disregard of the MSs’ supranational undertakings. Non-
compliance with the CJEU’s jurisprudence could undermine the credibility of the 
MSs’ commitments under the Treaty and the authority of the Court, weaken 
confidence in the EU and the credibility of the single market,
7
 and deprive citizens 
and entities of their rights,
8
 subsequently limiting the effect of the EU enforcement 
system while putting into question the effectiveness and overall aims of the Union 
(e.g. Mastenbroek 2003). In this light, non-compliance post-judgment could be seen 
as a ‘nuclear option’ (Blauberger 2012: 109) or as a crossing of the red line. 
In terms of compliance with GSs-related jurisprudence, a condemning 
judgment establishes why a particular GS is contrary to the Treaty. In its judgment, 
the CJEU confirms that such a protectionist measure, in its present form, is not 
suitable for the protection of the stated national interests and values. In this respect, 
the condemning GS judgment of the CJEU could be seen as limiting the unchecked 
diversity between national economic and societal traditions, forcing the MS to adapt 
and adjust accordingly for the sake of unity. Consequently, the supranational 
obligation to respect judgments of the highest legal authority of the EU would 
override the national interests claimed as justifications for an infringement of the 
Treaty. After the breach is judicially confirmed, the MS in question is liable for the 
infringement and is obliged to comply with the judgment even though the stated 
national interests and values could be undermined as a result of the removal of the 
                                                 
7
 European Commission (2010) ‘Internal market scoreboard’, December 2009, no.20, p.7. 
8




GS. At the same time, declamatory judgments remain silent on the precise limits of 
the GS, its form and application that could be deemed compatible with supranational 
obligations. The interpretation of the judgement is left for the MSs and national 
courts, so the domestic authorities themselves must ensure that the new GS ‘fits’ 
with EU rules. Consequently, to accommodate value diversity at national levels, 
MSs could test the limits of the legality of the GS by making incremental changes to 
the overruled measures in order to further protect legitimate interests. Simply put, as 
far as the scope of this study is concerned, value diversity and the MSs’ obligation to 
protect national interest matter solely because non-compliance could be seen as 
testing the acceptable level of diversity in individual GS cases. When implementing 
incremental changes that could result in ineffective post-judgment compliance, the 
MS might be seen as trying to test the limits of legality in order to see how far it can 
go in its national diversity. This study sets out to demonstrate, that while the MSs 
tend to avoid openly resorting to outright non-compliance, they could employ other 
hard-to-track non-compliance tactics instead. This study demonstrates that factual 
non-compliance could be masked by different post-judgment compliance strategies 
aimed at avoiding the full compliance or full ‘regulatory surrender’ so that the 
‘misfit’ would not cease to exist (Blauberger 2012: 111). 
Over the course of one and a half decades, the MSs and the EU Commission 
have not been able to agree on the legitimacy of national protectionist measures 
called Golden Shares, so they have locked horns in a long-running battle. GSs are 
barriers to the single market and restrict the fundamental freedoms of capital 
movement and establishment guaranteed by the Treaty.
9
 In brief, GSs are special 
type of nominal share, special arrangement or law that grants its holder special 
control rights in a company limited by shares. These special rights are not available 
to ordinary shareholders and are generally created and held by the government 
allowing it ‘to pursue interests which do not coincide with the economic interests of 
the company concerned’.10 Simply put, GSs seek to preserve the influence of the 
state in privatised companies. Essentially they give the MSs special powers which 
are similar to the powers of a blocking minority shareholder, such as the power to 
veto certain decisions of a directors’ board at extraordinary general meetings. 
                                                 
9
 Capital - Article 65 TFEU, Article 346 TFEU; Establishment - Articles 49 and 55 TFEU, see ANNEX 
I of this study, p.272. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J., C 83/47, 30/03/2010. 
New numbering of the Treaty Articles is used throughout this study. 
10
 Joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v Netherlands [2006] ECR I-9141, para.28. 
19 
 
Special rights reserved for the national authorities allow them to intervene in 
important decisions of the company, such as modifications to the company’s articles 
of association, appointment of directors onto the company’s boards, control over 
acquisitions or disposals of shareholdings which could lead to major restructuring 
operations and corporate actions like mergers and acquisition (M&As). Under 
general corporate law, such important decisions usually require a qualified majority 
or a super-majority of 75% of the share capital, meaning that a shareholding 
representing  25% or more of the share capital constitutes a blocking minority stake 
and its holder normally is a blocking minority shareholder (Ringe 2015: 407). 
Golden shares grant its holder influence and control which would be available to 
blocking minority shareholder. Therefore, even in instances of the full transfer of 
share ownership from public to private hands, definitive influence over such a 
company could still be executed through the use of GSs – and all this without having 
to pay for the blocking minority stakes in the company. The substance and a further 
definition of the GS concept will be further explored at a later stage of this 
introductory chapter.  
GSs measures could be justified within the exceptions provided in the Treaty 
or by the compelling requirements in the general public interest (in particular with 
reference to public policy, security and health). Over the years the Commission has 
treated GSs cases as a priority, confirming that GSs represent ‘substantial barriers to 
the smooth operation of the single market’11 and are ‘the most serious 
infringements’,12 they ‘present the greatest risks [and have] widespread impact for 
citizens and businesses’13 and are ‘crucially important from the standpoint of 
integration of the single market’.14 The significance of GSs lies in the fact that they 
are protectionist measures (which have a protectionist intent and effect) infringing 
the two fundamental freedoms of essential importance to the very existence of the 
Union that constitute part of the core nucleus of shared EU values. The battle to 
overturn GSs, which continues to this very day, has resulted in interest-driven 
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litigation seeking to overcome the political deadlock that has prevented further 
market liberalisation (Lenaerts 2013: 16). 
Beginning from the first judgment handed down in 2000, the Commission has 
an almost undefeated record in proving that GSs are contrary to the Treaty. The 
CJEU had assessed the legality of implementation, application and maintenance of 
GSs on eighteen
15
 occasions (sixteen judgments assessed the compatibility of GSs 
with the Treaty including one judgment that has been referred for preliminary 
ruling,
16
 plus one judgment on the application of GSs to block a cross-border 
takeover
17
 and one more judgment assessed an MS’s alleged non-compliance with a 
GS judgment
18
). The CJEU has confirmed that GSs could be justified by overriding 
public-interest grounds that aim to ensure that the public is not harmed. However, 
any such barriers must be reasonable and proportionate to the objectives pursued
19
 
and, as GS jurisprudence demonstrates, passing the established test is (almost) 
mission impossible. The infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, which 
assesses the compatibility of GSs with the Treaty, demonstrate that only in one 
instance out of sixteen were GSs found to be reasonable and proportionate. The 
CJEU has a final say on GS legality disputes, yet for GS jurisprudence to gain any 
practical importance, MSs are required to accept full legal responsibility for non-
compliance and to remedy the breach. 
GS-related case-law constitutes only a small fraction of the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence, yet it is a politically sensitive issue that raises a number of important 
questions concerning the division of powers between the EU and the MSs, as well as 
related to the overall direction of the Union. Abundant questions have been raised by 
scholars in relation to the GSs and by the relevant case-law. These questions include 
why GSs are incompatible with EU law (e.g.Grundmann, Möslein 2003; Hopt 2010) 
and whether the Court has verged too far in its definition of a ‘restriction’ (e.g. 
Gerner-Beuerle 2012; Biondi 2010; Sanders 2008; Sørensen 2004; Herschinger et al 
2011; Ringe 2011; Papadopaulos 2012). Other questions relate to whether GSs have 
a significant adverse economic impact on the operating performance of companies 
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or on investors and financial market integration.
20
 Others ask questions about the 
practical implications of GS rulings for the development of the fundamental freedom 
of capital movement, for the creation of a level playing field in European capital 
markets and for the European market for corporate control (Adolff 2002; 
Kronenberger 2003; Barnard 2010; Craig, de Búrca 2011; Hartkamp 2010). Another 
question raised is how these rulings affect ordinary shareholders’ rights related to 
the design of corporate statutes and what the social implications are (Saam, 
Zumbansen 2007). Questions are also posed about whether and how the ability of 
GSs to block cross-border capital movements affects the EU market for corporate 
control. A final question is about how GS case-law promotes economic integration 
and the convergence of national economic traditions (e.g.Streeck 2009; Schweiger 
2014) and why it challenges national co-ordinated market economies and whether 
and how it threatens industrial and electoral democracy (Dorussen, Nanou 2013; 
Komo, Villers 2009; Snell 2013). The questions are abundant and throughout this 
introduction a number of these contemporary and hotly discussed issues will be 
highlighted. However, these questions are raised only as subsidiary themes aiming 
to compliment the main thrust of the thesis. Given the number and breadth of 
questions that surround the GS issue and in order to avoid the danger of stretching 
the aims of this thesis, it is necessary to specify not only what this study is about but 
also what it is not about. 
The purpose of this study is neither to contest the desirability nor the legality 
of GSs. Despite the fact that GSs represent a significant hindrance to the effective 
operation of the single market and that in all GS-related cases these measures have 
been found to constitute barriers to fundamental freedoms and that all but one of 
these measures could not be justified, this study adopts the view that GSs are not 
illegal per se. The starting position, therefore, is to remain neutral on the desirability 
and legality of such measures. However, since this study concentrates solely on GS-
related case-law, the starting point is to acknowledge that the GSs which have been 
proven to be illegal by the CJEU represent judicially confirmed unjustified barriers 
to the fundamental freedoms. 
Likewise, the purpose of this research is neither to examine in depth the 
reasons behind the introduction of GSs nor to evaluate their possible impact on the 
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functioning of the single market and the EU market for corporate control. Similarly, 
discussions on and the associated problems of the convergence of the EU market for 
corporate control and on the gradual disintegration of the stakeholder-oriented co-
ordinated market economy model on the way towards a more liberal shareholder-
oriented model are beyond the scope of this study. The aim of this study is not to 
assess the wider social and corporate costs and benefits that may arise from the use 
of GSs or from their subsequent repeal. It is also beyond the scope of this study to 
address the question of how well the CJEU has balanced the relevant EU and 
national interests when ruling on the GS issue. Neither is this study about GS-related 
judgments since these rulings have been extensively covered in academic 
contributions (Adolff 2002; Lustig, Weil 2002; Sørensen 2004; Herschinger
 
et al 
2011). To some extent, such a high level of attention could be due to the vital 
importance and key position of strategic industries – which have been subject to GS 
protection – in national economies. 
It is true that such a unique level of public and academic attention
21
 could also 
be caused by the scale and volume of foreign direct investments (FDI) which were 
precluded by GSs. The problematics of these impeded transactions, the related legal 
disputes and the significant national public interests involved have been widely 
discussed by the press, the public, and politicians alike. This study also highlights 
some of the relevant points of the takeovers that have been directly or indirectly 
affected by GSs which became subject to enforcement proceedings. However, this 
study is neither about free movement of capital nor about cross-border M&As. Since 
this study is not about the economic impacts and outcomes of M&As, it remains 
neutral concerning the desirability for the establishment of an EU market for 
corporate control, while also acknowledging that the neoliberal model of a 
shareholder-oriented market economy and the associated level playing field which 
encourages M&As could have both negative and positive impacts on value 
creation.
22
 The subject of M&As, their desirability in the free market and their 
impact on value creation are discussed in more detail below. At this stage, it is 
necessary to emphasise that this study is not about M&As, yet it reveals that 
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reluctance to remove GSs could have a detrimental effect on capital movement, 
precluding transactions that would otherwise have gone through. After delineating 
the subjects that are not the primary concern of this thesis it is now necessary to 




2. The Aim of this Study and Research Question 
The CJEU has an almost undefeated record in proving that GSs are contrary to 
the Treaty. Such a pattern of success lies in synergy with the perception that the EU 
judicial and enforcement systems are effective in combating non-compliance (Beach 
2005; Panke 2010; Conant 1998; Conant 2002). It has been argued that ‘a judicially 
inspired rule of law is universally respected, widely obeyed, and largely contained’ 
(Conant 1998). A condemning GS judgment addressed to a particular MS would 
primarily oblige the respective government to refrain from the continued use of the 
incompatible provisions. Ideally, the spirit of continuous integration behind the 
‘ever-closer union’ maxim, coupled with the fundamental importance of loyalty to 
the EU principle, would also imply that the MS must not only promptly remedy the 
confirmed breach, but also refrain from maintaining any analogous GSs or 
implementing similar measures aimed at substituting the overruled provisions. 
Ideally, efficient post-judgment compliance would also trigger significant legal 
adaptations and policy reforms at national level, prompting the MS to review 
analogous GSs which have not yet become subject to infringement procedures, but 
which have the potential of being put under the Commission’s scrutiny in the future. 
What has been said above is an idealistic best case scenario of post-judgment 
behaviour which could qualify as ‘regulatory surrender’ or comprehensive 
compliance in good faith. Such scenario of comprehensive compliance with GSs-
related judgments would go in synergy with the recent policy studies which found 
that the judicially inspired EU law ‘triggers broader reforms at the national level’.23 
Likewise, since the core objective behind judicial policy-making is to generate wider 
understanding and consensus among the MSs, a number of consecutive and 
consistent judgments on analogous GSs would send a clear message to all MSs, 
cementing the EU institutions’ policy. Preferably, any such clear-cut enforcement 
policies and specific enforcement decisions aimed at developing the single market 
would prompt the MSs to ‘see the light’ and submit to significant policy changes in 
order to address the controversial GSs issue at stake. Consequently, in accordance 
with recent studies, following the CJEU’s judicial policy-making in the area of GSs, 
national governments should have shifted to substantial and comprehensive policy 
change in relation to these protectionist measures. Given the significance of 
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compliance obligations imposed on MSs by Article 4(3) TEU and Article 260(1) 
TFEU, coupled with the Union’s clear-cut position on the subject of GS 
protectionism, it seemed that these measures had no future in the EU. 
However, the years of legal battles and one sovereign debt crisis later, the 
Commission still sees GS protectionism as a significant challenge to the single 
market – which is ‘less popular than ever, more needed than ever’ (Monti 2010). 
The fact that GSs still remain a challenge reveals that the CJEU’s jurisprudence 
could have failed to trigger broader national reforms. This would be in line with the 
findings of an earlier study in which Conant argued that the condemning judgment 
does not guarantee compliance by itself (Conant 2002: 15) and that the MSs ‘could 
“contain” compliance by applying the [Court’s] rulings only to the immediate court 
cases while neglecting their broader policy implications’ (ibid: 32). The MSs’ desire 
to contain compliance could point to a minimalist compliance strategy which could 
be incomplete and allow for the possibility of creating further infringements. 
Therefore, minimalist compliance can easily get transformed into non-compliance 
which would make a GS an obstructionist measure of national protectionism. Hence, 
this study reflects on the questions raised by Conant: whether the CJEU can ensure 
compliance with unpopular judgments against the will of the MSs’ and whether MSs 
choose to comply with immediate judgments while neglecting their broader policy 
implications (ibid)? 
The Commission’s assessment of MSs compliance with GS jurisprudence 
could be seen as twofold, since right from the start of the battle to break down 
protectionist GSs the Commission has reported on the overall positive compliance 
trend. For example, the Commission has reported that the Italian government 
implemented sufficient compliance measures in 2001 to address the first GSs 
judgment of 2000.
24
 The infringement procedure was terminated, but, as this study 
will demonstrate, the very same GSs were retained post-judgment and in 2003 Italy 
faced infringement action for non-compliance under Article 260 TFEU. Over the 
years the Commission’s assessments of compliance with GS-related judgments have 
pointed to a comprehensive compliance trend, reporting that MSs do 
comprehensively comply and, as a result of these judgments, many other GSs have 
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 For example, it has been claimed that Italian GSs, which were 
found incompatible with the Treaty in the first GS judgment mentioned above, were 
successfully amended prior to the judgment and following this amendment were in 
conformity with the Treaty.
26
 However, the subsequent judgment of 2009
27
 on the 
amended version of Italian GSs featured in the 2000 judgment clearly demonstrates 
that the initial and subsequent compliance attempts were inadequate, making the 
infringement stretch on for almost a decade. Similarly, in 2005 the report
28
 prepared 
for the EU Commission provided that as a result of the CJEU’s judgment29 on 
Portuguese privatisation law C-367/98 (which allowed for creation of GSs), GSs in 
Portuguese companies were abolished. Nevertheless, this study reveals that the said 
judicial compliance instrument has not been effective in facilitating compliance and 
it is only following the application of the penalty instrument that the breach was 
finally remedied. The said judgment also could not preclude Portugal from resorting 
to the GS mechanism in the future, as the Court had to issue another three rulings on 
GS mechanisms which were based on the privatisation law.
30
 In 2005, the 
Commission services assessed the work carried out on the abolition of GSs across 
MSs by asserting that it has ‘cooperated successfully’ achieving ‘a good level of 
understanding’ on the issue, particularly with new MSs.31 Regarding such positive 
outlook on compliance trend in new MSs, it should be emphasised that GSs 
implemented for the most important and major companies remain intact to this day. 
Also in 2005, the Commission commented on the diminishing role of GSs, revealing 
that as a result of the CJEU’s judgments, overruled measures were repealed or 
significantly scaled down by the respective governments. However, the majority of 
infringement cases opened in 2006 still related to different kinds of GSs and, 
remarkably, the Commission reported on the increasing frequency of the 
implementation of GSs not only in the ‘classic’ area of strategic industries such as 
the energy sector, but also in companies operating in the financial sector.
32
 In a 
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similar vein, the Commission once again confirmed in 2007 that GSs represent a 
significant issue and the majority of infringement cases opened in that year related to 
GSs.
33
 In 2007 the Commission also reported on the increasing number of new GSs 
implemented in the energy sector. In 2009 the Commission reported that it had 
closed many GS cases, yet 40% of all infringement cases handled in that period 
related to GSs.
34
 In 2010 the Commission announced that ‘progress has been made 
in the sense that MSs concerned have announced or prepared legislative 
amendments which could possibly solve the outstanding issues’.35 In line with the 
above statement, on 24 June 2010 the Commission closed
36
 the infringement 
procedure against Italy in view of the amendment of the GSs overruled in the 2009 
judgment mentioned above. This fact implies that the Italian government 
comprehensively complied by amending the overruled GSs. Despite the 
announcement that the infringement procedure on the matter was closed on 24 June 
2010, the Commission issued a reasoned opinion on 16 February 2011 under the 
second round infringement procedure of Article 260 TFEU (European Commission 
IP/11/175). In 2010 almost half of the infringement cases on GSs were pending 
before the CJEU or became subject to Article 260 TFEU proceedings.
37
 In 2011 the 
Commission once again reiterated that GSs remain a priority and a significant 
concern, particularly due to the protectionist measures implemented in the context of 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
38
 In the same report in 2011, the Commission 
rather optimistically revealed its expectations that the GS issue would be finally 
resolved in 2011. However in the following years the CJEU handed down several 
other GS-related judgments
39
 which imply that the issue remains unsolved. 
At this point, it could be concluded that over the years the issue of GSs as 
barriers to capital movement has remained prominently on the Commission’s 
agenda,
40
 which proves that GSs are still a significant problem despite the judgments 
of the CJEU. Some outlawed GSs have prominently remained on the Commission’s 
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infringement agenda for years following the condemning judgments. In this light, 
the Commission’s initial assessment of the MS’s compliance has been rather 
optimistic,
41
 while successive infringements via amended provisions have proved 
that the initial compliance was inadequate. To this day, GSs are still widespread and 
new measures are being implemented,
42
 which raises the question of the 
effectiveness of the EU institutions’ agenda-setting abilities. This study aims to 
demonstrate whether the Commission’s positive assessment of post-judgment 
compliance was premature, since the very same GSs became subject to further 
enforcement action. Consequently, the Commission and some commentators (e.g. 
Benyon 2010: 113) could have undervalued the obstructionist force of the GSs. This 
supports the argument that even though ‘GSs constitute only a small fraction of legal 
obstacles which stand in the way of the creation of the EU-wide single market’ 
(Adolff 2002), they are truly significant and above all they are not ‘tarnished gold’ 
(Benyon 2010: 113) and the battle to overcome these significant barriers continues 
to this day. 
Both the EU Commission and academic literature agree that non-compliance 
with EU law remains a concern (Tallberg 2000; Mastenbroek 2003; Panke 2010; 
Stone Sweet 2010). However, it should be noted that as little as 10% of all the cases 
ruled by the CJEU face the penalty procedure threats under Article 260 TFEU, but 
as this study will show this ratio is almost as high as 80% when it comes to GS-
related judgements. It is a clear indication that GS-related judgements could trigger a 
very unique compliance behaviour, which has to be studied and evaluated on its 
own. In other words, the preliminary non-compliance pattern is evident (even if the 
trend is not wholly uniform) consequently, additional research is necessary to 
investigate factual compliance with significant policy-setting judgments, such as 
GSs. 
This study reflects on the persistent conflict and current debate on the EU and 
the MSs’ fundamentally different conceptions of the role of markets and the role of 
states in the public service sectors (e.g. Cremona (ed.) 2012; Schweitzer 2011). In 
doing so, it demonstrates whether the MSs are likely to meet the Court’s decisions 
on GSs with strong scepticism in cases where national interests are juxtaposed with 
                                                 
41
 European Commission, SWD (2005), supra note 25, p.13. 
42
 For example in 2008 Greece implemented GSs in Hellenic Telecommunication Organisation; see 
European Commission (IP/12/420). Also in 2008 Greece implemented GSs in ‘strategic companies’; 
these GSs were later overruled by the CJEU in Case C-244/11 Greece, note 39. 
29 
 
the pressures of the single market. The findings of this study will echo the words of 
former EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, stating that ‘the MSs may be 
reluctant to comply with condemning judgments of the CJEU on matters which are 
deemed to be solely under their authority’ (Monti 2010). This study aims to establish 
whether the political commitments to respect the rulings of the highest legal 
authority of the Union could override the desire to protect national interests, or 
whether a wide gap exists between commitments and actual implementation, or else 
between the obligation to comply and actual compliance when the matter concerns 
GSs. As this study argues, due to the significance of the conflicting interests 
involved, the tension between national and supranational interests and values might 
persist post-judgment. This study aims to reveal whether the MSs’ attempts to 
continue using overruled GSs in EU-compatible ways could constitute an effective 
compliance strategy or whether such compliance tactics inevitably give rise to non-
compliance and to the emergence of obstructionist protectionism. This study argues 
that the MSs could seek to further protect the stated public interest and limit or 
contain the effects of the GS rulings at national level. As a result, GS protectionism 
could remain in force despite condemning judgments, as MSs often resist full 
compliance or ‘regulatory surrender’ in several ways. First, GSs could be amended 
in a manner that retains the protectionist effect and thus a new dispute concerning 
the same provisions might arise in separate proceedings, which in turn reveals that 
MSs resorted to non-compliance with the original judgment. In this instance non-
compliance could be seen as a form of sanctioning (Tallberg 2000). Secondly, MSs 
could fail to embark on a wider policy change by keeping similar GSs intact or using 
new GSs in place of the overruled ones. Such compliance techniques could actually 
be seen as factual non-compliance with GS jurisprudence which could lead to 
obstructionist protectionism. 
The key thrust of the thesis is to discover the factual compliance situation for 
each GS-related judgment, revealing the effectiveness of the EU enforcement system 
when applied to sensitive subjects such as GSs. By engaging in careful process-
tracing, this study reveals whether the MSs could be seen to be acting in bad faith 
towards the sincere cooperation obligation principle enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU 
and towards the compliance obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU, and whether 
they could have gravely disregarded the limits of their discretion by maintaining 
GSs despite condemning judgments. This study assesses the connection between the 
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various factors and casual mechanisms which could help to recognise the conditions 
that promote compliance and to explain non-compliance with GS judgments. It also 
demonstrates why non-compliance with GS rulings stands out from other instances 
of non-compliance and how the effectiveness of the enforcement system could be 
improved. The analysed information on compliance processes in various MSs allows 
an exhaustive picture to be drawn of the practical application of GS-related 
judgments at national level. The aim of this study is to stimulate academic debate on 
the role of the Commission and the CJEU, with a specific focus on the post-
adjudicative phase and to draw attention to the non-compliance issue from the 
particular perspective of MSs’ practice in the area of GSs. 
To analyse post-judgment compliance with such a complex issue as GSs it is 
necessary to identify the possible reasons for obstructionist protectionism and non-
compliance. To reveal the reasons, it is first necessary to put GS judgments and the 
subsequent compliance obligation in the context of the EU single market. The 
following section aims to do this by setting the background against which the 
present study is going to unfold. This relates to a very complex scenario that 
interlinks conflicting values and interests at European and national levels, which in 
turn have prompted MSs to implement GSs and subsequently could lead to non-
compliance post-judgment. To illustrate the intricate issues which arise as a result of 
the conflicting values and interests, discussion on the aims of the Treaty will be 
contrasted to the obligation of the MSs to protect legitimate national interests and 
the subsequent compliance obligations undertaken by them. As a starting point, the 
following section reveals the predominantly neoliberal ideas behind the single 
market that aim to promote competition by diminishing the role of the state and 
increasing shareholder value. The idea behind the market will be contrasted to 
different traditions of state involvement in national economies. This discussion aims 
to reflect on the interplay between the current differences in the national economic 
traditions or varieties of capitalism (e.g. Crouch, Streeck 1997; Hall, Soskice 2001; 
Crouch 2005) and the ultimate ‘ever closer’ unity which compliance with the 
CJEU’s judgments promotes.  
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3. The Complex Scenario: Shared Pursuit for Unity and Single Market v Diversity of 
National Interests and Values 
From the onset the primary objective behind the EU’s inception and the core 
justification for European integration has been a creation of single market (e.g. 
Schweiger 2014: 23; Leibfried 2010: 245) which has developed into ‘the world’s 
most advanced and sophisticated multi-national project of economic integration’ 
(Howarth, Sadeh 2010). The EU has predominantly taken up the role of economic 
liberaliser, striving to free national markets by harmonisation of national laws, by 
promoting market incentive and by introducing competition into previously closed 
industries (such as energy production and distribution, telecoms, post and transport). 
To date the establishment of single market remains ‘a key parameter for the overall 
successes’ of the European project (Maletić 2013: 1). 
One of the most important policies behind the single market is liberalisation of 
capital movements which aims to promote growth by fostering both intra- and extra-
EU investment.
43
 The logic behind the single market foresees that uniform, linear 
liberalisation of national markets and industries from state control and intervention 
would create a level-playing field which would have a direct impact on behaviour of 
companies as they would have to become more shareholder-oriented and operate in 
a profit-seeking way, which in turn will increase competitiveness, reduce prices and 
increase choice for consumers (Clifton et al 2010: 991; Haar, Jones 2008: 2610).
44
 
The single market logic assumes that the MSs, as voluntary signatories to the 
Treaties, would have a stronger incentive for market liberalisation than for national 
protectionism. Following a single market logic restricting capital inflows or 
outflows is simply counterproductive, as this would deter potential capital injections 
into a country’s economy (inbound movement) while also inhibiting domestic 
companies’ ability to invest capital in new territories and to establish themselves in 
new markets (outbound movement). 
The MSs have committed to progressive integration and liberalisation of 
national markets in order to build an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’ to ensure the economic and social progress by elimination of barriers to 
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fundamental freedoms that stand on the way of single market. The obligation of 
compliance derives from the legally binding duty enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, 
which signifies that the very essence of the Union’s success rests on the MSs’ 
sincere willingness to respect the supremacy of the EU acquis communautaire, to 
cooperate and comply in good faith in order to achieve shared interest and values 
that would bring more liberalisation and unity. In this light, purposeful imposition of 
unjustified barriers that limit capital movement ‘could bring market integration to a 
standstill undermining the core aim behind the EU (Clifton et al 2010: 989). 
According to many financial economists, a truly single EU-wide market could 
be characterised by free movement of capital and establishment which would 
promote competitiveness through M&As by introducing the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
idea that stimulates companies to operate more efficiently. This liberal, market-
oriented idea is supported by a strand in the theoretical economics literature which 
sees cross-border M&As as an important and desirable element (e.g. Jensen 1988; 
Scharfstein 1988; Brealey, Myers 1991: 823; Gill 1995; Grabowski et al 1995; Haar, 
Jones 2008; Bernitz 2010: 192; Scweiger 2014: 23). This strand of literature accepts 
that the market for corporate control represents an important corporate governance 
device, since, if a company is badly managed and performs poorly, it is more likely 
to fail or become subject to a disciplinary takeover (e.g. Bethel et al 1998; Denis, 
Sarin 1999; Lambrecht, Myers 2007; Segall 1968; Kini et al 2004). Some empirical 
evidence suggests that the conditioning effects of a takeover may correct failure as a 
result of poor corporate governance (Shleifer, Vishny 1997; Heiss, Köke 2004; 
Powell 1997).
45
 However, one-dimensional thinking about M&As as a means of 
disciplining underachievers and as a means of promoting development and 
generating growth is too simplistic. 
Despite the perception that a truly free market would benefit European citizens 
and companies, the mechanisms of a market economy and regulatory competition 
cannot be taken for granted, as ‘markets do not necessarily generate superior 
outcomes’ (Hall, Soskice 2001: 65; also Crouch 2005: 6; Hopt 2010: 18). The 
second strand of literature suggests that M&As are not related to poor performance 
(e.g. Franks, Mayer 2001) and could also destroy value and undermine growth, 
while also causing loss in employment (Sandford et al 1980; Turok, Richardson 
1991). On balance, the argument here goes against the disciplinary motives behind 
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M&As, demonstrating that in the majority of cases target companies were not 
underperforming (e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe 2003). For example, a company could 
become the target of a takeover not because it is badly managed and performs 
poorly, but because the stock market has erred in setting share prices so low that an 
undervalued company becomes a lucrative takeover target (Scherer 1988: 72). 
Similarly, stock market valuation errors could overvalue some companies, allowing 
them to gain control of a company that is undervalued (ibid). 
Consequently, M&As are not necessarily welfare enhancing and it has long 
been accepted that unrestricted capital movements and the non-discriminatory 
treatment of domestic and foreign companies raise a number of substantial problems 
(Charny 1991; Chen et al 2002; Contractor et al 2003; Haar, Jones 2008; Mitchell et 
al 1994). The adverse effects of unchecked market-driven values and global 
convergence in corporate governance on society have been voiced, for example by 
Branson (2001). Branson argues that the irrelevance and impotence of the state in 
the economy could lead to an increase in economic imperialism, worker 
exploitation, degradation of the environment, and the possibility of the related 
‘plantation production’ problem (Branson 2001: 71). Likewise, the pure market 
could also be associated with short-termism rather than long-term enhancement, so it 
has been claimed that the market cannot by itself sustain economic dynamism (Gill 
1995; Crouch, Streeck 1997). Consequently, a number of authors emphasise the 
importance of state intervention in modern capitalist economies (Schweiger 2014). 
As Schweiger rightfully notes, MSs are responsible ‘for the overall well-being of 
their citizens’ and governments have to look beyond pure market interests (ibid: 9). 
This particularly applies to industries that provide services in the general interest, as 
the state has a crucial role to play as a provider and guarantor of the secure and 
continuous delivery of such services (ibid: 12). The important role of the state in the 
regulation of national economies has been strengthened by serious problems into 
which the single market has run as a result of the severe sovereign debt crisis. The 
crisis has revealed ‘[t]he limits to what the market can deliver’, also revealing that 
‘the single market is not yet […] rooted in mindsets’ (Monti 2010: 23). 
Following the above delineation of the positions taken by both pro- and 
contra-market camps, it is necessary to re-emphasise that this study is not about 
cross-border M&As and their costs or benefits. Opinions are divided on whether 
M&As are effective for welfare enhancement, and in reality only time will tell if a 
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particular transaction has been an overall success or not, if it has created value or is 
liable to destroy welfare. Consequently, an in-depth discussion of the arguments on 
each side is outside the scope of this study. The author does not lean towards any of 
the camps and approaches the subject from a legal perspective and not an economic 
one. At the same time, solely from the legal perspective, the author acknowledges 
that an illegitimate barrier to M&As is undesirable (especially if the illegitimacy has 
been confirmed by the CJEU). It is also worth mentioning that out of sixteen 
judgments (where the CJEU has assessed the legality of GS measures) only seven 
cases have actually involved M&A-related activities.
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The situation is further complicated by the fact that in the EU MSs operate 
under different national economic traditions: they follow different models of 
corporate governance and have different traditions of state involvement in their 
national economy. These differences show that for some MSs the liberalisation of 
capital movement and the embracing of shareholder value would be significantly 
easier to achieve than for others. For the purpose of this study, a distinction will be 
made between MSs with co-ordinated (or continental) market economies and MSs 
with liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) market economies. The economies of the latter MSs, 
as the name suggests, are traditionally more liberal towards the free movement of 
capital, accepting market-driven changes in the economy and favouring an open 
market and a vigorous competition policy (the UK). The approach of liberal MSs 
welcomes less state intervention in the economy and less stakeholder protection, 
with consumer welfare and shareholder value placed at the front and in the centre. In 
contrast, under the co-ordinated model of capitalism (such as that in Germany, the 
Netherlands and France) greater attention is paid to social concerns so that societal 
or stakeholder pressures could limit the rights of shareholders and influence 
managerial decision-making (Charny 1991: 439). Under the co-ordinated model, 
consumer and shareholder interests are co-ordinated with the interests of other 
stakeholders, such as employees, while ‘the enforcement of single market rules has 
not always been welcomed’ (Monti 2010: 28). This diversity in national models of 
capitalism, economies and industrial relations has determined the level of exposure 
to the mechanisms of a single market and of liberalisation (Burroni et al 2012: 3). 
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However, in both liberal and co-ordinated models of capitalism, the 
liberalisation of public service industries (such as energy, national airlines, 
telecommunications, transports and utilities) has been a sensitive topic, as these 
industries are usually under state monopoly and involve political and industrial 
issues that hardly concern other competitive industries (Boubakri et al 2009: 367; 
Burkart, Lee 2008: 38; Cocciolo, Padrós 2010). When the companies operating in 
public services are owned by the state, governments inevitably pursue wider 
industrial, social and political interests in accordance with domestic policies, and 
they were clearly expected to do so by the public (Hansen 2010: 177; Colli et al 
2014: 489; Burkart, Lee 2008: 38; Shleifer, Vishny 1994: 995). There has been 
persistent public hostility and political opposition to privatization and liberalisation 
of public service industries (Howarth, Sadeh 2010: 927). Firstly, it has been 
perceived that public services could and should only be provided by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and that there is no place for privatisation or liberalisation in 
these markets (ibid; Szyszczak 2007: 42). Government control of these companies 
was often associated with increased security that ensured economic growth, low 
unemployment rates and an improvement in labour welfare. Secondly, in contrast to 
the state-induced obligation to protect public interests, markets contain no inherently 
dominant and stable long-term economic interest to safeguard the same interests. Put 
simply, SOEs were often seen as curing market failures (but Shleifer, Vishny 1994: 
995), so from this perspective liberal ideas behind the single market could be seen as 
an undesirable real or perceived threat for industries that provide services in the 
general public interest. It could be concluded that the supranational undertaking to 
liberalise national markets and capital movement is not the only relevant value and 
interest the MSs are obliged to protect. Besides, there are a number of significant 
concerns surrounding the single market. 
However, despite the importance of state control over public service 
industries, the MSs voluntarily choose to sell their shares and privatise SOEs. This 
fact could signify that national governments could be seen to be voluntarily pursuing 
economic policies which bring ‘more market’ and shareholder value into their public 
service industries. Such economic policies might be seen to be pursuing the shared 
values and interests of the EU and the single market. Unfortunately this has not been 
the case, as ‘more market’ has not meant a ‘free market’: the MSs choose to protect 
strategic national interests and values from the shared interest and values of the EU 
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single market by violating the guarantees provided by the latter. The MSs 
implemented GSs to preserve their role as ‘guardians of citizens’ against the dangers 
of a ‘pure’ market on the expense of the free movement of capital. From the one 
point GSs which were created at the beginning of the privatisation process in order 
to provide a shield against hostile takeovers and to give the newly privatised 
companies some ‘breathing time’ (Clifton 2010: 999) to adjust to the market could 
be seen as a useful tool. It is certainly reasonable to protect companies that are of 
vital importance, as long as their competitiveness is not fully restored and regulation 
is weak (Bortolotti, Siniscalco 2004: 97). From this perspective, given the weight 
and number of interests and values involved, the MS would be reluctant to allow a 
company providing public services to become the subject of a hostile takeover, 
undesirable restructuring, considerable disposal of its assets, workforce or even 
bankruptcy. Therefore, in order to protect national interests and to address the EU’s 
pressures to liberalise, governments have sought to implement GSs as a form of a 
state ‘guarantee’ (Biondi 2010: 102). However, even though the MSs could have 
legitimate reasons in protecting their public policy or public security by means of 
GSs, these barriers to capital movement must be legally certain, reasonable and 
proportionate to the objectives pursued. 
Shortly put, GSs represent national protectionism in action, allowing the state, 
and not the shareholders or the free market to control the company, effectively 
shielding former SOEs from the full force of single market. Basically, GSs were the 
result of an unfair deal which allowed respective MSs to obtain revenues from 
selling SOEs without full disposal of control which such an asset disposal would 
normally assume. In this regard, the idea behind GSs corresponds to the legal maxim 
that ‘he who can do most can also do least’,47 so that a government could legally 
decide to sell its companies without relinquishing corresponding control. However, 
given that the same protectionist objectives could be achieved by the simple decision 
to retain a blocking minority stake of 25%, which would not encroach on the 
fundamental freedoms of the Treaty, GSs could be seen as ‘little more than an alibi’ 
for raising unjustified protectionist barriers (Bortolotti, Siniscalco 2004: 88). Given 
the availability of the said alternative, the challenge of GSs is not so much the desire 
and necessity to find the right balance between supranational and national interests, 
but, in the words of Rickford (2010: 54), rather just an ‘assertion of selfish interests 
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in defiance of market forces’ which aims to ‘insulate national markets from foreign 
competition, mainly in markets for capital and corporate control (often dressed up as 
social policy)’. Likewise, the numerous examples of takeovers which took place 
immediately following the privatisation of former SOEs demonstrate that the 
provision of public services in the general public interest has not been undermined 
by hostile takeovers, as water and gas have kept flowing, trains have continued to 
run, and no one has cut the electricity supply to the homes of citizens. The GS-
related jurisprudence has been successful in demonstrating that GSs are not suitable 
for protecting the stated national interests. 
After it confirmed that the MSs’ interventions into the operation of national 
industries by means of GSs are unlikely to be justified, the CJEU has been seen to 
be encroaching on the policy-making capacity of the MSs and their powers to 
regulate the economy. These powers were thought to be under the exclusive 
responsibility of the domestic authorities and now, following the GS rulings, these 
powers have been proven to be subject to the Treaty freedoms, shifting from the 
national towards the supranational level (e.g. Goldmann 2001; Sørensen 2004; 
Herschinger et al 2011; Martinsen 2011; Stone Sweet 2004). Consequently, more 
and more GS arrangements have been found to constitute unjustified barriers to free 
movement. The dominant neoliberal vision of the ‘ever closer’ maxim has inevitably 
triggered a further clash of interests at European and national levels. This clash of 
interests could have different levels of severity, since MS laws, practices and 
traditions differ. Likewise, in some MSs, governments and the public could show 
greater acceptance of and support for the single market and relevant policies since 
the EU and national rules and practices are more compatible than in other MSs 
where such a ‘fit’ is significantly lower. Put simply, the more a GS-related judgment 
by the CJEU already ‘fits’ the current legal, societal and industrial framework, the 
more likely it is that the MS will comprehensively comply (Börzel 2002; Panke 
2010). Therefore, it could be argued that for some MSs the adjustment pressures 
stemming from the market-promoting GS judgments would be higher than for 
others. In this respect, the GS case-law could be seen to be exerting significant 
pressure on the co-ordinated model of a market economy, pushing it further towards 
a more market-oriented liberal model. Therefore, the prospect of the increasing 
irrelevance of the national state in light of a GS-related judgment could be seen as 
“an attack on the states’ system of corporate governance and national sovereignty” 
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in MSs with a co-ordinated model of capitalism (Saam, Zumbansen 2007: 1044). In 
contrast, the liberal model of a market economy ‘fits’ the overarching supranational 
aims of capital market integration. Consequently, MSs characterised by the former 
model of a market economy could be expected to exert more resistance to 
compliance post-judgment than MSs characterised by the latter model. 
Essentially, as the EU is sustained by the MSs’ respect for the rule of law and 
due compliance, the liberal aims of the single market and the CJEU’s interpretation 
of the Treaties which has deepened integration and liberalisation could trigger non-
compliance post-judgment. Since MSs are giving ‘flesh and blood’ (Vervaele 1999: 
v) to the smooth operation of the single market, non-compliance with judgments of 
the CJEU aimed at the enforcement of the core single market principles could be 
seen as one of the most serious forms of non-compliance. Non-compliance with 
judgments on GS cases could be seen as particularly significant since the 
protectionist aims of these barriers could be effectively achieved by other legitimate 
means – for example by re-nationalising the blocking minority stake in the company 
that the MS wishes to protect. Failure to comply with GSs judgments would signify 
that the defending MSs are acting in bad faith towards obligations enshrined in the 
Treaty. To understand and predict non-compliance in relation to GS judgments, it is 
first necessary to understand how GS protectionism operates and to further comment 
on the reasons why they represent such a significant hindrance to cross-border 
investments and takeovers.  
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4. GSs as Control Enhancing Mechanisms and their Justifications 
The ordinary or common share represents part ownership of a company and 
carries one voting right per share, which assumes proportionality or the ‘one share-
one vote’ (OSOV) principle at its core. According to this principle, there should be a 
correlation between shareholders’ degree of economic risk/reward and the degree of 
control that they exercise over the company (Manne 1965). Even though the MSs 
generally accept the said principle by default (e.g. Ringe 2010: 222) and some have 
even formally adopted it to some extent,
48
 it is not mandatory. This implies that the 
proportionality principle does not impair the freedom of contracting, allowing 
shareholders to organise the company as they desire and separate ownership rights 
from control rights by implementing different types
49
 of shares (e.g. shares with 
multiple voting or special rights). Under general company law, such 
disproportionate shares or Control Enhancing Mechanisms (CEMs) are a recognised 
tool that shareholders are free (e.g. Bebchuk 1989: 1826) to use even if they are 
clearly intended to restrict cross-border investments and takeovers.
50
 GSs aim to 
separate property rights from control rights and they represent one of the most 
powerful and effective CEMs. 
Typical GSs could have the following structure: where direct influence was 
lost due to privatisation,
51
 special rights (such as the right to veto the usage and 
disposal of strategic assets and the right to appoint directors) were attached to a 
special GS and were generally created for the sole benefit of the state. Special rights 
were introduced by inserting special elements into companies’ statutes,52 or by 
adopting legislation that privatised a particular company,
53
 or by legislation that 
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applied exclusively to companies operating in certain markets,
54




The availability of GSs and other CEMs may lead to a situation where an 
investor who has acquired a majority of shares will not be able to exercise full 
control over the company, inhibiting on his rights of a majority shareholder. In order 
to facilitate takeover activity a ‘revolutionary’ (Hopt 2010: 20) break-through rule 
has been incorporated into Article 11 of the EU Takeover Directive: in cases when a 
bidder acquires 75% of the target company’s shares, deviations from the OSOV 
principle should be suspended so that the bidder will be able ‘to break-through’ 
defensive CEMs and assume full control over the target company. However the 
‘break-through’ rule would not apply in situations where the MS has legitimate 
special rights in the target company. Such an exception from ‘break-through’ rule 
refers to the possibility of resorting to GSs only if such GSs are compatible with the 
Treaty. 
The CJEU held that GSs could only be applied for the protection of non-
economic interests
56
 and they must be subject to effective judicial review. Even 
though the protection of general financial interests cannot justify GSs, in the recent 
ruling on Servatius
57
 case the CJEU declared that a macro-economic reasons could 
be considered and restriction on free movement of capital could be justified if there 
is a risk of ‘seriously undermining the financial balance of social policies’. 
However, the CJEU confirmed its settled case-law,
58
 maintaining that in order for 
such Treaty exceptions to have a legitimate standing, they have to meet 
exceptionally limited criteria and pass the legal certainty and proportionality test. In 
a nutshell, GSs could be justified only when the four-fold proportionality criterion 
set out in Gebhard
59
 is met: 
‘national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they 
must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing 
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the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what 
is necessary in order to attain it.’ 
On signing the Treaty the MSs agreed on the Treaty’s neutrality as regarding 
to public versus private ownership of companies: pursuant to Article 345 TFEU the 
‘Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in MSs governing the system of property 
ownership’. This could imply that MSs are free to create new systems of property 
ownership differentiating from solely private or public ownership systems. 
However, the CJEU has maintained that MSs could not plead their own systems of 
property ownership referred to in Article 345 TFEU, by way of justification for 
obstacles to fundamental freedoms, such as GSs.
60
 The CJEU established that the 
shareholder-state could not opt out from provisions of company law in the same way 
as private shareholder can: in cases when the state holds the special rights, they must 
be used in accordance with the principles of public law and not in accordance with 
private company law simply because the MS is a signatory to the Treaty.
61
 This is a 
crucial point which means that if a state acts as a market participant it cannot 
intervene by opting out of the rules of company law in the same way as a private 
shareholder can, implying that when the state is a shareholder it has to adhere to the 
OSOV principle (e.g. Shleifer 1998). As a result, private shareholders are generally 
free to legally implement and use special rights that deviate from the OSOV 
principle and resemble GSs. MSs are not free to resort to this method unless GSs are 
duly justified. 
The CJEU’s judicial creativity interpreting such politically sensitive issues as 
rules on national property ownership, coupled with integrationist approach to 
interpretation of what constitutes barriers could be met with strong opposition from 
the MSs and result in non-compliance post-judgment. Such resistance to full 
‘regulatory surrender’ could be explained by the MSs’ disapproval of the EU’s 
agenda-setting policy and the CJEU’s interpretative case-law in relation to GSs. The 
CJEU’s unwillingness to accept Article 345 TFEU as basis for GSs’ legality could 
be seen as precluding the MSs from resorting to measures on which they have 
expressly agreed. Consequently, the MSs could resist compliance in trying to limit 
creativity of the CJEU by resorting to sanctioning through non-compliance. 
This study argues that non-compliance with Treaty provisions by 
implementation of GSs is often a result of deliberate policy choices by the MS to 
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maintain the ‘untouchable status’ of the company at issue. Therefore, the MSs could 
be inclined to contain the effects of GSs judgments. At this point, it is necessary to 
comment on the possible outcomes of compliance strategies employed by the MSs 
in relation to GS cases. First, the CJEU’s judgment on the GSs would not make all 
of these measures inapplicable, for which there are several reasons. Since GSs could 
have a legitimate standing, the Commission has to assess the legality of such 
measures on a case-by-case basis, initiating direct enforcement of the Treaty rules. 
In this respect, a harmonised approach to GS cases is unsuitable. As a result, every 
case on GSs leads to infringement proceedings concerning very specific provisions 
and their application. Given that the Court has so far found one case of GSs to be 
justified, it is clear that one cannot say that all GSs are illegal – it depends on the 
circumstances of each particular case. Also regarding compliance with the rulings, 
the Court has consistently held that ‘the incompatibility of national legislation with 
[…] [EU’s] provisions, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally 
remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature which have the 
same legal force as those which must be amended.’62 This implies that overruled 
GSs could only be validated by adequate national law that would amend or repeal 
them. 
Secondly, since the CJEU established that some GSs could have a legitimate 
reasoning but lack on legal certainty or proportionality, the MSs might be tempted to 
try and pass the legal certainty and proportionality test following the judgment. 
Theoretically, in this case, the way in which the law is applied could be amended, 
potentially making a GS, even an overruled one, a justified measure. However, here 
it is pertinent to emphasise that the erring MS is given sufficient time to comply on 
its own initiative at the pre-judicial stage of the infringement procedure under 
Article 258 TFEU. Consequently, since the MSs generally strive to avoid referral to 
the CJEU, they would choose to comply in good faith and adjust national laws so 
they would satisfy the general principles of proportionality and certainty if at all 
possible. However, legal certainty and proportionality test is very difficult to pass 
otherwise the MSs would have long amended their GSs without the necessity to 
enter the legislative battle with the EU Commission. Therefore there could be two 
outcomes of the compliance ‘by amendment’ strategy: one that is effective in 
facilitating post-judgment compliance and another that is insufficient. Following the 
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amendment, the GSs would either: (a) provide for significantly less protection as 
proportionality and legal certainty increases, or (b) they would retain the same 
amount of protectionist powers while significantly improving legal certainty. The 
former compliance ‘by amendment’ strategy could be potentially acceptable for 
effective post-judgment compliance. However, such strategy is undesirable for the 
MSs as they seek to retain the effective protection which equals to the level of the 
blocking minority shareholder, hence any protection that is less powerful would 
generally fail to guarantee the stated aims of public policy protection. The latter 
compliance ‘by amendment’ strategy is unacceptable for guaranteeing the effective 
compliance with the judgment, since the same amount of the protectionist powers 
would generally go beyond to what is necessary for the attainment of the objectives 
pursued. As a result, if the GSs have not been amended prior to the judicial stage of 
the infringement proceedings this could generally imply that the contested measures 
cannot be adequately adjusted, so they have to be repealed in their entirety. If, 
following the judgment, MSs attempt to comply by amending GSs it could lead to 
insufficient, or minimalist adjustments that are likely to be insufficient to eliminate 
unjustified impediment to capital movement. Hence, compliance ‘by amendment’ 
strategy is unlikely to facilitate effective compliance with GS judgments (otherwise 
the breach would be remedied before the judgment). 
It is pertinent to emphasise that compliance could easily be achieved by re-
nationalization of a blocking minority stake, which under the EU law and general 
company law would allow for effective protection of the stated public policy 
considerations and other national and societal values. Given the availability of the 
alternative solution for satisfying both obligations stemming from the EU law and 
national interests non-compliance with judicially approved infringement in GSs 
cases is a grave misconduct that could be seen as crossing the red line. 
Unwillingness to completely remove GSs following the condemning judgments 
could mean that for some MSs violation of the EU law is not as important and 
significant, as the decision to re-purchase the 25% of the strategically important 
company stakes.  
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5. The Puzzle and Current Studies 
The majority of hard non-compliance cases referred to the CJEU under 
Articles 258/260 TFEU relate to late or incorrect transposition and application of 
secondary law, while infringements for direct violation of fundamental freedoms, in 
particular the free movement of capital, are relatively rare.
63
 Similarly, it could be 
assumed that MSs generally conform to the Treaty provisions on capital movement 
so there should be only few hard non-compliance cases that end up at the CJEU and 
consequently non-compliance with judgments aimed at enforcement of this core 
single market freedom should not be of particular concern or prominence. In order to 
support the argument on the suggested significance of the non-compliance situation 
in relation to GSs, it is necessary to make a distinction between overall non-
compliance trends and non-compliance with the GSs jurisprudence. 
It is necessary to emphasise that non-compliance with GS-related judgments 
must be assessed in relation to the significance of the post-judgment compliance 
obligations imposed on erring MSs pursuant to Article 260(1) TFEU when coupled 
with the frequency of second referrals under Article 260 TFEU. Here, it suffices to 
emphasise that as few as 10% of all the cases ruled on by the CJEU face penalty 
procedure threats under Article 260 TFEU (e.g. Panke 2010). Over the years, around 
90% of all cases referred to the CJEU under the second round proceedings 
concerned non-compliance with judgments on late/incorrect implementation or 
application of the EU directives on environmental or social affairs, while cases for 
direct violation of fundamental freedom of capital movement through the 
maintenance of unjustified national barriers are exceptionally rare. This fact is 
significant since it reveals that the Commission has hardly ever used this 
enforcement weapon to bend disobedient MSs to comply with judgments on free 
movement of capital and remove the imposed barriers. However, a striking majority 
of judgments on barriers to capital movement that do proceed to second round 
penalty procedure relate to GSs. 
This leads to the fact supporting the argument on the suggested significance of 
the non-compliance situation with GS-related judgments: out of a total of fifteen 
condemning judgments on GSs issued pursuant to the general infringement 
proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, in twelve cases the Commission resorted to 
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penalty threats under a second round infringement proceedings of Article 260 
TFEU. Given that the complimentary enforcement action is only applied in cases of 
severe non-compliance which constitute about one-tenth of all CJEU judgments, 
non-compliance with GS rulings stands out as one of the most obstructionist cases of 
non-compliance. Therefore, when compared to other judgments on capital 
movement, GS case-law accounts for the largest percentage of infringement actions 
under the penalty procedure. The above facts suggest that despite the Union’s 
success in overturning GSs, there is a significant deficit in compliance with CJEU’s 
judgments nonetheless. 
Much of the current academic research is concentrated on the effectiveness of 
a combined compliance approach (management and enforcement) used by the 
European system (Börzel et al 2010; Tallberg 2002). Here, enforcement assumes 
that MSs violate law voluntarily, because they are not willing to bear the costs of 
compliance, while the management approach accepts that MSs ‘are generally willing 
to comply with the law of the […] [EU] but lack the capacity’ (Börzel 2003: 199; 
but Börzel 2001: 804), suggesting that the lack of the Member States’ compliance 
with the EU law was not attributed to the lack of willingness or capacity to comply.  
The procedure of Article 258 TFEU, which stretches on for many months, 
leaves the MS with a number of opportunities to comply. However, this study will 
demonstrate whether a MS could successfully stretch the infringement procedure 
and play the enforcement system when it is determined to delay compliance. As a 
result, even when the GSs are outlawed they may still remain in place, resulting in 
obstructionist protectionism that is in direct violation of sincere cooperation 
obligation. 
The lengthy compliance bargaining during the infringement procedure is 
favourable for the MS in several aspects. Firstly, the GSs continue to serve their 
protectionist purpose, effectively shielding strategic companies from cross-border 
takeovers. Some of the GS cases have had significant implications for major cross-
border deals which were pending at the time of infringement procedures. Here it is 
pertinent to emphasise that in cases where the infringement procedure of Article 258 
TFEU seeks to overturn protectionist barriers which directly impede particular 
takeovers, the procedure is unacceptably long. A potential takeover is a very time-
sensitive issue, so protectionist GSs implemented to thwart particular takeovers 
could effectively frustrate them, and thus the infringement action would be seen to 
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be acting too late to be effective. This study demonstrates whether the enforcement 
system of Articles 258 and 260 TFEU are ill-suited to accommodate the issue of 
GSs, particularly when the matter concerns a pending cross-border deal. 
Specifically, this study predicts a higher degree of non-compliance when an 
undesirable takeover is a real threat, so the MS’s government would obstinately 
resist compliance with a condemning judgment and could willingly choose to 
proceed to the second round of infringement procedure and face penalty threats only 
to ensure that the undesired takeover collapses. No corporate action would survive 
such long-lasting processes, which aids the GSs in serving their purpose. 
In a similar vein, the application of contested GS measures by the national 
authorities in order to block a pending cross-border deal, despite the Commission’s 
expressed or implied warnings, would suggest that the respective MS would most 
likely resort to non-compliance following the judgment. Such disregard of both the 
Commission’s warnings and the ongoing enforcement action would signify explicit 
bad faith of the MS. Also, as predicted by the hypotheses developed in this study, if 
the MS implements similar measures to substitute those that are subject to the 
infringement proceedings it will be seen to be acting in an obstructionist manner and 
in explicit bad faith towards compliance obligations. Here, it should be emphasised 
that in cases where the MS employs existing (not yet overruled) GSs in order to 
frustrate a cross-border deal, such conduct would be seen as a grave infringement. 
However, in cases where the MS chooses to implement and employ new GSs in 
order to substitute those already under the Commission’s scrutiny, such conduct 
would be seen to be even more dire. The fact of implementation of new GSs or the 
use of existing measures to block a cross-border takeover deal would clearly 
demonstrate that the respective MS obtained a financial/competitive advantage from 
the breach, which is a sign of a very severe disregard of compliance obligations and 
disrespect of the core EU principles and aims. Such a state of play could prompt the 
Commission into proactive action, as there could be complaints from the involved 
companies because the measures in question hinder the particular cross-border deal. 
It would confirm that complaints about GSs (from citizens, companies or 
organizations) are more likely to be initiated by companies or investors that are 
interested in pursuing an acquisition of a company that is protected by such 
provisions. Supporting this statement, Sjafjell (2009: 6) rightfully notes that ‘nothing 
in the business world brings latent conflicts of interest to a head and reveals 
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structural, systemic, cultural and political variations between jurisdictions like a 
cross-border takeover attempt’. It follows that a potential takeover or a merger 
could be seen as a trigger for accelerating tensions and dissatisfactions within the 
company that is controlled by the MS through GSs, as shareholders of the target 
company could be economically attracted to such corporate action (incoming 
capital). Complaints on GSs, either from the target company itself or from potential 
investors, would prompt the Commission to pro-actively address the issue by 
employing the general enforcement instrument of Article 258 TFEU. 
Secondly, the lengthy procedure of Article 258 TFEU is favourable for the MS 
since it is left to choose whether to comply at its own initiative or to postpone 
compliance until the binding judgment. Ideally, post-judgment, the tables are turned, 
as after the infringement has been confirmed the Commission will have gained an 
advantage in the sense that the MSs are now condemned and bound to comply 
sooner or later (Tallberg, Jönsson 2001: 16). However, this study demonstrates that 
when GSs are at stake, the advantage of the MS over the Commission could persist. 
Moreover, during the proceedings, the MS has sufficient time to investigate the 
compliance issue and find ways to recast its laws in a manner that would lead only 
to minimalist compliance. This situation could be established in cases where the 
application of GSs is proven to be illegal, yet the enabling law itself does not 
infringe the Treaty. In this instance, the national government would be left with a 
wide discretion on how to change its GSs, and they could be changed in a manner 
that avoids full compliance, so the MS shifts to minimalist compliance which could 
eventually lead to obstructionist non-compliance. The MS would not fail to take 
immediate action if it duly initiated the re-drafting of the national law; on the other 
hand, this legislative action could involve unnecessary procrastination. In cases 
where the action has been initiated but the progress is unsatisfactory or the 
legislative outcome of this action is insufficient and continues to employ GSs, the 
MS might be seen to be acting in bad faith towards the Treaty. The MSs’ 
governments seem rather willing to test the strict justification criteria and eventually 
alter the GSs, expecting that the amendments will pass the subsequent justification 
tests. Furthermore, enforcement mechanisms would not appear to be sufficiently 
credible to deter the strategic behaviour of disobedient MSs, in cases where the 
government retains similar GSs, not yet overruled by the CJEU. 
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Time could also be a decisive factor in evaluating whether the MS has 
cooperated in good faith in trying to resolve the infringement. It could be argued that 
the initial unwillingness to cooperate or the shift to comprehensive compliance 
could be detected during all three stages of the infringement procedure. This study 
employs ‘compliance as process’ perspective (Panke 2010: 849), assessing the 
behaviour of MSs during the entirety of the infringement procedure, analysing any 
implied or expressed inclination to sincerely cooperate and comply in good faith. 
The MS’s behaviour, such as statements, compliance initiatives or non-action at the 
pre-judicial stage, at the hearing and at post-judgement stage, will be assessed. In 
this regard, it could be hypothesised that in cases where the MS replies with delay or 
altogether fails to reply to the Commission’s official ‘warnings’ (formal letter and 
reasoned opinion), it could be assumed that the MS moves towards non-compliance. 
In a similar vein, if the MS challenges the Commission’s application merely on its 
incompleteness or pleads its inadmissibility on vague or unsubstantiated grounds, it 
would point towards a desire to resist compliance and protect GSs by any means 
possible. Such conduct would imply that the MS resists cooperation in good faith, 
acting contrary to the obligations imposed by the Treaty. Additionally, if during the 
judicial stage of the infringement proceedings the MSs continuously argue at cross 
purposes with the Commission, never reaching an agreement on the legality of the 
GSs, this could imply that the relevant government was heading towards non-
compliance. Yet we have found only limited support for the above predictions, since 
in some cases MSs have engaged in expressly ‘co-operative’ discourse at all stages 
of the infringement procedure, while still failing to comply in good faith. However, 
in some cases the MS has continuously failed to reply to correspondence, yet has 
consequently shifted into comprehensive (yet delayed) compliance. 
The management approach which is occupied with improving the capacity of 
the MSs to comply is seen to be ineffective when dealing with GSs because non-
compliance in this instance is deemed voluntary, and there is no genuine willingness 
to comply by fully removing GSs. To demonstrate this initial absence of an 
inclination to comply fully, it is pertinent to distinguish obstructionist non-
compliance involving GS-related cases from other non-compliance cases referred to 
the CJEU under Article 260 TFEU. As mentioned before, the majority of cases 
referred to the CJEU under the penalty proceedings relate to the late implementation 
or incorrect transposition of the EU’s secondary law, namely directives. In relative 
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terms, this kind of non-compliance could be harder to resolve since it requires the 
MS to correctly transpose the directives, which at times could be achieved only 
through expansive legislative reforms of the existing national measures. In such 
cases, the MS is obliged to legislate in order to comprehensively comply. Firstly, the 
breach here is harder to repair as not only correct transposition is required, but also 
factual technical adjustments. Secondly, given that the wording of some of the 
directives could be obscure and imprecise, prompt and comprehensive compliance 
would be harder to achieve. Lastly, when it comes to compliance with judgments on 
secondary law, the MSs are not only obliged to correctly transpose such measures in 
order to comply in good faith, but also to ensure that the implemented rule is duly 
obeyed and correctly applied at the national level. For example, in relation to cases 
on incorrect application of EU’s environmental law, the national compliance 
measures would often require for long-term and complex adjustments on the 
ground.
64
 With GS judgments, it is different, since the MS is the only subject that is 
responsible to comply and to stop the infringement by taking all the necessary steps. 
Consequently, compliance with judgments on incorrect transposition by simple 
repeal is not suitable, whereas it could be practised with GSs-related judgments. In 
the case of compliance with GS-related judgments, the MSs are not obliged to 
correctly implement any particular EU secondary law and all that is required is to 
repeal GSs. In the case of GS-related judgments, the legislative adjustments which 
have to be initiated at the national level in order to achieve compliance are of a 
purely documentary nature only. In the case of GS-related judgments, compliance 
could be achieved swiftly. Therefore, since the Commission sets the ultimate 
compliance deadline for all judgments at twelve months, this study envisages that 
full compliance with GS-related judgments must be anticipated within six months. 
However, according to Martinsen (2011: 945), judgments ‘clearly provide 
more room for interpretation when national executives are to implement the 
supranational case-law than when implementing secondary legislation’. Following 
this thread of argument it could be claimed that when it comes to compliance with 
GS rulings, MSs would have more opportunities to avoid full repeal while trying to 
exploit possible justifications by further amendments. However, this study questions 
this statement by emphasising that when it comes to compliance with GSs, national 
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positions are indefensible due to the following reasons. Despite the uncertainty in 
interpreting the scope of any particular GS-case, the link between the protectionist 
measures and the infringement is reasonably clearly established, which signifies that 
state-driven protectionist laws have to be considerably amended/repealed or 
removed from the statutes of the company concerned. It is important to emphasise 
that in comparison to other cases which can result in obstructionist non-compliance, 
GS cases stand out as being legally complex, politically sensitive and requiring 
significant effort and resources both from the defendant and the Commission.
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Current theories of compliance with EU law generally assume that MSs 
comply with the Court’s judgments when the net benefits of compliance exceed the 
net benefits of non-compliance. From this point of view, non-compliance could be 
prevented by increasing the costs of non-compliance (Panke 2010: 23), and these 
costs could be increased by mobilising social and political pressure, as well as by 
increasing the publicity of the case and shaming
 
the offending MS (Tallberg, 
Jönsson 2001: 18). The level of publicity and the visibility of a case are claimed to 
be two of the factors that directly influence the possibility of compliance (ibid). 
National constituencies and other state and societal actors can encourage their 
governments into compliance from below via shaming (Panke 2010: 8; Conant 
1998, 2002). In addition, the price for non-compliance could be considerable for the 
MSs in much publicised cases that reach the headlines, as ‘governments generally 
do not like to have their sins trumpeted on the front pages’ (Beach 2005: 12). It is 
claimed that the joint effect of these factors could also increase the reputational 
costs. A number of scholarly contributions agreed that pressures from organised 
groups and institutions contribute to judicial policy impact in the EU (Alter 2001; 
Alter, Meunier-Aitshalia 1994: 535; Alter, Vargas 2000: 452; Conant 1998, 2002). 
However, as Conant (ibid) acknowledges, political mobilization on national level is 
only sometimes effective to facilitate compliance. Given that GS-related cases 
receive rather unique publicity and concern intense interests and values, it could be 
assumed that GS jurisprudence could increase social and political pressure to 
comply, as well as create considerable reputational losses in an event of shirking. 
However, this study provides the supporting analysis of motives for non-compliance 
and claims that when it comes to GSs protectionism the public and government 
could be strongly opposed to the Courts’ judgment and the MSs are likely to resort 
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to procrastination and inaction leading to non-compliance. Consequently, this study 
envisages that in GS-related cases the self-interest compliance would seem not to be 
an option, as compliance with GS judgments not only costs power and money, but 
could also imply high electoral losses and political resistance to compliance. This 
would support the claim made by Conant (1998) that reactions from national 
authorities, companies, organisations, and citizens could restrict the application of 
the CJEU’s judgments. Consequently, it could be predicted that shaming campaigns 
are less likely to occur in GS-related cases, since the broad public is generally 
opposed to removing GSs and sides with the national government. Therefore, it 
could be claimed that the enforcement of compliance via shaming does not apply to 
GSs; on the contrary, governments could be strongly opposed to repealing GSs to 
avoid electoral losses. The MSs could be keen to avoid electoral punishment, as 
major national companies are also major employers and all those employees are 
voters. The voters’ preferences over desirability of GSs mechanism could influence 
voting behaviour in national elections and since general public could be strongly 
opposed to GSs removal, they can express their interests regarding these policies 
and attempt to influence related political decisions (Gabel 2000: 55). The employees 
and the organised interest pressure groups may be opposed to the idea of their 
company being unprotected by government GSs and any threat of a subsequent 
hostile cross-border takeover could undermine the security of employment and 
social benefits of the employees. In such cases, to please both the voters and the 
Commission the MS’s government could choose to shift to minimalist compliance 
by not repealing the GS measures but marginally amending them. Such an outcome 
could be expected particularly when upcoming elections are due. In this view, the 
increase of social and political pressure would not lead to the desired effect of 
increasing the chances of compliance, as the politicians and public would oppose 
full compliance with judgment. This study reveals that the ‘visibility’ prerequisite is 
of little relevance in ensuring compliance. Even though GS-related cases are highly 
publicised and stirred by discussions in leading European economic and legal 
publications, this does not preclude the MSs from resorting to non-compliance in the 
post-adjudicative phase, once the waters are calm again. Likewise, the prerequisite 
for ‘direct compliance/non-compliance’ also plays little role in facilitating 
compliance, as the MSs are left with wide discretion on the necessary compliance 
measures which could often be minimalist. In contrast, in cases where the 
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proceedings and the judgment under Article 258 TFEU resonate well with the on-
going political and economic reforms regarding existing GSs, we would expect 
prompt and effective post-judgment compliance. 
Some authors (Wasserfallen 2010: 1228) empirically show that the CJEU is 
taking up the leading role in policy-making an it is successfully promote distinct 
policy outcomes and shape new legislation ‘that would not have been in the zone of 
possible agreement without judicial activism’. Overall the CJEU enjoys a strong 
support within the academic community. However, current compliance studies 
largely fail to demonstrate if, and under what conditions, the EU’s compliance 
system and judicial policy-making would prompt the MSs to comply by embarking 
on policy changes at national level. For example Krämer (1993) revealed growing 
trend of non-compliance with environmental judgments. Several recent studies 
aimed to address the identified gap by studying instances in which MSs did not 
comply immediately (Panke 2007, 2010). Two studies by Panke (ibid) provide 
analysis of the scope conditions for the success of the enforcement system when 
applied to German and the UK cases on legal transposition of a social policy and 
environmental directives. In the latter study, Panke applied qualitative methods in 
order to empirically test the effectiveness of thee compliance instruments (namely 
judicial discourses, judgments and sanction threats) in eight cases (four in each of 
the policy fields). Panke developed a fine-grained theoretical approach focusing on 
the interplay between the CJEU’s and domestic politics demonstrating that in 
majority of cases MSs complied as a result of application of two compliance 
instruments (judicial discourses and judgments). Even though Panke’s research has 
been nation- and issue-specific the case choice could be seen as eclectic spreading 
across two different policy fields. However Panke’s findings could not generalise 
the effectiveness of the enforcement system in other policy-areas, such as free 
movement of capital in single market. By narrowing this study to one policy area 
while encompassing all the existing case-law on the GSs issues this study aims to 
draw a distinctively different picture associated with compliance. Essentially, this 
study uses the research approach similar to Panke exploring the question of 
effectiveness of enforcement system across all judgments on GSs in eight MSs. 
Management and enforcement theories assume that judgments are effective as soon 
as they are applied. This study challenges this assumption. 
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6. Issue-related Factors, Research Hypotheses and Design 
In order to assess the compliance conduct of each individual MS and to 
measure the extent to which each particular MS has respected obligations enshrined 
in the Treaty, this study developed a set of hypotheses. These hypotheses will be 
applied to each individual MS in question in order to assess the compliance conduct 
in each particular GS case. The hypothetical structure represents an assessment 
prism which would allow arriving at conclusions on compliance strategies and their 
effectiveness. The set hypothetical structure does not, in a way, tell us something 
about the bigger picture, neither is it used as an overall theme of this study. These 
hypotheses could only be used in a combination with the author’s discretionary 
reading of reality. 
This study considers three main and one supportive hypothesis on 
effectiveness of the enforcement system when applied to GSs-related case-law. The 
first hypothesis on enforcement effectiveness (H1) (which is also an obstructionist 
non-compliance hypothesis) states: The first round enforcement procedure under 
Article 258 TFEU is a particularly weak compliance mechanism when applied to 
GSs, so MSs resort to obstructionist non-compliance and breaches of EU law could 
persist after the condemning judgment. The hypothesis is confirmed, if following the 
judgment, the respective MS fails to promptly comply and the Commission had to 
initiate second round of infringement proceedings under Article 260 TFEU. This 
situation would signify that the MS resorts to unnecessary procrastinations, therefore 
causing obstructionist protectionism and non-compliance which could stretch on for 
years before the breach is remedied. In contrast, the hypothesis would be falsified if, 
during the course of the first round enforcement procedure, the MS’s government 
comprehensively complies within six months following a judgment. In its recent 
Annual Report,
66
 the Commission established that full compliance with the CJEU’s 
judgment must be achieved within twelve months. As will be explained in section 
5.1 of this Introduction, due to the specificity (and perceived simplicity) of the 
compliance obligations stemming from GS-related judgments, this study limits the 
ultimate compliance threshold to six months. In cases where full compliance is 
achieved within twelve months, the hypothesis on the effectiveness of the 
enforcement mechanism under Article 258 TFEU will be partially confirmed. If 
compliance is achieved after the twelve-month period, the MS would be seen to be 
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engaging in unnecessary procrastinations, so acting in bad faith, undermining the 
effectiveness of the said enforcement instrument. If the said core enforcement 
effectiveness hypothesis holds, this leads to the supporting hypothesis on the 
effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) which states: The governments are not 
willing to withdraw from the use of GSs, so the measures would retain their 
protectionist force even after they were amended/partially repealed as a result of the 
ongoing judicial proceedings or as a result of the judgment. This hypothesis is 
confirmed in cases where pre- or post-judgment compliance initiatives were of a 
minimalist nature, inadequate or incomplete. If the core effectiveness hypothesis 
holds, it points to a major puzzle comparable to one identified by Harker (2007) 
that: “[Member States’ governments are willing to weigh in the balance the adverse 
political consequences of a foreign acquisition against the cost of being held to 
account before the Court for an infraction of EU law several years in the future” 
(Harker 2007: 534). If the core enforcement effectiveness hypothesis holds, it also 
casts a shadow on the effectiveness of the infringement proceedings under Article 
260 TFEU, raising the question of whether it is successful in facilitating compliance 
with GS-related judgments. 
In 2010, a decade following the first condemning judgment on GSs, the 
majority (about 60%) of the total number of cases opened under second round 
infringement proceedings related to disrespect of the CJEU’s first round judgments 
on GSs.
67
 The above fact leads to the second enforcement effectiveness hypothesis 
(H2) which states: The second round infringement proceedings and associated 
penalty threats could fall short of persuading the MSs to duly and fully remove 
illegal GSs when the factual imposition of deterrent penalties is not likely in the 
foreseeable future. In cases where a MS resists post-judgment compliance and the 
penalty procedure under Article 260 TFEU progresses to advanced stages, the 
second hypothesis will be supported. In instances where the MSs comply as soon as 
the penalty threats are applied and the procedure is initiated, the second hypothesis 
will be falsified. 
Additionally in cases where certain GSs were overruled in a particular MS and 
the latter chooses to implement and maintain another set of GSs despite the EU 
institutions’ clear-cut position on the issue, the judgments on the foregoing GSs 
would be seen to have failed to trigger a wider policy change, and consequently the 
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MS’s government has failed to ‘see the light’. Thus, the third hypothesis on the 
effectiveness of the agenda-setting case-law (H3) states: A MS’s government fails to 
embark on a wider policy change if similar GSs measures are implemented or 
maintained despite the infringement proceedings and condemning judgment on 
analogous GSs. Such conduct would qualify as obstructionist non-compliance in bad 
faith. Above all, in cases where a MS chooses to use ‘soon-to-be’ overruled GSs 
measures in order to preclude cross-border capital movement, it would be seen as 
acting in bad faith towards compliance obligations. By addressing the above 
hypotheses this study is set to reveal the existence of an obstructionist and 
protectionist trend. 
To understand and predict obstructionist behaviour in relation to GSs, it is 
necessary to explore some of the factors that could influence and/or predict 
compliance in good faith. For this purpose it is necessary to outline different country 
and industry variables which will be taken into account for a contextual compliance 
analysis in each particular country and for each particular case. Apart from the 
factors discussed above (the promptness of correspondence, the presence of pending 
takeovers, the application of GSs or the introduction of new GSs) the following 
analysis of issue-related factors and variables, though by no means exhaustive, can 
be helpful in setting the scene for predicting and explaining compliance with GS 
judgments. The aggregate effect of the reasons below could potentially be the reason 
for obstructionist non-compliance. 
(a) Overall compliance record. Some studies on compliance argue that 
particular MSs are more likely to violate the Treaty freedoms than others (Beach 
2005; Börzel 2003: 205; Börzel et al 2010: 3; Tallberg 2002). Generally, these 
studies predict compliance by taking into consideration the MSs’ political power 
(share of votes in the Council of Ministers); its administrative capacity (the training 
and motivation of the administrative staff) and legitimacy (a moral obligation 
entailing that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed). Other studies reveal that 
MSs’ political power, its administrative capacity and legitimacy do not determine its 
willingness to comply (Panke 2010: 5). Correspondingly, by approaching the non-
compliance issue from the perspective of GS-related cases, this study demonstrates 
that resorting to obstructionist protectionism does not necessarily derive from the 
MSs’ power or administrative capacity, as in some cases powerful MSs would 
comply promptly while weaker MSs could considerably resist compliance. Prior to 
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analysing factual compliance situations with GSs cases, this study comments on the 
overall compliance record for each jurisdiction, also taking into account general 
support for EU integration and policies. Specifically, this study predicts a higher 
degree of non-compliance with GS case-law in MSs with poorer records and in 
countries that display significant euro scepticism. 
Yet this study has found only limited support for these predictions, as some 
MSs with better compliance records have demonstrated significant resistance to 
compliance, while others with poorer records have complied in good faith. Also, the 
most euro sceptic MSs could comply in relatively good faith in comparison to other 
countries that display more support the EU. Here another factor should be taken into 
account related to whether non-compliance with GS judgments is systemic and 
pathological for particular MS and whether there are numerous ongoing parallel 
infringements. In cases where judgments interlock and GS provisions interweave 
and correspond with one another, we would expect a higher likelihood of 
obstructionist non-compliance in bad faith. 
(b) MSs’ public service traditions are ultimately shaped by fundamentally 
different conceptions of the role of markets and the role of states. Historic pre-
requisites, such as a country’s traditions in respect of the free market versus state-
driven protectionist, traditions could affect the MS’s pull towards obstructionist 
protectionism. Here the historic links between the state and key industries will be 
contextually analysed, which could predict the obstinacy of GS measures. It could 
be predicted that in countries with state-influenced market economies characterised 
by strong traditions of state-driven dirigisme, post-judgment non-compliance would 
be more expected than in countries with co-ordinated market economies or liberal 
market economies. Additionally, the national rules for corporate control could have 
a significant influence on subsequent compliance. It could be ascertained that in 
MSs where the corporate control rules envisages a significant stakeholder 
participation in management of the company, the latter could be more protected 
from approaches of competitors and less exposed to undesirable corporate 
restructurings (Charny 1991: 439). Consequently since the objectives of public 
interest could be achieved through pressure groups and worker codetermination the 
government would be likely to withdraw unlawful GSs and comply. This leads us to 
the following variable which assesses the reasons and ideology behind the 
privatisation of strategic companies and liberalisation. 
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(c) Since GSs have largely evolved from privatisation, it is necessary to assess 
national specificities relating to this process, as this could shed light on the potential 
obstinacy of the GS measures. This study will assess the motives behind 
privatisation legislation in order to reveal any significant protectionist inclinations of 
the MS’s governments. Across jurisdictions, some motives for privatisation 
prevailed over others. Some MSs demonstrated a stronger push towards market 
liberalisation and aimed at increasing the competitiveness of national companies, 
others privatised mainly due to budgetary motives, such as the pressure of economic 
needs, debts and deficits, as well as the move towards the establishment of a free 
market economy and the overall modernisation of the economy (e.g. Clifton et al 
2006; Bortolotti, Siniscalco 2004; Vickers, Wright 1989). In countries that 
privatised primarily to raise revenues, as opposed to pursuing the idea of true 
liberalisation of industries, governments would be more likely to resist the removal 
of GSs. The extent to which the governments decided to privatise and open-up 
markets to free competition could also be one of the decisive factors that point 
towards the overall necessity of GSs. At this stage it is necessary to comment on the 
general openness of relevant markets. 
(d) The level of liberalisation differs as MSs have liberalised at different 
speeds and different ways, which also differs from industry to industry. In cases 
where privatisation began at an earlier stage, allowing the strategic companies 
protected by GSs sufficient time to adjust to free market environment, the MSs 
would be more likely to demonstrate better compliance patterns with GS-related 
judgments than MSs in which privatisation commenced later. Generally, in countries 
where privatisation and market liberalisation started earlier, markets tend to be more 
open compared with countries that privatised at a later stage. Some of the most 
opened markets of network/regulated industries are telecommunications and airlines, 
and some of the most closed are energy generation services, on-land transport 
(railways) and postal services.
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 Regarding telecommunications, it is sufficient to 
note that this market has been regulated in great detail at the European level, so there 
is little room left for government interventions, such as GSs (Benyon 2010: 35). The 
market of network/regulated industries is the most liberalised in the MSs with co-
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ordinated market economies, in particular in the UK.
69
 Less market liberalisation 
could be observed in MSs with co-ordinated market economies, in which the 
enforcement of the free market rules experienced more resistance, such as in 
Germany and Italy. Generally, privatisations in MSs with co-ordinated market 
economies were based on more pragmatic reasons, whereas the privatisation 
programmes in the UK (and France) were more ambitious in scope and nature, while 
being ideologically inspired (Vickers, Wright 1989: 8). However, companies that 
were privatised and liberalised at the later stage, had more opportunity to grow into 
‘national champions’ becoming a monopolies too big to be acquired, hence became 
takeover-proof (Bethel 1998; Clifton et al 2010). From this perspective, as Clifton 
argues, “a ‘wait-and-see’ logic may have proved advantageous [as] slower 
liberalisers took advantage of incumbents in countries that had liberalized previously 
(Clifton et al 2010: 1001). 
(e) The takeover regulation in the given jurisdiction could also influence and 
predict compliance. The EU Takeover Directive was aimed at the harmonisation of 
national takeover laws, although it was considerably watered down and became a 
minimum standard directive containing only general principles. The Directive 
allowed the MSs to opt out of core provisions via the reciprocity rule under Article 
12, giving governments a lot of leeway in transposing its provisions. Some MSs, 
such as Italy and Spain, transposed the Directive in a protectionist way, so launching 
a hostile takeover would be significantly more complicated and more expensive for 
the acquiring company and thus less likely to take place in those countries.
70
 Other 
MSs’ takeover regulations, on the other hand, make it easy for foreign companies to 
launch hostile takeovers, as for example the UK takeover laws are very liberal. 
Existing differences in national takeover regulations alongside asymmetry in market 
openness across the MSs provide a competitive advantage for certain companies and 
as a result could distort competition and obstruct the achievement of a level-playing 
field. The aforesaid situation forces some MSs’ governments to attempt to balance 
this asymmetry by creating GSs in order to remedy the existing competitive 
advantages of others. This protectionist trend is on the rise even in the most 
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liberalised and free-market oriented countries.
71
 It could be expected that countries 
which have transposed the Directive in a more liberal way would also most likely be 
‘liberal’ towards their compliance obligations stemming from the judgments, in 
contrast to their counterparts that transposed it in a more protectionist way. 
(f) Empirical studies have shown that ownership complexity and availability of 
CEMs deters hostile takeovers (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Heiss, Köke 2004). Hence the 
presence of cross-shareholdings, large loyal shareholders and other CEMs, that are 
not subject to the breakthrough rule of the Takeover Directive, in companies 
protected by GSs could signify that compliance with GSs judgment would be more 
likely than in cases when share ownership is highly dispersed and there are no 
effective and powerful CEMs. Also, the availability of CEMs could be seen as one 
of the factors which could prompt compliance. The presence of powerful and 
effective CEMs in a jurisdiction could imply that the MS in question is more likely 
to comply by removing GSs: if powerful alternatives to GSs are readily available, 
additional safeguards, such as GSs, could be of limited importance. 
(g) Even though the CJEU has established
72
 that national political, 
administrative or institutional difficulties could not qualify as an acceptable reason 
for non-compliance with EU law, this study nonetheless reflects on political and/or 
financial situations at the time of the judgment if those could potentially influence 
compliance. If there is a political crisis or pending elections, it brings about the 
electoral political pressure which could increase the chances that compliance will be 
postponed or minimalist measures implemented. This prediction draws a parallel 
with the Political Business Cycle hypothesis (McMenamin et al 2015: 49) which 
states that politicians are expected to inflate the economy before elections in order to 
win votes and austerity should not be expected before elections. 
(i) The situation in the market for companies/industries in which GSs are 
implemented would also be an important part of the compliance assessment puzzle. 
If the said market is highly competitive and the company at stake represents a well-
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developed, internationally competitive entity it would be assumed that GSs have 
achieved their purpose and could be repealed in relatively good faith. Conversely, in 
cases where national privatisation/GSs legislation encourages the creation of 
national champions, a MS would be expected to considerably resist compliance. 
(h) If GSs are implemented in industries which are thoroughly regulated at the 
EU level (such as telecoms), comprehensive compliance with judgments would be 
predicted – in contrast to GSs implemented in other strategic industries, for which 
EU legislation does not provide sufficient protection/regulation (such as energy). 
All these factors have to be considered. This background analysis seeks to 
generate some predictions about whether the government is likely to comply post-
judgment, also allowing to draw general conclusions on the reasons for non-
compliance with particular judgments. It suffices to conclude that the more 
protectionist the overall outlook of the MS is, the more resistance to compliance is 
to be expected. In a similar vein, this study would predict a higher degree of 
resistance to comply in cases where the judgments of the CJEU allow for radical 
liberalisation which goes against the social models of some MSs, bringing additional 
legal restrictions on national systems (e.g. Höpner, Schäfer 2007; Scharpf 2008). 
In order to probe the developed hypotheses, this study engages in careful 
process-tracing and concentrates on an in-depth analysis of compliance initiatives. It 
should be emphasised that compliance is extremely difficult to measure due to the 
numerous variables involved in its assessment. The situation of actual compliance 
could not be solely divided between comprehensive compliance and obstructionist 
non-compliance. There could be marginal variations in both outcomes, with 
different levels of good faith predispositions, or severities of bad faith behaviour. 
Though ultimate compliance is difficult to measure, it is even much more difficult to 
gather sufficient information on the nature and content of amended GSs due to the 
differences of legislative processes in each MS. Needless to say that ultimate 
compliance measures are drafted in national languages, so difficulties in tracking 
and translating these documents have been significant. However, restricting the 




This study sought to provide complete information about numerous transitory 
amendments and final compliance measures in relation to sixteen
73
 GS-related cases 
in eight jurisdictions. In cases where overruled laws were amended, the content and 
motivation behind these compliance measures, as well as their deterrent effect, were 
assessed within the framework of the obligation to comply as soon as possible and in 
good faith. This study also sets out to determine whether the amended GSs could 
repeatedly hinder capital movement. The final amended GSs will be assessed 
according to their potential hindering effect. This study approaches non-compliance 
with GSs judgments from three levels of severity: firstly, resistance to compliance 
during the general enforcement action under Article 258 TFEU on the failure to 
comply with the Treaty freedoms could be seen as relative non-compliance; 
secondly, non-compliance with the subsequent judgment of the CJEU is considered 
as obstructionist; and lastly the initiation of a procedure for non-compliance with the 
original judgment under Article 260 TFEU is seen as absolute non-compliance. Two 
of the latter levels of non-compliance are expressly contrary to the sincere 
cooperation obligation and amount to action in bad faith. 
An empirical and comparative analysis of GS-related judgments delivered 
between 2000 and 2011 allows for a remarkable observation. All judgments (apart 
from one that was justified) experienced (to a greater or lesser extent) some 
resistance to full compliance. Cases where the Commission terminated proceedings 
are not considered in this study. The following operative part puts the research 
hypotheses to the test, carrying out contextual analysis of compliance with GS 
judgments in different jurisdictions over a period of more than ten years. A 
discussion of the post-adjudicative phase will be the focus. Here, the contextual 
analysis of the factual background data is essential as it is required to assess the 
scope of the compliance obligations. For this purpose, the circumstances of each 
particular case will be considered – such as the route by which the case reached the 
Court; the history of companies in which GSs are present, the subject matter of the 
dispute; the public and national interests involved. 
This part of the study draws GS-related cases into clusters by their country of 
origin and evaluates them in chronological order. This approach was chosen due to 
the fact that many cases build on each other. The reaction of each MS to a potential 
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hostile takeover of the company at issue and the reaction to the referral to the Court 
and finally reactions to the judgment will be assessed. This information will help to 
understand and predict the pull towards possible non-compliance. This study 
therefore generally draws on sources which form the basis for compliance with the 
CJEU’s judgments. This broad variety of sources ranges from the case-law of the 
CJEU to national legislation, from the Commission’s communications to academic 
contributions. It assesses and analyses information from primary sources on judicial 
disclosures, newspaper articles,
74
 as well as public statements, strategy papers and 
statutes of the companies concerned. The primary sources for assessing compliance 
for the purpose of this study are official publications by the Commission and the 
MSs. Primary documents of respective national and EU institutions will be used to 
assess the MSs’ compliance initiatives aimed at amending the GSs in question. 
These documents are assessed and analysed in order to evaluate possible 
justifications, as well as the necessity for further amendments. Secondary sources 
include recent academic research on the theory of compliance, coupled with research 
on privatisation, the liberalisation of national markets and GS issue. 
Chapter 1 of Part II is on ‘firm standing’ Italian Decree-Laws - the chain of 
cases which could be seen as a typical example of obstructionist protectionism: C-
58/99 Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-03811, C-174/04 Commission v Italy [2005] 
ECR I-4933, C-326/07 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-02291 and joined cases C-
463/04 and C-464/04 Federconsumatori v Commune di Milano [2007] ECR I-
10419. Here compliance is assessed by examining how GSs stemming from the 
decree-law were amended, why these amendments could be seen to be avoiding full 
compliance, and which actions and amendments could be seen as an ideal solution 
for facilitating compliance? The outcomes of these re-drafting activities are the 
subject of comparative analysis with the original GSs. Thereafter these amended 
GSs are assessed by their potential protectionist powers. Furthermore penalty threats 
under Article 260 TFEU are assessed. 
Via the same method used in assessing the Italian cases, Chapters 2-8 assess:  
Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4581, 
Case C-274/06 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I-00026, 
Case C-207/07 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I-111, 
Case C-196/07 Commission v Spain [2008] ECR I-00041, 
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Case C-98/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-4641, 
Case C-483/99 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781, 
Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809, 
Joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v Netherlands [2006] ECR 
I-9141, 
Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-8995, 
Case C-95/12 Commission v Germany [2013] ECR I-0000, 
Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731, 
Case C-543/08 Commission v Portugal [2010] ECR I-0000, 
Case C-171/08 Commission v Portugal [2010] ECR I-0000, 
Case C-212/09 Commission v Portugal [2011] ECR I-0000. 
Conclusions will be brought on the above analysis and the enforcement 
effectiveness/obstructionist hypotheses will be proved or dismissed. The concluding 
Part III evaluates the findings of this study and identifies factors which have proved 
to promote compliance in good faith or to encourage obstructionist non-compliance. 
Further emphasis has been laid on areas where improvement is needed. This part 
will also suggest further directions for addressing GS judgments in the future and 
will comment on the recent developments in the area of GS-related case-law. This 
study concludes with an actual compliance situation on GS cases and an evaluation 
of the prospects for the future. 
Though the record for the GS-related judgments has been fairly positive, the 
factual assessment of the MSs’ compliance is yet to come. When all is said and 
done, the analysis of the actual compliance pattern will show that while much is left 
to be done, state-driven protectionism remains obstructionist and cannot be 
overcome without a significant battle. The following part of this research will put 
the hypothesis of obstructionist GSs protectionism to the test.  
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PART II. EVIDENCE: COMPLIANCE WITH GOLDEN SHARE JUDGMENTS - A 
CASE STUDY 
 
The following operative part focuses on the GS-related case-law by assessing 
the extent to which the CJEU’s judgments have solved the underlying issue of non-
compliance in those cases. This is done by concentrating on the analysis and 
evaluating the outcome of national pre- and post-judgment compliance activities. 
The examination of compliance will determine whether the MSs have been acting in 
good or in bad faith towards their obligations under the Treaty. The findings will 
determine that in the majority of cases MSs tend to resort to non-compliance and 
initial amendments to GS laws tend to retain their protectionist powers. This 
supports the core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis of this study, 
which maintains that MSs are likely to resort to non-compliance following the 
judgments on GSs, so acting in bad faith and contrary to the sincere cooperation 
obligation under Article 4(3) TEU. 
 
1. Italy: Firmly Standing Golden Share Laws 
 
Introduction on Jurisdiction 
The government’s protectionist policy legacy and control over strategic 
industries has had a lasting history in Italy: companies have been extensively used 
for attaining non-economic, political and social goals (Bianchi et al 1989: 84-95; 
Bortolotti, Milella 2006: 9). Traditionally the government controlled all public 
services and its wide discretion in this sector has been accepted as the norm (Della 
Cananea 2002: 74-5). Such an interventionist anti-market approach has been, to 
some extent, protected by the Constitution, where Article 43 reserves special rights 
for the state in strategic sectors.
75 
Therefore, Italian protectionism is a powerful tool 
that is rooted in legal tradition. At the beginning of the 1990’s Italy was eager to 
meet the Maastricht criteria and secure participation in the European Monetary 
Union, so privatisation (followed by liberalisation) came as a convenient solution 
(Bull, Newell 2005: 222-4). Widespread privatisation swept across Italy, yet the 
government was more concerned about increasing its revenues rather than in true 
liberalisation of the said markets (ibid). In 1994 the government led by Prime 
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Minister Berlusconi paid its tribute to protectionist traditions: to retain influence 
over former SOEs it has implemented the privatisation legislation law of1994
76
 
allowing for the creation of GSs in strategic companies. Apart from the possibility to 
implement GSs, Italian companies have been protected through a complex web of 
effective CEMs such as pyramids and cross-shareholdings, in which influential 
families and powerful credit institutions worked as allies to control Italian industry, 
excluding the feasibility of hostile takeovers (Bull, Newell 2005: 179). 
Once the Maastricht requirements were met eagerness for integration has 
significantly diminished and the obstacles to the free market have been maintained 
and reinforced (ibid, 224-6). Such protectionist approach has reversed the success of 
the ‘energetic’ privatisation and has also considerably slowed down (if not put on 
hold) the true liberalisation of strategic industries. It suffices to note that Italy could 
generally be seen as a MS that is reluctant to use its own initiatives to open up its 
markets and reluctant to reform its laws, so that most of the recent changes have 
been strongly influenced by the EU (ibid, 223; Della Cananea 2002: 73, 88; OECD 
2001: 6). Italy is one of the largest economies in the EU yet, as regards non-
compliance with EU law, it could be seen as the ‘extreme outlier’ who is renowned 
for its continuous disobedience and that is accountable for almost a quarter of 
delayed compliances with the CJEU’s judgments (Beach 2005; Börzel 2001: 818-
20; Tallberg 2002: 629). The test for compliance with GS judgments will disclose 
whether Italian obstructionist traditions could be overcome by a newly established 
law of the CJEU. The conclusion on each particular case will reveal if Italy has 
acted in good faith towards the sincere cooperation principle when addressing the 
compliance obligations stemming from four GSs judgments.  
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1.1. The First Golden Share Case on Privatisation Law of 1994 
 
After the Commission’s communication of 199777 explicitly specified that 
unjustified GSs are incompatible with the Treaty, the CJEU has further supported 
this view in its first judgment on the Case C-98/99 issued in 2000 on Italian GSs. 
This sub-chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.1.A provides factual background 
data on origin and composition of GSs. Section 1.1.B examines Italian conduct 
during the infringement procedure, assessing its defence strategy and any 
compliance initiatives disclosing whether there has been an inclination to comply 
prior to the judgment. Section 1.1.C assesses Italy’s compliance initiatives providing 
the basis for the evaluation of any push towards obstructionist protectionism and 
helping to predict the potential non-compliance. Section 1.1.D analyses whether 
Italy has acted in good faith when addressing the judgment. The latter section also 
presents the potentially ‘best-case scenario’ for facilitating compliance, helping to 
understand Italy’s motivation behind implemented compliance measures. This 
analysis would support the hypothesis of obstructionist GSs protectionism, 
concluding that the Italian government resorted to non-compliance. 
1.1.A: Special Rights 
Pursuant to Article 2 of DL 332/1994 (as converted with amendments into 
Law No.474/1994), the government would issue further company-specific decrees 
which would apply to companies controlled by the government and operating in 
public service sectors. These company-specific decrees would determine that before 
adoption of any measures resulting in the loss of government control, a special GS 
provision must be inserted into each company’s statutes by a decision taken at an 
extraordinary AGM and conferring one or more special rights to the Treasury 
Minister. The Law of 1994 then listed special rights which could be implemented, 
such as the special right to: (a) issue express approvals or oppositions on acquisition 
by any investor of stakes representing at least 5% of voting share capital (approval); 
(b) approve agreements between major shareholders representing at least 5% of 
voting share capital; (c) veto amendment of the company’s statutes and decisions on 
strategic reorganisations, such as merger, dissolution, transfer of businesses or 
registered office; (d) appoint a minimum of one or several (up to one quarter of the 
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total number) directors and an auditor. The approval regime on acquisition had to be 
issued within sixty days following each notice and until the expressed approval was 
gained a stand-by clause would apply, depriving the acquirer of any non-economic 
rights attached to the shareholding at issue. In case of express opposition or absence 
of approval following the expiry of the sixty day period each relevant acquirer 
would have to dispose of its shares within one year or be ordered to do so by the 
national Court. The same sixty day period applied to the approval regime on 
shareholders’ agreements: following the express opposition or absence of approval 
after the expiry period agreements were deemed ineffective. 
After the implementation of company-specific decrees the Treasury Minister 
would define contents of the special rights in each particular case by further decrees, 
which could also lower the 5% threshold for the purpose of the special approval 
regime. As could be seen from the said GS provisions, special rights were not 
attached to specific ‘golden’ shares held by the government, instead the DL 
332/1994 directly granted the state authorities with time-unlimited special rights 
which had to be used by ‘having regard to national economic and industrial policy 
objectives’.78 Article 1(5) of Law No.474/1994 also contained a discriminatory 
provision providing that the government may entrust the execution of certain tasks 
to professionals who have been officially registered in Italy for at least five years. 
The latter provision clearly discriminated against professionals established in other 
EU MSs or those recently established in Italy.
79
 
As seen from the provisions at issue, Article 2 of Law No.474/1994 enabled 
the government to issue further decrees determining which companies have to 
become subject to GSs and subsequently empowering the relevant authorities to 
further determine the contents of special rights. Article 2 of Law No.474/1994 does 
not create GSs but merely enables their further implementation, so it does not 
constitute an obstacle for EU law per se. However, since the main purpose of the 
provision was to enable the creation of GSs by further decrees it represents a clearly 
protectionist piece of legislation. On the other hand, further decrees which actually 
implemented GSs had to specify not only the contents of particular special rights, 
but also any conditions for their application. Therefore, Article 2 of Law 
No.474/1994 does not infringe the freedom of capital movement and establishment 
                                                 
78
 Case C-58/99 Italy, note 24, para.4. 
79
 Ibid, para.1. 
68 
 
for as long as GSs implemented pursuant to it could be justified by those further 
implementing decrees or, perhaps, by companies’ statutes. Yet, as revealed below, 
neither subsequent company-specific decrees that implemented GSs, nor the 
companies’ statutes provided for any such further justifications. 
Provisions of 1994 privatisation law were soon put to use when the 
government chose to implement GSs for the most valuable companies prior to their 
privatisation. Italy has privatised its state monopoly Telecom Italia (TI) – this 
became the largest privatisation within the EU at the time (Bull, Newell 2005: 185). 
In 1997, pursuant to Article 2 of Law No.474/1994, the government implemented a 
decree providing that GSs must be introduced in TI’s corporate statutes.80 Two days 
later, the Treasury Minister issued two further decrees: first - establishing the 
composition of GSs and second - lowering the relevant 5% threshold for the purpose 
of the approval regime to 3% of voting share capital.
81
 Here it should be emphasised 
that by lowering the threshold for the application of special GS regime from 5% to 
3% of voting share capital, the Minister has made the provisions of Law 
No.474/1994 even more stringent – more acquisitions and agreements would now be 
subject to approval. 
In 1995 the government inserted corresponding GSs provisions into the 
corporate statutes of ENI – Italy’s largest energy/oil company.82 The Treasury 
Minister applied GSs provisions of enabling Law No.474/1994 to the fullest extent 
by implementing the entire spectrum of special rights at hand in both companies’ 
statutes, creating approval regimes for both acquisitions of stakes and major 
shareholders’ agreements representing at least 3% of voting share capital, rights to 
veto companies’ reorganisations and also rights to appoint a minimum of one or 
several directors and an auditor. The Ministerial decrees have not made the exercise 
GSs in ENI or TI subject to any further conditions and there were no further 
justifications for GSs application in both companies’ statutes.83 The conditions for 
exercise of special rights, or more precisely their absence, have become the subject 
of the following judicial proceedings. 
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1.1.B: Negotiations and Judicial Proceedings 
The EU Commission has formally notified Italy that the GSs implemented 
pursuant to provisions of Law No.474/1994 and companies’ decrees infringe the 
Treaty freedoms of capital movement and establishment. The Italian government led 
by Romano Prodi insisted on compatibility of its laws justifying GSs by the 
necessity to guarantee a minimum level of provision of oil supply and telecom 
services to the general public (European Commission IP/98/717). On 10 August 
1998 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion, allocating two months for 
compliance.
84
 At that time Italy went through governmental elections and the newly 
elected government led by Massimo D’Alema replied (with a twelve day delay), 
undertaking to amend the law in question. However, apart from a declamatory 
conformity with the Commission’s observations, the government did not provide 
any supporting evidence of potential amendments or their proposed implementation 
date.
85
 There was no effective compliance by the date stipulated in the reasoned 
opinion, as the amendments have not been submitted to the Italian Parliament.
86
 On 
19 February 1999 the Commission lodged an application to CJEU. 
At this point a short diversion to the situation on the Italian telecom market is 
necessary as it might shed some light on the disclosure of the relevant GSs and 
explain the Commission’s pro-active approach on the matter. The infringement 
proceedings coincided with the largest takeover battle of that time when in February 
1999, TI became a target of a hostile bid by another Italian company Olivetti - 
corporate attacks of this kind were unprecedented in post-war Europe (Bull, Newell 
2005: 187; BBC News Online 29/02/1999). The Italian government favoured the 
takeover, yet TI management and shareholders were strongly against it (BBC News 
Online 26/02/1999) and sought to accept a friendly ‘super merger’ with the German 
company Deutsche Telekom instead (Negrelli 1999: 27; BBC News Online 
12/04/1999). The Italian government turned against a merger with a foreign 
company, in which the German government was a major shareholder (Bull, Newell 
2005: 189). Knowing that the government could block this controversial merger, the 
two Italian companies had to come to terms with the government and the hostile 
takeover by Olivetti eventually went through (BBC News Online 22/05/1999). The 
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Olivetti takeover battle and unsuccessful cross-border deal involving the German 
company points towards the Italian government’s protectionist stance and this is 
how the GSs could come to the forefront – by promoting complaints to the 
Commission from unsatisfied shareholders. 
Returning to the judicial proceedings the Commission criticised discriminatory 
provisions of Article 1(5) of Law No.474/1994 which applied to professionals, also 
arguing that GSs applied pursuant to Article 2 could not pass the legal certainty and 
proportionality test.
87
 According to the Commission it was not clear in which 
circumstances special rights could be applied, in which circumstances the 
governmental approval would be granted or refused, thus leaving the state 
authorities with wide discretionary rights. During the judicial stage Italy has not 
denied that the relevant provisions of Law No.474/1994 are incompatible with the 
Treaty. Moreover the government has not just merely re-iterated its intention to 
adopt necessary amendments to the law at issue and comply with the reasoned 
opinion, but went even further by revealing at the hearing that the necessary 
compliance measures have already been approved (and GSs justified).
88
 Even 
though the amendments allegedly were on their way to adoption, the CJEU ruled 
that they cannot be taken into account since non-compliance with the Treaty 
persisted following the two months allocated by the reasoned opinion.
89
 On 23 May 
2000 the CJEU ruled that by adopting Articles 1 and 2 of Law No.474/1994 and the 
decrees concerning GSs in ENI and TI Italy has failed to fulfil its obligations under 
the Treaty on free movement of capital and establishment. 
1.1.C: Assessing Potential for Compliance 
Italy has revealed its intentions to comply pre-judgment, so its only defence at 
the proceedings has been its active engagement in implementation of compliance 
measures which would eventually justify GSs. At the hearing the government has 
updated the CJEU on the progress of its law-drafting activities, confirming that the 
Law No.488/1999
90
 would address the Commission’s concerns by amending GSs so 
they would meet the legal certainty and proportionality requirements.
91
 On 11 
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February 2000 Prime Minister D’Alema had implemented a further DPCM/200092 
which defined the criteria for the exercise of special rights of Article 2 of Law 
No.474/1994. From the moment when Italy officially undertook to comply with the 
Commission’s observations until the judgment it had nineteen months to comply on 
its own initiative. The alleged compliance came on 11 February 2000, or three 
months prior to the judgment. If Italy’s compliance measures were sufficient to 
remedy the breach of the Treaty it would indicate that it has cooperated sincerely by 
complying both with the Treaty provisions and by promptly complying with the 
subsequent judgment. Since at the time of implementation of the above compliance 
measures Italy has not yet been obliged by the condemning judgment to amend its 
GS law, it could be perceived that the government complied on its own initiative and 
in good faith – in line with the Union’s objectives and principles. The timing for 
potential compliance has been adequate, but the real question remained: whether the 
amendments themselves were sufficient and could they be seen as compliance 
measures that are in line with the good faith and sincere cooperation principles? 
In a situation where the implemented compliance measures would not justify 
the application of GSs, the question of non-compliance would immediately arise 
again. However in such a setting, non-compliance would evolve into an 
infringement of EU law at a significantly different level: non-compliance with EU 
law prior to the judgment and non-compliance with the condemning judgment 
constitutes an infringement of a different quality. Despite the allegedly good-natured 
pre-judgment amendments the CJEU’s judgment from 23 May 2000 has bound Italy 
to comply. Nevertheless the Italian authorities were free to decide on how to 
comply, as they were not obliged to repeal the enabling provisions of Law 
No.474/1994 altogether. 
In this setting the insufficiency of the pre-judgment amendments, which would 
inevitably trigger non-compliance with the judgment could be envisaged due to the 
following reason: the condemned GS law ought to be repealed and not amended. 
However, since Article 2 of Law No.474/1994 merely represents an enabling 
measure, the government would most likely be willing to try and pass the 
justification test by amending the conditions for exercise of special rights. If 
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subsequent amendments would not pacify the Commission, they could be repeatedly 
amended by testing justification criteria over and over again. For the reason that the 
potential number of these justification attempts or compliance measures could 
become very high would make the enabling GSs provision of Law No.474/1994 an 
obstructionist piece of legislation. Put simply, the Italian government would most 
likely be inclined to continuously amend the way in which GSs are applied instead 
of wholly repealing enabling provisions of Law No.474/1994. 
This situation would leave the Italian authorities with a wide discretion for 
manoeuvring and avoiding full compliance which ideally would involve a complete 
withdrawal from application of GSs and relevant approval regimes. The following 
Section 1.1.D first analyses the possible ‘best-case scenario’ for facilitating 
compliance with judgment on case C-58/99, then turning to examine implemented 
compliance measures, testing them against the sincere cooperation principle and 
obligation to comply in good faith. It will assess whether unjustified GSs have 
remained intact after the alleged amendments or not. 
1.1.D: Compliance v Non-compliance 
What could be seen as optimal compliance with the judgment on case C-
58/99? Firstly, the government had to repeal the discriminatory Article 1(5) of Law 
No.474/1994 or make it non-discriminatory. Since the objective of his provision was 
merely to distinguish between professionals who have been officially registered in 
Italy for certain period of time and all other professionals, recasting the 
discriminatory manner in which this provision applies would make its purpose 
irrelevant. Secondly, it would be improbable to justify such restriction on the 
grounds of overriding interests of the public or its security, as it would be virtually 
impossible to explain why entrusting the execution of certain tasks to professionals 
who have been officially registered in Italy for at least five years is necessary for 
protection of the public interests and security. In this light appropriate compliance 
would involve full repeal of Article 1 of Law No.474/1994. The following analysis 
will show that the amendment of Article 2 of Law No.474/1994 would not be as 
straightforward. 
Article 2 of Law No.474/1994 is the legal basis for the creation, 
implementation and activation of GSs by further company-specific decrees, so 
abrogating this basis would eliminate the possibility for maintaining and 
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implementing similar GSs in the future. Simply put: if there are no provisions 
enabling the implementation of GSs, there would be no necessity for their 
justification, so the preferable solution for facilitating compliance with judgment on 
case C-58/99 would be to repeal the enabling Article 2 of Law No.474/1994. 
However, as GSs could potentially be justified, Italy chose to amend the way in 
which GSs would be applied in order to try and pass the legal certainty and 
proportionality test. Since this test is usually very difficult to pass, any amendments 
to GSs would have the potential for being inappropriate compliance measures, so 
any insufficiency of justifications would leave room for further infringements. As 
predicted by the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance 
(H1a), any unsuccessful justification could retain some level of state discretion and 
postpone full compliance, ultimately leading to obstructionist non-compliance. 
Taking the potential insufficiency of any subsequent amendments to GSs coupled 
with Italy’s lasting tradition of state-driven protectionism in the public sector, it has 
been assumed that Law No.474/1994 would not be amended appropriately. In this 
light, fully repealing Law No.474/1994 would make a proper and better compliance 
measure. 
The CJEU did not take amendments to Law No.474/1994 into consideration, 
so these measures were spared from judicial scrutiny: it has not been considered 
whether Law No.488/1999 and DPCM/2000 have justified GSs and whether Italy 
had adequately complied. Before embarking on the analysis of these compliance 
measures it would be reasonable to look at the final legislative outcome which could 
be obtained directly from the statutes of the companies concerned. Statutes of ENI 
(2013)
93
 and TI (2014)
94
 reveal that the Italian government continues to maintain 





 so there is no reference to Law No.488/1999 or DPCM/2000 
whatsoever. Firstly, the mere presence of GSs a decade following the condemning 
judgment points towards an obstructionist character of relevant provisions overruled 
back in 2000 also suggesting that Article 258 TFEU has been ineffective in 
facilitating effective compliance. Secondly, the finding that GSs were repeatedly 
amended in 2003 points to the fact that the pre-judgment compliance measures of 
                                                 
93
 ENI statutes of February 2013, Article 6. 
94
 TI statutes of March 2014, Article 22. 
95
 Law No.350 of 24/12/2003, ‘Financial Law for 2004’ (GURI No.229 of 27/12/2003) available in 
Italian at: http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/03350l.htm (last accessed on 24/09/2014). 
96
 DPCM of 10/06/2004 (GURI No.139 of 16/06/2004). 
74 
 
1999 and 2000 were insufficient, suggesting that the supporting hypothesis on 
effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) would be confirmed for this case. 
Subsequent compliance tests would solve the puzzle by revealing what these 
controversial compliance measures actually were and if they were adequate. 
At the hearing Law No.488/1999 represented the sole Italian defence and the 
government claimed that it justifies application of GSs.
97
 Article 66 of Law 
No.488/1999 entitled ‘Method of disposal of the shares held by the state’98 
contained an explanation under which circumstances and how Article 2 of Law 
No.474/1994 should be executed. In a nutshell, the objective of Article 66(1) of Law 
No.488/1999 was to exclude application of GSs to relatively small companies, in 
which the state holds only a minor stake. This would constitute a non-controlling 
investment which is of limited importance for the objectives of national economic 
and industrial policy. Before this amendment, the state had a wide discretion on 
implementation of GSs which could have been created for any company operating in 
the public service sector – no matter how small or how important. Article 66(3) of 
Law No.488/1999 also contained the alleged justification providing that GSs should 
be introduced only for important and compelling reasons of general interest, in 
particular with reference to public order, public safety, public health and security 
and be appropriate and proportionate for the protection of those interests. The 
provision further maintained that GSs should be exercised in accordance with the 
principles of EU law, primarily the non-discrimination principle should be 
consistent with the objectives of privatisation and protection of competition and the 
free market principles. Article 66(4) of Law No.488/1999 established that further 
decrees shall define the criteria for the exercise of GSs and the special approval 
regime which must also be based on objective criteria, be stable and made public 
beforehand. 
Prima facie, the amendment of Law No.488/1999 could appear as a ‘good 
intention’, but in essence it represents an inadequate compliance initiative, as it 
merely acts as a smoke screen dispersing the attention from active GSs. 
Additionally, Article 66 of Law No.488/1999 does not address the discriminatory 
provision of Article 1(5) of Law No.474/1994. What it does do is the following: it 
merely divides companies which operate in the public sector into two categories: 
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those that are of great value and strategic importance, and those of less value or 
importance, maintaining GSs for the former category companies. This division is 
certainly of some value, as it excludes some companies from the application of GSs. 
However this division is actually of little importance, as the Italian government 
seems to confuse quantity with quality: excluding a number of smaller and less 
important companies from the potential ‘list of protection’ while retaining the 
largest and most strategically- important on it. It is important to emphasise here that 
these relatively small companies are not essentially relevant in the context of 
European competition as they are minor players in the European market. Moreover 
this ‘justification’ does not address the judgment on case C-58/99 as TI and ENI 
companies clearly qualify to fall under GSs provision. 
The remaining GSs in large strategically-important companies had to be 
justified. To this extent Law No.488/1999 merely declares that the special rights 
should be applied in a non-discriminatory manner and only in overriding 
circumstances in the compelling interest of the general public: its order, safety, 
health and security. These provisions are of a declamatory character and in essence 
repeat the requirements for the barriers to fundamental freedoms to be compatible 
with the Treaty. By solely proclaiming that the GSs should be applied only in 
overriding circumstances in the compelling general public interest, but without 
actually specifying what precisely those circumstances and interests could include, 
does not make GSs more legally certain – and this once again leaves a wide 
discretion for the government. Controversially, merely referring to act in accordance 
with the free market objectives and the EU law principles, and generally committing 
to base GSs on stable objectives, would not justify the use of these measures per se. 
Justifying the national piece of legislation that has been found to be in breach of EU 
law by solely committing to act in good faith does not make the existence of this 
legislation or its exercise justified. Amending incriminated GSs in good faith would, 
first and foremost entail the government to severely restrict their application by 
laying down a very limited and precise criterion for their exercise. According to 
Article 66(4) of Law No.488/1999 further decrees had to define such criteria – this 
was the purpose of DPCM/2000.
 99
 
The DPCM/2000 specified in which circumstances the Treasury Minister 
could oppose acquisitions of stakes above 5% of the voting right ceiling pursuant to 
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Article 2(a) of Law No.474/1994. Pursuant to DPCM/2000, opposition could be 
applied to acquisition of shareholdings which: (a) would allow taking over control of 
the company only where the acquirer and its industrial objectives and programmes 
could not be identified; (b) could hinder liberalisation of the market and /or are 
inconsistent with the established privatisation policies or create conflict of interests; 
(c) involve objective risks for the company to become involved in illegal activities; 
(d) are detrimental to the maintenance of GSs; (e) subject to substantial risk of 
causing serious damage to the vital interests of the state with regard to the 
independence and uninterrupted supplies of essential raw materials and goods, 
uninterrupted supply of essential public services and the security of the relevant 
installations and networks and the development of high-technology sectors 
(European Commission IP/03/177). 
The above criterion for exercise of GSs could once again be very broadly 
interpreted since the government did not specify in which particular instances 
acquisitions could hinder the opening-up of the markets; what are those conflicting 
interests which could be affected by such acquisitions and what exactly are the vital 
interests of the state. Pursuant to DPCM /2000, the abrogation of GSs was virtually 
impossible and in fact, any hostile takeover situation would be detrimental to the 
maintenance of GSs. Therefore, amendments to GSs by DPCM/2000 do not 
implement substantial changes to how and under which particular circumstances 
GSs could be used. In this light, (even following the amendment) the criteria for GSs 
application was not entirely precise, leaving discretionary rights to the Treasury 
Minister, meaning that the legal certainty requirement could not be satisfied. 
Therefore, the amendments of 1999 and 2000 do not address the judgment on 
case C-58/99, as they leave the Law No.474/1994 principally unchanged and GSs 
unjustified. This supports the earlier finding that GSs implemented pursuant to Law 
No.474/1994 could be of obstructionist character and that Italy would most likely 
persist in non-compliance by maintaining GSs even after they were overruled by the 
CJEU. This finding goes in contrast with the statements not only by the Italian 
government, but also by several international organisations and the Commission 
itself. For example, in 2003 the OECD commented that pursuant to amendments of 
Law No.488/1999 and DPCM/2000 GSs are applied ‘for very limited public interest 
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reasons’ and only in strategic industries.100 It is important to note that in 2001 the 
Commission revealed that the proceedings on Italian GSs which were firmly on its 
infringement agenda for months following the condemning judgment on first GS 
case were terminated in 2001.
101
 What is clear is that relevant GSs were retained 
despite the condemning judgment and terminated infringement proceedings. 
Similarly in 2005, the EU Commission services stated that that the amendments 
have significantly scaled down the scope of GSs in both ENI and TI following the 
ruling.
102
 Despite such positive outlook on the compliance measures: what appears 
to be clear from this analysis is that amendments of Law No.488/1999 and 
DPCM/2000 were insufficient which confirms the supporting hypothesis on 
effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a). Moreover, discriminatory provision 
of Article 1(5) of Law No.474/1994 remained unaffected by these amendments. 
The above analysis brings us to the conclusion that Italy had sufficient time for 
effective compliance with the judgment on case C-58/99 and, in order to comply in 
line with the sincere cooperation principle and in good faith, the enabling provisions 
of Law No.474/1994 had to be repealed altogether (and not just amended). 
Resistance to comply and repeal GSs alongside the inadequate amendments, made 
Italy act in bad faith and contrary to the sincere cooperation principle: a very 
disturbing situation indeed. By implementing Law No.488/1999 and DPCM/2000 
and by maintaining GSs in statutes of TI and ENI, the Italian government (at a time 
led by Massimo D’Alema) resorted to obstructionist non-compliance with the ruling 
on case C-58/99. This situation would trigger the necessity for subsequent 
amendments which would result in further judgments by the CJEU in which it 
would once again question the compatibility of GSs introduced pursuant to Law 
No.474/1994. The obstructionist GSs implemented pursuant to Law No.474/1994 
will be brought up in the subsequent case analysis as the battle for their abolishment 
will sprawl for over a decade. This study will return to the Law No.474/1994 and 
further compliance assessment on case C-58/99 at the later stage of this study. 
One year after the first GS judgment on Italian case C-58/99, the Commission 
issued a communication reconfirming its position on GSs by making it sufficiently 
clear that there is no place for unjustified GSs (which should not be maintained or 
implemented) in the area of the energy market (European Commission IP/01/872). 
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However, in the very same year, Italy has implemented yet another GS law 
specifically aimed at controlling the energy sector. The judgment on these GSs and 




1.2. Urgent Golden Shares for Energy Market 
 
This sub-chapter begins with a short introduction into the issue of 
liberalisation of the EU energy market, which is necessary for understanding the 
reasons for the creation of relevant GSs. Section 1.2.B presents arguments of the 
parties during the infringement procedure – to reveal any potential for 
obstructionism in relation to the GSs and subsequent non-compliance. Section 1.2.C 
analyses the pre-judgment compliance measure and assesses further compliance 
obligations stemming from the judgment on case C-174/04. Section 1.2.D analyses 
efficiency of Italy’s compliance in the light of infringement proceedings for non-
compliance with the original judgment and concludes that the core enforcement 
effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis of this study is supported in this case. 
1.2.A: Electricity Market and ‘anti-EdF’ Law 
Eliminating obstacles to the free market in the energy sector has been a 
challenging task, as energy production and distribution has been a sensitive issue in 
Europe since World War II (Johnston 1999; Cameron 2007).
 
Traditionally public 
service providers in network utilities, such as gas and electricity industries, were 
state monopolies which operated exclusively on the territories of the respective MSs 
(Cameron 2007: 4-6). This situation has changed significantly during liberalisation 
via the EU Energy Directives.
103
 Markets opened to different extents however, as 
some MSs, including
 
Italy, went beyond the minimum requirements and opened up 
to a greater extent (Scarsi 2001). France remained one of the most closed markets, 
liberalising to the minimum requirement and at the slower pace while enjoying 
considerable market power and dominant position of state-controlled near monopoly 
‘Electricité de France’ or EdF became a leading energy exporter within the EU 
(Bonardi 2004: 102; Maclean et al 2007: 539; Clifton et al 2010: 1003). This 
asymmetry in market openness indicates that EdF enjoyed a competitive advantage 
over more opened newly privatised companies in other MSs, such as Italy.
104
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Naturally, the former could not be acquired by the latter and also remaining 
protected from theoretical energy exports from Italy. Since France became the 
largest exporter of electricity to Italy, EdF could also take advantage from this 
dominant position and penetrate the Italian market. 
To balance-up this asymmetry, the Energy Directive encompassed a 
reciprocity clause
105
 which assisted MSs to establish competitive electricity market 
and ensure that relevant companies would operate in accordance with the principles 
of the free market. This clause allowed MSs to refuse energy imports to its eligible 
customers in cases where corresponding (same/similar) customers would not be 
considered as eligible in the exporting MS. The Energy Directive also empowered 
the MSs to employ ‘appropriate and efficient mechanisms for regulation, control and 
transparency so as to avoid any abuse of a dominant position, in particular to the 
detriment of consumers, and any predatory behaviour.’106 Pursuant to these 
provisions, some more opened energy markets sought to balance out the existing 
asymmetry and implemented additional safeguards to protect themselves from the 
dominant position of EdF, which was renowned for its predatory behaviour. 
On 22 May 2001, EdF disclosed its 20% shareholding in a newly privatised 
company Montedison – the second largest electricity company in Italy. At that time, 
Italy had been on the way towards electing a new government, so the outgoing 
government led by Giuliano D’Amato had rapidly responded to this potential 
takeover threat: a mere three days following EdF’s announcement, it relied on 
provisions of the Energy Directive and implemented GS Law No.192/2001
107
 
entitled ‘Urgent provisions to ensure the liberalisation and privatisation of specific 
public service sectors’. This urgent protectionist measure, commonly referred to as 
‘anti-EdF’ Law, limited the foreign state-controlled monopolies’ rights to access the 
Italian market. The law established a 2% voting right ceiling for shares held in 
electricity and gas companies if these shares were to be held by a (non-listed) state-
controlled company that is dominant in its domestic market; the voting rights of any 
such shareholdings exceeding 2% of total share capital would be automatically 
suspended.
108
 This voting right ceiling applied to all acquisitions made after 24 of 
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 so EdF’s shareholding of 20% became non-controlling and now 
carried only 2% of the voting rights in Montedison. Provisions of Law No.192/2001 
had to remain in force until the EU market is ‘wholly open to competition in the 
electricity and gas sectors’.110 
As EdF’s takeover plans have been restrained by Law No.192/2001 it pursued 
its ambitions via back doors by creating a special joint venture company named 
Italenergia and controlled by FIAT, so the owners of Italinergia were mostly of 
Italian ‘origin’ (European Commission IP/01/1229). Following Italenergia’s hostile 
bid for Montedison the Italian government, now led by Mario Monti, has 
complained to the EU Commission emphasising that this ‘predatory behaviour’ 
stems from EdF’s dominant market position and represents an abuse of the national 




 the said takeover the 
Commission noted that EdF would take de facto or de jure control over Montedision 
via Italenergia if Law No.192/2001 is found incompatible with the Treaty 
(European Commission IP/01/1229). EdF’s takeover strategy of Montedison and the 
following judgment on GS’s could be seen as a joint venture of the Commission and 
the French company on the way to promoting competition and free movement of 
capital in European energy markets. EdF has made its move, now it was up to the 
Commission to proceed with the infringement procedure. 
1.2.B: Judicial Proceedings 
On 23 October 2002 the Commission has notified Italy of the alleged Treaty 
violation, asking it to submit observations and setting a two month period for 
reply.
112
 On 12 March 2003 the Italian government has responded, acknowledging 
that the 2% voting right ceiling constitutes a restriction, and submitting that it is the 
only measure which could guarantee fair competition in the energy market and 
protect Italian companies from anti-competitive attacks. On 11 July 2003 the 
Commission issued its reasoned opinion, allocating two months for compliance. The 
two month period lapsed with no response from Berlusconi’s government, so the 
matter got referred to the Court. Even though the Italian government agreed that 
Law No.192/2001 constitutes a restriction, during judicial proceedings it has eagerly 
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defended ‘anti-EdF’ Law, arguing that the measures in question are in fact 
supporting the liberalisation ofEU’s energy markets and due to the existing 
asymmetry in the market openness, it is also the responsibility of the MSs to balance 
out this competitive asymmetry.
113
 The Italian government argued that Law 
No.192/2001 is the only measure available for safeguarding the national energy 
market from abusive anti-competitive behaviour of foreign public companies which 
enjoy a competitive advantage by virtue of their national legislation.
114
 However, the 
factual circumstances which triggered the implementation of Law No.192/2001 
reveal more pragmatic protectionist motives, as the outgoing government merely 
sought to restrict EdF from taking over Montedison. What appears to be of particular 
significance is that the Italian government willingly opted to sell off its shares in 
energy companies to boost revenues and now is accusing other MSs’ governments 
for retaining their stakes in national energy markets. 
Italy also claimed that Law No.192/2001 is not discriminatory since it also 
applies to Italian public companies.
115
 In this regard, the European advocate 
rightfully noted that the fact that dominant state-controlled companies which are not 
listed on a stock exchange do not exist in Italy; this makes Law No.192/2001 only 
applicable to companies from other MSs.
116
 What is clear is that by inserting such 
distinction on ‘eligible’ companies, Italian legislators effectively excluded national 
companies from application of Law No.192/2001 without imposing clearly 
discriminatory provisions. The Italian authorities have also argued that Law 
No.192/2001 is limited by time, as it would cease after the EU energy market is 
fully open to competition. The Commission dismissed all these defensive arguments, 
emphasising that it is not the MSs’ responsibility to implement unilateral legislative 
measures directed to ensure the proper functioning of market while violating the 
Treaty freedoms.
117
 To this extent Law No.192/2001, which allegedly aimed at 




Italy failed to justify Law No.192/2001 on the grounds of any overriding 
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reasons in the general public interest, merely stating that the law is necessary to 
safeguard the supply of energy within national territory but without providing any 
explanations how and why restricting shareholdings held by state-controlled unlisted 
companies to 2% of voting rights would safeguard such supply.
119
 Therefore, the GS 
law at issue aimed merely at hindering the access to Italian energy market, but not at 
pursuing the high goals of European integration.
120
 In absence of justifications on 2 
June 2005 the CJEU has ruled that by maintaining in force provisions of Law 
No.192/2001 Italy has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty provisions on 
free movements of capital. 
1.2.C: Obligation to Comply 
In this case the short insight into the correspondence between the parties 
reveals the Italian government’s push towards obstructionist non-compliance. 
Firstly, Berlusconi’s government has negated the two month deadline allocated for 
reply by the Commission’s formal letter – actually replying three months later. 
Secondly, Italy had extra two months before the Commission issued its reasoned 
opinion and then it was given another two extra months to comply. At this stage of 
proceedings the time available for compliance on its own initiative amounted to nine 
months in total. From the issue of formal letter until referral to the CJEU, the 
government had more than eighteen months to comply in good faith. However there 
was not any inclination to do so. Italy’s conduct during the infringement procedure 
reveals that it was determined to resist compliance which points towards the 
obstructionist character of the ‘anti-EdF’ Law. 
Above all, the Italian authorities have been aware of the Commission’s 
attitude towards this particular ‘anti-EdF’ Law ever since the clearance of the 
takeover of Montedison.
121
 Nevertheless, from the moment of its implementation 
until the judgment ‘anti-EdF’ Law which evolved as an urgent protectionist reaction 
to the hostile bid from EdF for Montedison, it was successfully fulfilling its purpose 
for more than four years restricted the French monopoly’s rights to take control of 
an Italian energy company. Two months following the judgment, the Commission 
has authorised EdF (jointly with AEM) to acquire Montedison,
122
 expressing its 
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expectations that the overruled Law No.192/2001 shall soon be removed and 
replaced by new Law No.81/2005,
123
 entitled ‘Urgent measures on investments in 
companies which operate in electricity and gas markets’. The following Section 
1.2.D evaluates the sufficiency of this compliance measure, revealing that EdF’s 
ambitions have been restrained once again. 
1.2.D: Compliance v Non-compliance 
The Law No.81/2005 came into force one month prior to the judgment so, 
prima facie, it could be seen as a timely compliance in good faith. However as the 
supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) suggests, 
any amendment to GSs could be minimalist and inadequate. The question remains: 
Was the compliance ‘by amendment’ effective in the current case? As hypothesised, 
the ultimate compliance would involve removing the 2% voting ceiling altogether 
by repealing the Law No.192/2001. However, Berlusconi’s government had 
amended the ‘anti-EdF’ Law, and as the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of 
minimalist compliance (H1a) suggests, amendment of the GSs which are of clearly a 
protectionist nature is a challenging task. If the amendments are insufficient, Italy 
would be seen as resorting to obstructionist non-compliance, acting in bad faith and 
contrary to the obligation of sincere cooperation. Such compliance conduct would 
support the core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis of this study 
(H1) undermining effectiveness of the enforcement action under Article 258 TFEU. 
Ultimately, only compliance per se is important, so any inefficient compliance 
initiatives are of little relevance. 
Prior to the amendment, Law No.192/2001 comprised of four paragraphs, and 
basically, the Law No.81/2005 introduced an additional sub-paragraph – a new 
feature to already existing provisions. This sub-paragraph declared that the 2% 
voting rights ceiling would not apply to state-controlled companies from other MSs 
which are holding a dominant position in their domestic markets; in cases when the 
competent authorities of the MSs concerned have applied standards and guidelines 
defining and initiating a procedure for privatisation of such companies. According to 
the Law No.81/2005, a procedure for privatisation could include such measures as 
listing on a regulated stock exchange or other procedures which would have been 
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defined in agreement with the Italian government and aimed at ensuring the security 
of the energy supply, opening of the energy market and promotion of the effective 
exercise of freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty on access to the energy markets. 
Basically, the new sub-paragraph refers to the companies from other MSs which are 
actively moving towards their privatisation, essentially referring to the governments 
which have committed to open up their energy markets. Therefore, the new so-called 
‘liberalisation-commitment’ sub-paragraph of Law No.81/2005 does not cover state-
controlled unlisted companies, hindering the access for such companies into the 
Italian energy market by imposing a 2% voting ceiling, so once more targeting EdF. 
It is clear that the amendments of Law No.81/2005 are insufficient to comply with 
the judgment, revealing that Italy has knowingly resorted to non-compliance, acting 
in bad faith and contrary to the sincere cooperation principle. 
On 18 October 2005, four months following the judgment, the Commission 
has officially reminded Italy of its compliance obligations by issuing a formal letter 
under the enforcement action pursuant to Article 260 TFEU (European Commission 
IP/06/439).
 
Six months later there was still no compliance and on 4 April 2006 the 
Commission issued a reasoned opinion, allocating two months for compliance 
(European Commission IP/06/439). At that time Berlusconi’s government gave way 
to the new government. On 1 August 2006 the new government, led by Romano 
Prodi, had abolished both Law No.192/2001 and Law No.81/2005, fully complying 
with the judgment by the most reliable method – repealing the GSs altogether 
(European Commission IP/06/1366). Italy complied fourteen months following the 
judgment and it took one unsuccessful amendment and a penalty procedure to force 
it into compliance. In the present case, when approaching its compliance obligation, 
Italy seems to repeat the strategy adopted in the earlier case C-58/99 by initially 
choosing to amend GSs prior to the judgment. In the present case and in case on GSs 
of TI and ENI, initial compliance ‘by amendment’ proved to be minimalist and 
ineffective, therefore approving the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of 
minimalist compliance (H1a). In order to guarantee effective compliance the 
Commission has applied the last enforcement instrument available to it – Article 260 
TFEU. This fact signifies that the first round enforcement action has been ineffective 
and GSs have been of obstructionist character, supporting the core enforcement 
effectiveness hypothesis of this study (H1). 
The ‘anti-EdF’ Law has been fully repealed fourteen months later following 
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the initial judgment, and only as a result of the enforcement action under Article 260 
TFEU. The final compliance ‘by repeal’ has been achieved only after the second 
round enforcement action progressed to advanced stage of the reasoned opinion, so 
that second referral and associated penalties became an imminent threat. Such 
considerable and unnecessary delay in compliance also undermines effectiveness of 
the infringement proceedings under Article 260 TFEU, thus confirming the second 
enforcement effectiveness hypothesis (H2). Such procrastinated compliance could 
not qualify as compliance in good faith. Despite the fact that in case C-174/04 the 
GSs were eventually repealed, this is the only Italian GSs case which ended up in 
compliance. From this point onwards this study shall return to the first Italian GS 
case C-58/99 and its obstructionist enabling Law No.474/1994 in light of CJEU’s 
preliminary ruling in Federconsumatori and another condemning judgment on GSs 
in case C-326/07.  
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1.3. Federconsumatori: re-appearance of Privatisation Law of 1994 
 
This sub-chapter analyses the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in 
Federconsumatori
124
 on GSs stemming from Law No.474/1994, which featured in 
the first case on GSs in Italian companies TI and ENI. The GSs in Federconsumatori 
were introduced via companies’ statutes and concerned directors’ appointments to 
the board. This case is remarkable for its interpretation of the Treaty provisions on 
free movement of capital. Here the CJEU confirmed that even if special rights are 
granted to the state pursuant to a normal application of company law it does not 
preclude the application of Treaty provisions on free movement of capital. Here the 
analysis proceeds as following: Section 1.3.A gives a short background summary in 
order to gain understanding on the reasons behind GSs, Section 1.3.B analyses GSs 
in light of judicial proceedings and Section 1.3.C comments on post-adjudicative 
developments, revealing the continuous existence of protectionist features of Law 
No.474/1994 in statutes of the concerned company. This section is set to reveal how 
the government addressed the CJEU’s preliminary judgment in order to circumvent 
relinquishing of powers in the relevant company. The concluding analysis of 
Federconsumatori supports the hypothesis on obstructionist nature of Law 
No.474/1994 and its amendments. It also reveals the Italian government’s 
obstructionist protectionism which could not be overcome by the third ruling of the 
CJEU on Italian GSs. This section also prepares the foundation for further 
examination of obstructionist characteristics of Law No.474/1994 in the last Italian 
GS case C-326/07 (ENEL). 
1.3.A: Special Appointment of Directors 
As in the first case on GSs in TI and ENI, the story in Federconsumatori 
begins with privatisation. The City of Milan (Comune di Milano) established its 
public service company – AEM, which distributed gas and electricity for that 
municipality. In 1996 AEM became a joint-stock company managed by the City of 
Milan, and several years later the Italian authorities decided to dispose of the 
majority of their shareholdings, selling 49% of the company’s shares.125 Since then 
AEM has developed into one of the biggest public service companies in Italy and 
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became the sole supplier of electricity for Milan.
126
 Further privatisation plans 
involved further disposals of shareholdings. In 2004 Comune di Milano further 
privatised 17.6% of its stakes in AEM. However the municipality made this sale 
conditional by choosing to employ protectionist features of Law No.474/1994: prior 




Following privatisation Comune di Milano remained a relative majority 
shareholder, retaining 33.4% of AEM’s shares. Interestingly enough, AEM has 
featured in the previous case-law analysis of sub-chapter 1.2 as a company that 
jointly with EdF has acquired Montedison in 2005. This fact points towards the 
magnitude of the above privatisation transactions and their importance for the Italian 
state. The stakes were high, the sector was sensitive and asymmetry in the market 
openness existed, so in the view of Comune di Milano the Italian state sought to 
create sufficient protection and to allow significant control over AEM, which would 
be stable and preferably permanent. This is when and why the municipal council of 
Milan enabled the implementation of protectionist measures into company’s statutes 
pursuant to provisions of the Law No.474/1994 under GSs provisions in company’s 
statutes and the Italian Civil Code. 
On 29 April 2004, in accordance with aforementioned decision, AEM’s 
shareholders amended its company's statutes and two special provisions on the 
appointment of directors to the board have been inserted.
128
 The first provision was 
based on Article 2449 of the Italian Civil Code
129
 – it allowed the company’s 
statutes to confer onto the shareholder-state the right to appoint any number of 
directors or auditors or members of the supervisory board.
 
The law does not limit the 
total amount of directors which could be appointed. Pursuant to this provision, 
AEM’s corporate statutes granted Comune di Milano with the right to appoint 
directors in proportion to its shareholding.
130
 The correlation between the 
appointment rights and the amount of the state shareholdings aimed at specifically 
serving the situation established in the case of AEM: since Comune di Milano held 
33.4% shares, it was authorised to directly appoint up to one quarter of the members 
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of the Board of Directors.
131
 This deliberate restraint of appointment rights could 
point towards the Italian government’s intention to justify the measures of Art 2449 
of the Civil Code. Pursuant to the Civil Code, the government’s appointees had the 
same rights and duties as other directors but could only be removed by the same 
bodies that appointed them. The Code also stipulated that provisions of special laws 
shall prevail. The second provision on a directors appointments has been 
implemented into AEM’s corporate statutes pursuant to such special Law 
No.474/1994,
132
 which has been overruled back in 2000 in case C-58/99. 
In Federconsumatori the enabling Law No.474/1994 appears in a new format: 
it has been recast by amendment of Law No.350/2003
133
 but its core features 
remained unchanged, allowing implementation of GSs into company’s statutes and 
granting the government special rights.
134
 Pursuant to Law No.474/1994, there were 
several special rights available at the state’s disposal, however the government chose 
to employ solely the provisions of Article 2(1)(d) Law No.474/1994, introducing 
into AEM’s corporate statutes the special right to appoint a director without voting 
rights.
135
 This special appointment was governed by Article 4(1) of Law 
No.474/1994 which amended Law No.474/1994 and established that if the rights of 
shareholders are limited by company’s statutes, the company in question shall adopt 
in its statutes a special provision to the effect that directors shall be appointed on the 
basis of a list system.
136
 Simply put, in case of exercise of the right of a director 
appointment pursuant to Article 2(1)(d) Law No.474/1994 company directors shall 
be appointed pursuant to a minority list system of Article 4(1) of Law No.474/1994. 
For as long as company’s statutes contain provisions implemented pursuant to 
Article 2(1)(d) Law No.474/1994 the list system provision introduced under Article 
4(1) cannot be amended or removed by the shareholders. 
Pursuant to the provision of a list system, a minimum of one fifth of the 
supervisory board members not directly appointed pursuant to Article 2(1)(d) of 
Law No.474/1994 shall be appointed from minority lists.
137
 To summarise: the 
AEM’s corporate statutes conferred on Comune di Milano not only to directly 
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appoint up to one quarter of the members of the supervisory board, but also to 
choose candidates for the position of a non-voting director. The joint effect of the 
special provisions on directors’ appointments enabled Comune di Milano to hold the 
majority of all appointments to the supervisory board.
138
 This majority of 
appointments would not correlate with Comune di Milano’s 33.4% stake in AEM, 
however this shareholding means that Comune di Milano basically controlled the 
company and this control could remain absolute, as ‘their’ directors could outvote 
any proposed amendments to the company’s statutes.139 
1.3.B: Findings of the Court 
Private shareholders of AEM have complained to the Italian national court, 
claiming that the special appointment provisions discourage investors from 
purchasing shares, since their investment could not guarantee control of the 
company.
140
 The applicants argued that this situation had a negative effect on the 
value of their own shareholdings.
141
 The national court referred the matter for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU which examined the national provisions at issue. The 
CJEU analysed whether Article 63 TFEU on fundamental freedom of capital 
movement must be interpreted
142
 as precluding the joint effect of provisions which 
enable the government to obtain control, disproportionate to its shareholdings. 
Comune di Milano took the view that the Treaty provision on freedom of capital 
movement is irrelevant as directors are appointed according to the corporate statutes 
and not due to specific legislation,
 
also emphasising that provision of the Article 
2449 of the Civil Code is voluntary and applied at the shareholders’ discretion.143  
In this matter the CJEU noted the fact that the rights of appointment of 
directors are based on a provision of private law and this does not preclude the 
application of Article 63 TFEU.
144
 The CJEU had further established that direct 
appointments pursuant to Article 2449 of the Italian Civil Code, enabled the 
government to participate to a greater extent in the control of AEM than its status as 
a shareholder would normally allow.
145
 The CJEU also pointed out that provision of 
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the Civil Code derogates from normal operation of company law, granting the 
appointment rights only for the shareholder-state, and potential investors would be 
unable to remove the special provisions from AEM’s corporate statutes for as long as 
Comune di Milano retained its relative majority shareholding.
146
 These special 
provisions could not be justified as they were not subject to any conditions.
147
 
Therefore, on 6 December 2007, the CJEU established that: Article 63 TFEU must 
be interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as Article 2449 of the Italian 
Civil Code, under which the Articles of Association of a company limited by shares 
may confer on the State or a public body with a shareholding in that company the 
power to appoint directly one or more directors which, on its own or in conjunction 
with a provision such as Article 4 of Law No.474/1994, which grants the national 
authorities the right to participate in the election on the basis of lists of the directors 
it has not appointed directly, is such as to enable that State or public body to obtain a 
power of control which is disproportionate to its shareholding in that company.
148
 
1.3.C: The Ruling Addressed 
While the CJEU has been busy interpreting Article 63 TFEU, the Italian 
government and Comune di Milano had been searching and developing new ways to 
pursue its ‘business as usual’ and retain control over AEM. Since the state 
shareholdings have been gradually reduced due to privatisation to a relative 
majority, Comune di Milano sought to increase its stake in the company. The 
solution came in the manner of a merger. AEM decided to merge with two other 
public utility companies: AMSA (Milan's Environmental Services Company) and gas 
and energy company ASM (Municipal Services Company) which was previously 
owed by the Municipality of Brescia. 
On 4 June 2007, Comune di Milano and the Municipality of Brescia (which 
owned one of the two companies) signed an agreement relating to the guidelines for 
the merger for both directors’ boards.149 The company's merger led to a merger of 
powers of Municipalities in their battle against giving-up of their protectionist 
control over companies which operated in the public service sector. After the 
merger, a new joint-stock company was created – A2A – in which the Municipality 
of Brescia and Comune di Milano held 27.456% and 27.455% of share capital 
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Yet again, the new corporate statutes of A2A contained special arrangements 
which granted special rights to the said Municipalities. These special rights are 
based (no surprise here) on protectionist Law No.474/1994, as amended by Law 
No.474/1994, and by Law No.350/2003. The special rights granted an array of wide-
ranging special rights to the said Municipalities.
150
 For example, Article 9(1) of 
A2A’s statutes imposes a limit on shares that could be held by any shareholder other 
than the Municipality of Brescia and the Municipality of Milan. This Article 
establishes an ownership ceiling at 5%.
151
 Article 9(9) of the corporate statutes in 
turn provides that the voting rights of any shareholdings exceeding 5% of total 
company's share capital may not be exercised. Pursuant to Article 15(3) of A2A’s 
statutes, the two Municipalities have the special right to jointly veto the dissolution 
of the company, its restructuring, and transfer of the businesses and relocation of its 
registered office abroad as well as changes in its corporate purposes. Article 15(3) 
grants the Municipalities with the right to veto any amendments or abolition of 
A2A’s statutes. It must be noted here that the two Municipalities were now jointly 
holding above 50% of share capital in A2A, which would be giving economic 
control over the company to them even under normal operation of company law – in 
contrast to ownership situations such as of TI. But should the Municipalities decide 
to re-privatise some of their shares in the future – this Pandora’s box would be open 
again. 
At the time of writing, special rights are present in corporate statutes of former 
SOEs such as A2A, ENI and TI which it indicates that the battle over GSs 
implemented pursuant to obstructionist Law No.474/1994 continues. Previous 
amendments of Law No.488/1999 and DPCM/2000 failed to provide sufficient level 
of legal certainty for the GSs of Law No.474/1994 and are neither mentioned in 
Federconsumatori, nor in the relevant companies’ statutes. This further supports the 
assumption of insufficiency of these compliance provisions. 
The following paragraphs will review the last bastion of enabling GS Law 
No.474/1994 and its amendments.  
                                                 
150
 Article 9(1) and (7) and (9); Article 14(2); 15(3) of A2A’s corporate by-laws of 14/07/2011, 
available from A2A official web site at: http://www.a2a.eu. 
151
 Article 9(1) of A2A’s corporate by-laws, p.4. 
93 
 
1.4. Privatisation Law of 1994-– a Final Challenge? 
 
This sub-chapter further examines Italy’s resistance to repeal GSs 
implemented pursuant to Law No.474/1994
152
 and its pull towards obstructionist 
non-compliance in course of proceedings in case C-326/07. The analysis 
commences with insight into a non-compliance situation which established 
following the first judgment on case C-58/99, followed by the comparative analysis 
of compliance measures. Section 1.4.A supports the findings of the first sub-chapter: 
the compliance initiative in the first GS case C-58/99 was insufficient and 
inadequate. Section 1.4.B in turn examines the two stages of infringement 
proceedings. Prior to the examination of judicial proceedings, a short introduction 
on two companies further protected by GSs will be presented. Italian compliance 
conduct is analysed in Section 1.4.C revealing whether the government’s 
compliance strategy actually addressed the CJEU ruling on case C-326/07 in good 
faith or whether GSs have retained their protectionist powers post-judgment and 
whether Law No.474/1994 remains an obstructionist piece of national protectionist 
legislation regardless of the third judgment of the CJEU associated with it. This 
analysis will support the core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis of 
this study. 
1.4.A: Amendments: Obstructionist and Insufficient 
As discussed in section 1.1 of this study, for the first time GSs implemented 
pursuant to enabling Law of 1994 have been overruled back in 2000 in case C-
58/99. Prior to the judgment the measures have been amended by Law No.488/1999 
and the criterion for exercise of special rights has been set in DPCM/2000. The 
initial analysis revealed that these compliance measures were insufficient, making 
the Law No.474/1994 an obstructionist piece of national protectionist legislation. As 
these amendments were not ending the initial infringement, on the 5 February 2003 
the Commission initiated second action under what is now Article 258 TFEU and a 
new action under what is now Article 260 TFEU by issuing two formal letters 
accordingly and allocating two months for compliance (European Commission 
IP/03/177). The first letter related to the amendments set in Law No.488/1999 and 
justification criteria set in DPCM/2000 while the second letter related to the 
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discriminatory provision on eligible professionals of Article 1(5) of Law 
No.474/1994. 
Interestingly enough the infringement procedure on compliance with the 
judgment has been divided into two separate judicial proceedings: firstly on GSs and 
secondly on discriminatory provision. This procedural division signifies that the 
initial Italian ‘compliance’ strategy is functioning as predicted in the previous 
analysis: the judgment would seem to be addressed if the government implements 
compliance measures which amend GSs in question. Even though the compliance 
initiatives could be subsequently found insufficient and inadequate, initially they 
could be deemed as adequate compliance measures by the Commission. The 
inefficiency of amendments to Law No.474/1994 might be of less significance than 
in case of urgent protectionist ‘anti-EdF’ Law No.192/2001 which became the 
subject of judgment on case C-174/04 (section 1.2 of this study). It could be the case 
that, since Article 2 of Law No.474/1994 does not infringe the Treaty as such, the 
subsequent amendments of the way in which the GSs could be exercised are 
approached in a different manner than the expressly discriminatory provisions of 
Article 1(5) of Law No.474/1994 or clearly protectionist provisions of urgent Law 
No.192/2001 (featured in case C-174/04). However, in any case it is unclear why the 
Commission had to wait almost three years before it requested the particulars on 
compliance measures from the Italian authorities. This regards particularly the 
discriminatory provision of Article 1(5), since the compliance with this part of the 
judgment on case C-58/99 would be relatively simple – it had to be repealed. 
1.4.B: New Amendments and New Proceedings 
Following the formal letter issued under what is now Article 260 TFEU the 
Italian government informed the Commission that on 1 March 2002
153
 it has 
repealed the discriminatory provision of Article 1(5) of Law No.474/1994 – almost 
two years after the judgment. First of all, it is necessary to stress that the compliance 
measures, simple as they may seem, were not implemented immediately following 
the judgment – the government led by Berlusconi postponed compliance, supporting 
the core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis of this study (H1). This 
implies acting in bad faith towards sincere cooperation obligation and duty to 
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comply with the binding judgments of the CJEU. Secondly, it is apparent that the 
Commission initiated further proceedings for non-compliance as it has been unaware 
of the Italian compliance. The failure to inform the Commission on measures 
undertaken could also point towards behaviour which is contrary to a sincere 
cooperation principle. It is sufficient to conclude that even though there could be 
several signs of ignorance of the loyalty obligation, the discriminatory measure has 
been removed at last. 
As regarding the GS provisions of Article 2 of Law No.474/1994, in June 
2003 the government replied to the formal letter with a controversial statement, 
saying that Law No.488/1999 and DPCM/2000 were in fact consequences to the 
ruling on case C-58/99 (which came three months following the compliance 
measures).
154
 In November 2003 Italy has reassured the Commission that it will 
implement necessary provisions amending Article 2 of Law No.474/1994 to comply 
with the judgment by the end of the year.
155
 The relevant Law No.350/2003
156
 has 
been promptly implemented on 24 December 2003. 
Pursuant to the amendment, the law allowed for the creation of identical 
special rights as contained in Law No.474/1994
157
 with one major exception relating 
to the director’s appointment right. This provision, which featured in 
Federconsumatori, now allowed for the appointment of only one non-voting 
director. Also previously Law No.474/1994 presented the government with a right to 
grant express approvals (ex ante measure) or a right to oppose acquisitions and 
shareholders’ agreements (ex post measure). Following the amendment the right to 
grant approvals is no longer available, only the right to opposition has remained, 
which could be seen as a less restrictive ex post measure. This amendment signifies 
that in cases where the government has not exercised its right of opposition the 
acquisition/shareholders’ agreement would be deemed as approved by silence. 
Another major modification related to the period allocated for the issue of 
decisions on opposition of acquisitions or shareholders’ agreements. Law 
No.350/2003 considerably shortened this ‘reflection period’ – now the government 
could issue its opposition within ten days (instead of the previous sixty days) 
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following the assessment of the relevant transaction’s possibility to jeopardise any 
vital interests of the state. For this period a stand-by clause would apply, precluding 
the acquirer from exercising of any non-economic rights. The Law No.350/2003 
now expressly provides that both opposition and veto rights could now be appealed 
within sixty days before the national Court. The rights to oppositions could also be 
evoked within ten days from the occurrence of a situation in which the need to 
protect the overriding public interest would arise. In this case the exercise of special 
rights must contain explicit and reasoned reference to the date on which such 
overriding reasons have occurred. The special right of veto basically remains 
unchanged apart from the introduction of the new requirement obliging the 
government to provide reasons for veto imposition, explaining why vetoed decisions 
could pose a threat to the vital interests of the state. 
Pursuant to Law No.350/2003 the government had to issue further decrees, 
setting the criteria for the exercise of GSs, which in turn means that Law 
No.350/2003 actually does not comply with the CJEU’s judgment by itself as 
previously stipulated by the Italian authorities, yet it merely establishes a platform 
for further justifications. The DPCM/2004
158
 represented a long-awaited 
justification, stipulating that special rights could be exercised only ‘when justified 
by important and compelling reasons in the public interest concerning […] public 
policy, public security, public health and defence, and shall take the form of 
measures appropriate and proportionate to the protection of those interests, such as 
the application of appropriate time limits, without prejudice to observance of the 
principles of domestic and EU law and, above all, of the principle of non-
discrimination.’159 DPCM/2004 provided that the opposition and veto rights could 
be exercised in cases which could result in a real and serious risk to: (a) interruption 
of the minimum national supply of goods and services essential to the public as a 
whole; (b) continuous performance of obligations vis-à-vis the public as a whole in 
connection with the supply of public services and to the performance of the duties 
entrusted to the company in order to serve the public interest; (c) the security of 
plant and networks in essential public services; (d) national defence, military 
security, public policy and public security; (e) health emergencies. 
In summary, amendments which sought to comply with the judgment on case 
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C-58/99 include: limitation to directors’ appointment rights, introduction of a ten-
day ‘reflection period’ during which an appropriate, proportionate and non-
discriminatory ex ante opposition or veto (which is also subject to judicial review), 
could be rationally applied if justified by overriding public interest as established by 
DPCM/2004. In comparison to initial amendments of 1999 and 2000, the Law 
No.350/2003 and DPCM/2004 went further in an attempt to limit the discretion of 
the state. These compliance measures reveal that some level of uncertainty remains 
since it is not sufficiently clear what entails ‘real and serious risk’ and when the GSs 
could be triggered. Both Law No.350/2003 and DPCM/2004 are relied upon as 
measures for justification for GSs in corporate statutes of ENI, TI and AEM. Since 
these companies’ statutes still rely on Law No.350/2003 and DPCM/2004 on the day 
of writing it means that these provisions are still in force, confirming their 
obstructionist character. Yet were they actually sufficient to comply with the 
judgment on case C-58/99? 
It appears that they were deemed insufficient, since on 22 December 2004 the 
Commission issued another formal letter giving Italy two months for compliance.
160 
On 24 May 2005 the newly re-elected government led by Berlusconi has boldly 
declared that Law No.474/1994 and DPCM/2004 are in fact GSs that are in 
conformity with the Treaty.
161
 The Commission issued a reasoned opinion on 18 
October 2005, setting yet another two month compliance period. 
At the time it had been more than five years since the GSs incorporated into 
statutes of the two Italian companies TI and ENI pursuant to Law No.474/1994 were 
overruled by the CJEU in case C-58/99. It has been one and a half years since the 
GSs have been incorporated into statutes of AEM in a newly amended format of Law 
No.350/2003 – and one year since the latter provision has been referred to the CJEU 
for preliminary ruling in Federconsumatori. Nevertheless, the special rights of the 
controversial Law No.474/1994 were yet again introduced into statutes of another 
two companies: former electricity monopolist and present dominant Italian energy 
company ENEL and FINMECCANICA (operating in aerospace and defence). 
Corporate statutes of both ENEL (last edited on 21 May 2012) and 
FINMECCANICA (16 May 2012) mirrored one another and so do those of ENI and 
TI on the subject of special rights and their execution. 
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Italy persisted in non-compliance, so the Commission had lodged an 
application to the CJEU on 13 July 2007. The justifications for GSs of Law 
No.474/1994 have been put to judicial scrutiny once again – eight years after the 
first judgment in 2000. Firstly, in its application the Commission has criticised the 
‘real and serious risk’ criterion of DPCM/2004 for being general, imprecise and 
leaving too much leeway for governmental discretion.
162
 Secondly, the Commission 
acknowledged that GSs justified on the basis of the Treaty exceptions or by 
overriding reasons in public interest could be applied in areas that have not been 
subject to EU harmonisation law, providing for measures necessary to ensure the 
protection of the fundamental interests of the state.
163
 Since energy, telecoms and 
transportation sectors were subject of a number of harmonising directives any 
further measures at MS level would be seen as more restrictive per se.
164
 
In its defence Italy has challenged the Commission’s analysis and arguments 
on four points, particularly stating that the Commission has focused on the alleged 
illegality of the GSs provisions of Law No.474/1994 and not on DPCM/2004 which 
is subject of the present infringement action, so the alleged unlawfulness of Law 
No.474/1994 is not covered by the present action and the Commission’s main 
complaints cannot be upheld.
165
 Italy also contended the Commission’s arguments 
on applicability of harmonising directives by maintaining that ‘there is nothing to 
stop the MSs from adopting […] measures creating powers to intervene going even 
further than the provisions of those directives’.166 The defendant also maintained 
that ‘domestic legislation is more suitable than EU legislation for regulating 
situations presenting a risk to the vital interests of the state, situations that only the 
state can evaluate correctly and in good time’.167 The Italian authorities also 
contended the Commission’s arguments on legal uncertainty of the GSs use, 
specifying that only when a potentially threatening investor appears the special 
rights would be applied, and that it is not possible to foresee in advance what and 
who exactly would qualify as being in possession of a threat to the state.
168
 
The CJEU held that, contrary to the Italian arguments, the Commission has not 
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extended the subject-matter of the dispute as it is challenging not the GSs of Law 
No.474/1994 itself but the criteria for their application as provided by 
DPCM/2004.
169
 Regarding the criteria for GSs application, as laid down by 
DPCM/2004, the CJEU has ruled that it is general and imprecise: neither the mere 
statement that the GSs must be exercised in accordance with the Treaty nor the fact 
that they could be judicially reviewed is enough to make these protectionist laws 
justified.
170
 On 26 March 2009 the Court has established that by adopting 
DPCM/2004 which defined the criteria for exercise of GSs implemented pursuant to 
Law No.474/1994, Italy has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. 
1.4.C: Compliance v Non-compliance: From Golden Shares to Golden Rights 
Following the judgment the government, now again led by Prime Minister 
Berlusconi, had to comply as soon as possible. Yet again, this time around the 
government has adopted a familiar pattern previously applied in complying with 
other GS cases: firstly by informing the Commission of intention to comply and 
secondly, by leaving this intention not followed up by necessary actions (European 
Commission IP/09/1755). On 23 November 2009 the Commission issued a formal 
letter under procedure of Article 260 TFEU followed by additional formal notice of 
22 March 2010.
171
 On 20 May 2010 Berlusconi has issued DPCM/2010
172
 which 
aimed at addressing the CJEU’s judgment. It is necessary to note here that following 
this compliance measure on 24 June 2010 the Commission has closed the 
infringement procedure against Italy in a view of implementation of the foresaid 
measure.
173
 The compliance DPCM/2010 appears to be even more controversial, as 
it consisted of a sole article that in turn comprised of a single sentence: repealing the 
provisions of DPCM/2004 which laid down the criteria for exercise of GSs. By 
eliminating the sole justification of GSs the government has ‘complied’ with the 
judgment on case C-326/07 which established that criteria for GSs application laid 
down in DPCM/2004 are contrary to the Treaty. DPCM/2010 does not justify or 
eliminate GSs and appears to be a misleading compliance measure which only aims 
at further procrastination, acting as another smoke screen. The Commission has 
decided to terminate the proceedings since it considered that Italy has satisfactorily 
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amended the contested GS law. However it is evident that the above compliance 
measures are inadequate and after more than a year since the Commission’s last call 
to Italy for compliance there has been no adequate compliance in sight. 
Despite the announcement that the infringement procedure on the matter has 
been closed on 24 June 2010, the Commission issued a reasoned opinion on 16 
February 2011: a two month compliance countdown started once again (European 
Commission IP/11/175). During that time the Italian government has been going 
through one of the most difficult economic and political crises in its modern history: 
the European debt crisis. It has been a ‘lucky co-incidence’ that the need to comply 
and adopt a new GSs legislation has coincided with some radical changes within the 
Italian government following Berlusconi’s resignation on 12 February 2011. The 
new technocratic government, which had no partisan figures, has been formed in 
order to implement urgent austerity measures for strengthening the competitiveness 
of Italy (The New York Times 13/11/2011). There was a need for severe and urgent 
measures and the new formally appointed Prime Minister Mario Monti, the former 
EU Competition Commissioner known for his tough stance on pro-European 
integration and competition enhancement, was determined to implement such 
unpopular economic measures before the elections in April 2013. Amendment of 
GSs provisions would fall within that scope. 
On 24 November 2011 the Commission had decided to refer Italy back to the 
CJEU, however Monti went to reassure that compliance could be introduced in the 
very near future, so the Commission postponed the execution of this referral by one 
month (European Commission IP/11/1443). This bouncing around of re-assuring 
promises to alter overruled GSs and urgings by the Commission to finally comply 
had to come to an end: either through a second referral or by new measures which 
had to be introduced by late December 2011/early January 2012. 
As seen from the previous sub-chapters Italy is notorious for its 
procrastination and reluctance to comply with judgments on GSs, so it could be 
predicted that minimalist and insufficient amendments to GSs could once again 
reappear in the present case, causing obstructionist non-compliance. Inadequate 
compliance measures could have been introduced to further defend the protectionist 
effects of the Law No.474/1994. Yet since the technocratic government was outside 
of partisan politics its compliance measures would not require popular approval, 
allowing for implementation of the most restraining amendments to GSs provisions. 
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On 14 May 2012, four months after the set compliance deadline a new golden 
share Law No.21/2012
174
 entered into force, recasting Law No.474/1994. The long-
awaited compliance measure limits the government’s discretion and deals 
exclusively with GSs held in two types of companies: Article 1 covered those 
operating in defence and national security, and Article 2 covered companies holding 
strategic assets in energy, transport and telecommunications industries. 
From the onset it is apparent that Law No.21/2012 has a wider scope of 
application since it applies to all companies operating in defence or national security 
and to all companies that hold strategically-important assets, not only to companies 
which are subject to privatisation. Law No.21/2012 had to be followed by a set of 
further decrees covering each type of eligible companies and identifying companies, 
assets, plants and relationships which could be subject to GSs. 
As the following summary of the provisions reveals, the GSs and criteria for 
their exercise appear to be less generic. 
Article 1 of Law No.21/2012 provides that GSs in defence and national 
security companies could be used in case of a serious threat to the essential interests 
of defence and security of the state, so the government could: (a) impose conditions 
on the acquisition by any person, (b) veto resolutions concerning important 
decisions and (c) oppose share acquisition by any person other than the state when 
such acquisition would provide an acquirer, with voting rights which could 
jeopardise the interests of defence and national security. Article 1 of Law 
No.21/2012 further sets the pre-conditions which have to be assessed in order to 
evaluate the seriousness of a potential threat to the essential interests, such as: the 
purpose of the resolution, the strategic assets or businesses subject to the transfer, 
international interests of the state, protection of the national territory or critical 
infrastructure. For evaluation the government shall, in accordance with the 
principles of proportionality and reasonableness, apply a fit-and-proper test in light 
of the buyer’s potential influence on society. The government would assess a set of 
characteristics which would reveal whether the acquirer could adequately carry out 
the relevant activities in strategic industries and ensure the continuity of supply. It 
would determine whether acquirer is reliable and has no threatening or risky links 
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 Decree-Law No.21 of 15/03/2012 ‘Rules on special rights for companies in the defence and 
national security sector, as well as for the activities of strategic importance in the fields of energy, 
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(GU No.111 14/05/2012), available in Italian at: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-
res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2012-03-15;21!vig (last accessed on 24/09/2014). 
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that could undermine the secure delivery of services or jeopardise interests of 
defence and national security. Article 1 of Law No.21/2012 established an ex ante 
notification regime obliging companies to notify the government within ten days 
prior to implementation of any relevant resolution or acquisition. The government 
can exercise its special right within fifteen days following notification and this 
‘reflection period’ could be suspended once for a period of ten days. 
Article 2 of Law No.21/2012 establishes similar GSs regime covering strategic 
assets (including companies, plants, assets and relationships) in the energy, transport 
and communications sectors which are vital to ensure the minimum supply and the 
continuity of essential public goods and services. Article 2 established an ex ante 
notification regime obliging company holding strategic assets to notify the 
government within ten days prior to adoption of any strategic resolution or prior to 
acquisitions of ‘strategic assets’ by companies or residents originating from a non-
EU country. Article 2 specifies that the government could veto the resolution or 
acquisition within fifteen days if it could possess an actual and serious threat to the 
public interests of safety and operation of networks, services and plants and to 
continuity of any vital supply of such services. The special rights could be exercised 
only in an exceptional situation where the public interest relating to the safety and 
operation of any strategic asset may be materially jeopardised, if it is necessary to 
ensure the continuity of supply, the maintenance, safety and operation of networks 
and facilities and the free access to the market and also if such exceptional situation 
is not addressed by any relevant domestic or European regulation. Article 2 of Law 
No.21/2012 states that the special rights should be non-discriminatory and exercised 
solely on the basis of objective criteria. To this end, the government shall consider a 
similar fit-and-proper test of reliability and adequacy as applied in regime 
established by Article 1 of Law No.21/2012. 
Both Articles 1 and 2 of Law No.21/2012 provide that during the fifteen day 
‘reflection period’ a stand-by clause applies, suspending any non-economic rights 
attached to the relevant shareholding. Similarly, in both types of companies, veto 
and opposition rights could be exercised in the form of imposition of specific 
conditions sufficient to safeguard essential interests. All non-economic rights shall 
be suspended if the potential investor does not comply with the said conditions. Both 
Articles 1 and 2 provide that any relevant resolutions and acquisitions which are not 
notified to the government are null and void, while the failure to notify will be 
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subject to an administrative fine. All the notified transactions can be accomplished 
and non-economic rights exercised after the expiry of the ‘reflection period’. In 
cases of a veto or an opposition the shareholding in question shall be suspended of 
any non-economic rights and the acquirer must dispose of its shareholdings within 
one year. 
To summarise: the new GSs of Law No.21/2012 seems to be much fitter to 
adequately address the CJEU’s judgments on cases C-58/99 and C-326/07, since it 
appears to establish a comprehensive, legally certain and precise investment control 
regime in the strategic sectors. One of the central provisions of the law is the fit-and-
proper test applied to a potential acquirer. The director’s appointment right is no 
longer available, while obligation of ex ante notification to the government and a 
fifteen day stand-by clause seems to be primarily oriented on extra-EU investors. 
Provisions that govern GSs in defence and security companies seems to be 
justifiable, however provisions on strategically-important assets could once again be 
challenged, since the Law No.21/2012 leaves room for discretion as it does not 
specify what an ‘actual and serious threat’ would involve. The above mentioned 
vagueness could be addressed by the implementation of further decrees which could 
bring more clarity and legal certainty to these provisions. 
The decrees were to be implemented in September (for energy, transport and 
telecoms) and August (for defence and security) 2012. However, due to the new 
developments on the Italian political arena, in spite of the technocratic government’s 
promises, it became clear that the necessary decrees would not be implemented in 
time. On 8 December 2012 Monti had to resign after losing the support of 
Berlusconi’s party, so leaving the GS issue unsettled (BBC News Online 8/12/2012; 
Financial Times 28/12/2012). Following his resignation, new elections were due on 
24-25 February 2013 (BBC News Online 22/12/2012). In the meantime the old GS 
regime of DPCM/2004 and Law No.350/2003 still applies and the Italian 
government enjoys special rights in A2A, ENI, TI, ENEL and FINMECCANICA - 
companies in which the execution of these rights has been found to be contrary to 
the Treaty. 
The Commission is currently looking at the Law No.21/2012, but with 
reservation for further decrees, since the new GS regime, as a whole, could only be 
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evaluated after all legislative measures are implemented.
175
 However, as the 
supporting hypothesis on the effectiveness of minimalist compliance of this study 
suggests (H1a), amendments to GSs is likely to be insufficient to fully comply, so 
the complete repeal of GSs of Law No.474/1994 and compliance with both 
judgments on cases C-55/98 and C-326/07 seems to be once again avoided. This 
obstinate non-compliance situation proves that Italy has acted in bad faith and 
contrary to the sincere cooperation principle. In the light of all of the above, the core 
enforcement effectiveness hypothesis of this study (H1) is confirmed for both cases 
C-58/99 and C-326/07. Taking the great number of compliance ‘by amendment’ 
attempts and their subsequent inefficiency and inadequacy, the supporting 
hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) is also confirmed for 
both cases. In a similar vein, the fact that the Commission had to initiate 
enforcement action for non-compliance under Article 260 TFEU for both cases and 
since ultimate compliance has been (hypothetically) achieved only at the advanced 
stages of the procedure, the hypothesis on effectiveness of the penalty procedure 
(H2) is also confirmed.  
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 Here it is sufficient to provide updates on the issue. Following the numerous amendments and 
repeals the four implementing decrees have finally entered into force in 2014 (DPCM No.108 of 
6/06/2014, in force from 15/08/2014; DPCM No.35 of 19/02/2014, in force from 21/03/2014; DPCM 
No.85 of 25/03/2014 and DPCM No.86 of 25/03/2014 in force from 7/06/2014). These decrees 
identified the strategic assets in the energy, telecoms and transportation sectors (DPCMs No.85, 
No.86) and defence sector (DPCMs No.35, No.108) that are subject to the special regime. Special 
powers reserved for the government have been repealed from corporate by-laws of ENI (20/11/2014), 
ENEL (30/07/2014), A2A (12/06/2014), TI (26/06/2014) and FINMECCANICA (25/09/2014). In 
respect of the latter company, its corporate by-laws provide that the acquirer of stakes in excess of 3-
25% thresholds is required to notify the government of acquisition so that the state could exercise its 
special powers. The new Italian legislation on state’s special powers (see note 174) together with four 
implementing decrees improves significantly the legal framework. Currently the Commission 
services are assessing its full compliance with EU law. Following the adoption of the implementing 
decrees in 2014, the former legislation challenged in the infringement case for non-compliance with 
the CJEU’s judgment on case C-326/07 is no longer in force. The case is still open pending the 
comprehensive assessment of the new legislation. 
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Concluding Analysis and Remarks on Italian Golden Share Cases 
As the implementation of urgent GSs of ‘anti-EdF’ Law has demonstrated, the 
Italian government has proved to be quick to urgently and promptly implement GSs 
when the necessity arose. However the government was not that willing and prompt 
on removing the overruled GSs, resorting to non-compliance with the CJEU’s 
judgments, rendering the enforcement action under Article 258 TFEU ineffective in 
facilitating prompt compliance. The government has been willing to justify the 
existing GSs, however some (or most) of these justifications were genuinely vague 
and inadequate. This in turn has left the possibility of further disputes over the 
legality of GSs. Over a decade has passed since the first judgment on case C-58/99 
and overall there have been three rulings and one referral. Three out of the four 
cases concerned Law No.474/1994 which has undergone the largest number of 
amendments, yet the matter of non-compliance still goes on (as of July 2012), 
pointing towards obstructionist nature of the measures and resulting in action 
contrary to the sincere cooperation principle and in bad faith. The GSs have been 
contested in four Italian cases over the period of a decade. As a result, the 
Commission’s clear-cut position on the GSs coupled with agenda-setting case-law of 
the CJEU failed to facilitate significant policy shift at the national level. 
Consequently, Italy’s continuous willingness to employ GSs over the years, 
confirms the hypothesis on ineffectiveness of the Commission’s and the CJEU’s 
policy-setting (H3) for all Italian cases. 
Analysis of Italian cases revealed that only in one case C-174/04 compliance 
has been ultimately achieved, yet it cannot qualify as compliance in good faith. Here 
the government repealed GSs, but only following insufficient compliance attempts, 
only as reaction to the imminence of referral for non-compliance with the original 
judgment and only after a considerable delay. The battle over GSs of Law 
No.474/1994 has been a long-lasting one. Found unlawful back in 2000, amended 
by measures of 1999 and 2000, in Federconsumatori it emerged in a new format 
following amendments of 2003 and 2004, and subsequently ‘amended’ by 
Berlusconi in 2010 with no further conditions or justifications for GSs application. 
The GSs enacted pursuant to enabling Law No.474/1994 have been repeatedly left 
unjustified which supports the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of compliance 
‘by amendment’ (H1a). Finally, through numerous amendments, the contested GSs 
seem to come to terms with the Treaty. Along the way to justification from Law 
106 
 
No.474/1994 to Law No.21/2012 lays a large number of political undertakings to 
comply, blunted by numerous procrastinations and obstructionist non-compliance, 
and as a result contributing to the establishment of a ‘stalemate’ on compliance 
between the Commission and Italy. The case of urgent provisions which have been 
implemented in order to finally comply with case C-174/04 could serve as a good 
example of how GSs judgments must be addressed – not by amendments, but by full 
repeal. However, as the enabling Law No.474/1994 itself is not contrary to the 
Treaty, the government appears to be willing to find a ‘cure’ to flawed GSs instead 
of striking them off and implementing compliance measures such as Law 
No.350/2003, DPCM/2004 and DPCM/2010 and Law No.21/2012. Twelve years 
since their use has been outlawed, the special rights of the state are still very much 
alive in latest GS Law No.21/2012. 
A lack of political will to comply with the judgments and to let go of GSs 
appears to be balanced out by the excess of political will to lawfully protect strategic 
industries. The new GSs of Law No.21/2012, which appeared through trial and 
error, seem to be working in synergy with the Treaty. However, since the law itself 
remains inactive well past the estimated compliance deadlines and as the political 
battle continues, it is highly unlikely that further decrees would represent 
appropriate compliance measures or would be introduced any time soon.
176
 After 
more than a decade full of procrastination and inadequate compliance initiatives, 
Italy seemed to move away from unjustified dirigisme and state control towards 
justified and predictable regime for regulation of investments in key strategic 
companies. However grand were the expectations of Monti’s Law, it could all be 
proved unfruitful once more, since non-compliance persists despite all reassurances. 
It could be concluded that Italy acted in bad faith when addressing the obligations 
stemming from the GSs judgments, revealing a significant trend of obstructionist 
non-compliance. 
To summarise: the compliance analysis with the judgments on cases C-58/99, 
C-326/07 and C-174/04 has revealed that majority of compliance measures proved 
to be of minimalist character, insufficient and inadequate. This finding confirms the 
supporting hypotheses on effectiveness of compliance ‘by amendments’ (H1a). 
Consequently in all three cases issued pursuant to Article 258 TFEU (C-58/99, C-
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326/07 and C-174/04) the Commission had to initiate the second round of 
infringement proceedings. This fact confirms that the first round enforcement action 
has proved to be ineffective, which confirms the core effectiveness hypothesis of 
this study (H1). Likewise, ultimate compliance measures were implemented only at 
advanced stages of the second enforcement action, which implies that effective 
compliance with GSs cases could only be achieved if penalties are likely to be 
applied in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the second effectiveness hypothesis 
(H2) is confirmed for the three Italian cases ruled under Article 258 TFEU. The 
latest judgment on Italian GSs (C-326/07) has been issued in 2009, by the time the 
EU institutions’ position on the said protectionist measures has been fully developed 
and confirmed on a numerous occasions. Italy’s desire to retain and justify GSs 
despite the presence of such clear-cut policy reveals that it has failed to comply with 
the judgment in a timely and proper manner. Consequently, the hypothesis on 
ineffectiveness of EU’s policy-setting (H3) is confirmed for all four Italian cases. In 
conclusion it is necessary to emphasise, that the Italian state has made a significant 
effort to define and limit its GS regime. In case if the Commission’s services accept 
the implementing decrees as satisfactory compliance measures, Italy could be seen 
as a MS that successfully achieved its goal in justifying state intervention into 
operation of private companies. 
The obstructionist protectionism of Italian cases shall be mirrored in the 
Spanish cases analysed in the following chapter.  
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2. Spain: Golden Share Network - Overlaps and Substitutions 
 
Introduction on Spain 
Government’s control over strategic companies has a lasting history in Spain, 
dating back to a widespread nationalisation of industries under military dictatorship 
of Franco. Until Franco’s death in 1975, authoritarian governments owned and 
controlled the majority of strategic industries, putting non-economic goals above 
corporate policy objectives (Bortolotti, Milella 2006: 9). In order reduce budgetary 
deficits (Pardo 2011: 172) the government launched ambitious privatisation in 1989 
(Ortega, Sánchez 2001) subsequently making Spain one of the few MSs (alongside 
the UK) that has fully privatised majority of its key industries. It could be seen as a 
‘pace-setter’ in liberalizing electricity (Clifton et al 2010: 1003). However, 
privatisation was not followed by actual market deregulation as state-owed 
monopolies became privately-held monopolies and long transition periods allowed 
key industries to remain under state protection (Pardo 2011: 168, 172). For the most 
valuable national companies the Spanish government has implemented GSs. While 
enjoying competitive advantage some Spanish companies actively expanded into 
international arena, quickly growing into multinationals and ‘world-beaters’ (Pardo 
2011: 172; The Economist 6/11/2008; The Telegraph 1/10/2006). The Spanish 
Government has been highly protectionist allowing the usage of different CEMs 
such as pyramid structures, shareholders agreements and voting right ceilings.
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Spanish political parties and electorate have eagerly supported EU integration and 
Spain has greatly benefited from the membership (Pardo 2011: 168; Pardo 2012: 13; 
Farrell 2010: 167), however over time tensions emerged in the Spanish-EU relations 
as national interests were no longer defined as reflecting interests of the Union 
(Farrell 2004: 215, 218). 
When it comes to compliance with EU law, Spain could be seen acting in 
accordance with its reputation of a ‘good European’ (Farrell 2010: 167) which does 
not persist in violation and goes to great lengths to avoid referral to the CJEU 
(Tallberg, Jönsson 2001: 26; Börzel 2001: 811, 820; Börzel et al 2010: 4). However, 
the analysis of this chapter reveals that Spain could intentionally resist complying 
when it comes to GSs, promptly imposing barriers to the free market when there is 
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an urgent need to block cross-border acquisitions. Following the condemning 
judgments GSs were not as promptly repealed as they were introduced and the 
government resorted to procrastination and non-compliance. In all analysed GSs 
cases final compliance has only been achieved after deliberate procrastination and 
inadequate amendments which triggered second referrals for non-compliance with 
the judgments. As it will be shown, Spain tends to comply only when the GSs in 
question have served up to their protectionist goals.  
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2.1. Law No.5/1995: First Spanish Golden Share Case C-463/00 
 
This sub-chapter analyses Spain’s compliance with the first GS judgment and 
is organised as follows: Section 2.1.A discloses GSs, Section 2.1.B analyses 
compliance conduct during judicial proceedings, followed by Section 2.1.C which 
assesses compliance obligations. Section 2.1.D concludes with analysis of 
compliance initiative revealing subsequent implications. 
2.1.A: Special Rights 
Spain was well on the way to open its markets to full competition. However on 
23 March 1995 the Spanish government chose to allow creation of GSs by 
implementing privatisation Law No.5/1995.
178
 The law established a framework for 
prior administrative approval regime applicable for certain resolutions in companies 
that provide services of general public interest. The government revealed much 
about expressly protectionist aims of ex ante approval in preamble to the Law 
No.5/1995, stating that it aims to replace public participation with state-led control 
in private strategic companies.
179
 The government justified such intervention by the 
necessity to protect security and performance of companies on the grounds of public 
interest and security. According to the government, the approval regime is fully 
compliant with the Treaty, does not impair competition and represent a less intrusive 
protectionist measure since it has an automatic expiry date, could apply only to 
limited types of resolutions and could be suspended at any time in cases when public 
interests that sustained it ceased to exist.
180
 
Pursuant to Law No.5/1995, the said approval regime would apply to 
privatised companies (and groups of companies) which are controlled by the 
government and provide essential or public services, engage in activities which are 
subject to specific administrative review procedures, or their activities are exempt 
from the rules on competition under the Treaty.
181
 GSs must be implemented by 
further company-specific Royal Decrees prior to disposal of government control, 
granting the government with the special right to approve resolutions relating to 
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 Case C-463/00 Spain, note 19, para.9. 
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company’s dissolution, merger or de-merger, disposal of strategic assets and change 
of the company’s objectives. The Royal Decrees could also enact approvals for 
transactions that reduce government’s shareholding by 10% and also for share 
acquisitions, where such acquisitions would result in a holding of at least 10% of the 
total share capital of a relevant company. The voting rights of any acquisitions in 
excess of the established 10% ceiling were suspended. Pursuant to the Law 
No.5/1995, the government has to issue its approval within one month. In case of the 
absence of express approval any resolutions or acquisitions are null and void. 
Approval regime could have been modified or withdrawn by implementation of a 
separate Royal Decree. 
Further company-specific Royal Decrees
182
 were implemented for the Spanish 
strategic companies, setting timeframes during which the approval regime should be 
effective. The table below is a short overview of relevant companies and regimes. 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of the Companies and Relevant Golden Shares 
Regimes 
The first company subjected to GSs was Repsol – one of the biggest European 
oil and gas companies. Secondly GSs were implemented for Telefónica (e.g. Adell 
1997: 206) – at a time one of the most profitable telecommunication companies in 
Spain. Later, the government introduced GSs for Endesa (the biggest electricity 
producer and national utility company), Argentaria (it was a third largest Spanish 
bank) and Tabacalera (the oldest tobacco company in the world and a state tobacco 
monopoly). Two of the latter companies did not provide services of vital public 
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 Royal Decrees: Repsol – No.3 of 15/01/1996 (BOE No.14 of 16 /01/1996); Telefónica - No.8 of 
10/01/1997 (BOE No.10 of 11/01/1997); Argentaria – No. 40 of 16/01/1998 (BOE No.15 of 
17/01/1998); Tabacalera – No.552 of 2/04/1998 (BOE No.80 of 3/04/1998); Endesa – No.929 of 
1405/1998 (BOE No.129 of 30/05/1998); Indra – No. 482 of 18/03/1999 (BOE No.67 of 19/03/ 
1999); Iberia – No.343 of 4/04/2001 (BOE No.82 of 5/04/2001). 
Company Royal-Decree Nr. Entry into Force  Effective for Estimated expiry date
Repsol 3/1996 16 January 1996 10 years 6 February 2006
Telefónica 8/1997 11 January 1997 10 years 18 February 2007
Argentaria 40/1998 16 January  1998 3 years (+1 year extension) 17 January 2001
Tabacalera 552/1998 3 April 1998 8 years 28 April 2006
ENDESA 929/1998 30 May 1998 10 years 8 June 2007
Indra 482/1999 19 January 1999 5 years (+2 year extension) 18 March 2006
Iberia 343/2001 5 April 2001 5 years (+2 year extension) 3 April 2006
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interest, however other companies did. GSs in two other companies Indra (defence 
and electronics) and Iberia (airline) were implemented at a later stage and were not 
subject to infringement procedure. The approval regime of Law No.5/1995, in 
exclusion of two cases, could be justified, yet it represents an ex ante mechanism, 
which is more restrictive than ex post measures. To conclude, GSs created pursuant 
to privatisation law of 1995 applied for a limited period of time, in a limited number 
of companies, yet they were overly restrictive and imprecise, therefore prompting 
the Commission to intervene. 
2.1.B: Judicial Proceedings and Compliance 
The Spanish government has promptly replied to the Commission’s formal 
letter justifying the approval regime and subsequently clarifying its position on 
compatibility of the measures in supplementary letter from 18 March 1999 
(European Commission IP/99/579). The following day Spain implemented another 
Royal Decree, establishing a five year approval regime for Indra. On 2 August 1999 
the Commission issued a reasoned opinion allocating two months for compliance. 
Spain replied with a three-month delay reiterating its previous statements. At the 
same time the government has been aware that justifying special rights in banking 
and tobacco companies would be impossible, so it undertook some steps towards 
compliance. 
The government did not address the three year regime of Argentaria by simply 
allowing it to expire, yet it has withdrawn the eight year regime in Tabacalera after 
making several considerable adjustments to the Spanish tobacco market. The 
government has significantly re-enforced Tabacalera’s position in the European 
market by means of new protectionist Tobacco Law
183
 (which allowed it to regulate 
imports) and a friendly merger with another former state tobacco monopoly 
originating from ‘friendly’ MS – France (e.g. El Pais 5/10/1999; El Pais 
23/10/1997). The resulting company Altadis has established its seat in Madrid (El 
Pais 6/10/1999), meaning that Tabacalera retained its Spanish identity and the 
government’s objectives have been achieved, so that GSs could now be relinquished 
without any delay. In 2000 the government amended
184
 the term for the duration of 
GSs applicable to Tabacalera, also pointing out that one of the reasons behind this 
move is the introduction of Tobacco Law. 
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Following an eight-month deliberation the Commission had decided to refer 
the matter to the Court, lodging an application on 21 December 2000 (European 
Commission IP/00/715). One month later the GSs in Argentaria have expired, and 
prior to this event the government has strengthened the company’s competitiveness 
via a merger with a larger Spanish bank BBV (El Pais 20/10/1999; El Pais 
19/05/2002). Even though the GSs of Law No.5/1995 have been put to the CJEU’s 
scrutiny, it did not preclude the government to introduce new such measures in 2001 
for Iberia. 
During the judicial stage Spain has pleaded that the action is inadmissible, 
basically contending the precision of the Commission’s application as GSs in 
Argentaria and Tabacalera have expired and the Commission referred to incorrect 
paragraph of Law No.5/1995 and it provisions.
185
 The CJEU dismissed all the above 
pleas by stating that GSs in Argentaria and Tabacalera were effective following the 
two month compliance deadline allocated in reasoned opinion and that it is of no 
relevance that the Commission did not refer to each particular part of Law 
No.5/1995 in its application.
186
 
At the time of the judicial stage of the infringement procedure Spain argued at 
cross points with the Commission. It argued that GSs are perfectly legal under 
national law since the government’s sole intention was to create supplementary 
regulatory mechanism which would guarantee that companies in question would 
continue to deliver their services to the public.
187
 Spain also supported its claim on 
legality of Law No.5/1995 by referring to its preamble which dictates that the law 
should be applied in line with the Treaty.
188
 Above all, the government stressed that 
since the state could willingly decide on privatisation of the said companies it could 
also implement measures which limit full application of the Treaty freedoms, since 
‘that he who can do most can also do least’.189 Spain maintained that Law No.5/1995 
is not discriminatory, is justified by overriding requirements of general public 
interest and is proportional to the objectives pursued.
190
 In the Spanish government’s 
view the discretion left to the national authorities (on deciding when to grant 
approval) is necessary for effectiveness of the said regime since implementation of 
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The CJEU dismissed all the defendant’s arguments, upholding that GSs in 
Argentaria and Tabacalera could not be justified, while GSs in Repsol, Telefónica 
and Endesa lacked on precision leaving the government with wide margin of 
discretion.
192
 On 13 May 2003, after maintaining that an ex ante approval regime 
‘represents a serious threat to the free movement of capital and may end by negating 
it completely’193 the CJEU ruled that by maintaining in force Law No.5/1995 and 
company-specific Royal Decrees, Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
Treaty. 
2.1.C: Obligation to Comply and Compliance Measures 
Prior to the judgment on case C-436/00 two GSs regimes have ceased: in 
Argentaria it expired while in Tabacalera the expiry date has been amended, so in 
respect to the two latter cases the government has complied before the judgment. In 
order to fully comply with the judgment the government had to either amend or 
withdraw GSs still applicable for Repsol, Endesa and Telefónica since their expiry 
dates were not in the foreseeable future. Compliance in good faith and in conformity 
with the sincere cooperation principle would entail withdrawal of overruled GSs as 
well as of newly introduced regimes in Indra and Iberia, and not just waiting for 
these regimes to expire or attempting to justify them by amendments. The 
government could have applied the express provision for withdrawal of GSs as 
enshrined in the preamble to the Law No.5/1995, yet the provision implied that GSs 
could be withdrawn only in cases when public interest that sustained it has ceased to 
exist, which was not the case in the remaining three companies, as they provided 
services of public interest, thus the necessity to protect public interest persisted. 
Telecoms are throughout regulated at the Union level, so there is little room left for 
GSs in Telefónica, yet GSs in energy companies have the potential for being 
justified. Hence, the government has been attracted to the idea of compliance ‘by 
amendment’. 
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On 30 December 2003 the government adopted Law No.62/2003,
194
 amending 
the original provisions of 1995 privatisation law in a pursuit for justifying overruled 
GSs. The key changes introduced to the regime are: substitution of ex ante approval 
regime with ex post notification regime and further delineation of criteria for its 
application (El Pais 12/11/2003). According to Law No.62/2003 eligible resolutions 
and transactions shall be subject to notification to the government, which, within 
one-month of the ‘reflection period’, shall evaluate the notified decision and may 
oppose it. If there is no express opposition, the said resolutions shall be deemed 
approved by silence. The GSs regime would only apply to resolutions which unfold 
their effects on the Spanish market. During ‘reflection period’ a stand-by clause 
applies to notified resolutions and acquisitions, suspending their effects and attached 
voting rights.
195
 Any resolution which has not been notified shall not be effective, 
while resolutions which went through notwithstanding the opposition of the 
government shall be deemed ineffective.
196
 
Pursuant to Law No.62/2003 the government may veto notified resolutions 
only due to existence of significant risks or adverse effects on the activities of the 
protected companies, in order to ensure their proper management and delivery of 
services, in accordance with the objective criteria by applying the fit-and-proper 
test. Essentially, the government will assess the potential acquirer’s reliability, 
transparency and ability to adequately carry out the relevant activities to ensure 
undisrupted delivery of services.
197
 Law No.62/2003 further provides that in order to 
ensure the proper management and provision of services by the companies in 
question the government will the take into account the following criteria applicable 
to relevant products or services: security in the continuity of supply, uninterrupted 
physical availability on the market at an affordable price and in a manner consistent 
with environmental protection and sustainable development, protection against the 
risk of inadequate maintenance of infrastructure, protection of general interest in the 
relevant sector and ensuring adequate maintenance of policy objectives.
198
 
Additionally, Law No.62/2003 introduced new company-specific provisions 
effective from 1 January 2004, each establishing a notification regime and its expiry 
date for Repsol (until 6 February 2006), Telefónica (18 February 2007), Endesa (8 
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June 2007), Indra (23 March 2004) and Iberia (23 March 2004). These provisions 
also delineated sector-specific strategic assets which are subject to notification, such 
as: oil refining and storage facilities for natural gas, equipment used in telecoms, 
cables and transit stations. Pursuant to the Law No.62/2003, the new regime would 
apply to the existing Royal Decrees on Repsol, Endesa, Telefónica, Indra and Iberia 
which will remain in force. Lastly the Law No.62/2003 established that notification 
regime will not apply to acquisitions resulting in a holding of at least 10% of the 
total share capital which are of purely financial nature. 
In summary, the government has changed the way in which the special right of 
opposition/veto could be exercised – through ex post notifications which could be 
seen as less restrictive when compared with the previous ex ante approval. 
Following the amendment, GSs appear to be more legally certain because of 
introduction of fit-and-proper test and also applying only to strategic assets and not 
to purely financial acquisitions. However, notifications could lead to opposition/veto 
of transactions and major corporate restructuring decisions (such as M&As) on the 
grounds of public interest and security of supply. Hence, in the absence of any 
further provisions increasing the level of legal certainty of the said GSs, the 
government once again granted itself a wide margin of discretion. This allows 
drawing a first conclusion: in accordance with the supporting hypothesis on 
effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a), any amendments aimed at justifying 
the rejected GSs regime are less likely to facilitate full compliance. As a result, 
implementation of Law No.62/2003 could be seen as compliance in bad faith, which 
could trigger further sanction threats. 
2.1.D: Compliance v Non-compliance 
The government allowed Argentaria’s regime to remain intact for entirety of 
the allocated period (by allowing it simply to expire), so it could be seen as 
disregarding the obligations stemming from the sincere cooperation principle. The 
Spanish government suspended the validity term of the GSs in another less likely 
candidate for GSs protection – Tabacalera. The protectionist Tobacco Law, which 
aimed to substitute scrutinised GSs, has been challenged in a number of judicial 
procedures before the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
199
 The case has been referred to 
                                                 
199
 Supreme Tribunal of Spain (Madrid), Appeal: 387/1999, Judgment of 18/06/2001, Asociacion 
National de Expendedoresde Tabacoy Timbre (ANETT) and Asociacion Nacionalespanola de 
Distribucion Automatica (ANEDA) against Royal Decree 1199/1999 of 9 July, which implements 
117 
 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling. In 2012 the CJEU established that the provisions in 
question constitute a restriction on trade and are not justified by overriding 
interest.
200
 This finding points to one of the bad faith compliance strategies which 
could be applied by the MS in order to retain national protectionist provisions in 
place. In case of Tabacalera GSs were abrogated only after they have been 
substituted by similar protectionist measures, which were also incompatible with the 
Treaty. Acting in such obstructionist manner reveals that Spain acted in bad faith 
towards compliance obligations and loyalty to the EU principle. 
The implementation of GSs for Indra and Iberia does not point towards good 
faith behaviour either, since the government should have abstained from 
introduction of new GSs in light of the infringement procedure on the similar 
measures. Following the judgment the government attempted to justify GSs by 
implementing amendments of Law No.62/2003. However, as the supporting 
hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) suggests, instead of 
trying to justify the illegal regime the Spanish authorities should have abrogated the 
overruled GSs altogether. 
On 15 July 2004 the Commission issued a formal letter (European 
Commission IP/04/923) under what is now Article 260 TFEU; a year later followed 
a reasoned opinion (European Commission IP/05/874). Following the ruling on case 
C-436/00, GSs in Indra ceased to exist. On the date of the reasoned opinion, GSs 
remained valid in Telefónica, Endesa, Repsol and Iberia. Four months after the 
reasoned opinion, on 25 November 2005, the government announced its decision to 
abrogate GSs, stating in a letter to the Commission that the compliance process with 
the judgment has begun (El Pais 26/11/2005). The government declared that it no 
longer needs the GSs and the new law will soon abolish them (ibid). In due course 
GSs in Iberia expired - the regime applied for the whole period initially intended, 
thus the government has met its own target regarding the application of GSs. Same 
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applies to Repsol as its regime ceased to exist meeting the estimated ten year 
protection target. 
In April 2006 it has been reported that the draft legislation has been blocked 
on its way to implementation (Legal Week 13/04/2006). Yet one month later, the 
government led by José Zapatero has implemented the legislative compliance 
measure. The Law No.13/2006
201
 repealed GSs of Law No.5/1995, alongside the 
relevant provisions of Law No.62/2003 and all the Royal Decrees. The Law 
No.13/2006 itself comprised of a single article. In the preamble the government 
accentuated that previous amendment of Law No.62/2003 has been implemented 
due to the usefulness of GSs at a time and back then the government has been 
determined to retain GSs. The government went on, however, that following ‘a more 
than reasonable period of validity, during which the former regime has proven 
useful’ the stability of companies in question has greatly improved so GSs are no 
longer necessary.
202
 The above statement confirms that the Spanish government 
resorted to non-compliance following the judgment because the condemned GSs 
have not yet fulfilled their protectionist aims. However, once GSs in question have 
actually achieved their purpose they could be duly and fully repealed. In the 
preamble the government also mentions its ‘duty to comply with the judgment of the 
CJEU and preventing the imposition of financial penalties’.203 Effectively, 
compliance measures of the Law No.13/2006 applied to GSs in two companies out 
of seven – Endesa and Telefónica – withdrawing GSs merely one year prior to their 
estimated expiry dates. 
While GSs have been relatively easy dropped in tobacco, banking and airline 
companies, the government resisted to comply and repeal GSs in energy and 
telecom companies. It could be ascertained that Zapatero’s government moved 
relatively quickly towards final compliance, however, it took one unsuccessful 
amendment, penalty procedure which went into advanced stage and total three years 
to finally comply. 
The government has repealed GSs in Telefónica and Endesa and there are 
certain reasons for that. Firstly, during the nine year GSs protection, Telefónica has 
aggressively acquired (Bonardi 2004) and grew into a large multinational enterprise 
in near monopoly conditions (e.g. Clifton et al 2010: 1003) becoming immune to 
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takeovers – overly large and expensive (Bethel et al., 1998). Secondly, Endesa has 
been protected through other GSs implemented in1999 and in 2006 the latter has 
been exclusively implemented by Zapatero to shield the company from an 
unwelcome takeover. It is logical to assume that three analogous mechanisms 
protecting a single company might not be necessary, so one of them, which have a 
looming penalty threats, could indeed be repealed. Such substitution of one 
protectionist regime with another similar measure signifies that the Spanish 
government gravely disregarded the sincere cooperation obligation and resorted to 
obstructionist protectionism despite the EU institutions’ clear-cut policy on the 
matter. 
All in all, it could be ascertained that the government resorted to non-
compliance resisting to fully repeal GSs of Law No.5/1995 before they have met 
their protectionist targets, making the CJEU’s judgment on case C-436/00 appear as 
changing little if anything. The mere fact that in spite of the lengthy judicial 
proceedings, condemning judgments and penalty procedure the government 
succeeded in pursuing its protectionist aims points towards bad faith behaviour. In 
this case the enforcement action under Article 258 TFEU failed to facilitate 
compliance, so the core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis (H1) is 
confirmed. Compliance ‘by amendment’ also proved to be minimalist and 
inadequate, so the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance 
(H1a) is also confirmed. Since the ultimate compliance ‘by repeal’ has only been 
achieved at the advanced stage of the second round enforcement action under Article 
260 TFEU, the second enforcement effectiveness hypothesis (H2) is confirmed. 
Following the judgment on the first Spanish GSs in case C-436/00 some 
observers stated that a major obstacle for foreign investment has been eliminated 
and companies at issue shall become takeover targets (Corporate Legal Times 
(August 2003). However, Spanish state-driven protectionism remained a reality as 
GSs of 1999 restricted voting rights in the companies operating in energy sector, 
such as Endesa and shall become subject of the following discussion.  
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2.2. ‘Anti-EdF’ Law – the Spanish Version 
 
At the time of the judgment on first Spanish GS case the battle for a second 
GS measure, which specifically applied to energy companies and the associated 
takeover saga, have been in full swing. Compliance with the said judgment on case 
C-274/06 is analysed as follows: Section 2.2.A presents an overview on special 
rights, Section 2.2.B analyses the Spanish government’s conduct during the 
infringement procedure, Section 2.2.C assesses potential for compliance and 
subsequent compliance initiatives, while Section 2.2.D concludes with assessment of 
final compliance. 
2.2.A: The Law 
As discussed in Italian case C-174/04 on ‘anti-EdF’ GSs, the existing 
asymmetry in openness of the energy markets has triggered the introduction of 
protectionist measures pursuant to reciprocity clause of the Energy Directive,
204
 
which empowered MSs to employ regulatory and control mechanisms aimed at 
combating predatory behaviour. Similarly as it was the case in Italian ‘anti-EdF’ 
Law, the Spanish government sought to protect its national energy companies and 
implemented ‘anti-EdF’ Law No.55/1999205 which covered all Spanish energy 
sectors, such as gas, oil and electricity. The law allowed the government to restrict 
the exercise of voting rights in energy companies by investors that are owned or 
controlled by a (foreign) government and hold dominant position in the relevant 
domestic market. In cases if such entity takes control or acquires significant 
shareholding of or above 3% of total share capital or voting rights (in a relevant 
Spanish company), the acquirer may notify the Spanish government and the 
government shall inform the National Energy Commission (CNE). The CNE in turn 
would propose a non-binding resolution and refer it back to the government for 
authorisation. The government then may approve, oppose, limit or subject the 
exercise of voting rights to certain conditions. Pursuant to Law No.55/1999 the 
governmental decision shall be based, inter alia, on the principles of objectivity, 
reciprocity, transparency, balance and proper functioning of energy markets. 
Acquisitions which went through without the necessary approval from the 
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government will be suspended and the buyer would not be able to exercise the 
acquired voting rights. 
It is clear that Law No.55/1999 created ex post GSs measure which lacked 
precision and was broadly defined, allowing the government wide discretionary 
powers to approve, veto or impose conditions if foreign acquisitions by a state-
controlled company could undermine balance and proper functioning of energy 
markets. The law in question particularly targeted predatory behaviour by companies 
such as EdF, limiting their participation in control of Spanish energy sector and thus 
discouraging unwelcome investors from entering Spanish market. The provisions of 
‘anti-EdF’ Law have been applied in May 2001, when the government limited the 
exercise of voting rights at 3% ceiling for Portugal’s EdP and France’s EdF in 
Spanish electricity company Hidrocantábrico.
206
 Similar intervention occurred when 
Spain used GSs of Law No.55/1999 in Spanish company Adygesinval, in which EdP 
held the majority of total share capital (Pires 2001). In 2002 the government 
intervened in another two cross-border deals: firstly when Italian ENEL acquired 
Spanish Electrica de Viesgo and later when Danish Energi E2 acquired Spanish 
Cinergy Group (Roig et al 2003; 7). Government interventions of this art clearly 
impede free movement of capital, so the Commission entered into negotiations with 
the Spanish government, urging it to remove GSs and comply with the Treaty. 
2.2.B: Negotiations, Amendments and Judicial Proceedings 
On 11 July 2003 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion, allocating two 
months for compliance (European Commission IP/02/1489). One month prior to the 
issue of the opinion on Law No.55/1999 the CJEU overruled Spanish Law 
No.5/1995, so the Spanish government decided to please the Commission by 
simultaneously amending both laws in question: one already found illegal, another 
with a looming action before the CJEU. The Law No.62/2003
207
 has amended ‘anti-
EdF’ Law by introducing several changes to the GS regime. Originally, Law 
No.55/1999 granted potential acquirers with the right to notification if they wished 
to exercise their voting rights above the 3% ceiling, whereas following the 
amendment eligible investors were obliged to notify the authorities. Law 
No.62/2003 sets the two month ‘reflection period’ for the government to issue its 
                                                 
206
 Commission Decision (19/03/2002) EnBW/EDP/Cajastur/Hidrocantábrico, Case M.2684, SG 
(2002) D/228961/228962/228963. 
207
 Article 94 of Law No.62/2003, supra note 194. 
122 
 
decision either by resolution or by silence, which should be adopted in accordance 
with the objective criteria and based on the facts of the situation at issue, assessing 
whether or not the takeover or acquisition may possess significant risks or adverse 
effects on the activities of the national energy market. 
Provisions of Law No.62/2003 applied a similar fit-and-proper test for 
acquirers (as the ones implemented in amendment of Law No.5/1995), providing 
that the existence of significant risks or adverse effects shall be assessed having 
regard to transparency and reliability of acquirer which would enable him/them to 
adequately carry out the relevant activities and to ensure secure, undisrupted 
delivery of services alongside with the need to preserve and develop the 
infrastructure of the relevant markets.
208
 The new amendments introduced several 
important changes limiting the vague, imprecise and undisclosed criteria on which 
the government assessed merits of the case, introducing a two month ‘reflection 
period’, approval by silence clause and introducing fit-and-proper test. The Law 
No.62/2003 became subject of a bilateral meeting held on 27 February 2004 when 
the Commission criticised the insufficiency of amendments.
209
 Spain drafted 
additional amendments, which the Commission had rejected issuing a new formal 
letter on 9 July 2004. Almost seven months later the government submitted a draft 
of a new law, yet the next move by the Commission was to issue a new reasoned 
opinion on 13 July 2005, allocating two months for compliance.
210
 Spain has not 
replied to the reasoned opinion, so the Commission brought the matter before the 
CJEU. 
During the written procedure before the CJEU the Commission maintained 
that Law No.55/1999 (as amended) was restricting voting rights of investments by 
state-owned entities and thus discouraged such investments.
211
 Spain argued that the 
law in question does not constitute an obstacle to free movement of capital, as it 
does not veto the exercise of voting rights but merely allows for their non-
recognition in situations which are ‘potentially dangerous for the maintenance of 
public safety’.212 Spain maintained that the ownership of the rights is not restricted 
but only the voting rights attached to them.
213
 While referring to the similar Italian 
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‘anti-EdF’ Law No.192/2001,214 Spain argued that the Law No.55/1999 does not 
provide for automatic suspension of voting rights above certain threshold ceiling, as 
the Italian provision does.
215
 
The CJEU did not accept any of the foresaid justifications, stating that a mere 
power reserved for the government to decide on whether or not to allow or limit the 
exercise of such rights, acts as a deterrent for potential public investors from other 
MSs.
216
 Spain justified notification regime by the necessity to guarantee the security 
of the energy supply, however the Commission argued that the GSs at issue are 
disproportionate, legally uncertain and imprecise.
217
 Confirming its findings in 
judgment on Italian ‘anti-EdF’ Law in case C-174/04, the CJEU held that the aim of 
promoting the competitiveness in the energy market cannot justify protectionist 
measures which restrict capital movements.
218
 Consequently, on 14 February 2008 
the CJEU ruled that Spain has failed to prove that Law No.55/1999 is appropriate 
for ensuring the security of the energy supply and therefore, by maintaining the said 




2.2.C: Obligation to Comply 
The infringement procedure on ‘anti-EdF’ Law went on for five years and four 
months in total, during which the Spanish government has undertaken several steps 
towards compliance – which could point towards behaviour in accordance with the 
sincere cooperation obligation. Compliance measure of Law No.62/2003 has been 
implemented three months later than the date stipulated in the reasoned opinion. It is 
remarkable that at this point the Commission decided not to refer the matter to the 
CJEU, despite unpunctuality of the said amendments. The government, on its part, 
has not repealed the GSs of already overruled Law No.5/1995 and scrutinised ‘anti-
EdF’ Law, but opted to try and justify both GSs laws by the single provision of Law 
No.62/2003. This tactics in turn led to procrastination on the implementation of 
ultimate compliance measures in both cases. In the present case the Commission had 
to issue a supplementary letter of formal notice and a new reasoned opinion, to 
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which the Spanish government failed to reply whatsoever. The Commission could 
have based its referral to the CJEU on the original provisions of Law No.55/1999, 
yet it has decided to use an additional administrative stage, extending the 
proceedings at issue. If it would have referred the case following the expiry of 
allocated two month compliance period, the Court would have established the 
infringement of Treaty much earlier. 
In line with the supporting hypothesis (H1a) applied in this study, condemning 
judgment on provisions of Law No.55/1999, as amended by Law No.62/2003, 
demonstrates that the infringement of the Treaty could remain in place following the 
compliance ‘by amendment’. To conclude: amendments were not only unpunctual, 
they were inappropriate compliance measures. All in all, following the judgment 
Spain has been obliged to finally comply and compliance in good faith would 
involve full repeal of ‘anti-EdF’ Law of 1999 and Law No.62/2003. 
2.2.D: Final Compliance  
As proposed by the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist 
compliance (H1a), any compliance ‘by amendment’ of contested measures would 
most likely be of inadequate or minimalist character consequently postponing the 
full compliance. In the present case amendments of Law No.62/2003 were 
implemented at the time when the GSs were under the Commission’s scrutiny, yet 
prior to the referral to the CJEU, so they also could have been liable for causing 
procrastination. Nevertheless, non-compliance with EU law prior to the judgment 
and non-compliance with the condemning judgment itself result in comparable, yet 
different compliance obligations. From one side the government has been obliged to 
comply with the ruling by either amending or repealing the GS regime, yet from the 
other – it had to avoid electoral punishment by ensuring continuous protection over 
vulnerable energy champions, such as Endesa. 
On 30 April 2009 the government implemented DL No.6/2009
220
 which fully 
repealed ‘anti-EdF’ Law – rationalising its implementation by the urgent and 
extraordinary necessity to address the judgment of the CJEU.
221
 The repealed Law 
No.55/1999 has been effective for almost a decade serving up to its protectionist 
purpose, targeting and discouraging unwelcome public bidders from other MSs. 
From the onset, the government’s performance in complying with CJEU’s judgment 
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on ‘anti-EdF’ Law could be seen as compliance in relatively good faith, yet it took 
an issue of two formal letters and two reasoned opinions, one condemning judgment 
and nine and a half consecutive years of non-compliance with the fundamental 
freedoms of the Treaty. Consequently, the Spanish government has been given 
sufficient time to promptly comply immediately following the judgment, without a 
fourteen-month delay. Such considerable compliance delay reveals unnecessary 
procrastination which implies that the government disregarded its obligation to 
comply as soon as possible and without delay. 
There also has been another, more prominent, reason why the government has 
fully complied by repealing energy GS of Law No.55/1999. In the light of the 
following finding the government’s compliance with the judgment could be seen as 
action in bad faith towards the sincere cooperation obligations stemming from 
Article 4(3) TEU. The fact is that the government choose to replace overruled GSs 
of Law No.5/1995 and the scrutinised ‘anti-EdF’ Law with another GS law – this 
explains the promptness of compliance with the judgment under analysis. 
The GS protection implemented for Endesa pursuant to Law No.5/1995 has 
been eliminated on 26 May 2006 due to the first ruling on case C-436/00 and now 
following the condemning judgment on ‘anti-EdF’ Law in case C-274/06, the 
company could become vulnerable to foreign takeovers if it was not for another set 
of newly implemented GSs. Prior to the elimination of unjustified GS provisions on 
26 May 2006 and at a time when it was clear that the Commission would most likely 
refer the matter on Law No.55/1999 to the CJEU (following the reasoned opinion of 
7 July 2005 to which Spain failed to reply), on 24 February 2006 the government 
implemented yet another GS – DL No.4/2006.222 
Because of the availability of these alternative GSs, provisions of ‘anti-EdF’ 
Law No.55/1999 were no longer necessary and could be repealed as a result of 2008 
judgment. Therefore, the wider compliance assessment on Spanish GS judgments 
reveals that compliance with case C-274/06 is less of a ‘good faith’ than initially 
perceived. In any event the ultimate compliance in this case has been achieved with 
a considerable delay, which, as the core enforcement effectiveness hypothesis of this 
study (H1) suggests, would not qualify as compliance in good faith. In cases when 
the MS does not withhold from implementing and maintaining of similar GSs, it 
would be seen as acting contrary to the sincere cooperation obligation and resisting 
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to embark on a wider policy change in relation to such protectionist measures. 
Consequently, the overall compliance conduct, surrounding the implementation of 
compliance measures with judgment on ‘anti-EdF’ Law of 1999, reveals that Spain 
disrespected its obligations under the sincere cooperation principle. 
To conclude, the Spanish government’s compliance conduct with the 
judgment on case C-274/06 appears to be neither in good faith nor could it qualify as 
obstructionist non-compliance in bad faith. In this case the pre-judgment conduct 
reveals cooperation in relatively good faith. The minimalist character of initial 
compliance measures proved to be inadequate, triggering further infringement action 
and supporting the hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a). The 
ultimate compliance ‘by repeal’ has been implemented way past the six month 
compliance threshold in order to qualify as compliance in good faith. The 
compliance has neither been achieved within a twelve month period, which signifies 
that enforcement mechanism of Article 258 TFEU has not been successful in 
facilitating prompt compliance. In this case the pre-judicial procedure comprised of 
two sets of official warnings, stretching to staggering thirty four months. Given that 
the Spanish government has been given more than enough time to prepare for 
prompt compliance, the post-judgment compliance should have followed 
immediately and not with such a considerable delay, which points to disregard of 
obligation to comply ‘as soon as possible’. Another significant case-specific factor 
that influenced compliance is the fact that other GSs were implemented to substitute 
the ones under the Commission’s scrutiny. This finding signifies that by substituting 
of the scrutinised GSs with new protectionist measures Spain has acted contrary to 
sincere cooperation obligation. Since compliance with judgment on case C-274/06 
has failed to prompt a wider policy shift at the national level, (H3) is confirmed. Due 
to the above findings, Spain could be seen resorting to obstructionist protectionism 
and obstructionist non-compliance. This case also clearly demonstrates how the 
enforcement action under Article 258 TFEU could fail to facilitate prompt and 
comprehensive compliance, even though no further action under Article 260 TFEU 
has been applied.  
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2.3. ‘Anti-E.ON’ Law in Action 
 
Before the abrogation of GSs in Endesa and at a time when ‘anti-EdF’ Law 
has been put to the Commission’s scrutiny, Spain has implemented new GS law – 
DL No.4/2006.
223
 This law, also known as ‘anti-E.ON’ Law, became subject of two 
rulings of the CJEU: on case C-196/07
224
 relating to application of GSs for blocking 
the takeover of Endesa and case C-207/07
225
 on the GS law itself. The former case 
directly relates to the latter so the discussion on the takeover is relevant as it 
discloses the rationale behind the creation of GSs and revealing the government’s 
obstructionist protectionist conduct which points towards the subsequent resistance 
to comply with CJEU judgments. The analysis of compliance with judgment on case 
C-207/07 proceeds as follows: Section 2.3.A focuses on introduction of GSs, 
Section 2.3.B analyses the government’s conduct during infringement proceedings 
on both cases C-196/07 and C-207/07. Section 2.3.C assesses potential for 
compliance. The concluding Section 2.3.D analyses the current compliance 
situation. The conclusion reveals that intentional partial compliance was envisaged 
only once a favourable situation for the Spanish government has been established. 
This compliance conduct could be seen as contrary to the sincere cooperation 
principle, so that all of the effectiveness/obstructionist hypotheses developed in this 
study will be confirmed in this case. 
2.3.A. Endesa Takeover and ‘anti-E.ON’ Law 
Spain’s biggest and one of the most important electricity companies Endesa 
has always been protected by the government: first through public ownership, then 
by the GSs of Law No.5/1995 until 26 May 2006 and by Law No.55/1999 until 7 
May 2009. The Spanish government sought to make Endesa another national 
champion like Iberdrola (Pugsley 9/05/2008). In contrast to Iberdrola the state has 
significantly participated in Endesa right from the company’s inception, so it has 
enjoyed privileged contact with policy-makers (Clifton et al 2010: 1003).The 
government sought to re-enforce Endesa’s competitiveness through a state-promoted 
takeover involving another Spanish company Gas Natural (The New York Times 
22/02/2006; The Economist 31/08/2006; El Pais 3/05/2003; El Pais 7/09/2005). 
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Endesa’s shareholders considered Gas Natural’s takeover bid of September 2005 as 
politically motivated and sought for possible alternatives and higher bids.
226
 When 
on 21 February 2006 the German company E.ON has launched an appealing offer 
for Endesa,
227
 the Spanish government strongly opposed to it (El Pais 24/02/2006), 
laying the beginning of the so-called ‘Endesa takeover saga’ which lasted for two 
years.
228
 The core of the underlying interests could be seen as the clash between the 
government’s obstructionist non-compliance with the free market rules coupled with 
the desire to model the national energy market, and the Commission’s strive to 
eliminate GSs and force a disobedient MS to comply. 
E.ON’s ambitious takeover reached far beyond the mere economic interests, 
becoming a matter of a political battle: both the German and Spanish governments 
discussed this sensitive issue, as there have been concerns that the Spanish 
government led by the Prime Minister Zapatero may employ its still-valid GSs of 
Law No.5/1995 to veto E.ON’s offer (El Pais 22/02/2006a). The day following 
E.ON’s bid the Commission had expressly reminded the Spanish government that it 
should not employ GSs (Euobserver 23/02/2006). In reply, Zapatero has confirmed 
that the government seeks to protect public interests in strategic industries, however 
it is not anticipating using overruled GSs, which could be ‘too extreme’ and could 
only be applied ‘in truly exceptional circumstances’ (El Pais 22/02/2006); BBC 
News Online (22/02/2006). Clearly, application of any protectionist measures could 
severely damage Spain’s reputation as a MS with an open economy and a pro-
European stance. However, the government was not willing to give up without a 
battle and allow a foreign company to take over its ‘crown jewel’ Endesa. 
Disregarding Zapatero’s reassurances three days after E.ON’s bid, the 
government has urgently introduced a new GS DL No.4/2006,
229
 extending the 
rights of the National Energy Commission (CNE). The latter authority has been 
granted a special right to issue an ex ante approval on acquisitions of shareholdings 
in excess of the 10% ceiling of the total share capital or any other significant 
influence by any energy company in Spanish energy companies. As discussed in the 
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previous case on ‘anti-EdF’ Law of1999, originally the CNE had to be informed of 
foreign acquisitions, analyse their impact on the energy sector and then issue a non-
binding resolution which would be subject to governmental approval. In the foresaid 
case, the government itself decided upon the issue: whether to veto, approve or 
impose conditions on the notified deal. In the present case, the government has 
shifted the approval right to the CNE – an authority over which it had a substantial 
influence. According to DL No.4/2006 the acquirer had to apply for approval prior 
to an acquisition and the CNE would apply a fit-and-proper test
230
 to assess the 
acquirer’s reliability, adequacy and potential influence on security and continuity of 
services delivery. The CNE could deny approval or subject it to conditions due to 
existence of significant risks or negative effects on the activities of national 
companies concerned or for the protection of the general public interests in the 
energy sector or due to any other concern on public safety and security.
231
 
The takeover of Endesa by E.ON was of the EU dimension and pursuant to the 
Merger Regulation
232
 the Commission had the exclusive authority of approval, yet 
the DL No.4/2006 indirectly shifted this right of approval to the Spanish government 
through the CNE. The government stressed on extraordinary urgency of DL 4/2006, 
rationalising its implementation by the excessive concentration in European energy 
market and emphasising on a need to address the existing asymmetries by creating a 
legislation which would cover all interests that needed to be protected.
233
 It is 
apparent that by urgently implementing DL No.4/2006 the government has 
exclusively targeted E.ON’s pending takeover offer, allowing the CNE to frustrate 
the bid, which points towards the specific ‘anti-E.ON’ aim of the GSs. The urgency 
of the GSs appears to be in conflict with the earlier statements on non-intervention 
by the Spanish government. Following the implementation of this GS law the long 
‘political battle’ between the Commission and Zapatero’s government has begun 
(The Economist 6/11/2008). 
2.3.B: Two Infringement Procedures 
The implementation of the protectionist DL No.4/2006 alarmed the 
Commission, prompting it to remind the Spanish government that pursuant to the 
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sincere cooperation principle enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU it must not impose any 
conditions on E.ON’s bid.234 On 5 May 2006 the Commission issued a formal letter 
under Article 258 TFEU informing Spain of the illegality of DL No.4/2006.
235
 
Ignoring the concerns raised by the Commission the government insisted on the 
compatibility of the measures in question and on 27 July applied the DL No.4/2006 
to E.ON’s bid – the CNE issued a Resolution subjecting the bid to nineteen 
conditions.
236
 The press dubbed these unprecedented conditions as ‘swingeing’ and 
‘harsh’, while the Commission called them ‘arbitrary discrimination’ (The New 
York Times 28/07/2006; El Pais 6/08/2006). Put shortly, the imposed conditions 
created a system of long-term control and monitoring allowing the government, 
through the CNE, to control E.ON’s activities post-takeover. 
Some conditions concerned Endesa’s post-takeover status, restricting E.ON’s 
freedom to decide on managerial, operational and economic matters. For example, 
E.ON could not restructure Endesa or re-locate its headquarters. The CNE could 
assess the financial situation for Endesa and any future investment plans by E.ON, 
requiring the later to follow the already established plans and policies. E.ON was 
prohibited from participation in daily management of certain sectors of Endesa’s 
business and had to divest certain assets. The CNE had the right to authorise the 
disposal of assets and precluded E.ON from pursuing self-interests when adopting 
strategic decisions regarding Endesa. The CNE would supervise E.ON’s conduct 
and in case of non-compliance with any of the conditions it could suspend the voting 
rights held by E.ON or oblige it to divest all of its shares held in Endesa. In case if 
any other company acquired more than 50% of E.ON’s shares it would have to 
notify the CNE which in turn may oblige E.ON to divest all of its shares held in 
Endesa to a third party approved by the CNE. As one can see, these severe 
conditions were of an extremely controversial nature: they were not of a market 
standard, not economically viable and absolutely disproportionate, significantly 
limiting E.ON’s corporate rights. Effectively, the conditions assumed the control 
over Endesa to the government through the CNE. 
The imposed conditions reveal that the Spanish government has been 
determined to dissuade E.ON from entering the Spanish market despite a clear-cut 
position of the EU Commission on such intervention. The German government also 
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openly expressed its concerns on Spanish protectionist move and on 12 September 
2006 both Spanish and German leaders have met to discuss the situation (Focus 
12/09/2006; El Pais 20/04/2006). The Commission on the other hand was 
determined to rapidly resolve the time-sensitive matter threatening the cross-border 
takeover deal. 
On 26 September 2006 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion regarding 
the ‘anti-E.ON’ DL No.4/2006 under Article 258 TFEU237 and also adopted a 
binding decision on the application of the said law to E.ON’s bid, ordering Spain to 
withdraw the unlawful conditions without delay (European Commission 
IP/06/1265). The government has resisted to repeal ‘anti-E.ON’ Law238 and to 
comply with the binding decision, so the Commission issued a formal letter 
(European Commission IP/06/1426). Faced with the two infringement procedures 
the government has amended some of the unlawful conditions: instead of wholly 
removing them it has moderately scaled down some of the most controversial ones 
while also introducing some new conditions.
239
 Such a dubious compliance measure 
could neither be seen as compliance in good faith nor in line with the sincere 
cooperation principle. 
On 20 December 2006 the Commission issued a second binding decision, 
confirming that the new conditions of the CNE are unlawful and ordered their 
removal. The government resisted complying and prepared to defend the new 
conditions before CJEU. Since the judicial procedure would allow for the matters to 
drag on it would grant the government the necessary time for frustrating E.ON’s bid. 
The matter on non-compliance with the two decisions and the case regarding the 
‘anti-E.ON’ Law got referred to the CJEU on 11 and 19 April 2007 respectively. 
From the one point, the government has resorted to non-compliance and since 
the binding effect of the CJEU’s judgments was not likely in the foreseeable future, 
it continued to block E.ON’s bid. Yet from another point of view, taking the 
Commission’s pressure to comply, the government foresaw that the DL No.4/2006 
would sooner or later be outlawed, so it sought for alternative solutions which would 
further frustrate E.ON’s takeover ambitions and retain Endesa in Spanish hands. The 
solution emerged in form of another government-orchestrated takeover, where 
Spanish company Acciona began building up a stake in Endesa alongside with 
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Italian company ENEL, with which the Spanish government has reached an 
agreement over ownership of Endesa.
240
 The government was doing its best to 
scupper unwelcome cross-border takeover deal and frustrate E.ON’s bid so it choose 
to agree on Italian-Spanish solution to avoid further enforcement actions from the 
Commission (Pugsley 9/05/2008). The government-preferred contra-takeover 
strategy was a success as Acciona together with ENEL have launched a joint 
takeover for Endesa and E.ON has been forced to withdraw its bid.
241
 
During the judicial stage of the infringement procedure on case C-196/07 the 
government admitted that it has failed to withdraw the conditions, yet argued that 
the compliance with the two of the Commission’s decisions could no longer be 
facilitated, since the E.ON’s takeover bid ceased to exist.242 The CJEU stressed that 
the takeover has ceased after the deadline set in the reasoned opinion and since the 
government did not anticipate any steps towards compliance it is important to pursue 
the action in interest of laying down the foundations of responsibility for 
obstructionist non-compliance.
243
 The CJEU also emphasised that Spain has not 
shown that it is absolutely impossible to withdraw the conditions and that the 
principle of sincere cooperation requires that it must take all necessary measures in 
order to comply with EU law.
244
 Spain’s second defensive argument was to 
challenge the legality of the Commission’s decisions, stating that considering the 
importance of Endesa in the Spanish energy market, the conditions aimed at 
protection of public interest and ensuring the security of the energy supply.
245
 To 
this extent, the Court maintained that the imposition of the two decisions could not 
be deemed erroneous and their validity could not be challenged.
246
 On 6 March 2008 
the CJEU established that Spain has failed to remove the CNE’s conditions and thus 
failed to comply with two of the Commission’s decisions. 
In case C-207/07 on ‘anti-E.ON’ DL No.4/2006 the government also argued at 
cross-points with the Commission, insisting on proportionality and legality of the 
GSs. Spain argued that the wide discretion left to the CNE is necessary since it is 
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impossible to foresee in a single legislative act all the risks which could threaten the 
energy supply.
247
 The CJEU, on the other hand, rightfully established that the 
objective of ensuring the security of the energy supply could be achieved via less 
restrictive ex post regime, so the system of ex ante approval is not proportionate 
while the criteria for its application are vague and imprecise, which leaves a wide 
discretion on the CNE.
248
 On 17 July 2008 the CJEU ruled that Spain has failed to 
demonstrate that the objectives behind the approval regime cannot be achieved by 
less restrictive measures, concluding that by adopting provisions thereof Spain has 
failed to comply with provisions of the Treaty on free movement of capital and 
establishment. 
Following the two condemning judgments on cases C-207/07 and C-196/07 
and being one of the more compliant MSs, Spain had been expected to comply 
promptly, especially since the threat in face of E.ON was gone. Following the 
judgments the government has expressed its determination to comply, stating that it 
is willing to amend the ‘anti-E.ON’ Law and to withdraw all conditions imposed by 
the CNE.
249
 However, the compliance was not so easily achieved. 
2.3.C: Potential for Compliance 
As a preliminary point it is necessary to emphasise that at a time when both 
‘anti-E.ON’ DL No.4/2006 and its application on E.ON’s bid were referred to the 
CJEU, the Spanish government continued with its ‘business as usual’ by employing 
approval regime and imposing conditions on Acciona/ENEL joint takeover of 
Endesa.
250
 The Commission ordered to withdraw the conditions by 10 January 2008, 
yet the government persisted in non-compliance well past the established deadline, 
prompting the Commission to initiate yet another infringement action (European 
Commission IP/08/164, IP/08/746). The mere fact that the government used the DL 
No.4/2006 repeatedly, despite the Commission’s explicit preclusions, points 
towards, severe and obstructionist non-compliance. What is clear in the case of 
E.ON’s bid is that the government acknowledged that such a sensitive issue like 
takeover would not withstand a slow-moving infringement procedure. The 
government used all the possible procrastinations to stretch non-compliance for as 
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long as possible which points towards insincere behaviour and unwillingness to 
comply. 
While waiting for the EU apparatus to issue decisions followed by formal 
letters, reasoned opinions and finally the judgments, Spain found the way out of the 
unwelcome E.ON’s takeover situation, particularly acknowledging that it had 
sufficient time for avoiding pre-judgment compliance. The judgments themselves, 
which were likely to be condemning, alongside penalty threats, which were not 
likely in the foreseeable future, could not deter the government from non-
compliance and such conduct is contrary to the sincere cooperation principle. As 
regarding the pre-judgment amendments on conditions applicable to E.ON’s bid, it 
seems that the government used them as a ‘smoke screen’, avoiding full compliance 
which led to further procrastination. Taking the pre-judgment conduct of the 
government and in line with the hypothesis on obstructionist non-compliance it 
could be predicted that Spain would be eager to try and amend ‘anti-E.ON’ DL 
No.4/2006 in order to both resist full compliance and pacify the Commission. As the 
applied supporting hypothesis (H1a), suggests following the judgment the GSs 
measures ought not to be amended but repealed fully, so in case if the Spanish 
government chooses to comply ‘by amendment’ the DL No.4/2006 would most 
likely be insufficiently amended. 
2.3.D: Assessing Compliance  
Fifteen months following the judgments on case C-207/07 relating to GS DL 
No.4/2006 and case C-196/07 on the GS law application, there was still no 
compliance in sight. The compliance procrastination in the latter case seems 
especially disturbing since, as the government claimed during the infringement 
procedure, the conditions imposed on E.ON’s bid lacked on object and purpose and 
could be removed without unnecessary procrastination. On 3 November 2009 the 
Commission issued a formal letter under what is now Article 260 TFEU calling on 
Spain to comply.
251
 The compliance with judgment on case C-196/07 followed 
shortly after the foresaid formal letter, when on 13 November 2009 the government 
withdrew all of the CNE’s conditions – in this case the compliance with two of the 
Commission’s decisions on E.ON’s bid has been delayed for almost three years and 
with decision on Acciona/ENEL bid – for 21 months. 
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Regarding compliance with the judgment on GS case C-207/07 the 
government has opted to amend its GSs by Law No.2/2011
252
 which reformed the 
CNE’s functions. Following this amendment, it has been stated that the contested 
provisions of the DL No.4/2006 were repealed,
253
 however, as the below analysis 
reveals, the CNE’s right of approval has been modified and not altogether repealed. 
Pursuant to Law No.2/2011 the CNE had the right to approve acquisitions of shares 
by non-EU investors in eligible Spanish companies in excess of 20% of share capital 
or any lower significant influence. The approval may be denied or subjected to 
conditions if there is a real and sufficiently serious threat to public safety. The 
acquirer could appeal the CNE’s resolutions in the administrative court. A stand-by 
clause applied to acquisitions precluding the acquirer from exercising voting rights, 
until the CNE’s approval by resolution or by silence. 
The amendments of Law No.2/2011 introduced several important changes: it 
replaced the ex ante regime with new ex post regime, which applies to non-EU 
investors and could be seen as a less restrictive measure. However, the amended 
regime appears as less legally certain and broadly defined, since it provides for any 
criteria for application of the CNE’s approval in ‘cases of real and sufficiently 
serious threat to public safety’. The earlier proclamations that the above amendment 
adequately addressed the CJEU’s judgment could neither be confirmed nor accepted. 
What is clear is that the Law No.2/2011 appears as a framework, which needs to be 
justified by further provisions, as it cannot provide sufficient level of legal certainty 
by itself. Subsequently, the GS regime and its protectionist rights are still in place 
even post-amendment, so the Law No.2/2011 represent an inadequate compliance 
measure – or compliance in bad faith. If the foresaid measures would have been 
adequate, it could be said that the compliance has been finally achieved three years 
following the judgment, which still is quite late to qualify as compliance in good 
faith. The breach persisted nonetheless, despite condemning judgment, new 
infringement procedure for non-compliance and subsequent amendment of 2011. 
On 28 February 2012 the government issued a preliminary draft of law
254
 
which reformed the CNE by creating a new independent authority: the National 
Commission on Markets and Competition. The draft has shifted the right of approval 
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from the CNE to the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, basically mirroring 
in detail the previous GSs provisions of the Law No.2/2011. The preliminary draft 
reveals that the government once again inadequately addressed the judgment on case 
C-207/07. It is pertinent to note here that the CNE has issued a commentary
255
 on 
the draft, stressing that the approval regime should be maintained as it is a necessary 
ex post monitoring mechanism, which aims to determine any significant risks or 
negative effects of acquisitions in Spanish energy companies, reinforcing the 
principle of legal certainty.
256
 In its commentary the CNE concluded that the 
approval should be understood as a monitoring function or supervisory function.
257
 
It is pertinent to emphasise that such conclusions by the authority which was not 
independent from the government points towards extreme obstructionist nature of 
the GSs, since the government sought not only to maintain the regime, but expressly 
supported it, even though it has been proved illegal by the CJEU judgments and by 
the Commission’s decisions. 
The quest for compliance continued once the government has amended the 
preliminary draft
258
 transposing it into Law No.3/2013
259
 on 4 June 2013. The 9
th
 
additional provision of Law No.3/2013
260
 established a system for investments in 
energy markets, creating a system of notifications to substitute the earlier approval 
regime. Pursuant to Law No.3/2013 the foresaid Ministry of Industry, Energy and 
Tourism has to be informed on acquisitions of shareholdings in energy companies 
operating in the regulated sectors or companies which hold strategic assets of critical 
infrastructural importance (defined by law). The investors acquiring assets which 
have a potential of having a significant impact or influence on the activities of the 
said companies must notify the said acquisition to the Ministry within fifteen days 
following the acquisition. In cases where the Ministry considers that activities of the 
acquirer may possess a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the security of the 
energy supply, within thirty days from notification it can impose conditions in 
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relation to the activity of the companies subject to the acquisition as well as specific 
obligations on the acquirer to ensure compliance. 
According to the Law No.3/2013, the Ministry shall assess the risks in relation 
to: safety and quality of products/services, continuity of their supply, as well 
protection against the risk of inadequate maintenance of infrastructure, or any failure 
to comply with specific regulations that apply to the acquired assets or companies. 
The Ministry shall also take into account the stakes that the investor has acquired or 
intends to acquire in other companies. Pursuant to Law No.3/2013 any imposed 
conditions will respect the principle of proportionality and be necessary for the 
protection of the general interest. 
As could be seen from the provisions of Law No.3/2013 the explicit ex post 
approval regime is replaced with ex post notification regime, which could trigger 
imposition of conditions and obligations similar to the ones which could previously 
be imposed by the CNE. One major difference is that the government restrained 
from implementing particular acquisition thresholds (previously 20%), solely 
referring to assets which could have a significant impact or influence to the acquirer. 
The adopted law is now being formally analysed by the Commission for 
compliance with judgment on case C-207/07. However, as the supporting hypothesis 
on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) suggests, given that the law is once 
again amended and special powers are not altogether repealed it could be ascertained 
that subsequently the Law No.3/2013 may fail to facilitate full compliance. The 
Commission’s analysis of the new amendments could take another several months 
before being finalised, allowing matters of non-compliance to drag on.
261
 Even if the 
Law No.3/2013 of 4 June 2013 would be found to be an adequate compliance 
measure, it has taken the Spanish government five years to finally comply, which 
does not constitute action in good faith and in line with the sincere cooperation 
principle. At this point it could be concluded that the overall compliance pattern 
displayed during the two infringement proceedings (cases C-207/07 and C-196/07) 
the Spanish government could be seen as acting in bad faith gravely disregarding 
sincere cooperation obligation under Article 4(3) TEU and compliance obligation 
under Article 260(1) TFEU. In case C-207/07 all of the enforcement 
effectiveness/obstructionist hypotheses (H1, H1a, H2 and H3) are confirmed: 
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compliance measures were minimalist and inadequate, the MS failed to effectively 
and promptly comply with the judgment under Article 258 TFEU, ultimate 
compliance measures were implemented only at the advanced stage of the second 




Conclusion on Spain 
Analysis of the compliance with judgments on Spanish GS cases revealed the 
determined and obstructionist non-compliance which goes in sharp contrast with this 
MSs’ reputation as a compliant and a ‘good European’. The below summary on 
compliance outlines that GSs were relinquished only when the initially established 
protectionist targets were reached and neither could the Commission’s binding 
decisions nor the CJEU’s judgments succeed in breaking the armour of GSs’ 
protectionist powers and persuading the government to comply in good faith. 
In the first judgment on case C-463/00 the CJEU overruled GSs implemented 
pursuant to enabling Law No.5/1995 in five companies (Repsol, Telefónica, Endesa, 
Argentaria and Tabacalera). At the time when the infringement procedure under 
Article 258 TFEU progressed to its advanced stage, the government expressly 
disregarded the sincere cooperation obligation by implementing new GSs for Indra 
and Iberia. All Spanish GSs were intended to remain in force until protectionist 
goals have been fully fulfilled. The Spanish government resorted to inaction, which, 
coupled with procrastination, allowed it to apply the said protectionist regimes to the 
fullest extent. Spanish government’s conduct during the infringement procedure 
signifies that there has been a significant resistance to compliance. The government 
chose to amend GS regimes which were still in force following the judgment. As 
predicted by the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance 
(H1a), these amendments were insufficient to facilitate compliance and the amended 
GSs retained their protectionist powers. This inadequate compliance measure aided 
procrastination: basically it was a race against time – the longer the government 
procrastinated the shorter the period for GSs’ application became. 
By the time the reasoned opinion was issued under Article 260 TFEU the 
majority of GSs have expired. As regards the expired regimes in Indra and Iberia, it 
is apparent that the government was successful in implementing and maintaining 
(for the entirety of applicable period) the supposedly unlawful GSs, which points 
towards disregard of the sincere cooperation obligation. GSs in Telefónica and 
Repsol have also expired so the government did not address the compliance 
obligation either. Effectively, GSs in seven affected companies have expired or were 
repealed, but none of them as a direct result of the infringement procedures under 
Article 258 TFEU or the initial procedural stage under Article 260 TFEU. 
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The ultimate compliance with case C-274/06 has been achieved fourteen 
months following the judgment and only following the implementation of the urgent 
protectionist GSs, which specifically aimed at impeding of cross-border takeover 
deals involving Endesa (‘anti-E.ON’ Law). From this perspective compliance with 
the judgments on cases C-463/00 and C-274/06 was not in good faith as the Spanish 
government had revealed significant, even ‘militant’ resistance to compliance. 
Furthermore, the cases on the urgent ‘anti-E.ON’ Law (C-207/07) and its application 
(C-196/07) soundly demonstrate the distribution of powers between the MSs and the 
Commission on the issue of GSs’ obstructionist nature: the Commission and the 
CJEU can issue binding decisions and judgments while the relevant governments 
could still fail to comply. 
The wider analysis of the Spanish government’s conduct during the entire 
length of the relevant infringement procedures on cases C-207/07 and C-196/07 
reveal the grave disregard of the cooperation obligations. The quest for compliance 
with judgment on case C-207/07 continued at the time of writing (July 2013), as the 
government has continuously amended the GSs. It remains to be seen whether the 
latest compliance measure with ruling on case C-207/07 could be deemed as 
adequate compliance measure. To summarise: despite being one of the more 
compliant MSs and a ‘good European’, Spain went to great lengths to battle for its 
GSs. All GSs have served up their initial purpose, in spite of the numerous 
infringement proceedings, imperative amendments and craven attempts to pacify the 
Commission. According to these findings it could be ascertained that the Spanish 
protectionism has successfully overcome all of the compliance instruments available 
to the Commission, which demonstrates that Spain has disregarded the principle of 
sincere cooperation and acted contrary to the good faith obligation. Consequently in 
all of the Spanish GS cases all of the enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist 
hypotheses developed in this study are confirmed, with the sole exception of ‘anti-
EdF’ GSs in case C-274/06 where effectiveness of penalty procedure hypothesis 
(H2) did not apply.  
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3. The UK: the Leader in Golden Share Implementation 
3.A: General Introduction 
The United Kingdom has long cherished the system of market-oriented 
industrial capitalism according to which companies should be allowed to compete 
freely with each other and market forces should decide on the fate of any hostile 
takeovers – and not the government, which maintained a hands‐off approach to the 
management of the SOEs (e.g. Foreman-Peck, Millward 1994; Monti 2010: 29; 
Schmidt 2002:152). The UK has been considered as the most ‘pure’ free market 
model (Crouch, Streeck 1997: 4). This competition-centred shareholder-oriented 
model goes in sharp contrast with legal and cultural background of pervasive state 
dirigisme so typical of many other MSs (Schmidt 2002: 76,154). 
The British government led by Margaret Thatcher sought to apply this model 
to SOEs by means of radical, wide-ranging, ideologically and politically driven 
privatisation, which has begun almost a decade earlier than anywhere else within the 
European Union (Heald 1989: 29; Bishop, Thompson 2003). The government has 
fully privatised companies operating in major strategic and network industries, 
making share ownership of such companies highly diffused (Bishop, Thompson 
2003:40; Goyer, del Real 2009). However, while being a pioneer in privatisation the 
UK also became the birthplace of the classic example of GS. In contrast to other 
MSs, the British GSs could have more grounds since the UK companies were 
generally following the ‘one share-one vote’ principle and protectionist CEMs were 
rarely used (Conway et al 2008: 642).
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For the purpose of this general introduction it is necessary to note that the UK 
has a rather troubled relationship with the EU and has long appeared as Eurosceptic 
in comparison to other MSs, particularly demonstrating low public and elite’s 
support for the EU, its institutions and policies (Georde 2000; Nugent, Phinnemore 
2010). While being a Eurosceptic the UK is also one of the most powerful MSs with 
strong economy, and according to some compliance enforcement theories, it could 
afford to bear the costs of non-compliance (Panke 2010: 252). Nevertheless the UK 
is one of the most compliant MSs (Börzel 2001: 818; Tallberg, Jönsson 2001: 26) 
and the following analysis of compliance with GS-related judgment could support 
this statement. When addressing the compliance obligations stemming from the GS 
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judgment of 13 May 2003 on case C-98/01 the UK could be seen as acting in line 
with the sincere cooperation obligation. This chapter shall proceed as follows: 
Section 3.B analyses the essence of GSs as well as how they were brought to the 
attention of the Commission. Section 3.C evaluates the UK’s conduct during the 
infringement procedure. Section 3.D analyses the UK’s inclination to comply and its 
compliance initiatives. Section 3.E draws the conclusions approving the UK’s 
compliance in good faith. 
3.B: Golden Shares and Special Rights 
The British measures represented a GS in its purest sense: a situation where 
special provisions would be inserted into company’s Articles of Association at time 
of privatisation, granting the special shareholder – the government – special rights 
which were attached to a single GS with a nominal value of £1. GSs were introduced 
in 22 newly privatised companies and were held by the Secretary of State (or 
Minister) responsible for the privatised industry.
263 
The content of the special rights 
varied from company to company, yet generally they allowed to control the adoption 
of any strategic decisions, reorganisations, winding-up, appointment of directors, 
acquisitions of shares above a certain ownership ceiling or by a foreign entity, as 
well as inability of removing GSs from company’s Articles of Association without 
the special shareholder’s consent. Some GSs had an automatic expiry date and the 
government could redeem any of its GSs at any time and it often did so by disposing 
of unlimited GSs in several companies during government-preferred mergers or 
takeovers.
264
 Such redemptions indicate the UK government saw GSs as temporary 
mechanisms which should not be maintained for longer than strictly necessary. 
On several occasions the UK government has used
265
 GSs to impede takeovers 
or as a bargaining tool for pressing companies to agree on a takeover at government-
preferred terms.
266
 One example of effective dissuasive effect of GSs could be traced 
back to the UK biggest airport group operator British Airports Authority (BAA) and 
its GS dubbed as ‘one of the strongest GSs of any privatised company’ (The Times 
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28/03/1990). BAA was a natural monopoly which owned and operated seven British 
airports. It was privatised under the Airports Act 1986 pursuant to which the 
government authority (Secretary of State for Transport) modified and approved the 




The Articles of Association established the ex ante approval regime, 
subjecting effectiveness of certain corporate decisions to written approval by the 
special shareholder – the government authority.268 In short, approval applied to any 
amendments to Articles of Association of BAA or provisions governing the GS 
regime, to decisions to dispose of control over airport-operating subsidiaries, 
winding-up and dissolution of BAA or its subsidiaries, as well as for disposal of 
airports. Basically, any restructurings or alienations of material assets of BAA were 
not possible without the approval of the government. GS also aimed at preventing 
anyone, but the special shareholder, from casting votes in excess of 15% of voting 
share capital at the time of adoption of any resolutions at any general meeting of the 
company’s Board of Directors. 
Following the British government’s redemption of GSs in several companies 
there were speculations that BAA’s measures shall also be redeemed to smoothen the 
takeover path for the US company ADT, which was gradually building up its stake 
in BAA while lobbying hard for the British government to redeem its GS (The Times 
17/10/1990; The Independent 30/03/1990). At that time the EU Commission began 
to be increasingly alerted on the matter of existing GSs. The precluded takeover 
approach by ADT and absence of expiry date or explicit justifications of BAA’s GS 
could have contributed to the Commission’s pro-active intervention in the matter. It 
should also be noted that at that time the government became more cautious about 
introduction of new GSs, actively debating on exit strategies while dubbing GSs as 
‘golden handcuffs [that] are being put on the company’.269 With so many British 
companies protected by GSs, only BAA’s GS became subject to condemning 
judgment by the CJEU. 
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3.C: Infringement Procedure 
The Commission issued a formal notice to which the UK has not replied, so 
reasoned opinion followed on 6 August 1999 requiring the UK to comply within two 
months.
270
 The government replied with one month delay defending its right to 
define the characteristics of shares in private companies according to national 
company law.
271
 The government claimed that its GS does not deny access to the 
BAA’s share capital and is necessary for protection of the public interest.272 The 
Commission did not pursue to press on this infringement until one year later 
(European Commission IP/00/1142), lodging an application on 27 February 2001. 
By that time even the Spanish GSs, which were introduced almost a decade after the 
UK measures, have already been put to the scrutiny of the CJEU. 
During the litigation procedure the Commission argued that voting rights 
ownership ceiling and approval regime lacked on legal certainty, leaving wide 
discretionary rights to the government.
273
 The UK government, on the other hand, 
did not seek to justify its GS on grounds of overriding general interest or public 
security and its sole defence during the infringement procedure was that GS in BAA 
is a non-discriminatory private national law mechanism – so the Treaty provisions 
do not apply.
274
 The Commission insisted that BAA’s GS could restrict foreign 
investors’ right to access the UK market since the government was the sole 
beneficiary of the special rights.
275
 In this respect the UK asserted that GS does not 
affect daily management of the BAA. The CJEU established that since the GS were 
introduced by the government pursuant to the Airports Act, the measure represents a 
departure from normal operation of private law.
276
 As the UK has not sought to 
justify the measures at issue, on 13 May 2003 the CJEU ruled that GS held in BAA 
constitute a restriction on free movement of capital and establishment. Following the 
judgment the provisions of Airports Act 1986 that privatised BAA had to be 
amended or repealed to deplete the government’s special right to approve and 
modify the company’s Articles of Association, which also had to be amended in 
order to comply. 
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3.D: Compliance with the Judgment 
The BAA GS has been in place since 1987 and, as the example with frustrated 
takeover bid by ADT has illustrated, it has been effectively serving its purpose for 
sixteen years prior to the condemning judgment. Following the judgment BAA’s GS 
had to be redeemed or justified, yet these measures represented only one instance 
out of what used to be the widest distribution of GSs within the EU and their 
redemption would not have any effect on other such measures. Nevertheless, the 
judgment has considerably influenced the government’s attitude towards GSs 
prompting significant policy shift toward their elimination. 
Following the infringement procedure the government became much more 
cautious on introduction of new GSs: when evaluating the possibility of introduction 
of such measures, the government analysed them in light of ongoing infringement 
procedure on case C-98/01.
277
 As the infringement procedure went further into the 
reasoned opinion stage, the government found itself in limbo: on one hand it 
acknowledged the legal requirement to comply with EU law while on the other it 
sought to implement new GSs.
278
 In light of the Commission’s challenge to the BAA 
regime, the government sought to ensure that any new GSs would be in line with EU 
law and justified on grounds of overriding public interest and national security.
279
 
Following the Commission’s announcement to refer the matter to the CJEU, 
the government acknowledged that the GS in BAA might be overruled
280
 and even 
though the CJEU’s verdict would not be issued in months to come, the government 
got alarmed in a timely manner.
281
 This conduct signifies that the UK has been 
preparing itself for the judgment by not only looking for possible solutions on how 
to justify new GSs,
282
 but also by getting ready to comply in case of condemning 
ruling (The Times 14/03/2003). This behaviour could be indicative of the UK 
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willingness to comply with the judgment in comprehensive manner, in line with the 
sincere cooperation obligation and in good faith. 
The CJEU did not examine whether the BAA’s GS could be justified since the 
defendant chose not to invoke any justifications, even though the protection of a 
strategically-important company such as BAA could potentially be justifiable on 
grounds of public interest or national security. The government’s non-invocation of 
any justifications could predict that it is unlikely that the UK government would 
have resorted to compliance ‘by amendment’ following the condemning judgment. 
On 16 September 2003 the government announced that the GS in BAA is no longer 
needed and in order to duly comply with the judgment it shall redeem its GS 
(Financial Times 17/09/2003). 
When the EU Commission requested follow-up information on compliance, 
the UK replied that the government had announced of its intention to redeem the 
GS, also confirming that the redemption would be complete by mid-October 2003 
(European Commission IP/04/17). True to its assurances the government redeemed 
GS in BAA by the specified deadline (OXERA Agenda 2005: 2), however it has 
failed to provide the Commission with precise information in relation to removal of 
relevant provisions from BAA’s Articles of Association(European Commission 
IP/04/17). It is necessary to emphasise however, that even without removal of 
relevant provisions from BAA’s Articles of Association, following GS redemption 
the said provision effectively lost its dissuasive powers since there was no longer a 
special shareholder holding special rights. Therefore it could be concluded that the 
GS provision contained in BAA’s Articles of Association retained no significant 
impact on the compliance obligations stemming from the judgment on case C-98/01. 
On 7 January 2004, two months following the redemption of BAA’s GS, the 
EU Commission started infringement proceedings for non-compliance issuing a 
formal letter under what is now Article 260 TFEU and reminding the UK of its 
obligation to comply fully by removing relevant GS provisions from company’s 
Articles of Association (ibid). The full compliance has been established on 27 July 
2004 when BAA’s AGM has deleted GS provisions from the company’s Articles of 
Association (European Commission IP/04/1234). Here it is pertinent to emphasise 
that following the redemption of BAA’s GS the company indeed fell victim to a 
foreign takeover (Financial Times 10/07/2006), and this fact clearly indicates that 
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GSs effectively dissuaded foreign investors while GS removal ‘paves the way’ 
(House of Commons 14/03/2008) to cross-border capital movements. 
Following the judgment on BAA’s GS the government continued to redeem 
GSs held in strategic companies while in other instances it chose to re-nationalise 
some earlier privatised companies (European Commission, SWD (2005): 17-18). It 
is sufficient to note that the government retained GSs in defence companies such as 
Rolls-Royce and British Aerospace. The latter GSs could be justified on the grounds 
of public security and overriding requirements of the general interest. 
Proportionality and legal certainty of such GSs could have been contested, however 
it is highly unlikely that the Commission would test the legality of GSs in such 
sensitive areas (Cocciolo, Padrós 2010: 47). 
3.E: Concluding Remarks 
As the core enforcement effectiveness hypothesis suggests, the necessity to 
resort to the second round enforcement action under Article 260 TFEU points to 
weakness of the initial infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU. The 
initiation of the penalty enforcement mechanism would also imply that the 
supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance ‘by amendment’ 
(H1a) could also be confirmed. However, this was not the case with the UK’s 
compliance with GS judgment. The UK case demonstrates how all of the 
compliance instruments available to the Commission were effectively applied for 
persuading the MS to shift to comprehensive compliance. It could be concluded that 
the present case represents one of the examples of compliance in good faith and 
there are two reasons for that. Firstly, despite the application of penalty procedure 
under Article 260 TFEU, the UK government has effectively complied within six 
months following the judgment, which signifies that the enforcement mechanism of 
Article 258 TFEU has been successful in facilitating compliance. Consequently both 
hypotheses questioning the effectiveness of enforcement system (H1 and H2) are 
falsified. Secondly, the infringement procedure coupled with condemning judgment 
and penalty threats have facilitated a comprehensive compliance also triggering the 
significant policy shift in attitude towards GSs. The government could have retained 
other GSs since the ruling on case C-98/01 did not oblige redemption of any other of 
such measures. Nevertheless the government has actively redeemed other GSs, 
which represents comprehensive compliance both with the judgment and with the 
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EU Treaty. Since the UK government shifted its policy and wider attitude towards 
GSs, the hypothesis questioning the effectiveness of the policy-setting case-law (H3) 
is not confirmed. Interestingly enough, the prominence of the UK’s compliance is in 
spite of the penalty procedure for non-compliance which appears to have been 
applied prematurely, since the government has complied almost immediately by 
redeeming BAA’s GS. The full redemption of GS reveals compliance in good faith, 
despite the initiation of penalty procedure. In this regard, it could also be noted that 
the UK government’s failure to promptly communicate the amendments to the 
Commission constitutes a breach of obligations under Article 4(3) TEU (though not 
as grave infringement as non-compliance with the judgment). 
The prominence of shift towards compliance could be attributed to the fact 
that the proceedings and the ruling resonated well with the ongoing domestic 
political and economic reforms regarding existing GSs. Prior to the infringement 
proceedings and at the time when the action was still pending before the CJEU, the 
government redeemed many of its GSs while clearly indicating that it wishes to 
redeem other such measures and to make sure that any existing rules duly comply 
with EU law. The continuous use of GS measures went against the UK’s 
competition-centred and shareholder-oriented model of neo-liberal economy. 
Therefore, the government has not resorted to non-compliance, neither had it tried to 
justify BAA’s GS with new amendments nor shifted to minimalist compliance. The 
minimalist compliance hypothesis is not applicable this case, as the sole compliance 
‘by repeal’ resulted in the full and effective compliance. It is pertinent to emphasise 
that despite the fact that second round enforcement action has been applied, the UK 
GS case demonstrates that the first round procedure has been a success. Yet, when 
assessing compliance in this instance, it should be remembered that the UK had a 
clear advantage as its GSs were introduced significantly earlier than elsewhere 
within the Union and ahead of the initial concerns raised by the Commission on 
these measures. This leadership allowed the UK to successfully exploit GSs 
measures in full for the entirety of desired period, which could be one of the reasons 
why the enforcement action has triggered comprehensive compliance.  
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4. France: Compliance of a ‘Dirigiste’ Member State 
 
This sub-chapter analyses compliance with judgment on case C-483/99 
Commission v France. It begins with a short introduction on the background for 
GSs’ implementation, revealing the moderated necessity for these protectionist 
measures. It continues with the substance of GSs, the infringement procedure and 
analysis of the compliance measures, assessing whether France has complied in 
accordance with the good faith principle. 
4.A: Introduction on Jurisdiction and its Golden Shares 
Firstly, it should be noted that France (together with Germany and the UK) is 
the most influential MS within the EU and has long been the driving force behind 
European integration and the development of the free market (Drake, Lequesne 
2010: 38; Kassim 1997: 170-1). Secondly, France is long known for its multi-level 
interventionism in strategic industries or so-called dirigisme, which saw the 
government playing a central part in control of companies which provided services 
of general public interest, the so-called service public (Bauer 1989; Schmidt 2002: 
81). The function of the service public concept, in the words of Schweitzer, was not 
to delimit state activity, but rather to make the public interest its binding goal 
(Schweitzer 2011: 14). The French dirigisme has been strengthened by an intricate 
web of CEM’s, which allowed for effective defences from hostile takeovers 
(Gardner 1992; Carle 2007). 
In 1986 France began privatisation, which first appeared to be as ambitious as 
in the UK (Schmidt 2002: 81; Vickers, Wright 1989: 1), yet the former privatised 
only profitable companies which operated in competitive markets (such as banks 
and insurance companies) – neither strategically-important companies that provided 
public service, nor monopolies were privatised at that time. In fact, the French 
privatisation Law/1986283 prohibited privatisation of strategic companies if that 
could undermine national interests (Turrini 1993: 817). The Law/1986 restricted 
foreign acquisitions to 20% of shares initially made available for sale (ibid; Billot, 
Echard 1993: 407). Likewise in order to protect national interests the Law/1986 
granted the government with right to implement GS (action spécifique). French GSs 
had the same structure as the UK measures – special rights were attached to single 
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action spécifique held by the government. Pursuant to Law/1986 any implemented 
GS would be effective for five years, following which it would be permanently 
converted back into a common share. The imposition of relatively short application 
period signifies that the government perceived action spécifique as being a 
temporary mechanism. Effectively, the GS provision of Law/1986 has been 
fashioned with the view to facilitate future privatisations of service public and in 
1993 it has been amended by new Law/1993284 which facilitated such privatisations. 
The Law/1993 introduced several amendments to the previous regime, 
widening the scope of GS which now specifically applied to foreign acquisitions in 
companies which operate in strategic sectors, or service public. Firstly, the 20% 
ownership ceiling on initial foreign acquisitions no longer applied to EU investors. 
Pursuant to Law/1993 special rights attached to GS could include the right of ex ante 
approval of acquisitions above certain thresholds, the right to appoint two non-
voting state representatives on the company’s boards and the right to oppose 
decisions on disposal of assets if such decisions are likely to affect national interests. 
Two of the latter rights were absent from the 1986 provisions. Pursuant to Law/1993 
any acquisitions which went through without approval would be stripped of 
corresponding voting rights and the acquirer would have to dispose of such shares 
within three months, otherwise a forced sale shall be executed. Secondly, Law/1993 
introduced another major amendment which applied specifically to foreign 
investors: the approval was now required for foreign acquisitions exceeding a 5% 
shareholding ceiling in companies whose main activities fall within the ambit of the 
exercise of government’s official authority on grounds of public policy, public 
security, public health and national defence. Thirdly, the period of applicability of 
GSs was amended: instead of minimal term of five years any GS would be time-
unlimited and could be removed at any time. 
The content of 1993 amendments signifies the French government’s intention 
to possibly employ action spécifique for future privatisations of service public. The 
GS provisions of Law/1993 are not per se incompatible with the Treaty, since it 
merely allowed for implementation of further decrees, activating action spécifique. 
Even though Law/1993 itself did not contain any specific conditions for exercise of 
GSs (apart from the broadly defined necessity to protect national interests), further 
company-specific decrees could have clarified under which circumstances the 
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special rights would be applied (Turrini 1993: 828). However, as the case on 
contested French GSs shall demonstrate, these decrees would fail to bring any 
further legal certainty. 
For the purpose of this overall introduction it should be emphasised that 
France chose not to completely privatise many of its strategic companies, retaining 
significant shareholdings in companies such as EdF (Kassim 1997: 177; Maclean et 
al 2007: 539; Charbit 2001: 134). France has a relatively concentrated system of 
share ownership and ownership of major companies is largely concentrated around 
preferred investors, creating a ‘stable core’ of loyal shareholders (Morin 2000; 
Maclean et al 2007; Billot, Echard 1993: 408). Ownership concentration coupled 
with intricate web of CEMs, allowed for increased protection from hostile takeovers 
(Gardner 1992; Carle 2007). Additionally, as Conway et al (2008: 639) puts it, the 
concept of shareholder primacy enjoys no obvious legitimacy in France. In this 
respect, French companies were in favourable situation on the matter of protection 
against hostile takeovers, especially comparing to situations established in the UK, 
where the government refrained from retaining public ownership and companies 
quickly become targets for foreign acquirers (Haar and Jones 2008: 2611). 
It is also sufficient to note that when it comes to compliance with EU law 
France is one of the ‘top laggards’ when compared to EU average (Börzel 2001: 
819; Tallberg, Jönsson 2001: 26). Taken its significant political power, high 
administrative capacity and its overall compliance record France could also resist 
compliance when it comes to GS judgments. 
4.B: Early Concerns and the Infringement Procedure 
Initially, the French privatisation law has been drafted under the close scrutiny 
of the EU Commission (Turrini 1993: 820). The Commission quickly became 
alarmed about explicitly protectionist measures, threatening to sue France in case if 
the Law/1986 and its 20% foreign ownership ceiling were implemented.285 Even 
though the imposition of the foresaid ceiling explicitly violated the fundamental 
freedom of establishment, the Commission decided not to criticise but to reach an 
agreement with France, thus acting in good faith towards this MS.286 In return the 
French government promised not to apply the 20% ceiling to EU residents (Turrini 
1993: 820). As the amendment of 1993 clearly demonstrates, the government kept to 
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its promise and revised the provision which no longer applied toEU investors. 
However, the 1993 provision extended the special rights also introducing a new 
ownership ceiling which applied to all investors. The Commission remained silent 
for six months, up until the provisions of Law/1993 have been activated by further 
company-specific decree
287
 creating an action spécifique for energy giant Elf-
Aquitaine (Elf). This GS was later said to be used as a threat to prevent a hostile 
takeover by its French rival Total.288 
Elf-Aquitaine was one of the largest energy companies in France, becoming 
the first company to be protected by what was later said to be ‘the most extensive 
GS’ (Les Echos 14/12/1993). The government chose to fully privatise Elf, retaining 
a single action spécifique. Elf’s GS implemented all of the available options 
provided by Law/1993 – granting the government with the following rights: to issue 
ex ante approval on acquisitions by any investor of shares in excess of 10%, 20% 
and 33% of the company’s capital or voting rights, to appoint two non-voting 
representatives to the company’s Board of Directors and to veto the transfer of (or 
use as security) the majority of capital of Elf’s subsidiaries (European Commission 
IP/98/1058). Pursuant to Elf’s Decree, anyone wishing to acquire assets exceeding 
one of the set thresholds would have to submit documents to the government which 
could oppose the acquisition within one month or approve it by silence. Transactions 
which proceeded without prior approval would have been annulled. 
Elf’s Decree has attracted the Commission’s attention and in May 1998 it has 
formally notified France of the alleged breach.289 France replied in a timely manner 
stressing that the Treaty does not preclude the government from ensuring the 
continuity of national energy supply. French authorities have also expressed 
willingness to amend the contested GS. The Commission was not satisfied with the 
proposed amendments and has issued a reasoned opinion on 18 January 1999. In less 
than a month France issued a draft amendment of Elf’s Decree which sought to 
justify application of approval regime, stating that it would be applied only if 
pending acquisition ‘might threaten to disrupt France’s supplies of petroleum 
products’.290 The government further supported its case in a note sent to the 
Commission on 19 April 1999 clarifying that protection of Elf from a non-EU 
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acquirer is the matter of national importance since it is vital for safeguarding 
national economy in general and energy supplies in particular. The Commission did 
not accept France’s amendments and arguments bringing the matter to the CJEU. 
The Commission claimed that even though Elf’s approval regime applies to all 
market participants it represents an obstacle for capital movement which cannot be 
justified due to the lack of legal certainty.291 The Commission concluded that Elf’s 
action spécifique could be justified by the overriding reasons to ensure continuity of 
petroleum supplies in the event of a crisis, however it is not proportionate to the 
objectives pursued which could be attained by less restrictive measures.
292
 France 
agreed that action spécifique restricts capital movement, but has argued that since 
they are non-discriminatory and imperative for protection of national interests they 
‘constitute a necessary adjunct to the international measures’.293 France insisted that 
Elf’s GS satisfies the proportionality requirement and is justified by the necessity to 
guarantee public security as laid down in the Treaty and by overriding requirements 
of general interest.294 Contrary to the Commission’s claims the government argued 
that there are no adequate and less restrictive alternatives to GS both at the national 
and EU levels.295 
On 3 July 2001 the European advocate delivered his opinion, concluding that 
Elf’s action spécifique does not violate the Treaty and is ‘required by the economic 
reality of the various sectors of activity subject to the privatisation’ (Advocate 
General 2001: paras.31-72&90-1). The CJEU, however, sided with the Commission 
establishing that the measures in question lack on legal certainty, are 
disproportionate to the objectives pursued and leave the government with wide 
discretionary rights (ibid, paras.47-52). The CJEU rightfully ruled that ex ante 
approval could be substituted by the less restrictive ex post measures (ibid, para.46). 
On 4 June 2002 the Court delivered its judgment condemning Elf’s Decree which 
implemented action spécifique and its approval regime. Interestingly enough the 
Court did not challenge the provision of Elf’s Decree which allowed the government 
to appoint representatives to the company’s board. France’s compliance initiative 
and the reasons behind its shift to comprehensive compliance will be analysed in the 
following section. 
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As a preliminary point it should be noted that when GSs were implemented 
and challenged by the CJEU, France did not had considerable motives to resist 
subsequent compliance, since other effective contra-takeover mechanisms could 
effectively substitute repealed GS. Moreover the GS has been applied solely for Elf 
and the enabling provisions of the Law/1993 have not been challenged by the CJEU, 
so following the condemning judgment they could remain intact. 
4.C: Comprehensive Compliance 
Firstly, France’s good natured conduct at the time of the Commission’s early 
concerns should be emphasised. Back in late 1980’s the government negotiated with 
the EU authorities and in good faith has adjusted its GS provisions as demanded by 
the Commission: the 20% ownership ceiling no longer applied to EU investors. 
Likewise the new 5% ownership ceiling applied specifically to foreign investors and 
only to companies with activities linked to public health, security and defence. This 
provision did not automatically cap foreign investments at 5%, instead requiring for 
approval for acquisitions to be valid. The above amendments signify that the 
government sought to make Elf’s GS compatible with the Commission’s demands, 
while at the same time allowing for adequate protection. The elimination of a 
mandatory five year applicability period, found in initial Law/1986, could signal that 
France was aiming to employ its GS for no longer than strictly necessary. However 
the time-unlimited provision of new Law/1993 could also appear to be less defined, 
as the GS now could be applied for more than five years, so the increased 
transparency of the measure in this regard is of debatable nature. 
Secondly, France’s conduct during infringement procedure clearly 
demonstrates that it has genuinely cooperated: it has not only replied to all of the 
Commission’s correspondence but replied in a timely and comprehensive manner. 
France’s reply to the reasoned opinion arrived within one month and contained not 
only defensive arguments, but also a draft amendment of contested measures. The 
government went on to further clarify its position with a complementary note, 
emphasising the importance of ensuring the security of petroleum supplies for its 
national economy and security. These amendments and arguments were not enough 
to satisfy the Commission, but then again France has been cooperating in good faith, 
in spite of its prominent belief that Elf’s Decree is genuinely compatible with the 
Treaty. Interestingly, France’s position on compatibility of the measures has been 
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also re-indorsed by the opinion of the European advocate on the case, which has 
criticised the Court’s approach to analysis of the GSs.296 
Thirdly, and most importantly, France’s post-judgment conduct should be 
analysed. It should be emphasised that at the time of the condemning judgment the 
government was getting prepared to fully comply: adequate compliance measures 
were implemented shortly following the judgment. The relevant compliance 
Decree
297
 has entered into force on 5 October 2002, permanently repealing Elf’s 
Decree which implemented action spécifique. The government did not pursue to 
amend its contested law, neither to delay full compliance. Instead it has complied 
fully within three months following the judgment, which constitutes compliance in 
good faith. However, the legal basis for GS implementation, namely privatisation 
Law/1993, remained in force. On the basis of Law/1993 two further action 
spécifique were implemented in defence and aerospace companies: one in 1997 for 
Thomson (now Thales)
298
 and in 1999 for Aerospatiale.
299 
Here it is should be 
emphasised that even though GSs in such sensitive industries could be justified and 
were unlikely to be challenged by the Commission, in 2000 the French government 
chose to permanently transform
300
 action spécifique back into common share in case 
of Aerospatiale. 
In October 2002, following compliance with the judgment, the government 
issued a statement concluding that the judgment of the CJEU on Elf’s Decree 
‘should not, however, have important consequences’.301 This is due to the existence 
of further post-privatisation protectionist devices, which have promoted France’s 
comprehensive compliance in good faith. Firstly, France still had the ability to 
control foreign acquisitions in strategic industries post-privatisation, which stems 
from Law/1993 – setting a 5% foreign ownership ceiling in companies operating in 
public health, security and defence. Secondly, Law/1993 allowed the government to 
concentrate the ownership around preferred investors and this mechanism could be 
perceived as superior to the GSs (Grundmann, Möslein 2003: 6). This concentration 
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of ownership around loyal shareholders allowed for increased protection against 
unwelcome takeover bids.302 Thirdly, in many cases France chose to retain 
controlling stakes in many of its strategic companies to guarantee effective 
control.
303
 The existence of other effective CEMs which interlocked preferred 
investors in intricate web of cross-shareholdings, also allowed for effective control 
post-privatisation (Bauer 1989: 56; Rhodes, Apeldoorn 1998: 411). Due to 
availability of all of the foresaid mechanisms, the government could comply with 
the judgment on Elf’s action spécifique in case C-483/99 without delay. 
The consolidation strategy practised in France could be another reason for 
timely and appropriate compliance. In contrast to the UK’s desire to break-up its 
large companies, France promoted national champions through domestic takeovers 
and mergers – an approach later employed by Spain and Italy (Schmidt 2002: 189). 
France sought to strengthen the position of its former SOEs – consolidating 
companies by increasing their competitiveness via mergers and takeovers, so that 
application of action spécifique mechanism would be no longer needed in the 
future.
304
 A great example of the government’s policy towards consolidation could 
be seen in case of Elf’s takeover by its national rival Total, bringing Elf’s action 
spécifique to the front lines of the world’s press (Financial Times 1/08/1999). The 
government implicitly approved this takeover since it would create an effectively 
takeover-proof national champion.
305
 By the time the case got referred to the CJEU, 
Elf was already on the way to consolidation. By the time of the ruling on GS case 
the French government was fully prepared for compliance as Elf’s action spécifique 
was no longer needed – the takeover by Total was already under way (European 
Commission IP/00/135). 
Elf’s GS has never been used, but its challenge by the Commission and the 
CJEU has prompted France to change its approach towards this measure. For 
example, the French government has referred to the judgment on Elf’s Decree when 
drafting action spécifique for Gaz de France in order to be certain that the new 
provisions would comply with the Treaty.
306
 Similarly to the UK’s compliance, the 
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French example demonstrates how the infringement procedure has triggered a shift 
to comprehensive compliance. The prominence and promptness of implemented 
measures appear to be even more in line with the good faith principle than the UK’s 
compliance measures, since the Commission had not been forced to initiate 
infringement proceedings for non-compliance with the judgment on French GSs. 
It should be emphasised that both the UK and France were pioneers in 
privatisation and GS implementation – this time-lag allowed for timely adjustment 
to the challenges brought by liberalisation of strategic industries and establishment 
of the free market thereof. However, when assessing the new provisions of 1993 
action spécifique some commentators prematurely praised privatisations in Italy and 
Spain, claiming that these countries abstained from introduction of GSs while the 
UK and France did not (Turrini 1993: 819). In contrast to this statement, the analysis 
revealed that when it came to implementation of GSs and subsequent compliance 
with the judgment in the foresaid MSs, France could be seen as a leader for 
implementation of relatively viable GSs and for compliance in good faith post-
judgment. 
France’s comprehensive compliance is even in sharper contrast when 
compared with Italian or Spanish minimalist compliance strategies which often did 
not end the violation themselves but prescribed implementation of potential 
justifications. In Italian and Spanish ‘anti-EdF’ and ‘anti-E.ON’ cases the 
protectionist measures were the ones to be rapidly implemented but not the 
compliance measures, which were fidgeted with, procrastinated and defied 
compliance. 
4.D: Concluding Remarks 
Despite the country’s comparatively poor compliance record, France’s 
approach to GSs issue stands out as an exemplary case of compliance in good faith. 
Prior to this judgement the CJEU had issued only one judgment on Italian GSs in 
2000, so the EU institutions have not yet established a clear-cut position on the 
issue. Still, France has comprehensively complied in good faith. Even though France 
has maintained other GSs (in defence and aerospace companies) which could 
potentially be justified and were unlikely to be challenged in the first place, it has 
‘seen the light’ and repealed some of these GSs measures. To summarise: the French 
government’s compliance measure with the GS judgment could be seen as 
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particularly adequate, transparent and permanent compliance initiative which does 
not allow for further compliance procrastinations, amendments or justifications – the 
compliance is therefore absolute and paramount. All what was necessary to persuade 
France to comply and repeal GSs was an infringement procedure and a single 
judgment. Consequently, since the core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist 
hypothesis of this study (H1) is falsified, the supporting hypothesis on effectiveness 
of minimalist compliance (H1a) and second enforcement effectiveness hypothesis 
(H2) are not applicable in this case. The French GS case falsifies the hypothesis on 
effectiveness of the agenda-setting case-law (H3). 
In conclusion it suffices to note that France has complied only after the 
protected company Elf has been consolidated becoming a takeover-proof national 
champion. The purpose of the GS has been achieved, and hence it was no longer 
needed. The judgment fitted well into national policy on GSs, which allowed the 
government to shift into comprehensive compliance.   
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5. Belgium: Setting up the Criteria for Justification 
 
This sub-chapter analyses the judgment on Belgian GSs on case C-503/99, 
delivered on the same day as the French ruling. The significance of this case stems 
from the fact that to this day it remains the only instance when GSs have been 
justified. Since analysis of the post judgment behaviour is not applicable in this case, 
the sub-chapter will assess the pre-referral compliance initiatives which eliminated 
the excessively protectionist provisions of Belgian measures, revealing how GSs 
ought to be structured in order to be justified and which other factors could 
contribute towards their justification. It begins with a short introduction of Section 
5.A which is necessary for understanding why GSs were of limited importance for 
the said MS. Section 5.B reveals the substance of GSs. Section 5.C analyses these 
GSs in light of the subsequent compliance measures, which signified Belgium’s 
intention to comply with the Treaty in good faith. The concluding analysis of 
Section 5.D will compare Belgian measures against GSs already discussed in this 
study. 
5.A: Introduction on Jurisdiction and its Golden Shares 
Similarly to the French dirigisme, Belgian government is known for its 
interventionist approach to strategic industries (Hermann, Verhoest 2012: 12; 
Drumaux 1989: 72). Belgium engaged only in partial privatisations which had a 
limited impact on government interventionism due to unique mixed public-private 
economy, characterised by companies in which ownership is shared between both 
public and private investors (Drumaux 1989: 72).
 
The government commonly 
retained majority stakes in privatised companies, controlling them by means of 
indirect ownership (ibid). Strategic companies operating in energy sector mainly 
remained under state- or joint public-private ownership (Clifton et al 2006: 750). 
Apart from continuous indirect state-participation in the capital of privatised 
companies Belgium is known for widespread use of powerful CEMs which protect 
companies from unwelcome takeovers.
307
 Additionally, the government has 
implemented the EU Takeover Directive in a protectionist way, making it difficult 
for foreign investors to launch hostile takeovers (Mukwiri 2009: 113). 
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Taking into account the effectiveness of all of the above protectionist 
measures it should be stressed that strategic businesses in Belgium have experienced 
a large degree of protection, thus additional safeguards, such as GSs, were of limited 
importance. However, purchases of stock by foreign investors in listed companies 
that provide services of general public interest raised important questions of national 
security prompting the government to allow for implementation of GSs. 
The Ownership Disclosure Law of 1989
308
 applied to publicly listed 
companies, obliging investors to disclose (notify) to the government significant 
acquisitions or disposals of shareholdings in excess of particular thresholds. The 
ownership threshold for this purpose has been set at 5% of the total existing voting 
rights, and it could be further reduced by corporate statutes of the relevant company 
to 3%. On the basis of the enabling Law/1989 the government created notification 
and approval regime by means of further company-specific decrees in three strategic 
companies: gas distribution companies SNTC and Distrigaz and nuclear energy 
company Synatom.
309
 The EU Commission did not put to the scrutiny the GSs held 
in Synatom, whereas GSs in two other companies became subject to the CJEU’s 
judgment analysed below. 
For the completeness of this overall introduction it should be noted that 
Belgium is one of the MSs that demonstrates significant level of non-compliance 
with the EU law (Börzel 2001: 819). 
5.B: Golden Shares and a Right of Retrospective Opposition 




 of June 1994 created GSs in 
Distrigaz and SNTC respectively. Distrigaz is a company which has exclusively 
distributed gas in Belgium and its strategic assets comprise of infrastructure for the 
domestic conveyance and storage of gas.
310
 SNTC is a network utility which 
exclusively owns and services the systems of national gas pipelines and conduits, 
which constitute major infrastructure for the domestic conveyance of energy 
products.
311
 In accompanying document to the Distrigaz Decree (Distrigaz Report) 
the government stressed that following the privatisation of state-controlled 
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shareholdings, it is essential to create a balance between the change of ownership in 
the relevant sector and the need for continuous state control.
312
 
Essentially, the government justified GSs in Distrigaz on the basis that the 
company has exclusive rights for the inland transportation and storage of gas on 
Belgian territory and national interests demand that continuous state control by 
means of GS or action spécifique is ensured. The government emphasised that the 
action spécifique is a contemporary instrument of public control which is commonly 
used in other MSs (such as the UK, France and Italy) also stressing that Belgian GSs 
differ from other such measures.
313
 The government further maintained that action 
spécifique shall be maintained specifically in public utility companies and the 
control over Distrigaz would be exercised in the interests of society and national 
energy policy. 
The Distrigaz Decree of 16 June 1994 provides that one action spécifique is 
sold to the state with the special rights reserved for the Minister of Energy. The 
share could not be disposed without prior legislative authorisation and the special 
rights are effective for as long as the share remains property of the state. GS created 
a special mechanism which would allow the state to control significant transfers of 
securities which could result in change in the ownership of Distrigaz. For attainment 
of the foresaid objective, firstly, the Distrigaz Decree established a system of 
notification for transactions in company’s shares, allowing the Minister to oppose 
any such operation if it ‘might adversely affect national interests’ in the energy 
sector. This provision effectively allowed the government to intervene in company’s 
shareholding structure and it was essentially based on the Ownership Disclosure 
Law of 1989. Secondly, the Distrigaz Decree grants the Minister the right to oppose 
certain transactions involving ‘strategic assets’ and establishes a system of prior 
notifications. The Minister would have the right to oppose any transfers, use as 
security or change in the strategic assets of Distrigaz, within twenty one days if 
he/she considers that such transaction could adversely affect the national interests in 
the energy sector. The strategic assets were listed in the Annex to the Distrigaz 
Decree and included infrastructure for inland transportation, storage and supply of 
gas. 
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Thirdly, the Distrigaz Decree reserved a special right to the Minister to 
appoint two representatives of the government to the directors’ board, who shall also 
sit on the Executive Committee. These representatives served in advisory capacity 
with no voting rights, yet they could appeal to the Minister against any decision of 
the board or Executive Committee if they consider such decision being contrary to 
the guidelines on national Energy Policy, including the government’s objectives 
relating to country’s energy supply. The appeal to the Minister could be evoked 
within four working days of the meeting at which the relevant decision was adopted 
or of the date on which the representatives learned of its adoption. The Minister then 
could annul the adopted decision within eight working days. 
In addition to the above special rights, at the time when shares of Distrigaz 
were publicly listed, a further Distrigaz Decree of 20 July 1994
314
 widened GSs 
established by the Decree of 16 June 1994. According to the accompanying Report 
on the Distrigaz Decree of 20 July 1994, the system of prior notification established 
by Decree of 16 June remains in force for listed shareholdings. However, due to 
‘anonymity’ of the traded shareholdings it is desirable to further establish an 
ownership ceiling on acquisitions. The Decree of 20 July established a limitation of 
a number of shares which could be acquired by any shareholder. The accompanying 
Report to the Distrigaz Decree of 20 July 1994 further clarified that the objective of 
this ownership ceiling compliments the desire of the government to distribute a 
significant stake in Distrigaz among public and private institutional investors.
315
 
Therefore, similarly as in the French case, the provision of Belgian ownership 
ceiling aimed at establishment of ‘stable core’ of shareholders (Verhoeven 1996: 
885). In case of Distrigaz the ownership ceiling has been set at 3% of the total 
voting rights: no one could acquire listed shares if such acquisition would result in 
voting rights ownership in excess of a 3% threshold.
316
 According to the Distrigaz 
Decree of 20 July 1994 any voting rights attached to the shares acquired in excess of 
that limit would be automatically suspended. 
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As regards the action spécifique created for SNTC, the accompanying 
Report
317
 to the SNTC Decree of 10 June 1994 provides that the special rights should 
enable the government to assume the coordinating role in the construction and 
expansion of pipelines and conduits necessary for the domestic conveyance of 
energy products. The SNTC Report further provides that this controlling role of the 
government is of interest to the national energy policy insofar as it relates to major 
infrastructure for the domestic conveyance of energy products or pipelines and 
conduits which could be used for this purpose. Due to the above reasons, the 
government sought to continue to exercise some degree of public control following 
the privatisation of SNTC. The action spécifique mechanism created for this purpose 
is tantamount to the one created for Distrigaz, yet there are several differences 
between the Distrigaz and SNTC regimes. 
Firstly, in case of SNTC the notification regime granting the Minister with the 
right of opposition of certain operations applies not to ‘strategic assets’, but to 
operations involving company’s system of pipelines and conduits, promptly listed in 
a separate document. As in case of Distrigaz the Minister can oppose such 
operations within twenty one days if it could adversely affect the national interests 
in the energy sector. Secondly, the notification regime grants the Minister with the 
right of opposition on operations by which a natural or legal person acquires 5% or 
more of the capital or voting rights of SNTC, or increases his holding in such a way 
as to control 10% or more of the capital or voting rights.
318
 Lastly, the SNTC Decree 
grants the Minister with appointment rights, but applies only to appointments to the 
company’s Board of Directors and not to Executive Committee. 
As one can observe from the special rights which applied both to SNTC and 
Distrigaz, the GSs provisions allowed the government to exercise control via 
numerous mechanisms: ownership ceilings, right to ex post opposition for certain 
transactions and right to appoint representatives to companies’ boards. Even though, 
similarly to French GSs, Belgian action spécifique applied without distinction to all 
investors, some of the special rights were of excessively restrictive character. In 
particular the system of notification of significant transfers of SNTC and Distrigaz 
shares and the relevant right to Ministerial opposition is not subject to any condition, 
apart from the fact that opposition could be exercised on decisions which ‘might 
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adversely affect national interests’ in the energy sector. Likewise, the provision on 
Distrigaz Decree of 20 July 1994 which established ownership ceiling at 3% is of 
highly deterrent effect, as well as the 5% and higher ownership ceilings applicable to 
SNTC shareholdings. These provisions attracted the EU Commission’s attention 
which sought to intervene. 
5.C: The Infringement Procedure 
On 8 July 1998 the Commission services formally notified Belgium on the 
alleged breach of the fundamental freedoms of capital movement and 
establishment.
319
 The Commission’s primary concern was the notification regime for 
acquisitions equal to or exceeding certain ownership thresholds (European 
Commission IP/98/1135). Belgium replied to the formal letters in a timely manner, 
stating that the special rights have not been exercised, are not of discriminatory 
character and shall not be applied in a discriminatory manner.
320
 Belgium further 
expressed its inclination to revise the GSs and to inform the Commission of any 
cases when the special rights of action spécifique are going to be applied as well as 
the objective of their application (European Commission IP/98/1135). Unpersuaded, 
the Commission issued two reasoned opinions on 18 December 1998 allocating two 
months for compliance. On 4 March 1999, later than the compliance date stipulated 
in the reasoned opinions, Belgium replied with a single letter stating that it intends 
to amend special rights of action spécifique.
321
 
The government stood by its promise, and shortly following the reply to the 
reasoned opinions repealed its most controversial GS provisions by the Law/1999.
322
 
Firstly, the government repealed the provisions of SNTC and Distrigaz Decrees of 
16 and 10 June 1994 respectively, which concerned share transfers and had 
established the notification regime alongside the Ministerial right to oppose such 
transfers.
323
 Secondly, the Law/1999 established that further decrees shall define 
non-discriminatory and transparent objectives for exercise of the special rights 
attached to action spécifique under the SNTC and Distrigaz Decrees.
324
 Thirdly, the 
Law/1999 repealed the Distrigaz Decree of 20 July 1994, which established an 
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ownership ceiling on acquisitions at a 3% threshold of the total voting rights and 
automatically suspended any voting rights for shares acquired in excess of that 
limit.
325
 Finally, the Law/1999 allowed for implementation of additional safeguards 
for Belgian energy supplies in cases of a threat of attack, a sudden crisis in the 
energy market, or in cases when the security of supply, safety and security of the 
persons, equipment, facilities, integrity of energy transmissions of the country would 
be under threat.
326
 In the above situations, after deliberation with the Council of 
Ministers and consulting the Belgian Commission for Energy, the government may 
issue a decree stipulating the necessary protective measures, which might include 
temporary derogations from the provisions of the Law/1999. 
By repealing the most controversial special rights which could have had a 
deterrent effect on potential investors, the government has acted in good faith 
towards its obligations under the Treaty. However, the Law/1999 did neither address 
the right of appointments with its option for annulment of company’s board 
decisions, nor the right of opposition to transactions both in SNTC and Distrigaz. 
The EU Commission therefore announced its intention to refer the matter to the 
CJEU, lodging an application on 22 December 1999. 
In its application the Commission had challenged the provisions of SNTC and 
Distrigaz Decrees which granted the right to oppose certain transactions. According 
to the Commission, even though the special rights applied without discrimination, 
they were liable to impede, or render less attractive, the exercise of free movement 
of capital and establishment.
327
 The Commission argued that the right of opposition 
cannot guarantee adequate energy supplies, and could be attained by less restrictive 
measures, such as supply contracts and long-term planning.
328
 The Commission also 
referred to the EU harmonising legislation which concerned common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas, stating that Belgium could employ the provisions of 




During the litigation proceedings Belgium agreed that the action spécifique in 
two gas companies constitutes restrictions on the Treaty freedoms, yet arguing that 
the special rights reserved for the government are adequate and proportional to the 
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 Belgium argued that the aim of the notification regime is to 
keep the government duly informed, while the right to opposition relate only to very 
specific situations and is limited in time.
331
 Same goes for the right to oppose certain 
resolutions of the companies’ boards, as it could be applied only in very specific 
situations and is extremely limited in time.
332
 Belgium argued that the measures of 
supply contracts and long-term planning cannot guarantee adequate safety for 
continuity of supplies, stressing that such a guarantee is vital for the survival of the 
public and the security of country’s existence.333 
After analysing measures at issue the CJEU agreed that action spécifique and 
its notification/opposition regime in SNTC and Distrigaz could be justified on the 
grounds of public interest and by the objective of guaranteeing the continuity of the 
energy supply in the event of a crisis.
334
 The Court distinguished that regime at issue 
is an ex post facto measure which does not necessary trigger an opposition by the 
government.
335
 The Court established that the regime applies to limited decisions 
concerning limited assets and only in cases of a threat to national energy policy 
objectives, while also being subject to effective judicial review.
336
 The Court also 
dismissed the relevance of the Energy Directive, since its implementation deadline 
was set in 2000 which is after the application to the CJEU has been lodged.
337
 In the 
light of the above findings, on 4 June 2002 the Court ruled that the Belgian GSs are 
justified and the Commission’s application must be dismissed. 
5.D: Analysis 
During the course of the judicial proceedings Belgium introduced 
Decree/2000
338
 regulating the application of GSs in SNTC and Distrigaz which was 
based on Decree/1999, prescribing the implementation of decrees laying down the 
criteria for the exercise of special rights attached to action spécifique. The 
Decree/2000 was an urgent compliance measure driven by the need to establish 
objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria for the exercise of special 
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rights attached to action spécifique held in SNTC and Distrigaz.
339
 This additional 
urgent compliance measure sought to address the judicial procedure initiated on 22 
December 1999 as well as to comply with the forthcoming (possibly condemning) 
judgment of the CJEU. It is outside the limits of this study to analyse in detail the 
provisions of the Decree/2000, however some of the main features should be 
highlighted to emphasise Belgium’s intention to duly comply by amending GSs so 
its application would be justified. 
The Decree/2000 specified that the special rights of Distrigaz and SNTC may 
be exercised in order to: achieve opening of the gas market, guarantee the provision 
of public services and ensure secure and safe operation of equipment and stability of 
the transmission of natural gas. The Decree specified that special rights may be 
exercised in the general interest if energy policy so demands and only on the basis of 
objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria. The Decree/2000 further 
listed eight-fold criteria for the exercise of special rights in SNTC and Distrigaz in 
relation to particular facilities, while also laying down six-fold criteria which shall 
be taken into account for exercise of special rights. 
The Decree/2000 reveals that the government sought to comply with the 
Treaty provisions prior to the judgment, clearly defining the objectives and instances 
for the exercise of GSs. These timely amendments could have proved to be adequate 
compliance measures in case if the contested GSs were to be overruled by the CJEU. 
Since the GSs were justified the foresaid pre-judgment compliance measure stands 
out for its appropriateness, revealing that Belgium is a MS which sought to comply 
in good faith. Likewise, in contrast to the Commission’s observation that the 
Law/1999 has merely made some ‘structural adaptations’ (European Commission 
IP/98/1135), it could be argued that the Law has effectively scaled down the 
provisions of Belgian action spécifique legislation. It not only repealed the most 
restrictive provisions, but also provided for further legal certainty by disclosing the 
possible objectives for GSs application.
340
 The amendment of Law/1999 which 
repealed the ownership threshold ceilings found in the SNTC and Distrigaz Decrees, 
as well as the ownership ceiling of Distrigaz Decree of 20 July 1994, also reveals 
that Belgium was acting in good faith towards its obligations under the Treaty. 
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Nonetheless, the situation on the GSs in SNTC and Distrigaz seems to be confusing 
due to the following chain of events. 
The amendments to the GSs came after the date stipulated in the reasoned 
opinion: the compliance by the MS’s own initiative could have been effectively 
achieved only before the two month period has lapsed.
341
 The Law/1999 has entered 
into force on 15 June 1999, which is almost three months past the deadline 
stipulated by the two reasoned opinions of 17 December 1998. The Commission’s 
approach to the GSs in SNTC and Distrigaz seems to be confusing since following 
the amendments of the Law/1999, instead of issuing complementary reasoned 
opinion (as it later did in case of Spanish GSs)
342
 it pursued to proceed with the 
application to the CJEU by simply omitting the repealed provisions from the 
application to the CJEU. It is established case-law that the MS’s compliance 
obligations must be determined by reference to the situation as it stood at the end of 
the period laid down in the reasoned opinion as the CJEU should not take account of 
any subsequent amendments to the contested measures. This was clearly confirmed 
by the CJEU in its first GS-related judgment on Italian case C-58/99.
343
 However, as 
the judicial procedure on Belgian GSs demonstrates, the EU Commission did not 
pursue to press Belgium on provisions repealed by Law/1999, only the right for 
opposition has been challenged. This also goes in contrast with the approach taken 
in the Italian GS case since if the Commission would have followed the above 
principle as applied in the said case, Belgian GSs might have not been justified, due 
to the highly deterring effect of the ownership threshold restrictions. 
Of course the Belgian situation goes in sharp contrast with the Italian approach 
(assumed in relation to compliance with judgment on case C-58/99), since the latter 
only envisaged compliance at the time when the judicial stage was in its final phase 
and the resulting compliance measure was found to be inadequate. Similarly, 
Belgium’s good mannered pre-referral compliance measure of Law/1999 coupled 
with pre-judgment compliance initiative of Decree/2000 stands out when compared 
to Spanish compliance approach, since the latter MS merely allowed its GSs to 
expire and no compliance measures were envisaged at the pre-judgment stage. From 
this perspective, Belgian approach to compliance is comparable to comprehensive 
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compliance techniques applied in France and the UK – the MSs which complied 
following the judgments also envisaging considerable policy shifts on GSs issue 
prior to the judgments. However, since Belgium’s comprehensive compliance 
initiatives were implemented before the initial referral and subsequent judgment 
issued pursuant to the infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU, its approach 
to compliance could be seen as the model for compliance in good faith with 
obligations stemming from the Treaty and judgments on GSs. 
Similarly to French GSs and Spanish amendment to ‘anti-E.ON’ Law, the 
Belgian regime constituted non-discriminatory ex post facto measures. However, 
what is the most significant difference between the Belgian case and French and 
Spanish GS regimes is that Belgian action spécifique applied only to certain 
decisions and assets with tight time limitations for its application. Even though the 
Advocate General Colomer (paras.38-40) and other commentators (Cocciolo, Padrós 
2010: 45-8) criticised the supposed ex post nature of the Belgian measures, when 
compared to French and Spanish regimes in energy companies, the substantive 
scope of Belgian measures appears more defined, as it applies to strategic assets and 
pipelines and not to the capital of the companies. What is pertinent to emphasise is, 
when comparing the Belgian GSs with other such measures it must be stressed that 
Belgian special rights were justified due to the Distrigaz and SNTC’s exclusive 
status as sole gas distributors within the national borders, the position different to 
any other MSs’ companies analysed in this study. Both Distrigaz and SNTC 
provided only a network utility service with the sole aim of storage and distribution 
of gas on the national territory, with no production involved whatsoever. So it is 
imperative to distinguish between the companies that provide services of general 
interest and companies whose sole responsibility is to distribute energy. Neither 
Italian ENEL or ENI, nor Spanish Repsol and Endesa or French Elf could have 
matched Distrigaz or SNTC due to the latter companies’ sole specification in gas 
distribution. The Belgian GSs could have been used as a framework for new GSs, 
however circumstances of the Belgian case were exceptionally unique so it is 
unlikely that similar GSs could be justified due to the following reasons. 
Firstly, any such potential GSs would not only have to be legally certain and 
justified on imperative necessity for protection of public security, but also to apply it 
in companies which sole activity is provision of public service via network system, 
such as Distrigaz and SNTC. Secondly, even though in theory any new GSs could 
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meet the above criteria, such measures might not pass the proportionality test if they 
were implemented after the deadline for transposition of the Energy Directive. 
Nevertheless, the Belgian pre-referral amendments as well as pre-judgment 
compliance initiatives should be taken as an example of compliance with GS 
judgments in good faith. For the reason that the early stage of the enforcement 
action under Article 258 TFEU has been effective in facilitating comprehensive 
compliance in this case, the Belgian case is the only instance which demonstrates 
that compliance ‘by amendment’ could be of a comprehensive manner. In the 
Belgian case the core effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis (H1) and the 
supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) are falsified. 
The second enforcement effectiveness hypothesis (H2) is not applicable and the 
hypothesis on effectiveness of the agenda-setting case-law (H3) is falsified.  
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6. The Netherlands: Comprehensive Compliance  
 
This sub-chapter analyses compliance with the judgment on Commission v 
Netherlands GS in joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 (see Looijestijn-Clearie 
2007). This GS judgment is significant for the development of the GS jurisprudence 
in several aspects, some of which will be shortly discussed in one of the following 
sections. The following analysis will reveal the initial resistance of the Dutch 
government to comply and relinquish GSs, followed by a significant policy shift into 
comprehensive form of compliance. This sub-chapter begins with a brief 
introduction on Dutch privatisation and the government’s role in regulation of 
strategic industries, revealing why only limited number of GSs has been introduced. 
Section 6.B continues with the analysis of GSs in formerly state-owned 
telecommunications giant KPN NV and postal monopoly TPG NV, followed by 
analysis of the infringement procedure. Section 6.C concludes with analysis of the 
government’s compliance initiatives revealing whether the Netherlands have acted 
in good faith. 
6.A: Introduction on Jurisdiction 
The Netherlands is a MS with one of the proportionally-largest public sectors 
within the EU, but there were very few publicly-owned companies and there was no 
fundamental difference between private and public companies as such (Edwards 
1999: 23; Anderweg 1989: 117). Similarly to the UK, the Dutch economy has been 
open to national and foreign competition and since public enterprises operated 
mainly in domestic markets their share in national economy has been relatively 
small (Anderweg 1989: 118; Haffner, Berden 1998). The majority of public 
enterprises had a form of limited liability companies (Naamloze Vennootschap), thus 
the company’s board of directors had the primacy over the state when it came to 
establishing the company’s policies (Haffner, Berden 1998: 11). Since many of 
these companies were not natural monopolies, they have already been exposed to 
national and international competition as well as to foreign capital inflow.
344
 Thus, 
efficiency and competitiveness of the majority of Dutch public companies has been 
high with no need for further improvement through privatisation (Haffner, Berden 
1998: 11; Anderweg 1989; Grundmann, Möslein 2003; Vries, Yesilkagit 1999;. 
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Even so, the government sought to privatise in order to limit expansion of public 
sector, yet due to the specific nature of the latter and minimal state participation in 
ownership of the companies there was little to privatise in first place (Haffner, 
Berden 1998: 4-5). Dutch privatisation was generally similar to the Belgian one: it 
has been modest both in terms of width and depth, as there have been no ideological 
ambitions. On one hand, since the government has been reluctant to participate in 
ownership of public companies, the state involvement has been minimal. On the 
other hand, the government’s ownership in companies which had a bigger impact on 
general public interests (such as public transportation, energy and water supply, post 
and telecommunications) has been considerable, yet in comparison to other MSs this 
ownership has never been substantial (Haffner, Berden 1998:10, 28). 
For the purpose of this overall introduction it is pertinent to note that share 
ownership of Dutch listed companies is highly dispersed (Bekkum et al 2010: 13). 
In contrast to the British neo-liberal model of capitalism the Netherlands employ a 
stakeholder-oriented model allowing employees and trade unions to play a 
prominent role in corporate affairs.345 Additionally, a wide-ranging set of CEMs., 
with their effect similar to GSs mechanism, such as preference and priority shares – 
granting the holder special rights – are prevalent in the Netherlands.346 Some of 
these wide-ranging CEMs not only used to defend companies against hostile takeovers, 
but also substantially reduce shareholders’ involvement in corporate affairs under 
normal circumstances Similarly to Belgium, the Netherlands have also implemented 
the EU Takeover Directive in a protectionist way that discourages hostile takeovers 
(e.g. Roosenboom, Goot 2003: Bekkum et al 2010: 21-4). This defensive takeover 
tactic, coupled with effective CEMs and specific structure of Dutch public sector, 
have created significant protection for national companies. The large degree of 
protection, alongside with high competitiveness of national companies allowed the 
Dutch government to withhold from extensive application of GSs which provided 
only additional safeguards to the existing defensive measures against potential 
hostile takeovers. 
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6.B: Golden Shares and the Infringement Procedure 
Overall, there have been only four state-owned companies in the Netherlands, 
one of them being the Dutch Postal & Telecommunications Service – the main 
incumbent in the relevant markets.
347
 The government sought to introduce 
competition in relevant sectors by privatising Dutch Postal & Telecommunications 
Service in 1989 and renaming it PTT in which the state remained the sole 
shareholder. The government gradually disposed of its stake in PTT, at the same 
time making sure that following the entry of foreign competition the company does 
not fall into undesirable hands and the universal provision of public services in post 
and telecom is duly safeguarded (European Commission IP/03/1753). For this 
purpose the state amended PTT’s corporate statutes creating a non-discriminatory 
GS. 
In 1998 the company was divided into two separate companies: KPN and 
TPG, so the government amended its initial GSs held in PTT to cover two new 
companies accordingly.
348
 At the time of the division the government has retained 
minority stakes, yet following GS’s implementation the government has been 
gradually disposing of shares in both companies. In 2000 GSs held in KPN and TPG 
came in the midst of discussion on protectionist measures created across the EU, as 
KPN’s measures became one of the reasons for the Spanish government to employ 
its GSs held in Telefónica.
349
 
The special rights reserved for the government in KPN were tantamount to the 
ones in TPG, establishing the system of ex ante approvals for a wide range of day-
to-day and strategic managerial decisions, such as: certain investments and 
payments of share dividends, amendments to various provisions of company’s 
statutes and resolutions of company’s board on corporate restructurings.350 The GSs 
also granted the government with the right to appoint representatives with a decisive 
voting right onto the companies’ supervisory boards.351 
Similarly as in the UK, the Dutch GSs have been incorporated into companies’ 
statutes upon agreement between all shareholders, so the government envisaged that 
there was no need for any further justifications for these measures. In contrast to the 
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UK measures, however, Dutch GSs were transferrable.
352
 Following the amendment 
of KPN’s and TPG’s corporate statutes, the Dutch government and companies 
concerned entered into an agreement according to which the government undertook 
not to use GSs in KPN and TPG to block any hostile takeovers, but to use its special 
rights only if the public interest in telecom and postal sectors would so require or in 
order to protect its interests as a shareholder in those companies.
353
 
In spite of the foresaid agreement, the EU Commission sought to eliminate 
special rights reserved for the Dutch state, yet the government indicated that it has 
no intention of relinquishing its GSs (Putek 2004: 2278). The Commission issued 
formal letters to which the Dutch government replied by stating that special rights 
reserved for the government do not violate the Treaty freedoms and even if they do, 
they are justified on the grounds of necessity to ensure universal delivery of relevant 
services to the public.
354
 The Commission remained silent for more than two and a 
half years, without pursuing the matter any further. During this period the Dutch 
government continued to gradually dispose of its ownership in both companies.
355
 
The condemning judgment on the similar UK GSs held in BAA could have prompted 
the Commission to pursue the matter on the Dutch case, so on 5 February 2003 it 
has issued a reasoned opinion. The government replied with a delay restating its 
claims. 
On 13 May 2003 the CJEU has handed down its condemning judgment on the 
UK’s GSs. Due to similarity of Dutch and UK provisions, the judgment presented 
certain implications for the justifications of the Dutch measures, since in comparison 
with the BAA’s GSs, the special rights in KPN and TPG appeared more wide-
ranging and restrictive. Yet the major difference between the UK and the Dutch 
cases is that the government remained a minority shareholder in the latter case. In 
spite of the condemning judgment on UK measures the Dutch government resisted 
compliance, prompting the Commission to start judicial proceedings. At the time of 
referral to the CJEU the special right to appoint government representatives to the 
companies’ supervisory boards has been removed from both companies’ statutes, so 
the Commission did not maintain its claim on this point.
356
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During the judicial proceedings the Commission claimed that the system of 
prior approval in both Dutch companies is unjustified and disproportionate, thus 
contrary to the Treaty freedoms on capital movement and establishment.
357
 In its 
defence the Dutch government argued that the Treaty is not applicable in this case, 
since the GSs are not a state measure and the state is acting in its capacity as a 
private shareholder and not as public authority.
358
 In his opinion on the Dutch case, 
the Advocate General Maduro supported previous findings of the CJEU expressed in 
the ruling on the UK GSs case. The European advocate concluded that the obligation 
to obey to the fundamental freedoms stems from the state’s ‘organic capacity’ as a 
signatory to the Treaty and ‘it is immaterial how [special] powers are granted or 
what legal form they take’.359 The European advocate also rightfully stressed that if 
the government chooses to open certain sectors to competition via privatisation it 
has to ‘act in a manner which is consistent with that decision’ and protect the 
autonomy of the privatised company, unless there is a need to safeguard 
fundamental public interests.
360
 The Court had no difficulty in determining that the 
Dutch GSs at issue are in fact a state measure.
361
 
In case of special powers held in KPN the Dutch government did not put 
forward any justifications on the basis of general public interest, whereas in case of 
TPG it has claimed the general interest of safeguarding the universal postal 
service.
362
 After analysing possible justifications and proportionality of the special 
rights, the Court ruled that the measures in KPN are not justified by any overriding 
reasons of general public interest, while the measures in TPG are disproportionate, 
overly restrictive, go beyond to what is necessary to attain the objectives pursued 
and, above all, both regimes are not subject to effective judicial review.
363
 Notably 
the CJEU commented on the ‘one share-one vote’ principle, establishing that the 
special rights reserved for the Dutch state allowed it to influence the management of 
the companies to the significantly greater extent than the size of its investment 
would normally allow.
364
 According to the Court, such enhanced influence 
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undermines the rights of other shareholders and enhances the risk that such special 
rights would be used ‘in order to pursue interests which do not coincide with the 
economic interests of the company concerned might discourage direct or portfolio 
investments in that company’.365 The Court issued a condemning judgment on 28 
September 2006, obliging the government to comply as soon as possible. 
6.C: Analysis of Compliance 
From the onset it should be noted that the Dutch government duly cooperated 
with the Commission on the GS cases by replying to the correspondence and 
revealing its inclination to withdraw the state participation from the companies 
concerned. At the time when the judicial proceedings have been in their advanced 
stage, the government further reduced its stakes in the said companies.
366
 This 
tendency of the government to withdraw its participation has been already evident at 
the pre-judicial stage of the infringement procedure (formal letters).
 
On 16 
December 2005 – one day prior to the Commission’s official announcement to refer 
the matter to the CJEU – the government’s GS has been transferred to KPN 
(Looijestijn-Clearie 2007: 439). From this moment, the state was no longer a 
beneficiary of the special rights as the GS in KPN with all the rights attached to it 
now became owned by the company itself. This transfer of the GS to KPN 
eliminated the infringement of the Treaty in this case as such. Interestingly enough, 
the determination of the Commission to include the matter of KPN’s GSs in its 
application to the Court goes in contrast to the similar situation established in the 
Belgian case.
367
 In the latter case, the breach has also been remedied after the date 
stipulated in the reasoned opinion, yet the Commission withheld its complaint on the 
matter and did not include the amended provisions in its application. 
In this light, the Dutch pre-referral compliance measure on KPN’s GS sought 
to address the initiated infringement procedure, yet this compliance initiative did not 
preclude the Commission from referring the matter further. Since the GS in KPN 
could also be perceived to be similar to arrangements in BAA’s statutes, the 
Commission’s pursuit to bring the matter to the Court could be understood from this 
perspective.
368
 In the UK case, the Commission did not withdraw its compliance 
pressures until BAA’s statures were amended and special GS provisions removed. In 
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April 2006, on the following AGM of KPN, the company’s statutes were amended 
and the GS provisions removed. On 2 September 2006 – six days prior to the 
condemning judgment – the last state-owned shares were privatised (Looijestijn-
Clearie 2007: 439. In contrast to the GS provisions in BAA’s corporate statutes, 
which have been removed after the condemning judgment, the Netherlands fully 
complied with the Treaty prior to the judgment. This tactics constitutes the 
compliance in line with the good faith principle. 
The Dutch government applied similar compliance strategy in relation to the 
GS held in TPG by gradually reducing its stake in the company. The government 
transferred its GS to the TPG on 16 November 2006, fully disposing of the residual 
ownership (ibid). The government has fully complied merely two months following 
the condemning judgment, transferring both GSs in the companies concerned. On 
the next AGM held on 20 April 2007 corporate statutes of TPG’s were amended and 
the GS provisions removed (ibid). 
In spite of the Dutch government’s resistance to relinquish its special rights at 
the earlier stages of the infringement proceedings, the pre-referral and pre-judgment 
compliance initiatives inevitably point to the MS’s genuine inclination to comply as 
soon as possible and in good faith. Such pre- and post-judgment compliance conduct 
implies that the core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis of this 
study (H1) is falsified. The comprehensive compliance has been achieved due to the 
fact that the ruling resonated well with the on-going national policies on state 
withdrawal from public sector companies. The Dutch privatisation has been a 
gradual and methodical process, which allowed the government to ensure that its 
interests are duly protected. From the year of their implementation back in 1998, the 
GSs have been effectively serving their purpose and were duly relinquished when no 
longer necessary. It should be emphasised that at the time of the judgment on Dutch 
GSs, the CJEU has already ruled on six other such judgments, so the EU institutions 
have already confirmed and developed their policy regarding these measures. As a 
result, the compliance with cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 could be seen as 
confirming the Dutch government’s wider shift to significant policy change in 
relation to GSs. The Dutch government had exceeded the compliance requirements 
by not only transferring the GSs in the said companies, but also by completely 
removing residual state ownership and proceeding with the full privatisations. 
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Hence the core enforcement effectiveness hypothesis of this study (H1) is not 
confirmed, (H1a) and H2 are not applicable, while (H3) is falsified.  
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7. Germany: Obstructionist Protectionism and VW Law 
 
This chapter analyses compliance with the judgment on case C-112/05 
Commission v Germany369 which is one of the most famous and longest-running 
cases in EU history. The case concerns the law defining corporate statutes of 
Volkswagen AG, the so-called VW Law.370 This landmark case differs considerably 
from other cases on non-discriminatory GS provisions created for the sole benefit of 
the state, such as GSs of the UK and the Netherlands (e.g. Sanders 2008). Similarly 
as in the foresaid cases GSs in Volkswagen were incorporated into company’s 
statutes through the general provisions of national law, yet they were not exclusively 
reserved for the national authorities’ benefit and applied without discrimination to all 
market participants, making its provisions a less obvious instance of GS. 
Being one of the oldest instances of GSs the initial aims of the VW Law and its 
structure were unlike any other such provisions, which resulted in complexity of its 
post-judgment amendments. This case reveals a complex question of the 
Commission’s pursuit for striking down national protectionist measures, which saw 
it verging too far into the ambit of national company and public law, allowing for 
radical liberalisation which goes against social models of some MSs and bringing 
additional legal restrictions on national systems (Höpner, Schäfer 2007). In this 
respect the VW Law, which gives an exclusive position to Volkswagen’s workforce, 
also went to the heart of the debate on increasing reform pressures exerted on 
Germany’s unique system of corporate relations and co-determination (e.g. Baums 
2001; Komo, Villers 2009). 
Most importantly, following the Volkswagen judgment the CJEU’s case-law 
has been criticised for its ambiguity as the ruling represented an interpretational 
challenge for both the Commission and the German government. As a result, 
following the German compliance initiative, in the Commission’s view, Germany 
resisted to comply fully. This led to a situation when Volkswagen case became the 
only known instance of the MS’s shift to ‘determined non-compliance’ even under 
penalty threats. 
This sub-chapter reveals motives for non-compliance based on substantial 
conflict between the defendant’s and the Commission’s interpretation of the 
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compliance obligations. To address the rationale behind obstructionist behaviour this 
sub-chapter encompasses an introduction on the German model of managed 
capitalism and its long-standing tradition of unique industrial relations. This 
overview analyses evolution of the relationships between the German companies, 
Federal state (the Bund), the States (Länder) and stakeholders, which evolved as a 
result of a corporate shift from tradition of social responsibility towards a 
shareholder-oriented philosophy – the shift which concerned all German companies 
with the sole exception of Volkswagen. This introduction sets the scene for the 
subsequent evaluation of the VW Law as a unique measure aimed at safeguarding 
social objectives inherent in principle of social responsibility. It also contributes 
towards evaluation of Germany’s reluctance to remove GSs both pre- and post-
judgment. 
Building on introduction, Section 7.A analyses background of the VW Law, 
while Section 7.B reveals the main differences between the law and Aktiengesetz 
(AktG)
371
 – the German stock company law. This section will also assess the extent 
to which the shift to free-market values has contributed towards the inherent 
obstructionist nature of the VW Law. Section 7.C provides insight into the 
Volkswagen/Porsche takeover battle, coupled with the infringement procedure and 
followed by the analysis of the government’s inclination to comply pre-judgment. 
Section 7.D analyses the potential for compliance and Section 7.E analyses the post-
judgment compliance. Here the emphasis is laid on Germany’s incline to resist 
compliance due to the interpretational challenges presented by the CJEU’s 
judgment. The summative analysis of the compliance situation is provided in 
conclusion. 
Introduction 
Historically, Germany operated under typical system of ‘managed’ or 
‘organised’ private capitalism. Its main characteristics are: political regulation which 
promoted tight business inter-connections, close business-banking partnerships, 
interlocking directorates, high ownership concentration, cross-shareholdings and 
coordinated industrial relations between numerous stakeholders such as employees, 
managers, customers, suppliers, cooperating companies and banks (Rhodes, 
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Apeldoorn 1998; Schmidt 2002; Beyer, Hoppner 2003). Another characteristic 
feature is the labour co-determination via the two-tier corporate governance 
structure in large companies, which assigns the creation of supervisory and 
management boards. The German dual board system ensures that the labour interests 
are duly accounted for by the management of the company. This dense network of 
closely-knit relationships promoted consensus and long-termism among 
stakeholders who worked together to achieve common goals, at the same time 
investor protection has been weak and shareholder influence limited (Rhodes, 
Apeldoorn 1998; Beyer, Hoppner 2003; Franks et al 2005). 
Coordinated industrial relations between social partners assumed the 
embedded principle of social responsibility which was ‘deeply rooted in German 
society’ (Beyer, Hoppner 2003; 181) and played an important role in business 
(Franks et al 2005: 6). The social responsibility principle implied that the company 
and its management have broad social obligations. As opposed to the UK 
shareholder-orientated model, German companies prioritised by putting social 
interests front and centre, such as stable employment for labour, as well as serving 
the wider interests of the state (ibid). Shareholders were seen merely as ‘savers’ and 
not investors, their interests were not a priority (Berger 1970: 741). Employees’ 
interests were supported through board-level co-determination, centralised trade 
unions and strong workers councils. The first AktG of 1937372 strengthened 
management influence over the companies and managers’ control has gone far 
beyond sole interests of their own companies, but outstretched to consider wider 
interests of regional and national economy (Berger 1970: 690; Rainer 1968: 71; 
Beyer, Hoppner 2003: 183. 
The Bund has played an important role in regulation of industries and even 
though the state’s ownership was relatively small (Esser 1989: 60-2, 68; Schmidt 
2002: 177), the state assumed considerable impact on some key industries since it 
has retained large stakes in biggest companies. From the onset, the industrial 
ownership and control of the Bund should be distinguished from the ones of the 
Länder. Due to the constitutional limitations, the Federal government has little 
intervened in the economic decision-making and industrial policy. The Bund merely 
‘enabled’ effective activity of the Länder by means of supportive legislation and 
financial aid (Schmidt 2002: 166-7, 180). The regional governments on the other 
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hand, had a significant participation in ownership and control of strategic companies 
(Vickers, Wright 1989: 10; Schmidt 2002: 167), actively nurturing them by creating 
supportive economic environment for development and success (Schmidt 2002: 
167). Moreover, the regional governments of the Länder in which large companies 
dominated, were most likely to resort to divergence and experience more freedom in 
their relationships with such companies. One good example of such business-
government relationship could be observed in the case of car-manufacturing giant 
Volkswagen and the Land of Lower Saxony where the company has been historically 
established (ibid, 308). 
The German business/social system faced little economic vulnerability, 
effectively ensuring high competitiveness for companies on European and 
international markets, as well as high wages and secure employment for the 
workforce. At that time the largest German companies operating in network 
industries co-ordinated their actions instead of competing for the market, this 
ensured their special position as the most successful companies of that art within the 
EU (Hermann, Verhoest 2012: 13). The matters have changed considerably in 
1990’s in a view of emerging international competitive challenges and the EU 
pressures to de-regulate and liberalise national industries. The Bund adapted to 
changes by introducing market capitalist elements into its system via reforms and 
widespread privatisation of 1990s’, yet previously there were several other 
privatisation attempts (Schmidt 2002: 172). 
In 1959 Germany became the real pioneer in promotion of stock ownership 
culture through privatisation (Bortolotti, Milella 2006: 15; Berger 1970: 690). At 
that time, the Federal government encouraged small investors, such as companies’ 
employees and ordinary citizens, ‘to participate in Federal wealth’ (Esser 1989: 63) 
by purchasing so-called ‘people’s stock’. In 1960 the Bund has partially privatised 
few profitable companies such as Volkswagen with both the Bund and the Land 
retaining 20% minority stakes each – to guarantee continuous state influence. 
During the second wave of 1980’s privatisations the Bund fully disposed its stake in 
Volkswagen, while the Land of Lower Saxony refrained from selling its stake, 
becoming the largest shareholder. 
The attitude to social responsibility concept shifted in 1990’s when German 
companies became increasingly concerned about international competitiveness, 
striving to increase productivity and lower production costs by decreasing the 
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numbers of employees and moving businesses abroad. In 1998 the Bund has brought 
the long tradition of social responsibility obligation to an end by amending the 
AktG.373 From that time on, the German tradition of tight industrial relations has 
eroded considerably, triggering disintegration of managed capitalism, undermining 
traditional relationships between stakeholders and reducing the influence of the state 
(Beyer, Hoppner 2003: 184;). 
Originally, the AktG allowed for the creation of powerful CEMs such as 
multiple-vote shares and ownership ceilings, which aimed at shielding national 
companies from foreign takeovers (Berger 1970: 724; Henle 1994: 123). The 
§134(1) AktG of 1998 introduced the shareholder value philosophy by declaring the 
‘one share-one vote’ principle for the listed companies and stating that there must be 
a correlation between the amount of shares held and the voting rights attached to 
them. In an accompanying document the government expressly confirmed that one 
of the most effective CEMs – the voting right ceilings – is undesirable for listed 
companies.
374
 According to the§134(1) AktG of 1998 in cases where a shareholder 
holds a larger number of shares in a non-listed company, the company’s statutes 
could contain provisions on capping voting rights by setting a voting right ceiling. 
The AktG of 1998 did not fully apply to one particular listed company – 
Volkswagen, making the VW Law and its voting right ceiling the sole derogation 
from general company. The exclusive 20% voting right ceiling of the VW Law 
indirectly benefited the minority shareholder – the Land of Lower Saxony. 
For the purpose of this introduction it should be noted that even though 
German company law makes a ‘one share-one vote’ a mandatory principle for the 
listed companies it also allows for implementation of other CEMs, yet they are not 
generally implemented by German companies.
375
Apart from the VW Law, GSs are 
uncommon in Germany. 
7.A: The Background of the VW Law 
The system of managed capitalism and its embedded concept of social 
responsibility served the wider interests of the state, guaranteed secure employment 
and high wages for the labour, yet the long-standing tradition of co-ordinated 
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industrial relations adopted a free market values and shareholder orientation, 
diminishing the importance of social responsibility obligation and increasing 
shareholder influence. With one exception: at times when other companies were free 
to implement decisions which would seem contrary to social responsibility principle, 
Volkswagen remained subject to the VW Law, which effectively diminished 
shareholder value while increasing stakeholder value. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the VW Law and subsequent compliance it is necessary to consider 
the historic prerequisite. This background of the GSs’ origin has made up a principal 
part in Germany’s defence during the infringement proceedings, so it is essential for 
the understanding of the relationships between the initial spirit of this GS law and 
Germany’s resistance to its removal. 
Volkswagen stands out as a symbol of German economic miracle
376
 as it is one 
of the most prominent examples of successful operation of managed capitalism and 
social-oriented industrial relations. Being one of the largest car manufacturers in the 
world, Volkswagen is known for its extensive, powerful lobby and it has long been 
associated with strong labour influence and employee participation in building the 
company’s wealth and boosting its economic development. Therefore, it is 
understandable why many saw the infringement procedure brought against the GSs 
of VW Law as a direct attack on ‘a symbol of the German way of life’,377 as well as 
an attack on the long-standing traditions of German industrial relations and inherent 
social responsibility values (Saam, Zumbansen 2007). The company has grim 
national socialist origins that go back to 1933 and its past has been tightly associated 
with the objective of building the ‘People’s Car’ (ibid; Lupa 2003: 35). The project 
required large capital injections and for this purpose the German trade union 
organisation has introduced a savings plan. The plan encouraged company’s 
employees, wishing to obtain an automobile, to deposit funds which were intended 
to cover the costs of production. Therefore, initially Volkswagen is a state-owned 
company partially funded by employees and public investments. The company’s 
factory and a new city called Wolfsburg were built in Lower Saxony. The grandiose 
plans for building an affordable car were abandoned because of the Second World 
War and the savings plan collapsed. Following the war, Lower Saxony assumed 
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administration of the company on behalf of, and under the supervision of, the Bund 
(Lupa 2003: 35). 
Over the coming decade Volkswagen became an exceptionally successful 
company and the largest employer in Lower Saxony. Its stable workforce perceived 
itself an integral part of the company while also receiving high wages, and 
considerable social benefits. . At that time, despite its success, Volkswagen remained 
without an owner, so when the Bund raised the question of privatisation it brought 
up a considerable conflict of interests between the stakeholders such as savers, trade 
unions, employees, the Land and the Bund. Employees fought for their privileged 
position, assuring themselves a direct participation in the success of the company. 
The unfortunate savers claimed their private rights over the company. The trade 
unions also claimed their share. As a result, each of the above five parties claimed 
the ownership of Volkswagen and the dispute stretched for many years.378 
The solution to privatisation stalemate emerged in the view of an ownership 
compromise: the national and regional governments agreed that shares of the 
company should be widely distributed, while the interests of the workers and trade 
unions must be protected against any large shareholder which could gain control 
over the company. Employees and the unions agreed to relinquish their ownership 
claims for Volkswagen in return for the authorities’ guarantee that their interests 
would be duly protected.379 The Land and the Bund agreed to widely distribute the 
company’s shares, making it difficult for any party to accumulate a large 
shareholding. In 1959 the two administrations concluded a private contract 
(Staatsvertrag) according to which 60% of shares had to be privatised, while the 
remaining 40% would be equally divided between the Land and the Bund.380 All 
interested parties: shareholders, the Land, the Bund, employees and other 
stakeholders agreed that the provisions of the contract have to be incorporated into 
company’s statutes. Subsequently, on the basis of this Staatsvertrag the German 
parliament (Bundestag) approved the VW Law on 21 July 1960. 
To summarise on the subject of origins of the German GSs law, it should be 
emphasised that the initial aim of the provision was to solve the stalemate situation 
regarding the Volkswagen’s ownership by reaching an agreement between the 
administrative bodies and stakeholders. The text of the Staatsvertrag, which sought 
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to ensure the authorities’ influence and control over Volkswagen, has been cemented 
by way of further legislative activities of the Bundestag. Since all the parties 
accepted and agreed on the further legalisation of the measures by the Bundestag, 
the VW Law could be considered as facilitating interests of all of the parties 
involved: the Land, the Bund and company’s employees. The savers, employees and 
trade unions relied upon the continuous administrative protection over their inherent 
interests and over the company as a whole, so declaring these guarantees via specific 
legislation seemed as the right way forward. 
7.B: Analysis of the VW Law 
Initially the VW Law established a voting right ceiling limiting shareholders’ 
rights at 0.01% while both the Land and the Bund could exercise their rights in 
proportion to their shareholdings.381 Later this provision has been amended and the 
20% voting right ceiling applied to all shareholders. Apart from the provision of 
§2(1) establishing a voting right ceiling that limited the voting rights of any investor 
to 20%, the VW Law contained the following provisions: §3(5) restricted the right of 
representation for the exercise of voting rights at the AGM to a maximum of 20% 
for any single shareholder; §4(1) governed the right of directors appointments, 
allowing the Bund and Lower Saxony to appoint two members to the supervisory 
board each, for as long as these administrative bodies remain shareholders; §4(2) 
provided that construction and relocation of factories must be approved by a 
majority of two thirds of the supervisory board. The latter paragraph was not subject 
to the subsequent infringement proceedings. Finally, §4(3) provided that in order to 
be approved, resolutions of the AGM shall require a favourable vote of more than 
four-fifths or 80% of the share capital, whereas the AktG provides for a majority 
being at least three quarters or 75%. 
The VW Law applied to all shareholders, yet it deviated from general 
provisions of the AktG in two aspects. Firstly it has introduced a voting rights ceiling 
which was prohibited for listed companies, secondly it has provided for an increased 
majority and lastly it granted the authorities with special right to appoint four 
directors. The voting right ceiling of §2(1) and the increased majority provisions of 
§4(3) VW Law differ considerably from other such arrangements in other MSs in one 
respect: they did not reserve the special right for the benefit of the authorities per se 
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but rather used the provisions of national company law to treat the authorities as a an 
ordinary private shareholders via corporate statutes. The VW Law granted the 
authorities only with the special right to adopt directors, yet no other provisions as 
such referred to the Bund or the Land. The initial share ownership of the authorities 
was exactly matching the provisions of the VW Law, effectively putting the state-
shareholders in advantageous position. In the strictest sense, any other shareholder 
owning 20% of Volkswagen’s shares could benefit from the foresaid provisions. 
However, the provisions were implemented by the Bundestag making them an 
anomaly in the general operation of the German company law. Above all, the VW 
Law differs from other GSs since it has been exclusively introduced for one single 
company, which does not provide services of general public interest. 
The effectiveness of the VW Law has neither been undermined by 
disintegration of managed capitalism, nor by legislative reforms. Following the 
reform of the AktG in 1998, voting right ceilings have been outlawed for listed 
companies, but not for Volkswagen. On one hand, the fact that the said provision 
was exclusively exempt from reforms which points towards its inherent 
obstructionist character. On the other hand, it also signifies that the stakeholders and 
interested parties have been content of with the said provisions. 
Here it is pertinent to emphasise that the exclusive 20% voting rights ceiling of 
§2(1) VW Law could be ineffective by itself (Henle 1994: 123) for thwarting a 
hostile takeover due to the following reason. According to §134(1) AktG any 
limitation on the voting rights would not be taken into account on strategic 
decisions, such as company’s dissolution, for which the capital majority is required. 
Moreover, according to §179(2) AktG a shareholder who acquires 75% of the 
company’s share capital may amend company’s statutes by removing any voting 
right limitations. For this reason the voting right ceiling introduced by § 2(1) VW 
Law has been re-enforced by further provision of §4(3) VW Law which increased the 
threshold for required majority shareholding from 75% to 80%. This increased 
majority now matched the blocking minority stake held by the authorities. The 
combination of the two above paragraphs of the VW Law ensured effective control 
over the company, making it takeover-proof for as long as any of the authorities 
holds on to its 20% minority stake. 
Provision §4(1) VW Law on director’s appointments is closely reminiscent of 
the classic GS mechanism, since the authorities are directly put in advantageous 
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position to appoint two directors onto supervisory board each irrespective of their 
actual stake. Supervisory Board of Volkswagen comprises of 20 members, 50% of 
which are employee representatives and 50% are elected by shareholders. According 
to §101(2) AktG the right to appoint representatives on the supervisory board may 
only be granted by the company’s statutes and may concern only one third of the 
number of members of the supervisory board appointed by the shareholders. 
According to this provision the Bund and the Land could appoint a total of three 
directors out of ten members of Volkswagen’s supervisory board. At the same time 
§101(2) AktG further provides that the VW Law shall be exempt from the above 
restriction on appointments, so both authorities could appoint two representatives 
each. Therefore the VW Law gives the authorities an exclusive possibility of a larger 
representation on the board than general company law would normally allow, giving 
the authorities more weight in the company’s management. This would especially be 
the case if both the Bund and Lower Saxony would retain one share each – in this 
case the gained influence would not correlate with the actual share ownership. The 
Bund has sold its remaining block of shares and could no longer exercise its special 
right of appointment, yet the provision still applied to Lower Saxony. The two 
representatives of the Land together with ten representatives of the employees 
outweighed the remaining eight members appointed by other shareholders, 
effectively forming a majority. In spite of the fact that main function of the 
supervisory board is monitoring of the management board, it is a powerful body 
which can appoint and dismiss the members of management board and approve 
important decisions. As a result the appointment right complemented the protective 
powers of the voting rights ceiling and the blocking minority also complimenting 
§4(2) VW Law which provided that relocation of factories must be approved by a 
majority of two thirds of the supervisory board. 
The interplay of the VW Law provisions effectively allowed employees and 
authorities to execute greater involvement in operation of the company, thus 
allowing for the greater pursuit of social objectives, such as protecting jobs. The VW 
Law reinforced the power of Lower Saxony to further promote stakeholder interests 
and adhere to managerial strategy which would correspond with the principle of 
social responsibility that was largely abandoned elsewhere. The government has 
confirmed that the main purpose of the VW Law was to ‘take into account the 
interests of Volkswagen’s employees and to protect its minority shareholders’, so it 
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‘pursues a socio-political and regional objective, on one hand, and an economic 
objective, on the other, which are combined with objectives of industrial policy’.382 
Consequently, Volkswagen’s approach to company law and its philosophy of 
corporate governance represented a stakeholder-oriented model characterized by the 
traditional German way of negotiated solutions aimed at safeguarding the interests 
not only of the shareholders, but of all affected stakeholders (Gerner-Beuerle 2012: 
98). 
Germany’s view of the VW Law as a means of employee protection was later 
contradicted by Advocate General Colomer in his opinion on the Volkswagen case, 
stating that the provisions at hand do not protect interests of the employees and only 
remotely and indirectly apply to them.383 Controversially, conclusion of the 
European advocate could not be supported by the employment practices at 
Volkswagen.384 While it is almost impossible to shut down any of Volkswagen’s 
factories or relocate those abroad, the security of employment is also very high 
(Financial Times 25/10/2007). Employees’ strong interests in preservation of the 
VW Law as well as Lower Saxony’s control as shareholder and its powerful lobby 
could also contribute to obstructionist nature of the measures – both the employees 
and the Land could go to great lengths to preserve their influential positions. 
In mid-2000’s a German family-owned sports car manufacturer Porsche first 
appeared as a friendly bidder for Volkswagen (Financial Times 6/12/2005; 
Economist 14/06/2008). The Porsche deal could be attractive to Volkswagen’s 
shareholders, yet their voices could have been muted by the majority formed by the 
Land and the employees. It is important to note that in contrast to Volkswagen’s 
approach to corporate governance, Porsche adhered to the competition-centred 
shareholder-oriented model putting shareholder interests front and centre and 
rejecting the use of CEMs (Gerner-Beuerle 2012: 98). 
The scale and volume of this takeover attempt is unique even by contemporary 
standards making it one of the most complex and problematic takeovers worldwide. 
The VW Law became a real hindrance for Porsche ambitions, so it sought to remove 
it with the help of the EU Commission, hoping that the government could be talked 
into compliance. 
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7.C: The Infringement Procedure and Takeover Battle 
From the onset it was clear that the German authorities had a firm stance on 
the VW Law as throughout the decades it has neither been undermined by 
disintegration of managed capitalism, nor by legislative reforms. 
The Commission had been aware of the existence of the VW Law provisions 
long before the landmark GSs rulings of 2002.385 The EU Internal Market 
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein has long criticised the VW Law, stating that 
Volkswagen is taking over foreign companies, while itself staying out of reach, yet 
Bolkestein also referred to the VW Law as being only a ‘symbol’ which could be 
easily discarded by the German government (Euromoney, November 2004; 
Financial Times 28/01/2004). The lengthy process of informal compliance 
bargaining between the Commission and the Bund that started in 2001 proved to be 
unfruitful and Porsche’s takeover ambitions could have acted as a catalyst for more 
rigid intervention at the EU level. During the informal compliance bargaining stage 
politics came into play: there were concessions in a view of numerous delays 
initiated by the Commission, which could be attributed to the Commission’s strive to 
ensure Germany’s support for the EU Takeover Directive (European Commission 
IP/03/410). It took another year before the Commission finally launched official 
infringement proceedings, issuing a formal letter on 19 March 2003 and requesting 
Germany to submit justifications within two months (ibid). Setting the deadline for 
the MS’s reply at this stage has been an extraordinary circumstance, which arguably 
has been prompted by the urgency of Porsche’s takeover ambitions and by the 
evident unlawfulness and obstructionist nature of the VW Law. The government 
replied in a timely manner insisting on legality of the measures.386 Following this 
reply, the Commission prepared to issue a reasoned opinion, yet before the official 
move, the Commission’s President Romano Prodi decided to meet with Chancellor 
Schröder.387 The result of this meeting was negative and could have been predicted 
due to two circumstances. First of all, Schröder had been a member of Volkswagen 
supervisory board for eight years while serving as the premier of Lower Saxony and 
for this matter he has been dubbed as ‘automobile chancellor’ (Hopt 2010: 21). So 
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the ‘automobile chancellor’ was aware of the VW Law, its aims and provisions, as 
well as its importance for Lower Saxony. Secondly, Schröder was known for his 
strive to increase Germany’s freedom for pursuing its own national interests instead 
of normative commitments to Europe, thus protection of true tradition and symbol, 
such as the VW Law, would perfectly fit the bill (Schmidt 2012: 180). On 1 April 
2004 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion (European Commission IP/04/400). 
Germany failed to comply.388 
Following the Commission’s announcement to refer the action to CJEU 
(European Commission IP/04/1209), the government remained confident that the 
VW Law is compatible with the Treaty and the German Secretary for Justice Brigitte 
Zypries has assured that the Bund ‘will convince the Commission of this’ 
(Automotive News Europe 1/11/2004). In a similar fashion, Gerhard Schröder stated 
that he would fight the Commission’s attempts to overturn the VW Law (Euromoney 
November 2004). The referral came at difficult times for Volkswagen’s workforce 
since it got under increased pressure to reform by diminishing its labour spending: 
the company’s chief executive pressed for cutting jobs and extending working hours 
(Financial Times 3/03/2006). In this light defending the VW Law has become even 
more imperative for the government of the Land, since the current prime minister of 
the Lower Saxony was facing elections in a few years’ time (Financial Times 
30/12/2005). The government’s determination to resist compliance pre-judgment 
contributes to the obstructionist nature of the measures in question. 
Despite the government’s opposition to comply, when the case was brought to 
the CJEU on 4 March 2005, Porsche remained confident that the VW Law shall not 
withstand the Court’s enquiry and it has been widely accepted that the law will be 
overturned (ibid; Rammeloo 2007: 118). Porsche was gradually building up its stake 
in Volkswagen (Financial Times 26/09/2005, 27/09/2005) and its intentions became 
clear: gaining majority stake and once the judgment is handed and the VW Law 
removed – take control of Volkswagen.389 Even though German measures did 
significantly differ from the preceding GSs analysed it did not withstand the CJEU’s 
scrutiny and the following paragraphs will touch upon the most crucial points of the 
judgment revealing any inclination to shift towards compliance. 
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In the due course of the judicial proceedings Germany emphasised the 
historical background of the VW Law claiming that the Treaty provisions do not 
apply since the provision at issue is not a state measure so far as it merely 
reproduced the private law contract between the Bund and Lower Saxony. The 
government insisted that the measure stems from normal operation of general 
company law and Lower Saxony is acting not as an authority but as a private 
shareholder.390 In Germany’s view the VW Law was an expression of will of the 
parties which originally claimed ownership over Volkswagen at the time of the 
ownership stalemate, so the measures in question must be treated as an agreement 
between those parties. Yet, the Commission focused its criticism not on origins of 
the VW Law but on Germany’s determination to maintain these provisions for more 
than four decades.391 The Commission agreed that general company law allowed the 
company’s statutes to increase the majority threshold required for implementation of 
strategic decisions and to implement voting right ceilings for unlisted companies, 
however it has emphasised that in case of listed company Volkswagen the 20% 
ceiling deviates from normal operation of company law and both measures are 
imposed by means of the VW Law and not solely by the will of company’s 
shareholders.392 
Germany’s plea of inapplicability of the Treaty provisions to the VW Law has 
been addressed by Advocate General Colomer in his opinion where he has found it 
‘puzzling’ that the private law contract between the Bund and the Land is referred to 
as a private agreement and that the government does not regards the VW Law 
(adopted by the Bundestag) as a state-imposed measure.393 The European advocate 
sided with the Commission in its view that the initial purpose of the VW Law is 
irrelevant, but rather the government’s failure to amend or repeal existing GS 
provisions for so many years.394 The CJEU supported the Commission and the 
European advocate in their observations that the exclusive rights reserved for the 
authorities restricted the rights of other shareholders to effectively participate in 
control of the company, noting that the VW Law can no longer be amended or 
repealed by the sole will of the shareholders since any modification requires further 
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legislation by the Bundestag.395 The Court agreed with the Commission’s view that 
that there is a significant ‘difference between a power made available to 
shareholders, who are free to decide whether they wish to use [this CEM] or not, and 
a specific obligation imposed on shareholders by way of legislation without giving 
them the opportunity to deviate from it’.396 It should be added that the European 
advocate agreed that in case if increased majority and voting right ceiling of the VW 
Law would not exist, but rather were incorporated into company’s statutes the 
validity of the provisions disputed in these proceedings would not be called in 
question.397 This signifies that the special GS paragraphs of Volkswagen’s corporate 
statutes which benefit the Land are called into question only because they were later 
transposed into the VW Law.398 
After establishing that the VW Law is a state measure, the CJEU turned to the 
analysis of its deterring effect. Even though the Commission asserted that all three 
provisions infringe the Treaty individually, both the European advocate and the 
Court proceeded to analyse the increased majority and the voting right ceiling 
provisions together in order to assess their combined deterring effect.399 The 
European advocate maintained that the consequences of the two provisions aimed 
‘to preserve the status quo’ of the Bund and Lower Saxony, which has been further 
reinforced by the director’s appointment right.400 In his analysis the European 
advocate concluded that ‘[t]he difficulties faced by investors who were not parties to 
the initial agreement are clear and will continue to exist, at least potentially, while 
the contested provisions remain in force’ (Advocate General 2007a, para.90). 
The Court followed the European advocate’s lead in jointly assessing the 
voting right ceiling of §2(1) and increased majority of §4(3).401 The CJEU 
established that increased majority of the VW Law to 80% instead of 75% (as 
provided by AktG), ‘creates an instrument enabling the Federal and State authorities 
to procure for themselves a blocking minority, allowing them to oppose important 
resolutions on the basis of a lower level of investment than would be required under 
general company law.’402 The Court went on to link the effects of the increased 
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majority provision and the voting right ceiling, stating that ‘[b]y capping voting 
rights at the same level of 20%, §2(1) of the VW Law supplements a legal 
framework which enables the Federal and State authorities to exercise considerable 
influence on the basis of such a reduced investment’.403 Following the joint analysis 
of the effects of voting right ceiling and increased majority of the VW Law the Court 
came to the conclusion that ‘the combination of §2(1) and §4(3) of the VW Law 
constitutes a restriction on the movement of capital’.404 
When addressing possible justifications, Germany referred to a specific 
situation, the social, regional, economic and industrial policy objectives 
underpinning implementation of the VW Law, which established an ‘equitable 
balance of powers’ aimed at protecting minority shareholders and employees.405 The 
Court agreed that in certain special cases the Land and the Bund could defend 
general public interest which could be contrary to economic interest of Volkswagen 
and its shareholders.406 The Court also agreed that a company as large as Volkswagen 
could have such definite impact on the general interest which would justify GS 
measures of the VW Law.407 Yet, Germany failed to provide grounded arguments for 
the above justification and ‘failed to explain […] why the provisions of the VW Law 
[…] are appropriate and necessary to preserve the jobs generated by Volkswagen’s 
activity’.408 
Regarding the special right of directors’ appointments to supervisory board, 
the European advocate concluded that the VW Law ‘destroys’ ownership-control 
correlation and since the board’s approval is necessary for certain strategic 
decisions, the law limits rights of other shareholders for effective participation in 
company’s management and control.409 In response to German justifications the 
European advocate concluded that ‘it is completely misleading to cite the interests of 
the employees’ as justification for such measure and the government ‘confuses’ the 
general public interest with the interests of the Land and the Bund.410 The European 
advocate emphasised that Volkswagen ‘must adapt’ to changes which have taken 
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place on the European scene.411 The CJEU acknowledged that the right to directors’ 
appointments restricts other shareholders’ rights for effective participation in 
management and control of the company and therefore ‘is liable to deter direct 
investors from other MSs’.412 In the effect to all of the above, on 23 October 2007 
the CJEU has issued its verdict: Germany failed to present viable arguments for 
justifying the VW Law so its provisions are unlawful. In spite of the assurances that 
the judgment has effectively nullified413 the VW Law it has retained its dissuasive 
power. Nonetheless, the German government now had to repeal or amend it in order 
to comply with the judgment and clear the way for Porsche’s control over 
Volkswagen. 
7.D: Assessing Potential Compliance 
Generally the condemning judgment would signify that it is time for 
Volkswagen to abandon its long-standing tradition of social responsibility assumed 
by the company’s management. In principle, following the judgment, Porsche, being 
the largest shareholder, could have de facto assumed control, given its significant 
ownership of Volkswagen’s shares. Porsche acquired options for the remaining 
shares boosting its ownership to 75% threshold so according to the break-through 
rule of the Takeover Directive it could amend Volkswagen’s statutes and remove the 
controversial provisions of the VW Law. However, as the MSs’ compliance pattern 
on other GS cases suggests, in practice the implementation of post-judgment 
compliance measures could be severely delayed and when implemented, they could 
prove to be ineffective and inadequate for facilitating full compliance. In case of 
Volkswagen, Germany’s inclination to comply could be drawn from analysis of its 
pre-judgment behaviour as well as overall situation surrounding Porsche’s takeover 
at the time of the judgment. 
During the infringement procedure the government did not anticipate to 
succumb to the Commission’s observations and did not amend or undertake to repeal 
the VW Law, as was the case in Commission v Italy C-58/99 for example. On the 
contrary, when it comes to good faith conduct during the pre-judgment stage of the 
infringement procedure, Germany could be seen as effectively cooperating with the 
Commission. It has timely replied to correspondence striving to settle the matter 
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amicably. On the other hand, it is clear that Schröder’s government did not wish to 
repeal the VW Law. Instead it strived for the Commission to back away. The same 
could be said about Lower Saxony, which has vigorously opposed Porsche’s 
takeover advances and sought to retain the VW Law. The authorities were convinced 
that the measures are legitimate and serve for legitimate purpose of protecting 
general public interest, yet the only hindrance for retaining the VW Law was the 
impossible task of convincing the CJEU of its legality. During the infringement 
procedure the parties argued at cross points, never reaching an agreement on legality 
of the contested measures. 
It has been widely believed that the condemning judgment cleared the way for 
Porsche’s ambitions, yet the post-judgment situation was twofold due to the 
following reasons. Firstly, the judgment could not have legal consequences on 
Volkswagen’s statutes, since they were a result of shareholder’s agreement and not 
the VW Law (Werlauff 2009; Ringe 2010a). Also the corporate statutes were neither 
the subject of the infringement procedure nor of the condemning judgment. It was 
the VW Law which was based on Volkswagen’s statutes and not vice versa. All 
shareholders of Volkswagen approved the statutes by resolution at the time of the 
company’s privatisation. Subsequently, as pointed out by the CJEU, the shareholders 
are free to decide whether they want to retain provisions of the voting right ceiling 
in company’s statutes.414 Following the judgment the contested GSs provisions 
contained in the corporate statutes could only be repealed following the amendment 
of the said statutes by shareholders’ vote at the AGM, so the condemning judgment 
of the Court would not have a direct impact on effectiveness of Volkswagen’s 
corporate statutes. Secondly, the Court’s judgment did not automatically result in 
ineffectiveness of the VW Law415 – in order for its provisions to be fully ineffective 
it had to be amended or repealed by further legislation by the Bundestag. Following 
the judgment Porsche, now the largest shareholder, sought to exercise full control 
over Volkswagen which could potentially mean corporate restructurings, factory 
closures and re-location of production abroad (Business Week Online 10/01/2007; 
Automotive News Europe 15/10/2007). It is therefore implicit that the removal of 
the VW Law could have had a potential detrimental effect not only on Volkswagen’s 
workforce but also on Lower Saxony’s economy and public in general. In theory, 
                                                 
414
 Volkswagen, note 46, para.40. 
415
 But see OECD (2007), supra note 307, p.15. 
197 
 
these detrimental effects of the VW Law repeal could indicate that the GSs were not 
merely a ‘symbol’ but an effective shield for defending interest of wider public and 
Lower Saxony in general and on Volkswagen’s employees and Wolfsburg’s 
economic prosperity in particular. 
For Germany it was a difficult time for compliance: firstly, the consequences 
of Porsche’s overhanging threat to end the ‘fat years’ could be felt both on the Land 
and federal scale, secondly the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 was about to 
unleash. Germany is Europe’s leading power which long had a reputation of the 
most pro-European MS from the onset, striving for political unity (Rachman 1998: 
178, 182; Schmidt 2002: 177). However, from 1998 onwards there was a significant 
decrease in this strive for unity as the country plunged into budgetary strains and 
assumed the position of ‘paymasters of Europe’ (Rachman 1998: 184). From 1998 
to 2005 Schröder resisted the removal of the VW Law since he sought to focus on 
Germany’s own national interests instead of explicit commitments to Europe. At the 
time of the judgment Chancellor Merkel took office, and she also has shifted to her 
predecessor’s policies, increasingly defending national interests while expressing 
willingness to undertake unilateral actions and contesting EU policy in national 
politics (Schmidt 2012: 181). The economic crisis of 2008 only re-enforced 
Germany’s shift to protectionist stance over its national interests as the country felt 
the increasing burden of rescuing fellow nations (ibid: 181). Against this backdrop 
the VW Law, which assumed a principle of social responsibility at its core with the 
aim of protecting one of the largest German companies, had to be amended and the 
authorities’ explicit protection withdrawn – a challenging task indeed. 
Yet Lower Saxony remained the second largest shareholder after Porsche and 
a 20% ownership block could allow for some protection – the only challenge was to 
ensure that the new measure is in line with the Treaty and the Court’s judgment. The 
government has been caught between Scylla and Charybdis: from one perspective it 
recognised that provisions of the VW Law act as a shield securing the workforce of 
Lower Saxony (and the economic prosperity of entire purpose-built city of 
Wolfsburg), from another – it sought to comply with the judgment but with 
possibility of maintaining some of the control rights vested on Lower Saxony. Given 
Germany’s power and influence in the EU, the German government could have 
embarked on the procrastination path full of compliance initiatives and good faith 
undertakings to eventually comply with the ruling, as for example the Italian 
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government did. However, notwithstanding the economic pressures of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 Germany decided to comply, but to comply with 
precision – in the German way. 
7.E: Compliance and New Infringement Proceedings 
Two months following the judgment the Commission requested for 
information on compliance measures and less than three months following the 
judgment Germany undertook a number of legislative steps towards compliance. On 
16 January 2008 the Secretary for Justice Brigitte Zypries introduced the draft 
Amendment to the VW Law.416 Germany replied to the Commission’s enquiry, 
stating that the necessary compliance measures are being implemented, however it 
has neither provided the draft text of the Amendment nor further timeframe for its 
implementation. 
The Amendment comprised of the pre-amble, three articles and explanatory 
notes. It has been later implemented by the Bundestag in its original form, 
effectively removing some of the of VW Law provisions. In the pre-amble the 
government emphasised that the CJEU’s judgment must be transposed into national 
law and contested provisions of the VW Law must be repealed and not replaced. 
Article 1 of the Amendment aimed at giving effect to the Court’s judgment by 
repealing §4(1) and §2(1) of the VW Law on director’s appointments and the voting 
right ceiling.417 In the explanatory notes the government referred to the wording of 
the CJEU’s judgment that instigated the said compliance measure and anticipated its 
substance. Here the government emphasised that the CJEU’s judgment established 
that by maintaining in force §4(1) as well as §2(1) in conjunction with §4(3) of the 
VW Law, Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty provisions on 
free capital movement.418 The government specified that it is necessary to comply by 
repealing provisions which were declared illegal, yet the provisions which were not 
subject of the proceedings must not be amended.419 
The government then went on stating that the judgment anticipated two 
necessary amendments: to the appointment right and the deterring system which 
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resulted in joint application of voting right ceiling and increased majority 
provision.420 The government further clarified that the Court has ruled that the 
interplay of the two paragraphs constitutes a restriction on the capital movement and 
therefore, in order to comply, the interaction of these two provisions §2(1) and §4(3) 
VW Law must be terminated.421 In the government’s view this requirement is 
satisfied with the repeal of §2 VW Law (voting right ceiling) so that the connection 
or interaction of the two provisions is effectively terminated. The government 
additionally emphasised that §2 must be repealed in its entirety since it is contrary to 
§134(1) AktG which does not allow for voting right ceilings for listed companies. 
It could be confirmed that when drafting the foresaid compliance measure the 
government precisely relied on the Court’s analysis which assessed the voting right 
ceiling and increased majority provisions together, explicitly relying on their 
cumulative effect. The government emphasised that since the voting right ceiling 
supplemented422 a legal framework of the increased majority and it is their joint 
effect that has been found contrary to the Treaty, it would comply by following the 
precise wording of the judgment and repealing one part of the legal framework while 
retaining the increased majority provision of §4(3) VW Law intact. Following the 
implementation of the proposed Amendment, Lower Saxony’s 20% stake would 
allow it to continue its influence over the company’s strategic decisions. 
Interestingly enough, prior to the infringement procedure, some of the Commission’s 
officials maintained similar views on the issue, supposing that the VW Law is illegal 
due to the cumulative effect of its various measures and in case where some of them 
would be repealed the problem of illegality would be solved (Financial Times 
28/01/2004). 
Here it should also be recalled that provision of §4(3) has been re-enforced by 
§4(2) VW Law which provided that construction and relocation of factories must be 
approved by a majority of two thirds of supervisory board. The latter provision 
effectively re-enforced the employees and Lower Saxony’s influence over strategic 
decisions and it did not become subject to the judgment, so the government was not 
obliged to repeal it. Another remarkable protectionist feature of the VW Law was 
that provision §4(2) has been further re-enforced by §4(1) on the special right for 
director’s appointments to supervisory board, allowing the Land to exert greater 
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control on the company. As a consequence, prior to the judgment, the Land could 
have a significant influence on adoption of decisions relating to business re-
locations. Nevertheless following the judgment the government has repealed §4(1) 
VW Law and without the Land’s extra appointees shareholder’s influence on the said 
board could outweigh the one of the employee representatives and the Land, 
resulting in profit-maximisation/socially undesirable factories re-locations. The 
government addressed the above issue in its draft Amendment, maintaining that 
since §4(1) VW Law was found illegal by the CJEU it now must be repealed, adding 
however that under general corporate law the directors’ appointments right can still 
be determined by the company’s statutes.423 
The Amendment reveals the government’s expressed desire to retain 
protectionist features of the VW Law provisions, such as increased majority, which 
signifies that these German GSs are of obstructionist character. Likewise, the 
government’s expressed position on the possibility of insertion of directors’ 
appointment provision into Volkswagen’s statutes supports this finding. The 
government obstinately strived to retain provisions of the VW Law which could 
allow it to keep control over Volkswagen in order to serve wider societal interests 
and maintain social responsibility principle applicable for this company. For this 
reason the Amendment has overturned Porsche’s ambitions for breaking close 
relationships between the company’s management and the Land, since no factories 
could be closed without consent of the Lower Saxony and no stringent reforms 
could go through without its approval. Provisions of the VW Law incorporated into 
Volkswagen’s statutes limited Porsche’s influence, so assuming that the judgment 
had an immediate effect on the statutes it sought to delete the overruled provisions 
from the corporate statutes on the next AGM. Armed with blocking minority Lower 
Saxony effectively prevented these amendments424 so Porsche complained to the 
District Court of Hannover challenging the unsuccessful move to amend company’s 
statutes. 
Following introduction of the Amendment, the EU Internal Market 
Commissioner Charlie McCreevy publicly confirmed that he is not satisfied with 
Germany’s compliance measures and issued a warning letter to the German 
authorities – notifying of the violation and urging to comply fully by removing the 
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increased majority provision (Financial Times 10/04/2008, 5/06/2008). The 
government together with Lower Saxony stated that they will defend the 
Amendment, emphasising that the state had no obligations to amend the VW Law 
beyond the requirements of the judgment (Financial Times 11/04/2008; Stuttgarter 
Zeitung 1/06/2008). On 5 June 2008 the Commission proceeded with urgent action, 
initiating infringement procedure for non-compliance with the judgment on case C-
112/05 by issuing a formal letter under Article 260 TFEU (European Commission 
IP/08/873). The government replied the same day by giving details on the 
implementation of compliance measures of the draft Amendment to the VW Law, 
stating that the legislative procedure would begin shortly.425 Less than two months 
following the formal letter, the government provided further particulars specifying 
the timetable for implementation of the draft Amendment.426 
On 1 December 2008 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion under Article 
260 TFEU. Germany now had two months for compliance on its own initiative, or 
the matter could be referred to the Court and deterring penalties applied. Yet 
Germany firmly held its ground and resisted compliance. A mere ten days following 
the Commission’s reasoned opinion the draft Amendment to the VW Law entered 
into force,
427
 cementing Germany’s determination to retain provisions thereof. At 
that point Germany explicitly declined the removal of the increased majority 
provision – in the Commission’s view Germany was resisting to comply fully with 
CJEU’s judgment. 
The government and Lower Saxony both negatively reacted to the 
Commission’s infringement proceedings by criticising the Court’s inexplicit 
judgment on the VW case and the Commission’s inability to correctly interpret it. On 
the other side of the barricades, the infringement procedure for non-compliance has 
been welcomed by Porsche: it became ever confident that the government will 
comply by removing the remaining provision of the VW Law, which prompted it to 
increase its ownership with a view of increasing it to match the majority control 
threshold of 75%. Following Porsche’s move, Volkswagen’s employees also firmly 
resisted any possible changes to the VW Law by collecting signatures across Europe 
in support for the provisions (Braunschweiger Zeitung 27/10/2008). 
                                                 
425
 Advocate General (2013) Opinion of the AG Wahl delivered on 29/03/2013, Case C-95/12, note 
18, para.7. 
426
 Advocate General (2013), op. cit., para.9. 
427
 Law of 8/12/2008 amending the Law governing the transfer of share rights of Volkswagenwerk 
GmbH to private parties (BGBl. 2008 I No.56, p.2369) entered into force on 11/12/2008. 
202 
 
At this stage it should be emphasised that the situation on Germany’s 
compliance has been further complicated by the two judgments of the District Court 
of Hannover
428 which concerned the case of Porsche’s challenge to the rejection for 
amendment of Volkswagen’s statutes at the AGM. Following the hearing held on 6 
November 2008 the District Court of Hannover assessed in great detail the precise 
wording of the European advocate’s opinion alongside the reasoning of the CJEU on 
Volkswagen case C-112/05. Conclusions of the national Court matched the approach 
of the German government to the necessary compliance measures stemming from 
the CJEU’s judgment. The District Court concluded that from the wording of both 
judgment and opinion it is not apparent that §2(1) and §4(3) VW Law when taken 




The national Court maintained that there is a significant difference whether the 
two provisions infringe the Treaty separately or jointly and the CJEU’s choice to 
issue the ruling which expressly upholds to the measures’ joint deterring effect, 
points exactly to the fact that the measures constitute infringement only when 
applied together.
430
 The District Court further clarified that choice of words in the 
CJEU’s judgment ‘in connection with’ is not co-incidental and in legal methodology 
has a usual meaning that only when the two parameters join together they could be 
held of having a complete fixed position, as in the case of the VW Law having ‘a 
deterrent effect’ and constituting a Treaty infringement.431 
The District Court of Hannover compared provisions of the VW Law with 
other GS judgments, such as Commission v Netherlands, Federconsumatori and 
Commission v Portugal (C-367/98) and made a distinction between those cases and 
the one at hand.
432
 The national Court stated that unlike the provision of increased 
majority of §4(3) VW Law, in the foresaid cases special rights granted to the 
authorities went beyond their investment in the companies, whereas the 20% 
ownership of Lower Saxony does not provide for increased influence. The Court 
also determined that even though Volkswagen’s corporate statutes emulate 
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provisions of the VW Law it is doubtful that ineffectiveness of the latter would result 
in ineffectiveness of the former.
433
 To this effect, the District Court concluded that 
the increased majority contained in the provisions of Volkswagen’s statutes shall be 
maintained until a new resolution is adopted by the company’s shareholders, since 
such provisions are permitted under general corporate law.
434
 The judgments of the 
District Court further complicated the case on compliance with the judgment of the 
CJEU on case C-112/05 which further increased the obstructionist nature of the VW 
Law. 
For almost two years following the reasoned opinion issued under Article 260 
TFEU, the Commission tried to persuade Germany to repeal the increased majority 
provision of the VW Law and to comply fully. The government, on the other hand, 
tried to persuade the Commission of its erroneous interpretation of the judgment on 
case C-112/05 and the necessary compliance measures which it entails. On 17 
December 2008 in order to resolve the differing views which it held with the 
Commission, Germany went as far as proposing to submit a joint application for 
interpretation of the CJEU’s judgment. Following one month of considerations the 
Commission refused to submit such an application, stating that it has ‘no doubts as 
to the meaning or scope of the 2007 Judgment’.435 Germany resisted compliance and 
withdrew from negotiations in the summer of 2011. 
Following the judgment of CJEU of 2007 on case C-112/05, the rulings of 
2008 by the District Court of Hannover and the initiation of the infringement 
procedure under Article 260 TFEU, Porsche hoped that the VW Law will fall 
immediately (Financial Times 8/01/2009). However, due to obstructionist nature of 
the VW Law and Germany’s resistance to comply, Porsche’s takeover ambitions 
were shattered in first half of 2009. The tables have shifted as Porsche withdrew its 
takeover ambitions and agreed to merge with Volkswagen, becoming its subsidiary 
(Financial Times 7/05/2009). The half-a-century old VW Law has effectively 
prevented this unprecedented takeover attempt, which lasted for three and a half 
years. It could be concluded that the frustrated takeover by Porsche expressly 
demonstrates the restrictive character of §4(3) VW Law which ‘is capable of 
significantly restricting the movement of capital’.436 
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As a response to the Commission’s second challenge to the amended 
provisions of the VW Law, stakeholders of Volkswagen sought to preserve 
effectiveness of the measures and defend the Amended provisions of the VW Law 
with the intricate move which has been assumed by the CJEU and the European 
advocate. At the time of the judicial proceedings on VW case both the European 
advocate and the CJEU confirmed that the increased majority provision is called in 
question only because it is a state measure and not the expressed will of 
shareholders.
437
 Prompted by the line of analysis applied both by the Court and the 
European advocate, Volkswagen’s new shareholders,438 have amended the 
company’s statutes accordingly, specifically transposing the contested increased 
majority provision into the statutes. Volkswagen’s statutes of October 2011 (which 
were effective 9 months following the judgment) provide that resolutions by the 
AGM that are required by law to be adopted by a majority consisting of at least 
three-quarters of the share capital would require a majority of more than four-fifths 
of the share capital.
439
 Another significant development is that at the same AGM the 
shareholders voted to expressly incorporate the new version of director’s 
appointments into the company’s statutes, stating that Lower Saxony is entitled to 
appoint two members of the supervisory board for as long as it holds at least 15% of 
the company’s shares.440 The director’s appointment provision incorporated into 
Volkswagen’s statutes now specifically provided the necessary ownership of Lower 
Saxony to be eligible to appoint two directors, cementing the Land’s influence on 
decisions in relation to factories’ transfers. 
As could be seen from the new corporate statutes, the increased majority 
percentage expressly matches with the ownership of Lower Saxony – the fact which 
points towards the Volkswagen’s shareholders’ determination to preserve control by 
Lower Saxony and provisions originally incorporated into the VW Law. Equivalent 
stakeholder-oriented determination applies to the decision to specifically reserve the 
right for Lower Saxony to appoint two directors on supervisory board. Interestingly 
enough the participation threshold has been lowered from the actual ownership of 
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the Land by 5%. The approval of the new corporate statutes for Volkswagen raises 
certain important questions voiced, for example, by Hopt (2010: 17) ‘whether 
obstacles inserted – freely and in conformity with general provisions of company 
[law]– into the articles of incorporation could still violate the Treaty provisions if 
they privilege the state as owner’ (also Ringe 2011; Papadopaulos 2012). 
In a similar vein, following the incorporation of the VW Law provisions into 
Volkswagen’s statutes the question voiced by the European advocate and the CJEU 
on the fact that provisions of the VW Law are not the expression of the shareholders’ 
will, could not hold true. Shareholders solely by their own will chose to apply 
provisions of the VW Law which were attacked by the Commission and overruled by 
the CJEU. Yet, as the following motion by the Commission demonstrates, 
provisions of the VW Law incorporated into Volkswagen’s statutes could be one of 
the reasons for referral under Article 260 TFEU. 
On 21 February 2012 the Commission brought the action before the CJEU, 
maintaining that it is apparent from the judgment on case C-112/05 that each of the 
three provisions of the VW Law infringes the Treaty individually.441 The 
Commission maintained that “[w]hen implementing a judgment, it is not just the 
operative part thereof which needs to be taken into account, but also the grounds for 
the decision. In the context of the present case, it appears particularly far-fetched on 
the part of the Federal Republic of Germany to try to justify its failure to fully 
implement the judgment of the Court of Justice exclusively on the basis of the three 
words ‘in conjunction with’ in the operative part of the judgment.”442 The 
Commission concluded that “[s]uch an interpretation does not only ignore the 
overall grounds for the judgment, but also the case-law of the Court of Justice [...] 
on GSs”. 
By September 2012 the action was still pending before the CJEU and 
Germany did not succumb to the Commission’s view on necessary compliance 
measures. By the end of 2013 the amount of penalties which Germany would be 
obliged to pay amounted to nearly 80 million euros. Yet, the effect of penalty threat 
was not deterrent since in response to the second referral the government explicitly 
confirmed that it does not intend to change the VW Law and is ready to defend it 
before the CJEU (Wall Street Journal 24/11/2011; Handelsblatt 20/03/2012). 
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On 29 May 2013 Advocate General Wahl issued his opinion, rejecting the 
Commission’s complaints regarding Germany’s failure to amend Volkswagen’s 
statutes by stating that company’s statutes were neither put to the Court’s scrutiny 
nor subject to the judgment.
443
 The European advocate stated that in his view the 
CJEU’s judgment on case C-112/05 is not ‘particularly ambiguous’ and it is 
‘regrettable’ that the Commission and Germany had contrasting views on its 
interpretation and could not agree on the necessary compliance measures.
444
 AG 
Wahl stated that ‘a broad interpretation of the 2007 judgment cannot be accepted’.445 
Following the analysis of the operative part of the judgment the European advocate 
has sided with Germany
446 stressing that the present case is not aimed at determining 
whether or not the increased majority provision could be justified when taken 
individually, since this issue should be decided under general infringement 
proceedings of Article 258 TFEU.
447
 
On the 22 of October 2013, exactly six years following the condemning 
judgment on Volkswagen case C-112/05, the CJEU issued its verdict on the case of 
alleged non-compliance with the foresaid judgment (Case C-95/12).448 The Court 
followed the arguments of the European advocate and the District Court of 
Hannover, concluding that Volkswagen’s statutes were not subject to the judgment, 
so the government was not obliged to amend them in order to comply.
449
 The CJEU 
also confirmed that the deterrent effect of the voting right ceiling of §2(1) VW Law 
have to be assessed jointly with the increased majority provision of §4(3) VW Law 
so their cumulative effect amounts to infringement of the Treaty.
450
 The CJEU 
concluded that by retaining the increased majority provision Germany has not failed 
to comply with the judgment on Volkswagen case C-112/05.451 
To this day the directors’ appointments right as well as increased majority 
provision of §4(3) VW Law remain in force. The issue of the legality of the latter 
provisions remains open: in the future they could be challenged before the CJEU 
under separate infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU. The way in 
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which the Court shall address this issue remains to be seen, yet it could be 
ascertained that the highest legal authority of the EU is on thin ice while verging into 
ambits of national corporate and private laws. 
Concluding Analysis and Remarks 
One of the oldest instances of protectionist GSs – the VW Law – differs 
considerably from other such measures, so do the compliance obligations stemming 
from the judgment of the CJEU and the final compliance outcome. Germany’s 
compliance with the judgment on Volkswagen case could be seen as twofold, 
causing much controversy. The diverging views on necessary compliance measures 
by the Commission and Germany brought the whole issue into a new light. In spite 
of the judgment on the alleged non-compliance in case C-95/12 it is not precisely 
clear whether Germany could be seen as have complied in good faith or not. The 
outcome of the judicial procedure for non-compliance with Volkswagen judgment 
confirmed that the government has complied, yet it is unclear whether it could have 
acted contrary to the good faith obligation by retaining allegedly illegal GSs 
provision of the VW Law. 
On one hand, Germany’s conduct during the infringement procedure under 
Article 258 TFEU, its timely replies to the Commission’s correspondence and 
implementation of rapid compliance measures post-judgment signify that it has 
good-mannerly strived for compliance. The government has rapidly initiated 
compliance by duly repealing the exclusive voting right ceiling and director’s 
appointment rights without unnecessary procrastination and any further amendments 
or justifications thereof. Such determination for irreversible repeal of two of the 
condemned provisions could be seen as compliance in line with the good faith 
obligation. The fact that Germany offered to the Commission to submit a joint 
application for interpretation of the Volkswagen judgment further supports the good 
faith compliance inclination, even though the European advocate has criticised the 
government’s failure to submit the foresaid application on its own motion.452 All of 
the above could point towards Germany’s inclination to comply with the judgment 
on case C-112/05 in good faith. 
On the other hand, following the judgment on Volkswagen, Germany openly 
and expressly refused to succumb to the Commission’s views on the necessary 
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compliance measures and retained the increased majority provision which allows for 
Lower Saxony to execute increased controlling powers over the company, so the 
deterrent nature of §4(3) VW Law should not be underrated. It is highly unlikely that 
Lower Saxony would ever dispose of its stake in Volkswagen, meaning that the 20% 
blocking minority will effectively allow it to prevent any takeover or unwelcome 
restructuring of the company and appoint two directors onto company’s board. In 
case if the CJEU establishes that the increased majority provision of the VW Law is 
contrary to the Treaty, Germany’s desire to retain the provision could be seen as 
acting contrary to the sincere cooperation obligation. Such scenario would confirm 
the obstructionist nature of GSs. This could be due to the fact that in spite of the 
ambiguity of the Volkswagen judgment the compliance measures which were 
expected from the German government were quite ‘straightforward’ – the VW Law 
had to be repealed in its entirety without any reservations made to the increased 
majority provision. What is more, despite the fact that compliance has been initiated 
immediately following the judgment, the draft Amendment came into force fourteen 
months after the judgment, which could be seen as too late to qualify as compliance 
in good faith. Above all, the mere fact that the VW Law remained enacted for more 
than four decades points to obstructionist nature of these GS measures. This signifies 
that the GSs have the tendency of being obstructionist while in some instances the 
non-compliance with the Treaty provisions on capital movements tends to persist 
despite the condemning judgment on GSs. 
The Commission has accepted the decision of the CJEU in case C-95/12 and 
closed the infringement case for non-compliance with the CJEU’s judgment on 
Volkswagen case. However, theoretically, the author envisages that the controversial 
provision of §4(3) VW Law could become subject to further infringement procedure 
under Article 258 TFEU, however practically such scenario would be unlikely, due 
to the following reasons. Firstly, the Commission is ever more cautious to challenge 
provisions of the VW Law which are cemented in Volkswagen’s statutes and are 
acceptable under general company law. The Commission’s desire to stretch the 
Volkswagen judgment to apply to company’s statutes has been rightfully found 
inadmissible by the CJEU and could be seen as overzealous, verging too far into the 
ambit of national corporate and public law. In this regard the Commission could be 
on thin ice, especially if it will choose to challenge the provisions of Volkswagen’s 
statutes which have incorporated the increased majority ceiling for the inexplicit 
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benefit of Lower Saxony also explicitly granting it with the right to appoint two 
directors. Such a move could provoke unprecedented resistance to the EU policy-
making in general (Höpner, Schäfer 2007: 9). The legality of such state interventions 
has not been questioned just yet, and only the future could show how and if the 
Commission will address this issue. Secondly, it seems that the Commission and the 
CJEU are now more cautious in pressing for ‘more Europe’ and the VW Law is 
unlikely to be challenges in the near future. It is important to emphasise that given 
the Commission’s clear-cut position on the issue and its expressed opposition to 
perceived legality of retained GS measures, Germany could be seen as acting 
contrary to the sincere cooperation obligation. Such conclusions are of hypothetical 
nature, at least until the Commission challenges the retained paragraphs of the VW 
Law. Consequently what is clear from the outcome of compliance with judgment on 
case C-112/05 is that Volkswagen’s shareholders prefer a corporate governance 
model that may hinder the free movement of capital, because it emphasises the 
interests of the providers of other types of capital, such as human capital (Gerner-
Beuerle 2012: 98). 
To conclude, it should be emphasised that Germany’s compliance was neither 
influenced by the pressure to comply from below, nor by the high costs of non-
compliance or by reputational/electorate losses. Firstly, the general public has sided 
with the national authorities on the issue since the VW Law was widely seen as 
protecting national interests and social responsibility principle which is still deeply 
rooted in German society. In the electorate’s view the government and Lower 
Saxony are seen as remaining true to their commitment to retain prevalence of the 
social responsibility principle and employee orientation in Volkswagen while 
shielding the company from unwelcome challenges of the market-oriented business 
optimisation. This approach could have contributed to the potential obstructionist 
nature of the VW Law, which in fact strengthens stakeholders’ control over the 
company’s management. Secondly, the EU-wide reputational losses for non-
compliance would neither be applicable to this case, since Germany was extensively 
burdened with the important task of bailing out fellow MSs – its non-compliance 
with the controversial judgment on GSs would not be seen as significant fault 
towards its obligations under the Treaty. 
The revealed obstructionist nature of the VW Law as well as government’s 
twofold compliance with the Volkswagen judgment signifies that Germany is 
210 
 
reluctant to let go of GSs so the issue is not easily overcome: the VW Law could 
remain on the Commission’s and the CJEU’s radars for many years to come. The 
compliance with present judgment presents considerable implications to the 
hypothetical compliance hypothesis of obstructionist protectionism developed in this 
study. The government could be seen as cooperating with the Commission at all 
stages of the enforcement action, both during the infringement proceedings under 
Article 258 TFEU and under Article 260 TFEU. Yet at the same time, Germany’s 
resistance to succumb to the Commission’s demands and expressed disregard of the 
‘ever closer union’ idea which would imply that the remaining protectionist barriers 
must be removed, signifies that Germany resisted to comprehensively comply and 
embark on the wider policy change. Such resistance to move towards an ‘ever closer 
union’ maxim and repeal controversial provisions of the VW Law appears to be a 
political choice. Since the judgment under Article 260 TFEU procedure has been not 
in the Commission’s favour, the effectiveness of the said enforcement mechanism is 
not under question, so the second enforcement effectiveness hypothesis (H2) does 
not apply in this case. Given that the government initiated timely amendments 
following the judgment under Article 258 TFEU it could be concluded that the said 
enforcement mechanism has been successful in facilitating effective compliance. 
However, the amended law came into force fourteen months following the 
judgment, which is too late to qualify as compliance in good faith, so in this case the 
core enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis (H1) would be confirmed. 
Since in this case the MS complied ‘by amendment’ and the subsequent judgment 
under Article 260 TFEU proved that Germany has not failed to comply, the 
supporting hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) could be 
falsified. Consequently, it should be emphasised that the outcome and legality of 
such compliance measure is not a clear-cut matter. The mere possibility that the 
Commission could challenge the amended laws in the future would point to the 
inherent obstructionist nature of GSs at issue. What the compliance outcome with 
the Volkswagen case confirms is that the legal maxim ‘that he who can do most can 
also do least’453 could also apply to compliance with GS-related judgments.  
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8. Portugal: Obstructionist Privatisation Law No.11/90 as Protection for 
National Champions 
 
This chapter assesses Portugal’s practice in complying with GS judgments, 
encompassing some of the most recent rulings delivered in 2010 and 2011. The 
corresponding analytical approach is applied by first reflecting on the background of 
GSs and then assessing post-judgment compliance. Introduction reveals the 
obstructionist privatisation law which became subject to the infringement 
proceedings in all four Portuguese cases. Throughout the analysis particular 
emphasis is given to Portugal’s determination to actively employ GSs. The 
compliance assessment will culminate with the conclusive part encompassing 
measures aimed at simultaneous compliance with the three GS-related judgments. 
This chapter will reveal that Portugal has been successfully substituting overruled 
GSs with new protectionist provisions, resisting comprehensive compliance and 
resorting to obstructionist protectionism. 
 
Introduction on Jurisdiction and its Golden Share Law 
The Portuguese state’s involvement in operating of industry and strategic 
companies is similar to practices applied in Italy and Spain, as all these MSs share 
the authoritarian past with strong traditions of state dirigisme. Yet contrary to 
Spanish dictator Franco, who established economic control via widespread 
nationalisations of strategic companies, Portugal’s ruler Salazar refrained from 
industry nationalisation (Bortolotti, Milella 2006: 8; Jordana et al 2005; Vickers, 
Wright 1989: 11). Nationalisations came much later as a result of 1974 Revolution 
and democratisation, dramatically expanding public ownership and placing control 
over strategic companies directly onto the state. The government has produced, 
redistributed and regulated public services such as energy and telecoms, while state 
ownership has been constitutionally protected.
454
 Portugal’s protectionist tradition 
has a recent yet solid foundation that ‘stands out as a case where public commitment 
to the role of the state in the economy to public services and to redistributive and 
egalitarian policies seems particularly strong in a comparative context’ (Magalhães 
2012: 310). Following the democratisation, Portugal strived to join the EU, which 
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meant that government involvement in national industries had to be considerably 
reduced. 
The perspective of European membership acted as catalyst for liberalisation of 
strategic industries. The EU Commission recognised that it is necessary to aid 
Portugal’s liberalisation ambitions and implemented the Act of Accession in 1985, 
allowing the state to maintain a prior administrative approval regime which applied 
exclusively to foreign direct investments outside the credit institution sector.
455
 The 
foresaid concession allowed Portugal to control capital influx and prevent inherent 
takeover threats following the accession to the EU in 1986. 
Initially the state could dispose of limited amount of shares while acquisitions 
by private and foreign companies were also restricted by law.
456
 This cautious 
approach to privatisation aimed at gradually shaping of the corporate ownership 
structures of emerging private companies and to create stable shareholder groups. 
Yet, on the 1
st
 January 1990, following the expiry of concessions guaranteed by the 
Act of Accession, national companies could be exposed to unwelcome foreign 
takeovers.
 
This is when and why the government implemented the law on 
privatisation or the LQP
457
 which allowed for creation of wide-ranging GSs. Article 
3 LQP established objectives for re-privatisation: to increase competitiveness of 
companies, restructure industries, strengthen national businesses capacity, allow 
Portuguese citizens to participate in the capital of companies and to preserve 
property [financial] interests of the state and to develop other national interests. 
Essentially, the LQP aimed at strengthening of national champions and promoting 
their competitiveness via implementation of further decree-laws which would 
administer transformation of SOEs to private companies. 
Pursuant to the LQP the decree-laws could: establish acquisition ceilings 
limiting the rights of any entity to acquire shares above certain threshold (Article 
13(2)); limit rights of foreign companies to acquire shares and fix maximum foreign 
participation in share capital of privatised companies (Article 13(3)); create GSs by 
attaching special rights to ‘privileged’ share or the co-called acções privilegiadas 
(Article 15(1)). Pursuant to the LQP, GSs could be created in exceptional cases and 
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where grounds of national interest so require in order to safeguard the public 
interest. The GSs could grant a state-appointed director with the special right to 
approve resolutions relating to certain matters. Additionally, according to Article 
15(3) LQP, the decree-laws could ‘in exceptional cases, where grounds of national 
interest so require’ create GSs for the sole benefit of the state allowing it to veto 
certain resolutions and amendments to company’s statutes. The LQP established that 
penalties for breach of the set ownership/acquisition ceilings could result in 
compulsory sale of shares exceeding the thresholds, loss of voting rights conferred 
by those shares or invalidity of such acquisitions or subscriptions. 
The above provisions reveal that the LQP created a special framework for 
privatisation which had to commence via further decree-laws which in turn could 
create GSs. By means of the LQP the government sought to preserve other national 
as well as its own interests, and wide-ranging and flexible protectionist provisions of 
the LQP aimed at addressing those governmental concerns allowing it to both roll 
back the participation of the state in national economy, pay its debts, yet at the same 
time to stay in control over newly privatised SOEs by strengthening their positions 
and not allowing for market forces to decide on their faith. 
Equipped with such an arsenal of GSs the government could safely continue to 
privatise strategic companies such as energy giants GALP Energia and Electricidade 
de Portugal (EdP), telecom monopoly Portugal Telecom (PT) and the country’s 
largest cement producer Cimentos de Portugal (CIMPOR). The LQP allowed for 
these companies to extend business abroad to ‘natural markets’ – former colonies in 
Latin America – becoming multinational companies and largest national champions. 
Provisions of the LQP and ‘enabling’ decree-laws would become subject to 
condemning rulings by the CJEU, compliance with which will be analysed in the 
following sub-chapters. 
For the purpose of this overall introduction it is imperative to stress that 
Portugal was greatly supportive of European integration while significantly 
benefiting from injections from European structural funds and capital influx. 
However, following its accession to the EU and adoption of single currency, the 
enthusiasm for liberalisation ran dry – there was no more ‘demand’ and pressure for 
further incentives and reforms (Goucha, Soares 2010; Royo 2013: 202). Portugal’s 
resistance to aims of the free market will be observed throughout current chapter 
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revealing protectionist stance over the strategic companies and obstructionist non-
compliance with EU law which sought to overturn such protectionist practices. 
According to studies on compliance, Portugal could be seen as one of the 
leaders for non-compliance in spite of its relatively small bargaining power and 
political weight (Börzel 2001: 818; Börzel et al 2010; 19). At the same time, similar 
to Spain, Portugal does not generally persist in non-compliance seeking to remedy 
the breach prior to the referral to the Court (ibid Börzel 2001). However, similar to 
the extreme position applied by Italy, qualitative analysis of the Portuguese 
compliance with GS rulings will demonstrate that while being highly supportive of 
European integration, Portugal could be seen as reluctant to comply in good faith. 
The following analysis will reveal that when it comes to GSs the Portuguese 
government goes to great lengths to resist compliance. In all analysed GS cases, 
compliance has only been achieved after considerable procrastination and 
implementation of numerous inadequate compliance measures in response to penalty 




8.1. Discriminatory Golden Shares for National Champions 
 
This sub-chapter analyses compliance with judgment on case C-367/98 which 
was one of the three GS rulings delivered by the CJEU on 4 June 2002.
458
 In those 
landmark rulings the Belgian regime has been justified, while both French and 
Portuguese GSs were found to be in breach of the Treaty. Prior to the ruling on 
Portuguese GSs both the Commission and the Court had an opportunity to reflect on 
the restrictive nature of the LQP provisions in important proceedings
459
 under 
Article 21 of the Merger Regulation.
460
 These cases relate to case C-367/98 in fact, 
as they concerned the government’s application of GSs and imposition of veto on 
cross-border deals involving foreign investors. Assessment of these cases will reveal 
how the GS provisions of the LQP could be applied to block unwelcome cross-
border capital movements. The government’s conduct during these cases will reveal 
an openly protectionist stance and determination for maintaining GSs in spite of the 
ongoing infringement proceedings. 
It is sufficient to note that case C-367/98 is significant for the development of 
the GS jurisprudence for two reasons. Firstly, it was the first GS ruling in which the 
CJEU confirmed that protection of general financial interests cannot constitute 
adequate justification.
461
 Secondly, the CJEU established that mere undertaking not 
to apply existing provisions cannot justify their continuous existence as it could be 
liable for creating uncertainty.
462
 The latter development confirms the fact that in 
spite of supremacy of EU law over national provisions, GSs have to be repealed in 
order to fully exclude their dissuasive effects on potential investors. 
This sub-chapter proceeds as follows: Section 8.1.A reveals GSs and Section 
8.1.B assesses their application to block cross-border deals. Portugal’s actions 
during pre-litigation stage will be analysed in light of unsuccessful compliance 
attempt and contrasted with the government’s application of GSs to veto cross-
border deals. It will be concluded that, in spite of the on-going challenge of GSs 
under infringement procedures and in spite of the political commitments not to 
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employ GSs, the government has effectively used GSs. Parallel examination of 
government’s determination to defend existence and exercise of GSs will signify the 
measures’ obstructionist nature as well as the state’s expressive incline towards non-
compliance. Section 8.1.C accesses the potential for compliance with the judgment 
on case C-367/98. Section 8.1.D assesses compliance situation and summarises that 
Portugal has acted in bad faith and resorted to non-compliance. This section 
concludes with insights into obstructionist provisions of the LQP which were not 
scrutinised in case C-367/98 and which could become subject to subsequent 
infringement proceedings. 
8.1.A: Golden Shares 
Pursuant to enabling provision of Article 13(3) LQP the government has 
implemented at least fifteen GS decree-laws setting different ownership ceilings for 
foreign acquisitions in various companies, capping foreign investments to between 
5% and 40%.
463
 Also pursuant to the LQP, the government implemented DL 
No.380/1993
464
 establishing a special procedure for monitoring of share ownerships 
in privatised companies. Pursuant to the preamble of DL No.380/1993 ‘in light of 
past experiences and due to the strategic importance of companies to be privatised 
for the national economy, the government considers it is essential to facilitate the 
follow-up control on the shareholding structures of those companies with a view to 
strengthen their efficiency and business capacity, in a way that is consistent with 
economic policy guidelines’.465 Therefore, the follow-up control mechanism 
effectively allowed the government to exercise de jure and de facto control of 
shareholder structure of its former SOEs. 
To this effect, Article 1 of DL No.380/1993 created an ownership ceiling 
subjecting any investor, foreign or national, wishing to acquire more than 10% of 
voting capital in a company which is being privatised, to obtain prior administrative 
approval from the Minister of Finance. The approval will be subject to specific 
conditions laid down by further decree-laws for each particular case of state 
ownership disposals. Pursuant to Article 4(2) DL No.380/1993, the approval has to 
be issued within thirty days of receiving the application and shall be based on 
objectives pursued by re-privatisation in accordance with Article 3 LQP. Regarding 
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the non-discriminatory system of approval enshrined in DL No.380/1993, it should 
be emphasised that the Minister of Finance was left with an exceptionally wide 
margin of discretion which would enable him to unilaterally decide whether a 
potential acquirer ‘fits’ the government’s policy on re-privatisations. There is no 
expressive fit-and-proper test available under provisions of DL No.380/1993 while 
the objectives of the LQP, such as strengthening capacity of national businesses and 
ensuring the preservation of interests of the state are of imprecise and wide-ranging 
character. 
Provision of Article 13(3) LQP has been further activated by the DL 
No.65/1994
466
 which established a new ownership ceiling that applied exclusively to 
foreign investments. DL 65/1994 limited foreign participation to 25% in national 
companies whose privatisation procedure has already been completed, unless a 
higher threshold has been previously determined by a company-specific 
privatisation decree-law. 
8.1.B: Application of Golden Shares and Associated Infringement Procedures 
The Portuguese GSs have attracted attention of the EU Commission in 1992. 
The Commission issued a formal letter on 4 July 1994 to which Portugal replied on 
28 September 1994, maintaining that the LQP and associated decree-laws are of 
exceptional importance ‘from a historical, political and financial point of view’ since 
their implementation made the whole re-privatisation process possible.
467
 In its reply 
the government had also undertaken not to employ the restrictions on acquisitions 
based on nationality of investors for future privatisations, so that EU investments 
would not qualify as ‘foreign’ under provisions of the LQP and DL No.65/1994.468 
The government also maintained that the foresaid political commitment is further 
reinforced by the national Constitution, which provides that EU law will take 
precedence over conflicting Portuguese provisions.
469
 
On 29 May 1995 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion, allocating two 
months for compliance. The Portuguese authorities replied on 7 September 1995 
reiterating their commitment not to apply discriminatory provisions of the LQP and 
relevant decree-laws to EU investors while at the same time stressing on the 
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importance of DL No.380/1993 to the success of ongoing re-privatisation process.
470
 
The government intended to refrain from implementation of such discriminatory 
measures in future privatisations, leaving the existing discriminatory provisions 
applicable. Essentially, the government’s reply implies that the system of approval 
under DL No.380/1993 is a legitimate instrument which is justified by the objectives 
of re-privatisation. 
Following the expiry of compliance period allocated in the reasoned opinion, 
the Commission could have brought the matter to the CJEU starting from April 
1995. Yet the matters remained silent following the Portuguese reply. One of the 
possible reasons for the Commission’s inaction on the matter could lie in 
compliance measures envisaged by the Portuguese government. The Ministry of 
Finance has drafted a new DL No.24/1996,
471
 which established a new legal 
framework applying to EU investors participating in national companies that are in 
the process of privatisation or where privatisation has already been completed. 
According to the preamble, DL No.24/1996 aimed at allowing further 
development of objectives enshrined in the LQP while bringing provisions of Article 
13(3) LQP in line with the ‘new realities of economic globalisation’.472 The 
preamble further ascertains that pursuant to enabling Article 13(3) LQP several 
decree-laws were implemented limiting foreign participation in companies, however 
‘the evolution of the national privatisation programme and deepening of the 
European integration process’ determines the necessity to reformulate the present 
provisions.
473
 Further, the preamble declares that ‘given the evolution of the 
commitments of the Portuguese State, as a Member of the European Union’, it is 
appropriate to amend the way in which Article 13(3) LQP would apply in the 
future.
474
 Basically, DL No.24/1996 reiterated political commitment not to employ 
discriminatory provisions as already expressed by the government during the 
infringement proceedings. To this end, the sole Article of DL 24/1996 further 
established that provisions of Article 13(3) LQP would not apply to EU entities. 
Despite the fact that DL No.24/1996 merely reiterated the government’s earlier 
political commitments, the Assembly of the Republic refused to ratify it on 28 May 
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 Provision of DL No.24/1994 (as well as other company-specific decrees 
which limited foreign participation in each particular case of privatisation) continued 
to apply to EU investors. 
Infringement proceedings challenging provisions of the LQP and relevant 
decree-laws were put on hold until 1997 Communication,
476
 when the Commission 
confirmed its position on incompatibility of GSs with fundamental freedoms of the 
Treaty. Particularly, the Commission confirmed that system of approval for 
acquisitions of shares or voting capital must be considered as a restriction on direct 
and portfolio investments. Since DL No.380/1993 clearly established such system, 
the Commission decided to refer Portugal to the CJEU on 11 December 1997, 
lodging an application on 14 October 1998 (European Commission IP/97/1111). 
At the time when the case C-367/98 was pending before the CJEU, Portugal 
continued re-privatisations granting itself special rights in companies pursuant to the 
LQP. The Minister of Finance Pina Moura specifically confirmed that the 
government will protect strategic companies following their privatisation and that 
losing control over strategic companies such as EdP, PT and CIMPOR ‘is out of the 
question’ and that Portugal was not prepared to accept lesser rights than other EU 
MSs (Financial Times 7/06/2000). Even though many such GSs were created, none 
of them were officially exercised up until 1999 (Financial Times 12/04/1994). 
However, the Minister Moura soon had an opportunity to confirm protectionist 
stance with direct actions on 18 June 1999, imposing veto on cross-border deal 
which involved a Spanish Banco Santander acquiring stakes in certain Portuguese 
financial companies (BSCH/Champalimaud case).
477
 
Pursuant to DL No.380/1993 the Minister imposed veto by capping 
Santander’s voting rights at 10% (European Commission IP/99/773). The 
Commission issued a decision ordering the Portuguese government to withdraw its 
veto and initiated the accelerated infringement proceedings under what is now 258 
TFEU. The Commission stated that Portugal is ‘blatantly infringing [EU] law’ by 
employing special rights which are contrary to the Treaty freedoms.
478
 The 
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BSCH/Champalimaud case did not make it to the CJEU, Portugal did not comply 
with the Commission’s decision and the vetoed deal was eventually modified to 
become more government-friendly (Benyon 2010: 43). However this is a great 
example for demonstrating how Portugal could successfully employ GSs 
implemented pursuant to DL No.380/1993 to oppose a cross-border deal. 
Even though the Commission clearly expressed its views on illegality of 
Portugal’s veto in BSCH/Champalimaud case, the Minister of Finance Moura 
repeatedly used the GSs in June and again in August 2000. This time, both vetoes 
applied to a cross-border deal involving CIMPOR – a cement company.479 CIMPOR 
was subject to approval system pursuant to DL No.380/1993 and pursuant to Article 
15(3) LQP the state has also retained GSs. On 15 June 2000 CIMPOR became 
subject to takeover bid by Holderbank/Secil – Swiss and Portuguese companies – 
which demanded governmental approval of the acquisition pursuant to DL 
No.380/1993, removal of GSs provisions from CIMPOR’s statutes and disposal of 
remaining GSs.
480
 The Minister refused to satisfy Holderbank/Secil’s demands and 
vetoed the deal.
481
 Holderbank/Secil submitted an amended application, yet the 
Minister once again vetoed this acquisition. Holderbank/Secil applied to the 
authorities once again with a reviewed public offer making further concessions, yet 
their application has been refused – the takeover bid for CIMPOR has collapsed. 
Following the foresaid application of GSs the Commission issued a binding 
decision ordering Portugal to comply with EU law by withdrawing unjustified 
veto.
482
 The Commission rightfully observed that the veto could not be justified by 
any legitimate interests, so it is a barrier to free movement of capital and 
establishment.
483
 However, the Portuguese government did not withdraw its veto 
decisions. Instead the government proceeded with challenging the Commission’s 
decision by lodging an application before the CJEU.
484
 Portugal claimed that the 
Commission did not have the competence to rule on legitimacy of veto, but should 
have referred the matter to the CJEU instead, which in turn would have assessed 
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legality of national measures under Article 258 TFEU. It should be emphasised here, 
that should Ministerial veto be challenged before the CJEU, the government could 
not by any means defend this measures by invoking any of the justifications 
permitted under the Treaty – CIMPOR was a cement company, which did not 
provide services of general public interest. 
In a nutshell, the BSCH/Champalimaud and Holderbank/Secil/CIMPOR cases 
demonstrated how provisions of non-discriminative ownership ceiling of DL 
No.380/1993 could be applied and how the Portuguese government could apply it to 
block unwelcome cross-border acquisitions. These cases reveal how Portugal had 
openly ignored the Commission’s calls for compliance, resorted to obstructionist 
non-compliance while acting contrary to the sincere cooperation obligation. 
Portugal’s conduct clearly reveals the inherent obstructionist nature of the decree-
laws implemented pursuant to the LQP, as well as the government’s incline to resist 
compliance when security of its prised companies is at stake. Contrary to GSs in 
credit and cement-making companies discussed above, special rights in companies 
which operate in strategic sectors might eventually be justified. However as seen 
from the application of non-discriminatory approval regime of DL No.380/1993, 
such provisions could particularly target foreign acquisitions, leaving a wide 
discretion to the government. 
Discriminatory provisions of DL No.24/1994 and Article 13(3) LQP as well as 
non-discriminatory DL No.380/1993 were scrutinised by the CJEU in case C-
367/98. As regards the discriminative measures Article 13(3) LQP and DL 
No.24/1994 Portugal did not deny the infringement in principle and the only 
justification put forward was the political commitment not to employ these 
provisions to EU investors.
485
 In any event, Portugal claimed that GSs would not 
apply to EU investors due to direct effect and supremacy of EU law.
486
 As regards 
the non-discriminatory approval regime of DL No.380/1993 the government agreed 
that it falls within the scope of free capital movement, claiming however that these 
measures are justified by overriding requirements to safeguard general financial 
interest of the state.
487
 The Portuguese government’s defence strategy seems to be 
particularly inadequate taken the imposed veto in BSCH/Champalimaud and 
Holderbank/Secil/CIMPOR cases, which demonstrated that GSs could be applied to 
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EU investments. The CJEU concluded that the need to safeguard economic 
objectives could not be accepted as a legitimate justification of provisions at 
issue.
488
 On 4 June 2002 the Court has ruled that provisions of Article 13(3) LQP 
together with company-specific decree-laws enacted pursuant to it, as well as DL 
No.24/1994 and DL No.380/1993 are contrary to the Treaty. Following the 
judgment, Portugal had to repeal or justify the overruled provisions in order to 
comply. 
8.1.C: Assessing Potential Compliance  
From the onset it should be established that during the compliance bargaining 
stage of the infringement procedure Portugal and the Commission have argued at 
cross points: the former emphasised on the objectives behind the contested measures 
from historical, political and financial points of view, while the latter emphasised on 
their dissuasive nature. Since the government has committed not to apply 
discriminatory measures to EU investors in relation to future privatisations, it could 
be assumed that Portugal would make certain concession towards compliance. But 
the wording of Portuguese concessions implied that discriminatory measures would 
not apply only in relation to future privatisations, the already implemented 
company-specific decree-laws pursuant to Article 13(3) LQP and DL No.24/1994 
would stay in force, effectively blocking foreign investment. 
Given the government’s readiness to commit twice to such political 
concessions at the time of the infringement proceedings it could be assumed that 
Portugal accepts the deterrent effect of discriminatory measures. This could imply 
that during judicial review the legality of discriminatory measures would not be 
expressly defended by the state. In fact, at the hearing Portugal admitted the alleged 
infringement in principle, while putting an accent on its political commitment not to 
apply discriminatory measures to EU investors while at the same time reiterating the 
historical and economic objectives behind the provisions.
489
 Prima facie it could be 
concluded that the discriminatory national measures lacked on obstructionist 
qualities in principle and following the judgment they could be repealed without 
delay. However the refusal to ratify DL No.24/1996, which aimed at amending the 
measures in question, demonstrates inherent obstructionist nature of provisions of 
Article 13(3) LQP. Despite pre-judgment commitments in case C-367/98 and 
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reiteration of the same at the hearing, there was no inclination from Portugal to 
repeal the discriminatory measures post-judgment. Compliance measure of DL 
No.24/1996 has not been ratified pre-judgment, however following the condemning 
judgment there was enough motivation for Article 13(3) LQP and DL No.24/1994 to 
be finally revoked. Analysis of Portugal’s conduct in application of GSs to block 
cross-border deals signifies that numerous political commitments could not be taken 
as a sincere inclination to comply in good faith and the infringement could continue 
post-judgment. 
When it comes to good-natured compliance in relation to DL No.380/1993 it is 
a different matter when compared with the discriminatory provisions discussed 
above. Back at the pre-judicial stage the government did not make any political 
commitments in relation to the approval regime, stating that it applies equally to all 
investors. There was no inclination to remove the measures in question, or amend 
them, as was the case with provisions of Article 13(3) LQP and other discriminatory 
decree-laws. At the pre-litigation stage of the infringement procedure and at the 
hearing the parties argued at cross points: Portugal insisted on importance and 
necessity of the measures justifying them by a number of illegitimate objectives. 
Such pre-judgment behaviour implies that following the judgment the Portuguese 
authorities would most likely opt to comply ‘by amendment’ in order to retain such 
important piece of projectionist legislation. As the supporting hypothesis on 
minimalist compliance (H1a) suggests, any such compliance strategy have a 
significant potential of being insufficient and inadequate, which in turn places the 
question of effectiveness of the enforcement action under Article 258 TFEU, hence 
confirming the first main hypothesis of this study (H1). 
The government also used GSs and defended their application in 
BSCH/Champalimaud and Secil/Holderbank/CIMPOR cases in spite of the 
Commission’s clear-cut position on the matter. The obstructionist nature of DL 
No.380/1993 also stems from Portugal’s challenge to the Commission’s decision on 
CIMPOR deal when the government resisted compliance and sought to defend GSs 
by challenging the Commission’s authority to decide on the matter.490 The 
aforementioned point is particularly revealing of inherent obstructionist nature of 
DL No.380/1993, since the government’s challenge to the decision came at the time 
when the legal basis for the Commission’s condemning decision has already been 
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referred to the CJEU under Article 258 TFEU. Portugal’s conduct is even more 
disturbing in light of political commitment not to employ GSs to EU investors. Such 
obstructionist protectionist behaviour implies that the Commission’s clear-cut policy 
setting failed to reach the addressee and the Portuguese government could also ‘fail 
seeing the light’ and embark on comprehensive policy change following the 
condemning judgment on case C-367/98. 
It should be noted on the prominence of the reply to the Commission’s 
correspondence on the matter: Portugal’s reply to the Commission’s reasoned 
opinion arrived with considerable delay. Likewise, the government did not anticipate 
any amendments to DL No.380/1993 and amendment to discriminatory provisions 
(DL No.24/1996) has not been ratified either. The government had adequate time for 
compliance on its own initiative, since between its reply to the reasoned opinion of 7 
September 1995 and the Commission’s decision to refer the matter to the Court on 
11 December 1997 more than two years have passed. It should be noted that another 
ten months have passed between the Commission’s decision to refer the matter to 
CJEU and the actual lodging of application on 14 October 1998. The unsuccessful 
compliance measure DL No.24/1996 demonstrates that the government could have 
efficiently and promptly complied, yet it avoided doing so prior to the judgment. In 
spite of the foresaid inclination to resist compliance pre-judgment and the inherent 
obstructionist nature of the measures concerned, the government had an obligation 
to comply following the judgment. However, as the following section will 
demonstrate, it has failed to do so. 
8.1.D: Assessing Compliance  
At the time of the judgment Portugal was experiencing political instability 
(Royo 2013). Privatisation of the key strategic companies was in full swing, with 
most prized enterprises entering competitive markets. By the beginning of the 
2000’s the pressure for reforming national policies has vanished: ‘Maastricht test’ 
has been passed and the country has been accepted into the Eurozone, which 
inevitably led to lessening of enthusiasm for EU-induced reforms and overall EU 
integration (ibid). The government has entered ‘a phase of clear divergence’ 
(Goucha, Soares 2010: 319) with the EU, resorting to obstructionist protectionist 
measures, implementing numerous GSs for privatised companies. As the 
BSCH/Champalimaud and Secil/Holderbank/CIMPOR cases have demonstrated the 
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Portuguese government was ready to defend its protectionist stance, revolving back 
to traditional protectionist and interventionist approach. Naturally, this was an 
unpropitious time for compliance with the judgment on protectionist GSs. 
Almost a year after the judgment on case C-367/98 the government has not 
communicated any compliance measures to the Commission. The provisions of 
Article 13(3) LQP and other measures which limited foreign participation stayed in 
force following the condemning judgement. The matter remained unsolved for the 
months to come as the government resorted to unnecessary delays and non-
compliance. 
On 15 May 2003 the Commission had decided to initiate new infringement 
proceedings under what is now Article 260 TFEU (European Commission 
IP/03/692). Penalty threats have prompted the government to re-assess its 
compliance commitments. On 4 November 2003 the Prime Minister José Manuel 
Barroso approved Law No.102/2003
491
 which entered into force on 15 November 
2003. This compliance measure was implemented more than fourteen months 
following the judgment on case C-367/98 and exactly six months following the 
Commission’s initiation of infringement procedure for non-compliance. Provisions 
of Law No.102/2003 signify the unambiguous nature of compliance obligation 
imposed on the government by the Court’s judgment. The compliance measure 
represented a half-page long document with no preamble and only three provisions, 
repealing the following: Article 13(3) LQP, DL No.24/1994 and all discriminatory 
company-specific decrees implemented pursuant to Article 13(3) LQP. Yet the Law 
No.62/2003 addressed only part of the judgment, merely repealing the 
discriminatory measures which, as the above analysis revealed, initially lacked on 
obstructionist nature and had the potential for being removed in good faith back in 
1996. Controversial provisions of non-discriminatory DL No.380/1993 remained 
intact – their exquisite obstructionist nature proved to be the case. 
Non-compliance with the judgment stretched for another three months before 
the Commission decided to proceed with the second stage of the infringement 
procedure under Article 260 TFEU by issuing a reasoned opinion on 21 January 
2004. Portugal had two months to comply otherwise the matter would be brought to 
the CJEU and penalties applied. Prompted by the imminence of penalties Portugal 
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has finally complied on 4 February 2004 by approving DL No.49/2004.
492
 This 
compliance measure consisted of a repealing article and a short preamble. The 
preamble paid a tribute to the law it is repealing, re-emphasising the important role 
played by the DL No.380/1993 and stressing that the approval system has been a 
milestone for achieving objectives behind re-privatisation and its successes could be 
deemed as positive overall. Further the government went on to stress on the 
importance of maintaining state control over newly privatised SOEs post-
privatisation concluding that objectives behind DL No.380/1993 have been already 
met and its further existence is not justified so the provision must be repealed. 
The wording of DL No.49/2004 imitates a good-natured manner of 
compliance which, as the government suggests in the pre-amble, came as a result of 
successful application of DL No.380/1993 to its fullest potential. There is no 
mention of infringement proceedings whatsoever, neither of case C-367/98 nor of 
the infringement procedure for non-compliance, so the wording of the DL 
No.49/2004 imply compliance by the state’s own initiative, which was not the case. 
Firstly, the timing of implementation of both compliance measures of Law 
No.62/2003 and DL No.49/2004 signifies that the Portuguese government complied 
only once the second referral and the associated penalty threat has been likely in the 
foreseeable future, escalating infringement to the limit that could no longer be 
ignored. Secondly, the wording of the two compliance measures also signifies that 
compliance obligation was not of an ambiguous nature: discriminatory provisions of 
Article 13(3) LQP and DL No.24/1994 had to be repealed, since their application 
could not be justified. The non-compliance with the condemning judgment in case 
C-367/98 stretched for almost one and a half years which confirms that the 
government has acted in bad faith and contrary to loyalty principle when addressing 
obligations imposed on it by the GS judgment. 
One of the reasons behind the foresaid compliance and removal of DL 
No.380/1993 could be the fact that the protectionist/deterrent nature of this GS 
measure could be effectively substituted by another effective GS provision of Article 
15 LQP. The case C-367/98 has not challenged the legality of Article 15 LQP, 
leaving Portugal free to employ GSs which will become subject to the judgments 
analysed in the following three sub-paragraphs. It is pertinent to emphasise that 
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availability of this alternative protectionist mechanism prompted the final 
compliance ‘by repeal’ with the present case, so the government has ultimately 
complied without any further procrastinations or amendments to overruled DL 
No.380/1993. 
To conclude, when all of the above circumstances on compliance are taken 
into account the ultimate compliance measure with judgment on case C-367/98 is 
seen as compliance in bad faith. Firstly, the initial compliance failed to effectively 
remedy the breach confirmed by the CJEU. Even though some of the most 
controversial provisions have been repealed, the government chose to retain a non-
discriminatory provision, retaining protectionist powers of the GSs as a result. In 
this respect it could be concluded, that despite the compliance ‘by repeal’ the initial 
compliance measures were insufficient. Secondly, even though the ultimate 
compliance measures completely remedied the breach, the government failed to 
embark on the wider policy change by retaining other GSs (Article 15 LQP) in its 
arsenal of protectionist measures. Such conduct supports the hypothesis on 
effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a) also confirming hypothesis on 
effectiveness of the agenda-setting case-law (H3). In a similar vein, as compliance 
has been finally achieved only at the advanced stage of the second infringement 
procedure under Article 260 TFEU the core enforcement effectiveness hypothesis 
(H1) and the second enforcement effectiveness hypothesis (H2) are confirmed.  
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8.2. Legislator-State v Shareholder-State: ‘Classic’ Golden Shares 
 
This sub-chapter analyses Portugal’s compliance with case C-171/08493 – one 
of the latest contributions of the CJEU to the body of GS case-law. In this case GSs 
were implemented into the corporate statutes of Portugal Telecom (PT) pursuant to 
Article 15(3) LQP and the relevant privatisation decree-law. Section 8.2.A reflects 
on the GSs while Section 8.2.B reveals Portugal’s conduct during infringement 
procedure and application of GSs. The latter section will support the theory that, 
once implemented, GSs are likely to be used to block potential cross-border 
takeovers. Section 8.2.C assesses arguments of the parties at the judicial stage of the 
procedure and Portugal’s defence strategy, in order to further support the 
obstructionist nature of GSs. Section 8.2.D reflects on inclination to comply with the 
judgment and concludes that Portugal has resorted to procrastination and 
obstructionist non-compliance, thus acting in bad faith. This section also reflects on 
obstructionist nature of the GSs implemented pursuant to the LQP, which would 
become subject to subsequent judgments on GSs held in energy companies analysed 
in sub-chapter 8.3 of this study. Section 8.2.E first reflects on application of GSs 
prior to the CJEU’s judgment on GS case, then concluding with overall Portugal’s 
conduct at the time of penalty procedure for non-compliance with the said judgment. 
Following the analysis of compliance conduct in it will be concluded that Portugal is 
prone to obstructionist behaviour and non-compliance post-judgment. 
8.2.A: Through the ‘back door’ - Law No.11/90 
In the previous case C-367/98 the CJEU has not challenged acções 
privilegiadas of Article 15 LQP, while the major legislative reform of 1999
494
 left 
them enact by stating that they are ‘expressly legitimate and desired mechanism that 
should be applied in the future’.495 It is necessary to recall the substance of Article 
15(3) LQP, which allowed the creation of a classic GSs - the corporate statutes of 
privatised companies may ‘in exceptional cases, where grounds of national interest 
so require’ incorporate non-transferrable shares exclusively reserved for the state 
with special rights attached to them. Special rights applied irrespective of the actual 
amount of shares held, be it five single shares or five million shares. The enabling 
                                                 
493
 Case C-171/08 Commission v Portugal [2010], ECR I-0000. 
494
 Decree-Law No.558/99 of 17/12/1999, (DoR I, Seria-A, No.292, p.9012-9019). 
495
 Ibid, p.9013. 
229 
 
provision of Article 15(3) LQP did not infringe the Treaty per se, as it has merely 
allowed for further implementation of company-specific privatisation decree-laws, 
which in turn could enable the government to incorporate acções privilegiadas. 
Effectively, the government had discretion on whether to include GS provision 
in decree-laws and then factually create them via corporate statutes. Since, pursuant 
to the LQP each stage of privatisation must be governed by decree-law, every time 
the government disposed of shares it could amend or withdraw the existing GS 
provision. Subsequently, further decree-laws could have incorporated further 
justifications for GSs extending beyond the vague justification contained in the 
enabling Article 15(3) LQP. Also, at least in theory, further justifications could also 
be incorporated into corporate statutes of the relevant company by establishing clear 
and precise objectives for application of special rights. What has been said above is 
just a hypothetical possibility, which, as the Volkswagen case has demonstrated, has 
significant implications regarding the extent to which shareholders could freely 
impose special rights (such as directors’ appointments) on the shareholder-state via 
the company’s statutes. 
As the cases on BSCH/Champalimaud and Secil/Holderbank/CIMPOR have 
demonstrated, Portugal has been aware of the alleged illegality of GS provisions of 
the LQP, but chose to continue with practice of blocking undesirable cross-border 
capital movements. Consequently, the government employed GSs in companies 
such as PT in spite of early calls for abandoning such protectionist measures. Such 
disregard of EU law and persistence with the Treaty infringement has been met with 
criticism by the press (Financial Times (20/07/2000, 20/07/2000a). Before 
privatisation the government consolidated and considerably enlarged PT, making it 
the largest listed company in Portugal and de facto telecommunications monopoly, 
ready for international expansion and privatisation. PT’s privatisation commenced in 
1995 with first disposal of state shareholdings governed by company-specific DL 
No.44/1995,
496
 which from the onset confirmed that privatisation is a ‘valuable 
opportunity to affirm the presence of the country and its companies in international 
capital markets’.497 Basically, the Portuguese government expressed its view that 
privatisation is a means to establish its national champion PT as competitive 
international player and GSs aimed at facilitating this ambitious objective. 
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According to DL No.44/1995 no entity could acquire more than 10% of the 
company’s share capital and PT’s statutes could introduce special A-shares with 
special rights attached and the majority of these shares must be held by the state’s 
authorities.
498
 At a time when the government was still a majority shareholder it 
adopted PT’s statutes, creating 47.5 million A-shares.499 Between 1997 and 1999 
Portugal further disposed of its stakes in PT and the amount of A-shares has been 
gradually reduced. Beginning from 1997, Portugal was no longer major shareholder 
and PT could have been taken over if it was not for GSs in PT’s corporate statutes 
which granted the state with numerous special rights such as: to appoint one third of 
the directors’ board and a chairman, to appoint a minimum of one member of the 
executive committee, to authorise company’s resolutions, amendments to company’s 
statutes or introduction of any limits on special rights. 
PT’s corporate statutes also established approval regime granting A-
shareholder with special right to authorise acquisitions in excess of 10% of voting 
share capital by entities engaged in competing activities (European Commission 
IP/05/1594). The approval also applied for decisions approving general objectives 
and fundamental principles of PT’s policies in respect of acquisition and disposal of 
shareholdings in companies, in cases when the AGM’s prior authorisation is 
required.
500
 By means of PT’s statutes the Portuguese government effectively 
allowed itself to have the final say in strategic decisions allowing de facto control 
over the company. 
In September 2000 the government disposed of all shares held in PT, retaining 
only 500 A-shares (European Commission IP/05/1594). By that time GSs 
implemented pursuant to Article 15(3) LQP have already attracted attention of the 
Commission as revealed by Secil/Holderbank/CIMPOR case. Back then the 
Commission had acknowledged that GSs were implemented in CIMPOR corporate 
statutes.
501
 The issue of GSs once again re-appeared in 2004 during Portugal’s 
challenge of the Commission’s decision on Secil/Holderbank/CIMPOR case.502 This 
reveals that the Commission had long been aware of GSs’ existence in Portuguese 
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companies and of their dissuasive effect. Now it was time for the Commission to 
intervene and force Portugal to withdraw acções privilegiadas of Article 15 LQP. 
8.2.B: Hostile Takeover and Referral 
Even though the Commission had long been aware of GSs’ existence in 
corporate statutes of Portuguese companies, the infringement procedure on GSs held 
in PT was initiated years later on 19 December 2005 (European Commission 
IP/05/1594). Portugal has duly replied to the formal letter, but the Commission 
issued a reasoned opinion on 10 April 2006, allocating two months for 
compliance.
503
 Past the deadline, on 24 July 2006, Portugal denied the infringement 
and argued that GSs granted rights which have a private-law character, are non-
discriminatory and justified by the reasons of general interest (European 
Commission IP/08/120). Following considerable period of deliberation, the 
Commission decided to refer the matter to CJEU on 31 January 2008 (ibid). The 
Commission had been aware of GSs for several years, yet it decided not to initiate 
infringement proceedings until 2005. It could be argued that similarly as in other GS 
cases, the Commission’s infringement action has been prompted by foreign 
investors’ interest to take over PT. 
In January 2006 national rival Sonaecom partly owned by a French company, 
launched a hostile takeover of PT (Financial Times 8/02/2006). Sonaecom indicated 
that following the takeover it would dispose of PT’s biggest asset – Brazilian 
company Vivo (European Commission IP/08/120. Similarly as it was the case in 
Secil/Holderbank/CIMPOR, Sonaecom required the withdrawal of GSs.
504
 Such 
takeover and its consequences were a very politically sensitive issue, since disposal 
of Vivo would have undermined PTs’ dominant position in the Brazilian market. 
Therefore it is unsurprising that many commentators suggested that the government 
could veto the deal (Financial Times 3/03/2006). The Sonaecom bid reveals that the 
Commission could particularly attack GSs when they are likely to thwart hostile 
takeovers. Sonaecom’s concerns with PT’s GSs could have been brought to the 
attention of the Commission pre-bid, which could have prompted it to intervene. In 
this respect, PT’s case is very similar to Porsche’s takeover ambitions for 
Volkswagen, when the takeover ambitions acted as catalyst for the Commission’s 
pro-active intervention. In case of Sonaecom’s takeover there was no veto from the 
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government since PT’s shareholders rejected the bid, so there was no need for the 
state to intervene and employ its veto. PT’s shareholders once again rejected 
Sonaecom’s revised bid in 2007. If the shareholders would have voted in favour of 
any of the two takeover bids, the government would have most likely imposed veto 
to block the deal.
505
 This assumption will be later supported by the government’s 
actions during the post-judgment stage - when it has vetoed shareholders’ decision 
to accept another hostile takeover bid involving Vivo. 
In line with the enforcement effectiveness hypothesis, Portugal’s resistance to 
remove GSs in light of both Sonaecom’s request and the infringement proceedings 
reveals their potential obstinacy which could result in non-compliance post-
judgment. The main effectiveness hypothesis (H1) could further be supported by the 
fact that on 29 March 2006, following the first Sonaecom bid, the Ministry for 
Finance has implemented additional safeguards by updating the Code of 
Commercial Companies.
506
 The new provision concerned shareholdings subject to 
privatisation and offered the shareholder-state a supplementary control mechanism, 
providing that any shares subject to privatisation must always constitute a special 
category of shares and voting rights attached to such shares could not be limited by 
company’s statutes. For the purpose of present analysis it should be noted that by 
this new provision the government has limited the right of shareholders to impose 
voting limitations on privatised shares that are otherwise permitted under Article 
384(2) of the Code of Commercial Companies. This additional limitation of 
shareholder’s rights reveals Portugal’s determination to retain special rights and the 
following Section 8.2.C will analyse the government’s conduct at the judicial stage 
of the infringement procedure, revealing that there was no inclination to comply 
before the judgment on case C-171/08. 
8.2.C: Infringement Proceedings 
During the judicial proceedings Portugal argued that the action is inadmissible 
since the Commission failed to annex the texts of PT’s statutes in its application, 
therefore failing to provide the CJEU with proof of infringement and founding the 
action ‘on mere presumptions’.507 As Secil/Holderbank/CIMPOR case has 
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demonstrated, the government has long been aware of the Commission’s view on 
illegality of GSs enacted in national companies’ statutes, yet it pleaded that the 
failure to merely present the CJEU with PT’s statutes could make the action 
inadmissible. To this extent the CJEU stressed that Portugal has never denied the 
existence of GSs and repeatedly confirmed that it owns 500 A-shares in PT with 
special rights attached.
508
 Since the government has confirmed that it holds GSs 
such plea of inadmissibility appears to be ill-fated – its invocation points towards 
desire to protect GSs by any means possible. The second plea of inadmissibility also 
supports this claim, since Portugal merely questioned the completeness of the 
Commission’s complaint.509 Both pleas signify that the Portuguese government 
insisted on legality of its GSs and was inclined to resort to obstructionist behaviour 
and no compliance could have been envisaged prior to the judgment. 
During judicial proceedings, Portugal also argued that PT’s A-shares are not a 
state measure but preferred shares which are a result of private agreement expressing 
the will of shareholders and is in line with normal application of national company 
law.
510
 The claim that GSs are expression of PT shareholders’ will could not have 
legitimate standing, since the legislator-state first allowed for implementation of 
such protectionist measures into company’s statutes pursuant to DL No.44/1995, and 
then shareholder-state incorporated these measures into the said statutes. It appears 
obvious that GSs are in fact a state measure which is not attributable to the will of 
PT’s ordinary shareholders, especially considering that the state since has withdrawn 
its ownership by merely retaining 500 A-shares which effectively allowed it to veto 
any amendments to the corporate statutes. Therefore the Commission rightfully 
maintained that GSs are a state measure implemented pursuant to the LQP and DL 
No.44/1995 at a time when the government was a majority shareholder and since 




Portugal maintained that even if GSs were a state measure they are not 
intended to impede free movement of capital, since these measures concerned 
managerial decisions and not disposals/acquisitions of company’s shareholdings.512 
The Commission maintained that GSs restrict free movement of capital and 
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establishment since they create a system of approval allowing the government to 
veto a number of strategic decisions of the company, hindering shareholders’ right 
to participate in management and control of the company and impede acquisition of 
the controlling shareholdings.
513
 Portugal has also claimed that the mere fact that it 
holds GSs does not make investment in PT less attractive, since the government has 
never exercised its right to veto.
514
 The Portuguese government insisted that even if 
GSs restrict free movement rights they are justified on grounds of public security 
and public policy (ensuring availability of telecom services in case of crisis or war) 
as well as by the need to prevent disruptions on the capital market and ensure 
competition.
515
 The latter two justifications on economic grounds corresponds to the 
one applied in the first Portuguese case C-367/98 and as that case has demonstrated 
such justification could not have a legitimate standing. In respect of the invoked 
justification on grounds of public policy and security the Commission maintained 
that Portugal has failed to prove the existence of ‘genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat to a fundamental interest of society’ capable of justifying GSs held in PT.516 
The Portuguese government also maintained that GSs are proportionate to the 
objectives attained and are limited to particular situations.
517
 The Commission 
contended this allegation stating that GSs are neither proportional nor legally certain 
leaving a wide margin for the state’s discretion.518 
The CJEU ruled that even if GSs in PT were of private character, the 
shareholder-state is required to comply with provisions of the Treaty.
519
 Regarding 
Portugal’s claim that it has never exercised its veto, Advocate General Mengozzi 
maintained that this claim is irrelevant, and that whether special rights were used or 
not – the mere presence of approval regime effectively ‘discourages’ intra-EU 
investors from directly participating in the capital of PT since they would not be able 
to assume control over the company.
520
 The Court ruled that Portugal failed to 
demonstrate how GSs in PT could ensure availability of telecom services in case of 
crisis or war,
521
 also dismissing GSs’ justifications on economic grounds.522 The 
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CJEU established that in spite of Portugal’s claims that GSs in PT are limited to 
particular situations, GSs could not pass the test of legal certainty and 
proportionality since they are not subject to any conditions apart from the vague 
provision of Article 15(3) LQP which states that GSs shall be created when ‘grounds 
of national interest so require’.523 On 8 July 2010, the CJEU declared that Portugal 
has violated free movement of capital and establishment by maintaining special 
rights in PT allocated in connection with GSs. 
From the onset it is apparent that during the judicial proceedings Portugal 
argued at cross points with the Commission insisting on legality and proportionality 
of GSs. Portugal has contested the Commission’s illegality claims on all points and 
has not indicated any good faith intentions to amend/repeal or anyhow limit GSs. 
Such behaviour reveals signs of inherent obstructionist nature of the Portugal’s 
position which could result in minimalist compliance or implementation of 
inadequate compliance measures and procrastination post-judgment. Following the 
judgment GSs in PT had to be relinquished as soon as possible and the following 
section shall analyse potential compliance implications which stem from the 
judgment. 
8.2.D: Compliance Obligation 
The result of judicial proceedings could be seen as unsurprising, due to legal 
uncertainty of Portuguese measures and apparent lack of justifications. However the 
judgment itself possesses several weaknesses, which would most certainly result in 
further compliance implications and removal of Portuguese GSs. Firstly, the 
vagueness stems from the fact that provision of Article 15 LQP does not infringe the 
treaty itself, but rather enables further implementation of GSs via company-specific 
decree-laws. In the present case DL No.44/1995 also did not contain any specific 
provision regarding the contents of GSs, it merely established that company’s 
statutes may introduce them. It is pertinent to note here that the introduction of A-
shares was a voluntary option reserved for the company’s shareholders. From the 
CJEU’s earlier GS jurisprudence it is apparent that there were similar structures in 
Italian, Spanish and French cases
524
 where the laws merely facilitated for further 
implementation of GSs. As the compliance analysis in aforementioned cases 
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demonstrated, if the ‘enabling’ national laws do not infringe the Treaty they tend to 
retain a high degree of potential obstructionist nature post-judgment and are most 
likely to be amended, not repealed. Specifically, since the present case appears to 
fall within the ambit of such obstructionist GS cases, a higher tendency to resort to 
non-compliance post-judgment could be predicted. 
Secondly, another weakness of the judgment on case C-171/08 stems from the 
fact that restrictive ownership ceiling of Article 11 DL No.44/1995, which limited 
participation in PT’s ownership to 10% of the company’s share capital, was not 
challenged by the CJEU. This signifies that the government has not been obliged by 
the ruling to repeal or amend the said measure. Thirdly, according to the ruling the 
breach of the Treaty freedoms lays solely with the special rights reserved for the 
shareholder-state as provided in PT’s statutes. This fact signifies that the 
government could circumvent to dispose of A-shares and only remove special rights, 
which would suffice for full compliance. Above all, as the case of Volkswagen has 
duly demonstrated, some of the special rights contained in PT’s statutes could have 
been maintained if AGM of the company’s shareholders would vote in favour of 
their retention (such as the right to appoint a director). 
The above three inherent weaknesses of the judgment have left Portugal with a 
wide discretion on how to address the ruling on case C-171/08. At this point it is 
possible to conclude that in line with the core enforcement 
effectiveness/obstructionist hypothesis of this study and in line with the earlier 
findings on compliance in Italian and Spanish cases, following the judgment 
Portugal would most certainly strive for amendments to PT’s GSs in attempt to 
retain special rights. It is necessary to emphasise that enabling Article 15 LQP 
would not be repealed as a result of condemning judgment on case C-171/08. 
However there was another implication which emerged a mere seven days prior to 
the condemning ruling, when the government used its soon-to be overruled GSs to 
veto PT’s shareholders decision to accept cross-border takeover deal that involved 
Vivo.
525
 The following concluding section will reflect on Portugal’s conduct in light 
of the imposition of veto and subsequent resistance to compliance which resulted in 
infringement procedure under Article 260 TFEU. 
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8.2.E: Golden Shares in Action and Compliance 
In spite of the Portugal’s claim that the veto was never applied, on 1 July 2010 
the government used its soon-to-be condemned special right to veto PT’s decision to 
accept a bid by Telefónica of Spain to acquire PT’s stake in Vivo – a prized asset 
jointly owned with Telefónica.
526
 Similarly as was the case with two unsuccessful 
Sonaecom bids, PT’s shareholders have initially rejected two Telefónica’s offers, yet 
accepted the third one with 74% of shareholders’ votes.527 This is when the 
government used its GSs (Financial Times 1/07/2010). Non-evocation of the veto 
for Sonaecom’s takeover bid assumed inherent obstructionist nature of GSs while 
imposition of veto on Telefónica’s offer confirmed their explicitly protectionist 
nature. Prior to the imposition of the veto PT’s management explicitly pleaded with 
the government to withhold from using its GS, yet the government maintained that it 
is ‘not going against the will of [PT’s] shareholders, but these shareholders should 
not go against the state will’ and that the state was ‘thinking of the strategic interests 
of PT and [the] country [when employing the veto]’.528 Here it is important to 
emphasise that Portugal’s veto to overrule shareholder’s decision on disposal of an 
asset located outside of the EU (in Brazil) was unprecedented in the current body of 
GS case-law. 
Despite the condemning judgment issued days following the veto the 
government made public statements defending its protectionist move and 
maintaining that it will not withdraw the veto, while also suggesting that it would 
veto any takeover of PT by Telefónica.
529
 It is pertinent to reveal that the Portuguese 
government stated that CJEU’s judgment ‘does not diminish in any manner the 
determination [of the Portuguese government] in safeguarding national strategic 
interests and the interests of PT’.530 Such explicit disregard of EU’s stance over PT’s 
GSs signifies Portugal’s overall resistance towards compliance. It is necessary to 
emphasise that in line with the good faith compliance hypothesis, application or use 
of soon-to-be condemned GSs could be seen as acting contrary to the sincere 
cooperation obligation, particularly taken the government’s claim on non-evocation 
of veto right. 
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Non-compliance with EU law could be seen as ever more absolute taken that 
the veto applied not for the protection of its national champion from a hostile cross-
border takeover, but for opposition of the champion’s asset disposal. It is sufficient 
to note that the veto goes in sharp contrast with Portugal’s claims at the infringement 
proceedings, when it claimed that PT’s GSs concerned solely managerial decisions 
and not disposals/acquisitions of assets. However, as Vivo deal clearly demonstrates, 
the government could veto managerial decisions on asset disposals, effectively 
restricting cross-border capital movement. In any event, here it must be emphasised 
that it would be increasingly difficult to justify the veto on disposals of assets held 
outside the Portuguese territory on grounds of public security and the necessity to 
ensure availability of telecom services in Portugal. 
Going back to the compliance obligation stemming from the judgment, it 
suffices to note here that after the ruling the president of European Commission José 
Manuel Barroso (Portugal’s former Prime Minister) rather optimistically foresaw 
that the government will fully comply as soon as possible (Financial Times 
9/07/2010). In spite of Barroso’s positive view, the government’s explicit 
determination to maintain imposed veto as well as its resolve to retain other GSs 
implemented pursuant to Article 15(3) LQP signalled that Portugal was unlikely to 
comply following the judgment of 8 July 2010. 
The veto of Vivo deal prompted the Commission to employ a proactive follow-
up control on compliance. By the end of July 2010 the Commission issued a formal 
letter requesting for particulars on any compliance measures undertaken or 
envisaged (European Commission IP/10/1560). Portugal replied in early September 
reiterating earlier statements that it was considering best possible compliance 
strategies (ibid). However, as the weeks went by there was no compliance and no 
further information regarding possible compliance measures (ibid). The Commission 
issued a reasoned opinion under the penalty procedure on 25 November 2010, 
allocating two months for compliance.
531
 Such rapid invocation of compliance 
mechanism under Article 260 TFEU signifies that the Commission was determined 
to press Portugal to comply. It could be concluded that in spite of the generally slow 
follow-up control of post-judgment compliance behaviour any pending cross-border 
deal blocked by application of GSs promotes the Commission to engage in proactive 
compliance procedures post-judgment. This finding confirms that pending cross-
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border deal could be one of the factors that promote/influence compliance on GS 
cases. 
Following the expiry of the two month period, the government resisted to 
comply, resorting to obstructionist non-compliance. Pursuant to general compliance 
theory, penalty procedures significantly increase a potential for compliance, 
however as the present case clearly demonstrates Portugal has not envisaged any 
compliance initiatives even under the threat of penalties. At this point it should be 
recalled that the obstructionist nature of GSs could be traced back to the initial 
stages of the infringement procedure when the government decided to implement 
additional protectionist measures following Sonaecom’s bid in 2006. The threads of 
potential non-compliance with the judgment could be traced back to the judicial 
proceedings, when Portugal already resorted to non-compliance arguing at cross 
points with the Commission and withholding from indicating any compliance 
inclination. In a similar obstructionist manner, Portugal blatantly invoked GSs days 
before the judgment and there were no compliance-induced activities post-judgment 
even in light of imminent action under Article 260 TFEU. 
The whole issue surrounding the case C-171/08 received much publicity, 
however taken the overall increasing discontent with EU integration in light of the 
EU financial crisis, it may have caused that the general public and other actors 
abstained from compliance-induced shaming from below. It is evident that similarly 
as in recent Italian and Spanish GS cases
532
 compliance with the judgment on PT’s 
GSs was not on the forefront of Portugal’s agenda - as it was going through severe 
economic, financial and political crisis (e.g. Magalhães 2012: 324). In this difficult 
atmosphere the Commission had been cautious not to push struggling governments 
and postponed referrals for non-compliance with GS cases. At the time of the 
Commission’s enforcement action for non-compliance with ruling on case C-171/08, 
other cases on acções privilegiadas implemented pursuant to Article 15(3) LQP 
were pending before the CJEU. The following sub-chapter analyses simultaneous 
compliance with the present judgment on case C-171/08 and the two subsequent 
judgments delivered in 2010 and 2011.
533
 However at this stage it could be 
concluded that in case of compliance with judgment on case C-171/08 the 
Portuguese government acted in bad faith towards sincere cooperation obligation 
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under Article 4(3) TEU and compliance obligation under Article 260(1) TFEU. As a 
result, the government’s compliance conduct reveals significant shift to 
obstructionist non-compliance in bad faith, supporting the working enforcement 
effectiveness/obstructionist hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) of this study. The 
following analysis of compliance conduct with GSs judgments on cases C-543/08 
and C-212/09 would add to the graveness of the Portuguese conduct and disrespect 
of the EU law.  
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8.3. Classic Golden Shares for Energy Champions 
 
The previous sub-chapters have revealed the inherent obstructionist nature of 
the enabling provisions of the LQP – Portugal has been long aware of dissuasive 
nature of the relevant GS measures. Yet, in spite of the Commission’s on-going 
challenge to PT’s GSs, the government implemented similar GSs for two energy 
giants EdP and GALP. The infringement procedure on PT’s measures has been in its 
advanced stage when the Commission began to question legality of GSs in EdP and 
GALP. This sub-chapter analyses Portugal’s compliance with judgments on these 
GSs delivered in 2010 and 2011 respectively.
534
 Section 8.3.A discloses the 
substance of GSs. Section 8.3.B analyses Portugal’s conduct during the infringement 
proceedings concentrating on the government’s defence strategy and revealing any 
potential for compliance. Section 8.3.C analyses compliance post-judgment also 
reflecting on implications stemming from the judgments. Section 8.3.D analyses a 
forced compliance measure which sought to simultaneously comply with three 
judgments on GSs held in PT, EdP and GALP. In conclusion sub-chapter reflects on 
Portugal’s overall compliance conduct. 
8.3.A: Golden Shares 
At the time of the ruling on case C-171/08, cases on GSs held in EdP and 
GALP were pending before the CJEU. In both instances the Commission 
complained about special rights granted to the government by means of decree-laws 
which re-privatised relevant companies incorporating acções privilegiadas into their 
corporate statutes. Firstly, pursuant to Article 13(1) LQP each stage of re-





 Pursuant to Article 13(2) LQP EdP/DL of 1997 (governing the 
first stage of disposal of state-held shareholdings) established a 5% ownership 
ceiling on share acquisitions at the time of re-privatisation. Secondly, pursuant to 
Article 15(3) LQP the EdP/DL of 2000 (governing the fourth stage of re-
privatisation) has created approval regime by maintaining that, for as long as the 
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state is a shareholder, certain strategic resolutions must be approved by the 
government. The approval regime of EdP/DL granted the state authorities with right 
to veto any corporate restructurings, amendments to company’s statutes and 
withdrawal of the special rights. Thirdly, pursuant to Article 15(1) LQP, EdP/DL of 
2000 reserved a special right for the government to appoint its own director to the 
company’s board for as long as the state remains a shareholder. 
Pursuant to provisions of the LQP, GSs were also incorporated into EdP’s 
statutes distinguishing between class A and class B shares (held by the 
government).
537
 The corporate statutes incorporated a 5% voting rights ceiling 
providing that no one but class B shareholders could vote in excess of 5% of the 
total number of voting rights.
538
 Effectively, the Portuguese state ensured the 
continuous control over the company by means of EdP/DL and corporate statutes of 
EdP. It is suffices to note that subsequent EdP/DL of 2004 and 2005 that governed 
further stages of company’s re-privatisation preserved provisions on GSs 
unchanged. 
The government implemented similar GSs for GALP by means of GALP/DL, 
company’s statutes and a shareholder’s agreement to which the state was party.539 
Firstly, pursuant to Article 15(3) LQP, GALP/DL endorsed acções privilegiadas 
which established approval regime granting the state with right to veto one third of 
directors’ appointments, amendments of company’s statutes and resolutions on 
conclusion of certain contracts as well as resolutions which could jeopardise 
Portugal’s supply of oil, gas and their derivatives.540 Secondly, GALP’s statutes 
incorporated acções privilegiadas distinguishing between state-held A-shares and B 
shares granting the A-shareholder with the right to appoint the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and approve resolutions as provided in GALP/DL.
541
 Thirdly, 
GALP’s statutes maintained that certain resolutions concerning strategic managerial 
decisions must be approved by the Boards’ Chairman.542 
In 2006 the government concluded a shareholders’ agreement with GALP 
through a state-held banking group Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD) entitling the 
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latter to appoint the said Chairman.
543
 Basically GALP/DL, together with company’s 
statutes and the shareholders’ agreement allowed the government to veto directors’ 
appointments and managerial decisions deemed unfavourable. Here it is pertinent to 
emphasise that according to GALP’s statutes A-shares could be converted into B-
shares ‘upon a mere request’ by the A-shareholder and such conversion would have 
an immediate effect.
544
 To conclude it must be said that GSs’ enactment signifies 
that both GALP and EdP were, in the words of the LQP, seen as ‘exceptional cases’ 
and protection of these companies was enacted since ‘national interests so require’. 
8.3.B: Infringement Proceedings 
The Commission issued a formal letter on 18 October 2006 accusing Portugal 
for its overly restrictive GSs and requesting for justifications.
545
 Portugal replied two 
months later insisting on legality of GSs held in EdP and GALP on grounds of 
general economic and public interests that entail the security of energy supply 
(European Commission IP/08/1357, IP/09/278). On 29 June and 29 July 2007 the 
Commission issued two separate reasoned opinions for GALP and EdP respectively, 
setting a two month period for compliance. After the government’s reply of 30 
October 2007, the Commission deliberated on its further actions and finally decided 
to refer the matter to the CJEU on 18 September 2008 (EdP) and 19 February 2009 
(GALP). The Commission argued that GSs at issue represent state measures that are 
legally uncertain and disproportionate to the objectives pursued, deviate from 
normal operation of national company law and are liable to deter foreign 
investments restricting free movement of capital and establishment.
546
 
In its defence the government applied a strategy similar to that already tested 
in case C-171/08 on PT’s GSs, where it denied the infringement on all fronts. 
Firstly, it has challenged admissibility of the action, then the nature of the national 
measures as being of a purely private law origin. Secondly, Portugal claimed that its 
GSs do not constitute a restriction on the Treaty freedoms and finally if they do 
represent a restriction they are duly justified. Thirdly, in both cases Portugal claimed 
that the Commission had relied on new legal arguments, new grounds of complaints 
and made new claims which were unexposed at the pre-litigation stage. In its 
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defence, initially in EdP case and later in GALP, the government entirely denied the 
Commission’s allegations on illegality of the GSs by stating that neither their 
purpose nor effect aimed at establishment of any obstacles for investors to 
participate in share capital of energy companies. Portugal has argued that GSs in 
both companies do not place any conditions which would create any direct and 
substantial obstacles for domestic or foreign investors on either direct or portfolio 
investments. 
In both instances Portugal contested the concept of ‘restrictive measure’ and 
called the Court for its interpretation. Portugal also claimed that the Commission’s 
allegations on deterring effect of special rights are ‘purely hypothetical’, ‘very 
tenuous’ and ‘totally uncertain and indirect’, and since they are not supported by 
analysis of the effects of such rights on investors’ decisions to invest in relevant 
companies, the Commission had failed to discharge its obligation in relation to the 
burden of proof imposed on it by the Treaty.
547
 In this effect, the Portuguese 
government went on to stress that it is evident from the GALP’s shareholder 
structure that GSs do not have any negative effect on either direct or portfolio 
investments in company’s share capital.548 The government has also contended the 
Commission’s claims that GSs in both companies should be examined as restrictions 
on free movement of capital, insisting that special rights relate solely to managerial 
decisions and therefore could only affect shareholders that are capable of influencing 
management of the company so the free movement of capital is not infringed.
549
 
Above all, the Portuguese government stressed that even if the measures in question 
do constitute restrictions, they are justified by overriding reasons in the public 
interest and necessity to guarantee the country’s security of energy supply. In 
Portugal’s view, GSs in EdP were proportionate to the objectives pursued since the 
Commission had not put forward any possible alternatives of less restrictive nature 
‘which would allow the government to react swiftly and effectively in the event of a 
genuine and serious threat to the security of supply’.550 
The CJEU analysed the purpose of GSs provisions contained in both decree-
laws and in companies’ statutes, concluding that these measures are attributable to 
the state and are capable of restricting both free movement of capital and 
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establishment while affecting all investors.
551
 The Court established that GSs in EdP 
and GALP could not be justified since the security of the energy supply should be 
regulated by the government through administrative law and not through GSs.
552
 
The Court held that, in any event, GSs in two energy companies could not pass the 
proportionality test, as they are ‘formulated in general and imprecise manner’ and 
are not subject to ‘any specific and objective condition or circumstance’.553 The 
CJEU delivered its condemning judgment on 11 November 2010 in EdP case C-
543/08 and a year later on 10 November 2011 in GALP case C-212/09, obliging 
Portugal to comply. At the outset, the government addressed its obligations 
stemming from the ruling on case C-543/08 in a similar manner it has pursued its 
compliance obligations stemming from the judgment on PT case C-171/08: the 
government confirmed that it will comply (Wall Street Journal 11/11/2010). 
8.3.C: Assessing Potential Compliance 
As a preliminary point it should be emphasised that it is evident that there are 
significant similarities between GSs held in PT, EdP and GALP as they all have 
been created pursuant to the enabling provision of Article 15(3) LQP. Similarly as in 
PT, special rights in energy companies were granted via decree-laws and through 
companies’ statutes adopted at the time when the Portuguese state was still a 
majority shareholder. The government’s behaviour during infringement procedures 
on EdP and GALP cases also resembles the one used in PT case. In neither case did 
the Portuguese government express any inclination to comply at the pre-adjudication 
stage. This fact allows concluding that the government did not seek to avoid the 
referral to the CJEU – the finding that could also be supported by the fact that the 
government has replied with considerable delay to the two reasoned opinions in both 
EdP and GALP cases. Even so, the Portuguese government could still undertake 
some amendments to contested measures during the Commission’s lengthy 
deliberations on whether to refer the cases to the CJEU. Yet there was neither 
amendments nor expressed inclination to comply before the referrals. 
Portugal’s defensive strategy at the adjudication stage on both EdP and GALP 
cases also resembles the one applied in PT – the state completely disregarded claims 
on the measures’ illegality and disproportionality, arguing at cross points with the 
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Commission. At the adjudication stage, the Portuguese government eagerly 
defended its GSs. However, the futility of its defence strategy became evident 
following the hearing of 29 October 2009 on similar measures applied for PT and 
particularly following their condemnation by the European advocate on 2 December 
2009. It could be concluded that before the condemning judgment on PT’s GSs in 
case C-171/08, the government had little anticipation that similar GSs held in EdP 
and GALP could be justified, while following PT’s condemning judgment there 
could be even less anticipation that the CJEU would justify similar GSs 
implemented for two energy companies. Even though it was imminent that the 
measures held in EdP and GALP will be overruled in a similar manner as PT’s GSs, 
the government did not anticipate any steps towards compliance on its own initiative 
but instead merely awaited for predictably condemning judgments on the said cases. 
At this point it could be concluded that in both EdP case C-543/08 and GALP case 
C-212/09 the government evaded the possibility to comply pre-judgment, in spite of 
the fact that similar GSs have already been overruled. The above analysis leads to 
the conclusion that following the judgments on GSs held in two energy companies 
the Portuguese government would most likely avoid comprehensive compliance and 
resort to obstructionist non-compliance. 
Before resuming the assessment of factual compliance with EdP and GALP 
judgments it is necessary to overview the compliance obligations imposed on 
Portugal by the said rulings and the compliance measures which would be deemed 
adequate and in line with the sincere cooperation principle. The CJEU ruled that 
special rights enjoyed by the Portuguese government in EdP and GALP, such as 
those provided by the LQP, the company-specific decrees and companies’ statutes 
and allocated in connection with acções privilegiadas held by the state, are contrary 
to the Treaty. Following the judgments the government had to withdraw from 
ownership of any acções privilegiadas, relinquishing any special rights. An adequate 
compliance measure would entail the government to repeal relevant provisions of 
EdP/DL and GALP/DL which allowed for GSs implementation. Devoid of 
legislative basis approval regimes would cease while both companies’ statutes could 
then be amended by the shareholders and GSs provisions removed. Following the 
repeal of the foresaid provisions, the special appointment right reserved for the 
government via the GALP’s Agreement would lose its inherent power since the 
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implementation of strategic resolutions by the company’s board would not require 
approval by the Board’s Chairman. 
Ideally full compliance (which could be seen as being in line with the good 
faith principle), would entail the repeal of enabling provisions of the LQP, so that 
similar GSs could not be created in the future. This said, following the rulings, the 
Portuguese government was obliged solely to repeal special regimes by 
relinquishing special rights in the companies. Here it must be emphasised, however, 
that the CJEU’s judgments have not obliged the government to also remove 
provisions of the LQP, yet following three condemning rulings on almost 
tantamount GSs a substantial motive would seem to appear to once and for all repeal 
Article 13(2), Article 15(1) and (3). The three rulings seemed to send a clear 
message to the Portuguese government, revealing that any GSs created pursuant to 
the foresaid provisions of the LQP would be contrary to the Treaty and unlikely to 
be justified. At this stage it could be predicted that, similarly as was the case with 
German government’s compliance with judgment on Volkswagen case, the 
Portuguese government would not go beyond what is strictly necessary for 
facilitating compliance with EdP and GALP judgments and the LQP provisions 
would remain enact. Such compliance avoidance would signify the obstructionist 
nature of the Portuguese measures confirming the working hypothesis on 
obstructionist non-compliance with GS cases (H1). 
Compliance with the present judgments had to be initiated as soon as possible 
in order to be deemed as compliance in good faith. In the present cases there were 
several flexible paths that the government could have taken in order to promptly 
comply, such as urgently disposing of residual state ownership in the said 
companies, converting acções privilegiadas back into ordinary shares or 
implementing significant amendments to the companies’ decree-laws. However it is 
doubtful that the removal of GSs provisions from the company’s statutes while 
retaining the decree-laws intact would qualify as full compliance. What remains 
clear is that given the earlier condemning ruling on PT case C-171/08, the 
government could have promptly initiated some steps towards compliance with the 
judgments on EdP and GALP cases. Such tactics would have revealed the good 
natured inclination to comply. However, by the end of 2010 the time for adequate 
compliance with PT and EdP rulings was running out and penalty sanctions became 
an imminent threat. The following section reveals how two penalty proceedings for 
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non-compliance and international bail-out agreement have forced the Portuguese 
government to implement urgent measures aimed at facilitating simultaneous 
compliance with the three judgments on GSs held in PT, EdP and GALP. 
8.3.D: Obstructionist Non-compliance and Forced Compliance Deal 
As revealed in the previous sections, GSs in PT, EdP and GALP were all 
implemented pursuant to provisions of the LQP and vigorously defended by the 
government during the infringement proceedings by using similar defence strategies. 
The similarities do not end here but stretch to post-judgment behaviour, revealing 
compliance resistance with all the three GS judgments. At the time of the hearing on 
GALP case (held on 19 January 2011), there was no compliance neither with PT 
ruling on case C-171/08 issued on 8 July 2010 nor with EdP ruling on case C-
543/08 issued on 11 November 2010. Here it suffices to note that these rulings did 
not preclude Portugal from vigorous defence of GALP’s GSs: at the time of the 
hearing, it once again argued at cross points with the Commission even in spite of 
the two condemning judgments on the similar GSs. Moreover, regarding the 
judgment on PT case C-171/08 it should be accentuated that the two month 
compliance period set on 24 November 2010 by the reasoned opinion issued under 
Article 260 TFEU procedure was overdue shortly following the hearing on GALP 
case. 
Similar non-compliance situation established regarding EdP’s GSs when the 
Commission issued a reasoned opinion under Article 260 TFEU four months 
following the judgment (European Commission IP/11/288). The Portuguese 
government had to fully comply by 15 May 2011 in order to avoid second referral 
and associated fines. However there was no compliance with neither PT nor EdP 
judgments by the said date which sets both cases as examples of manifest and 
obstructionist non-compliance. In both cases the government could choose to 
comply after the set deadlines, yet such postponed compliance would not rule out 
the possibility of referrals for non-compliance. Even the imminence of penalty 
threats did not preclude the Portuguese government from procrastination long pass 
the set deadlines. Portugal’s vigorous defence of GSs in GALP and absence of 
compliance initiatives during adjudication stage also sets the scene for obstructionist 
non-compliance with the subsequent judgment. Undoubtedly, taken the legitimacy 
and obstructionist nature of the enabling provisions of the LQP, any new 
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amendments aimed at justifying GSs would have further stretched non-compliance. 
At this point it is necessary to lay the emphasis on the fact that from the above 
analysis it could be concluded that obstructionist non-compliance would most likely 
plague all three Portuguese cases, if it was not for the great necessity to request for 
financial assistance from the EU in order to salvage the country from deep economic 
and financial crisis. 
At the beginning of 2011 Portugal has been struggling through severe debt 
crisis (e.g. Financial Times 10/01/2011 and 28/02/2011; Magalhães 2012) Economic 
crisis has triggered a political crisis, when the Portuguese parliament failed to 
approve EU-backed austerity measures which led to the government’s resignation 
(Financial Times 24/03/2011; Magalhães 2012). The outgoing caretaker government 
had no other option but to request financial assistance from international rescue team 
on 7 April 2011, the so-called Troika (EU, ECB and IMF).
554
 The government and 
Troika agreed on 2011–2014 Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) by signing 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which detailed economic policy 
measures.
555
 The parties agreed to review Portugal’s performance on 
implementation of the said policies on a quarterly basis and supplement any 
additional measures in subsequent MoUs. The loan instalments were conditional 
upon Portugal’s compliance with MoU provisions, which anticipated privatisation of 
GALP and EdP and a complete elimination of GS provisions. Pursuant to MoU the 
government has undertaken to eliminate GSs by the end of July 2011 as well as any 
‘special rights established by law or in the statutes of publicly quoted companies that 
give special rights to the state’.556 Following such commitments under the EAP it 
seemed that there was no more leeway for procrastination and non-compliance with 
GS judgments. Without financial assistance under the EAP Portugal would have 
most likely defaulted on its debt, yet it is quite remarkable to see that compliance 
with the CJEU rulings on GSs became one of the conditions for financial aid – it 
says a lot about the Commission’s trust of Portuguese compliance initiatives. 
However the inclusion of the provision obliging Portugal to comply with GS 
judgments could also demonstrate that the Commission acknowledges that its own 
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enforcement powers might be not strong enough to guarantee due compliance with 
and respect to the CJEU’s jurisprudence. 
On 25 July 2011 the Decree-Law No.90/2011
557
 entered into force, repealing 
company-specific decree-laws that created GSs in PT, GALP and EdP. In its pre-
amble the government emphasised that elimination of GSs should be viewed in the 
context of MoU and concluded that notwithstanding the importance and justified 
application of GSs in PT, EdP and GALP in context of privatisation, these measures 
should now be repealed. Decree-Law No.90/2011 also repealed supplementary 
control mechanism of 2006 which was implemented following Sonaecom’s bid and 
which excluded state-held shareholdings from limitations permitted under Code of 
Commercial Companies. It is suffice to note that in spite of the condemning 
judgments and obligations under MoU the government chose to re-iterate the 
importance of role played by GSs during privatisation. This fact reveals that the 
government continued to perceive GSs as a useful mechanism, meaning that 
obstructionist non-compliance could persist in the context of future privatisations. 
Following implementation of Decree-Law No.90/2011, the government has 
met obligations under MoU by successfully eliminating decree-laws by the end of 
July 2011. However it has failed to entirely eliminate special rights, since relevant 
provisions were still incorporated into companies’ statutes. The corporate statutes 
were amended on 26 July (PT), 3 August (GALP) and 25 August (EdP) 2011. In the 
view of the adopted provisions and compliance initiatives the Commission has 
closed the infringement cases on PT and EdP GSs cases on 27 October 2011. At this 
point it should be stressed that the government failed to promptly repeal special 
rights by the end of July 2011 as agreed in the MoU, as the statutes of GALP and 
EdP were amended after the estimated compliance deadline which was on July 
2011. Additionally, the government continued to own a 1% stake in GALP through 
the state-held CGD, which granted it with special rights. In spite of such delayed 
compliance the Commission praised the Portuguese government for GSs removal.
558
 
Yet, as the following findings demonstrate, the Commission’s praise has been 
premature. 
                                                 
557
 Decree-Law No.90 (DoR I, Series-A, No.141). 
558
 European Commission (September 2011) The EAP for Portugal First review – Summer 2011, 
European Economy, Occasional Papers 83, Brussels, pp.115. 
251 
 
Under the updated MoU, the government undertook not to create obstacles to 
free movement of capital.
559
 The Portuguese government also committed to ensure 
that the government would avoid concluding shareholder agreements which could 
hinder free movement of capital or influence the management or control of 
companies and undertook to withdraw from the existing shareholder agreement in 
GALP by ensuring that CGD alienates the remaining 1% stake in the company by 
the end of 2011.
560
 On 13 September 2011 the government implemented the new 
LQP, as amended by Law No.50/2011,
561 
emphasising that by implementation of 
this measure Portugal goes beyond its initial commitments under MoU.
562
 The Law 
No.50/2011 repealed enabling provisions of Article 15(1) and (3) LQP, eliminating 
legislative basis for implementation of GSs and also eliminating possibility for 
imposition of voting right ceilings under Article 13(2).
563
 Following the amendment, 
pursuant to Article 13(2) LQP acquisition ceilings were permitted and could be 
applied in a proportionate manner solely in the context of future re-privatisations as 
determined in further privatisation laws and will not set or allow ownership or 
acquisition ceilings beyond the privatisation transactions.
564
 These compliance 
measures reveal significant compliance problems. 
Firstly, special rights in GALP implemented through a shareholding agreement 
were not fully eliminated since the government continued to indirectly own a 1% 
stake. Secondly, the amended Article 13(2) LQP allowed for imposition of 
ownership and acquisition ceilings for future re-privatisations. Subsequent 
privatisation of GALP and EdP would have been governed by these amended 
provisions of the LQP, so further ownership or acquisition ceilings could be 
imposed. The government’s commitment to dispose of the remaining 1% stake in 
GALP by the end of 2011 could also be seen as ‘good intention goes wrong’, since 
the transaction has been continuously re-iterated and subsequently delayed.
565
 In the 
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meantime, on 10 November 2011 the CJEU has issued its ruling on GALP case. In 
spite of the condemning ruling, in spite the obligations under MoUs and numerous 
commitments not to implement obstacles to free movement of capital and to 
relinquish special rights in GALP, the government engaged in further 
procrastinations, resisting relinquishing its special rights and further delaying 
compliance.
566
 It is sufficient to conclude that it is evident that the government’s 
good faith commitment under MoUs goes in sharp contrast with its actual 
compliance conduct. 
On 24 May 2012, more than six months following the judgment on GALP GS 
case, there was no compliance and the Commission formally asked Portugal for 
explanations.
567
 Apart from Portugal’s resistance to relinquish remaining GSs the 
Commission had another significant concern – new DL No.112/2012568 
implemented pursuant to the amended LQP of 2011. The DL No.112/2012 has 
created acquisition ceilings limiting anyone but the state and state-controlled 
companies from acquiring more than 25% of share capital in the energy transmission 
system operator or of any companies controlling it.
569
 Contrary to Portugal’s 
numerous commitments not to implement obstacles to free movement of capital, the 
ownership ceiling of DL No.112/2012 clearly represented such an obstacle. In this 
light Portugal’s conduct on compliance with the obligations stemming from the 
numerous MoUs and the CJEU’s judgments is seen as action in exceptionally bad 
faith. 
Likewise, in spite of the condemning judgments and commitments under 
Economic Adjustment Programme in the recent MoU of April 2014
570
 the following 
provision remains: ‘the [Portuguese] authorities also commit to ensuring that 
obstacles to free movement of capital will not be created by their action [and] 
acknowledge that the discretion granted under the amended article 13(2) LQP if 
used, shall be restricted solely to the concrete privatisation operation and thus used 
in such a proportionate manner that privatisation’s implementing laws will not set or 
                                                                                                                                         
The EAP for Portugal Fifth review – Summer 2012’, European Economy, Occasional Papers 117, 
Brussels, pp.106, p.31. 
566
 See European Commission, Third Review, op. cit., para.74, p.39 and §7.9-§7.10 MoU 
(15/03/2012) p.112; European Commission Fifth review, op. cit., p.31. 
567
 European Commission Fourth review, op. cit., para.88, p.40. 
568
 Decree-Law No.112 of 23/05/2012 (DoR I, Series-A, No.100). 
569
 European Commission Fourth review, op. cit., para.88. 
570
 European Commission (April 2014) ‘The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal Eleventh 
review’, European Economy, Occasional Papers, 191, Brussels, 140pp, p.103. 
253 
 
allow holding or acquisition caps beyond the privatisation transaction.’ The state of 
the facts reveal that despite the international bail-out, a number of condemning 
judgments and penalties procedures which proceeded to advance stages, Portugal 
foresees implementation of GSs (acquisition ceilings limiting the rights of any entity 
to acquire shares above certain threshold) for future privatisations by means of 
provisions of law on privatisation which were implemented in 1990. This fact 
reveals that the government anticipates using GSs in the future despite all odds. 
Subsequently the Commission opened a new infringement procedure on an 
acquisition caps in 2014 (ongoing as of 22 April 2015). 
On 27 November 2012 the government has sold the remaining 1% stake held 
through the state-owned CGD in GALP, finally eliminating the special rights and 
complying with the GALP judgment after one year of procrastination.
571
 The 
Commission has closed the infringement proceeding concerning non-compliance 
with judgment on GALP GSs on 24 January 2013. In respect to the latest case on 
GSs held in GALP it should also be recalled that in spite of the extreme pressures 
imposed on Portugal by the commitment under the EAP of 2011-2014, the deadlines 
set in MoU have not been observed. The above analysis of the compliance chain of 
events allows the conclusion that when addressing the compliance obligations 
stemming from the GS judgments on GALP, EdP and PT as well as from the sincere 
cooperation obligation enclosed in the Treaty, coupled with obligations under the 
EAP the Portuguese government has resorted to obstructionist non-compliance, 
disregarding its obligations to comply and remove GSs.  
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Concluding Analysis and Remarks on Portuguese Golden Share Cases 
This chapter has revealed that Portugal has been in consistent defiance of EU 
law when the matters concerned GS protection enacted for national champions, 
important for the country’s economy. Unwelcome acquirers buying into national 
businesses were seen as invaders: the government has been especially militant in 
BSCH/Champalimaud case
572
 imposing the veto on the said acquisition within 24 
hours following the deal. Companies such as Holderbank/Secil have also failed to 
breach the government’s resistance to remove GSs in CIMPOR and the bidders’ 
determination for the deal with their two revised applications could not match 
Portugal’s persistence to retain GSs in its ‘strategic’ cement company. Here it 
suffice to note that Portugal’s national champions such as CIMPOR, PT or EdP, so 
vital for the state’s economy, are in fact ‘small fry’ when compared with big 
international companies, and the government’s protection over these important 
enterprises could be justified to some extent (Financial Times 25/10/2000). GS 
protection could particularly be justified for companies providing services of general 
public interest, yet when reflecting on the matter of protectionism prior to the 
judgment on case C-367/98 the government emphasised on economic importance of 
such companies and this objective could not be justified by application of GS 
measures. The Portuguese government’s commitment to liberalisation, re-
privatisation and its support for the EU integration matched its desire to resist 
compliance and retain GSs, which led to obstructionist non-compliance with the 
Treaty provisions and the CJEU’s judgments. 
The LQP of 1990 was one of the earliest GS laws, yet it became the basis for 
some of the most recent judgments. This reveals obstructionist character of this GS 
law, which stems from its structure allowing for possible justifications which could 
have been implemented via decree-laws and companies’ statutes. This intricate web 
of protectionist provisions evolved into obstructionist GS system. All of the 
justifications attempted by the Portuguese government failed to remedy the breach 
of the Treaty, triggering further infringement procedures and further stretching non-
compliance. In spite of the numerous commitments the Portuguese cases reveal 
significant resistance of the national authorities to repeal GSs and the government 
actively used these protectionist measures to the fullest extent. 
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In case C-367/98 the government on several occasions politically undertook 
not to employ GSs to EU investors. These commitments appear ill-fated in light of 
the unsuccessful compliance attempt of 1996 and subsequent application of GSs that 
effectively thwarted two cross-border transactions at the time when the case on 
relevant provisions of the LQP was already pending before the CJEU. The 
government also defended its veto resisting complying with binding decisions of the 
Commission on BSCH/Champalimaud and Holderbank/Secil/CIMPOR cases. 
Portugal has successfully maintained protectionist GS provisions of DL 
No.380/1993 and DL No.24/1994 for two decades. Fourteen months after the 
judgment the overruled GSs remained intact, which confirms that the infringement 
proceedings under Article 258 TFEU has been unsuccessful. Initial compliance 
measures failed to guarantee full compliance. Compliance has been achieved only 
when the infringement procedure under Article 260 TFEU has progressed to 
advanced stages. This post-judgment conduct confirms both hypotheses on the 
effectiveness of enforcement system (H1 and H2), as well as the supporting 
hypothesis on effectiveness of minimalist compliance (H1a). One of the main 
reasons for ultimately reaching compliance in this case could be the fact that other 
GSs were readily available to serve the government’s protectionist aims. Since both 
the infringement proceedings and the condemning judgment failed to persuade the 
Portuguese government on the necessary policy reform on GSs, the hypothesis on 
effectiveness of the agenda-setting case-law (H3) is confirmed. 
Three of the latest cases C-171/08, C-543/08 and C-212/09 on GSs in PT, EdP 
and GALP respectively, have revealed significant resistance to compliance. The 
Portuguese government has blatantly disregarded of the obligations stemming from 
the Treaty, the judgments and the international bail-out agreement. In these cases 
special rights were also effectively used to veto cross-border transactions in spite of 
the government’s claims before the CJEU that veto has never been used. Imposing a 
veto mere days before the condemning judgment and subsequent statements of the 
government’s officials defending this move represents conduct explicitly contrary to 
the sincere cooperation obligation. Such disrespect for the EU’s law stands out as 
one of the gravest cases of obstructionist non-compliance. In all the three cases non-
compliance with the judgments is seen as action in bad faith, taken the government’s 
disregard of penalty procedures – particularly in light of the numerous commitments 
to comply. As a result in both cases C-543/08 and C-212/09 the Portuguese 
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government could be seen as resorting to obstructionist non-compliance in bad faith, 
so the working enforcement effectiveness/obstructionist hypotheses (H1, H2 and 
H3) of this study are confirmed for these cases. 
Portugal has been rescued by financial assistance from the EU yet it did not 
preclude the national government from continuous obstructionist and non-
compliance with EU law. Here it should be emphasised that the fact that Portugal 
has been forced by the EAP to remove its GSs should not be understated, since all of 
the compliance initiatives came as a result of extreme economic, financial and 
political pressures. It should also be emphasised that the Commission had 
demonstrated great loyalty to this MS in distress by not pushing the two non-
compliance infringement proceedings on GS judgments on EdP and PT cases to the 
adjudication stage. In this light, Portugal’s overall compliance performance is not 
short of being one of the most extreme cases of bad faith behaviour. In this context 
the Commission appears to be ‘the good’, Portugal ‘the bad’ and its forced 
compliance deal – ‘the ugly’. Portuguese conduct in compliance with the CJEU’s 
judgments on GS cases supports the hypothesis on obstructionist non-compliance, 
revealing that GSs could be of extremely obstructionist character and a MS could 
willingly act in bad faith towards its obligations. 
To conclude, it is necessary to emphasise that following the national economic 
struggle to overcome financial crisis, which to some extent has been caused by the 
Portuguese government’s unwillingness to play by the free market rules, the state 
has been forced to embark on extensive disposal of the remaining stakes in ‘national 
champions’. Shareholdings in PT, GALP and EdP – companies which earlier were 
perceived as strategic and vital for the national economy – were sold off to the third-
country buyers and companies became targets to foreign takeover bids.
573
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PART III. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Outline 
The MSs have voluntarily and democratically committed themselves to 
comply with EU law while also voluntarily agreeing to delegate adjudicatory powers 
to the CJEU. The very essence of the Union rests on the MSs’ sincere willingness to 
respect the supremacy of the EU acquis, to cooperate and to comply in good faith 
with EU law. In accordance with the sincere co-operation principle, every MS must 
be ready and willing to accept the obligations and requirements deriving from EU 
membership, which include the obligation to comply with judgments of the CJEU. 
Non-compliance with condemning judgments could be seen as crossing the red line. 
This study has assessed the latter kind of compliance obligations, emphasising that 
non-compliance with judgments on GS cases could be particularly significant, as the 
protectionist aims of these barriers could be effectively achieved by other legitimate 
means readily available under the provisions of the EU Takeover Directive. The aim 
of this study was not to delineate or give reasons for non-compliance with CJEU 
judgments on GSs, but to assess factual compliance with the whole body of the said 
jurisprudence. Here, it is pertinent to emphasise that even though non-compliance 
with the condemning judgments of the highest legal authority of the EU could be 
seen as grave misconduct on the part of MSs, in cases where the Court oversteps the 
boundaries of its competence, such national resistance to accept the judicial 
interpretation of the Treaty provisions could be justified to some extent. 
The GS-related case-law constitutes only a small fraction of all the 
infringement cases brought to the Court under general infringement proceedings. At 
the same time, GS jurisprudence has played a major role in the development of the 
fundamental freedom of capital movement. These cases have raised a number of 
important and politically sensitive questions: it is true to say that through these 
judgments the CJEU can be seen to be promoting a competition-centred and 
shareholder-oriented philosophy of the single market, and promoting the 
establishment of a level playing field in the market for corporate control. All these 
legislative developments may be seen as a threat to the diversity of national 
economic regimes and to the diversity of national industrial relations, which in turn 
could result in non-compliance post-judgment. Despite the importance of the GS-
related case-law for the development of EU law, the Court’s adjudicative success 
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has never been tested through an analysis of the effectiveness of post-adjudicative 
compliance. 
Non-compliance with GSs cases brings the matter of non-compliance with the 
core single market laws on free movement of capital and establishment to new 
heights, which up until now has been barely assessed in a systematic and coherent 
way. The core objective of the present work was a fact-finding mission aimed at 
closing the identified gap by systemically analysing post-adjudicative compliance 
with GS judgments. This study has striven to assess the effectiveness of the EU 
enforcement system in general, and the effectiveness of the EU judicial system in 
particular, when applied to GSs. The argument is that in some cases the MSs do 
everything they can in order to defend GSs and to shield companies from cross-
border takeovers. 
Part II of this study has evaluated the post-judgment compliance initiatives and 
their legislative outcomes in order to reveal under which conditions CJEU 
judgments and penalty procedures are likely to be effective. By engaging in careful 
process-tracing, this study has shown that the instruments of the EU enforcement 
system are only sometimes effective in facilitating due compliance, and that in the 
majority of cases GS jurisprudence does not produce a considerable policy shift in 
national attitudes towards GSs, leaving the MS disrespecting the rule of law of the 
EU. This study has revealed generally that effective compliance with GS judgments 
can be envisaged only when MSs are exposed to the threat of coming before the 
CJEU for the second time under the penalty procedure. Non-compliance with the 
provisions on free movement of capital and the subsequent judgments of the CJEU 
aimed at enforcement of these freedoms could be a matter of protectionist priorities 
deriving from national, political and economic choice. This study showed that 
governments could be keen to continue limiting free capital movements even 
following the condemning judgments of the CJEU – and such non-compliance could 





This study analysed in total eighteen judgments which related to GSs and were 
delivered between 2000 and 2013. The analysed judgments comprised of fifteen 
judgments which have established that GSs are incompatible with the Treaty 
including: Commission v Italy (C-58/99, C-174/04, C-326/07), Federconsumatori, 
Commission v Spain (C-463/00, C-274/06, C-207/07), Commission v United 
Kingdom (C-98/01), Commission v France (C-483/99), Commission v Netherlands 
(joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04), Commission v Germany (C-112/05), 
Commission v Portugal (C-367/98, C-171/08, C-543/08, C-212/09); one judgment 
which condemned the application of GSs in Commission v Spain (C-196/07); one 
judgment which justified GSs in Commission v Belgium (C-503/99) and one that 
assessed Germany’s compliance with Volkswagen judgment – Commission v 
Germany (C-95/12). Further sanction threats under Article 260 TFEU were applied 
in twelve cases out of total fifteen judgments, namely in three Italian (C-58/99, C-
174/04, C-326/07), four Portuguese (C-367/98, C-171/06, C-543/08, C-212/09), the 
UK, German, and three Spanish cases (C-463/00, C-207/07, C-196/07). This large 
number of penalty procedures signifies that the MSs failed to comply with GSs 
rulings following the first round procedure of Article 258 TFEU. Only in three cases 
(Netherlands, France and the UK – despite communicational issues which led to 
second round procedure) out of fifteen GS-related judgments under Article 258 
TFEU did the procedure culminate in clear-cut compliance. In other instances the 
MSs engaged in at least some sort of non-compliance behaviour, resisting full 
compliance with the Court’s judgments. These findings confirm that a GS judgment 
by itself is barely enough to ensure effective policy adjustments at national level and 
effective compliance. In majority of the cases the MSs have not complied in a timely 
and comprehensive manner and non-compliance persisted for several years. The 










Table 2: Summative Findings 
 
List of 18 judgments of the CJEU 
on cases that related to GSs 
Article 
260 
TFEU   
Hypotheses 
  
    H1 H1a H2 H3 
C-58/99 Commission v Italy yes yes yes yes yes 
C-174/04 Commission v Italy yes yes yes yes yes 
C-326/07 Commission v Italy yes yes yes yes yes 
Federconsumatori (1) n/a n/a n/a n/a yes 
C-463/00 Commission v Spain  yes yes yes yes yes 
C-274/06 Commission v Spain  no yes yes n/a yes 
C-207/07 Commission v Spain yes yes yes yes yes 
C-196/07 Commission v Spain (2) yes (2)  yes yes no yes 
C-98/01 Commission v UK yes no n/a n/a no 
C-483/99 Commission v France  no no n/a n/a no 
C-503/99 Commission v Belgium (3) n/a no no n/a no 






C-112/05 Commission v Germany 
yes (C-
95/12) yes (5) no (5) no (5) yes 
C-95/12 Commission v Germany (4) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
C-367/98 Commission v Portugal  yes yes n/a yes yes 
C-171/08 Commission v Portugal  yes yes n/a yes yes 
C-543/08 Commission v Portugal  yes yes n/a yes yes 
C-212/09 Commission v Portugal  yes yes n/a yes yes 
in total of 15 judgments the Court 
found that GSs are incompatible 
with the Treaty           
Cases with hypotheses approved  12 12 7 9 13 
(1) Preliminary judgment where GSs were not justified 
   (2) Judgment challenging use of GSs 
     (3) GSs justified 
     (4) Judgment challenging compliance with C-112/05 




As predicted by the supporting hypothesis on minimalist compliance (H1a) if 
the governments complied ‘by amendment’ the compliance strategy resulted in 
inadequate or incomplete compliance and GSs retained their protectionist powers 
post-judgment. Such minimalist compliance strategy subsequently triggered second 
round infringement proceedings under Articles 260 TFEU. As predicted by the 
hypothesis on the effectiveness of second round enforcement action (H2), in the 
majority of cases the MSs have complied only at the later stage of the procedure, 
when the liability for non-compliance and the imposition of deterrent penalties 
became imminent or foreseeable. This finding reveals that GS-related judgments do 
not bring the necessary change and MSs only consider removing GSs when they 
face imminent penalty threats under Article 260 TFEU. 
Finally, the study shows that MSs have repeatedly failed to embark on the 
wider policy change, consequently supporting the hypothesis on the effectiveness of 
the agenda-setting case-law (H3). 
Some factors proved to have a decisive impact on compliance while others 
proved to be of doubtful or non-measurable impact. For example, this study 
anticipated that cooperation during the enforcement would point towards the MSs’ 
inclination to duly comply post-judgment. In some cases, despite the due 
cooperation prior to the condemning judgment, MSs have failed to comply once the 
judgment has been issued. In a similar vein, some MSs (which have a better overall 
compliance record) failed to promptly comply, while others, with less positive 
compliance records, complied in good faith. In this light the MSs’ political and 
economic power, its legal traditions or historic prerequisites to state-driven 
dirigisme and presence of the powerful CEMs did not explain why in some cases the 
governments had effectively complied, while in others resisted. This study 
anticipated that in some cases the longer the MS maintained GSs the better they 
would comply, such was the case in the UK and France. However in other cases the 
longest-standing GSs revealed significant obstructionism (as in Portugal and 
Germany). This study has revealed that non-compliance is more likely to occur in 
certain MSs, such as Spain, Italy and Portugal. General studies on compliance 
assume that neither Portugal nor Spain persist in non-compliance. Contrarily, this 
study revealed that when it comes to GSs both Spain and Portugal significantly 
resisted compliance. The conclusive analysis of the findings is summarised in the 
following section.  
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3. Conclusive Analysis 
This study has argued that because GS judgments can be seen as an attack on 
the national systems of corporate governance and national sovereignty, MSs could 
attempt to undo or limit the expansionist effects of the CJEU case-law by resorting 
to non-compliance post-judgment, which could be seen as a form of sanctioning. 
This study has demonstrated that CJEU jurisprudence on GSs is an area where non-
compliance is a significant problem since the position of MSs is indefensible. The 
following paragraphs summarise the arguments on why the MSs’ position is 
indefensible and why non-compliance with GS jurisprudence can be seen as 
crossing the red line. 
Before turning to an analysis of compliance with GS judgments (developed in 
Part II), this study first reflected on the competing interests and values at both 
national and Union levels which could potentially explain non-compliance with GS 
judgments (Section 2). This study has revealed that non-compliance with GS 
jurisprudence could emerge from the clash of national interests (protection of the 
public good, policy and security) and the aims of the Union (promotion and 
development of market liberalisation). Put simply, the clash could be seen as one 
between national interests and the incursion of the single market into the sensitive 
area of strategic industries. From the outset, this study has acknowledged that due to 
the significant differences existing at national levels and due to the diverse interests 
and values which the MSs are obliged to protect, the Treaty provides for exceptions, 
allowing MSs not to comply with fundamental freedoms in order to protect 
legitimate interests. It could be argued that MSs should have significant powers to 
regulate sectors which are of fundamental importance for the public in order to 
safeguard them against unpredictable market forces. In this sense, GSs represent not 
only barriers to capital movements but also a state guarantee aiming to safeguard 
strategic companies that provide services of general interest. However, any such 
safeguarding imperative must adhere to the Treaty principles – hence the clash of 
interests and imperatives which could potentially result in non-compliance. 
Subsequently, as the nature of GSs was being revealed in Section 3, it became 
evident that the perceived clash of the EU and national interests was not so 
significant as to cause severe non-compliance post-judgment due to the two 
mitigating factors. First, it has been revealed that the governments themselves are 
free to decide on the level to which their national companies operating in strategic 
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industries are exposed to liberalisation, foreign competition, and a level playing 
field. This study has emphasised that MSs have freely decided to withdraw from 
ownership of strategically important companies through privatisation and voluntarily 
choose not to retain a blocking minority stake which could effectively and 
legitimately protect any strategic national interest, such as security of supply and 
public policy. Following this logic, this study considers that since MSs voluntarily 
pursue economic policies which bring ‘more market’ into their sensitive industries, 
there should not be significant resistance to comply once their initial imperative for 
‘more market’ is subsequently confirmed by the CJEU. 
The second factor which could preclude non-compliance with GS judgments 
by mitigating the clash of the EU and national interests is the fact that MSs could 
pursue the same protectionist aims by regaining or re-nationalising the blocking 
minority stake in strategic companies. By re-nationalising of the blocking minority 
stake, which under the EU Takeover Directive could allow for the same level of 
influence as GS measures, MSs could both retain the sought-after control of 
sensitive and strategic industries and respect the rulings of the highest legal authority 
of the EU. However, despite the availability of such a legitimate option for the 
protection of national interests and values, MSs first choose not to comply with the 
fundamental freedoms of the Treaty and then, after the GSs have been proven to be 
illegitimate by the CJEU, choose to resort to non-compliance post-judgment by 
turning to the compliance ‘by amendment’ strategy. Such a strategy has proven to be 
ineffective, with little potential for success, since the level of protection that the MSs 
have striven to retain following the GS judgment equals the level of the blocking 
minority shareholder. The following paragraphs summarise why the compliance ‘by 
amendment’ strategy could be seen to be unacceptable for compliance with GS 
judgments. 
It is very difficult to pass the legal certainty and proportionality test. If it were 
otherwise, the MSs would have long amended their GSs without needing to enter 
legislative battle with the EU Commission. There could be two outcomes of the 
compliance ‘by amendment’ strategy: one that is effective in facilitating compliance, 
and another that is insufficient. Following the amendment, the GSs would either (a) 
provide for significantly less protection as proportionality and legal certainty 
increase, or (b) they would retain the same amount of protectionist powers while 
significantly improving legal certainty. The former compliance ‘by amendment’ 
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strategy could be potentially acceptable for effective post-judgment compliance. 
However, such a strategy is undesirable for the MSs, as they seek to retain effective 
protection equal to the level of the blocking minority shareholder. Hence, any 
protection that is less powerful would generally fail to guarantee the stated aims of 
public policy protection. The latter compliance ‘by amendment’ strategy is 
unacceptable in guaranteeing effective compliance with the judgment. However, this 
strategy is desirable for the MSs, as they seek to win the race against time by 
retaining powerful GSs to block undesirable FDIs, while at the same time attempting 
to pacify the Commission by increasing legal certainty. Consequently, as this study 
has demonstrated, any post-judgment amendment of illegitimate GSs would show 
the MSs to be striving to preserve the powers of a minority shareholder, which 
results in ineffective compliance and unnecessary procrastination. 
Given the voluntary nature of the national political undertaking to bring ‘more 
market’ into national strategic companies via privatisation, and given the availability 
of alternative means to protect the stated public policy interests via the re-
nationalisation of majority stakes, this study concludes that non-compliance with the 
condemning judgments on GSs could be seen as crossing the red line and gravely 
disregarding the limits of discretion provided for in the Treaty. 
Evidence shows that when it comes to compliance with GSs judgments, MSs 
are often resorting to procrastination, minimalist compliance strategies or inaction. 
This study has demonstrated that if a MS is determined to delay compliance, it could 
play with the enforcement system by stretching the infringement procedure. It has 
been shown that replies to official correspondence are often delayed or are issued at 
the very end of the set deadline. In cases when the national government is strongly 
opposed to the Courts’ judgment, it could find the way to circumvent the full force 
of EU law. This particularly applies to situations when the state is strongly opposed 
to particular cross-border deals. Despite the fact that the Commission actively 
challenged protectionist measures, GSs are seen as a success in MSs’ battle against 
unwelcome M&As, such as CIMPOR in Portugal, Endesa in Spain, Telecom Italia 
in Italy and Volkswagen in Germany. Often the erring MSs were proved to be very 
keen on using GSs when the matters concerned strategic companies and possible 
takeover threats. Political undertakings to not employ GSs can’t be accepted in this 




Such a situation on post-judgment compliance renders enforcement system of 
Articles 258/260 TFEU a weak compliance mechanism when the matter concerns 
GSs. These findings indicate that non-compliance is widespread when it comes to 
GS cases, with half of the MSs featured in this study resorting to non-compliance (of 
some sort at least). What this study has clearly demonstrated is that the enforcement 
system is efficient in facilitating comprehensive compliance only in those cases 
when the judgment resonated well with the on-going national policies on GS 
removal (like the UK, France and the Netherlands). Only in cases when the MSs 
considerably rolled back the state participation in economy and have extensively 
employed the ‘state-withdrawal’ ideology, only then the EU institution’s policy-
setting fitted well into national interest. This study has also demonstrated that MSs 
would also comply when the GSs’ objectives have been already achieved, so there is 
no need for GSs anymore. In this light the Commission’s assessment of compliance 
with GSs is not as triumphal as perceived. 
This study has confirmed that the Commission’s law enforcement mission 
faces a number of drawbacks when it comes to effective compliance with GS 
judgments. First, the enforcement system of Articles 258 TFEU could be seen as too 
cumbersome and lengthy when applied in the case of GSs – when it comes to such a 
time-sensitive issue as a cross-border M&A. Resistance of MSs to comply with 
CJEU judgments on GSs poses an immediate threat to the freedom of capital 
movement. Not only does it inhibit shareholder’s rights but it also threatens the 
integrity of the single market – the core aim of the EU. Non-compliance with GS 
judgements reveals that MSs could fail in their basic duty to uphold the rule of law 
when it comes to the implementation of the CJEU’s judicial policy-making in the 
sensitive area of strategic industries. It reveals that national interests could outweigh 
the interests of the Union, and fundamental freedoms could be overshadowed by the 
necessity to protect other values and interests. Such resistance to comply could be 
seen as action in bad faith towards loyalty to the EU principle. These findings reveal 
a serious compliance deficit which undermines the core idea of the EU – the 
building of a union without barriers. The following section will comment on the 





4. Concluding thoughts and future directions 
Non-compliance with judgments on GSs is one of the central issues which 
have been on the Commission’s agenda for fourteen years. As early as in 2005 the 
Commission confirmed that MSs ‘cooperated successfully’, achieving ‘a good level 
of understanding’ on the GSs issue.574 Following the 2002 judgments, many 
commentators suggested that most of the GSs are now going to be turned down. 
However this study demonstrated that the battle over GSs is far from being over and 
it could be envisaged that both the Commission and the Court will encounter many 
more such cases in the future. The CJEU’s GSs rulings may have forced some 
governments to reconsider GSs mechanisms in the areas of lesser strategic 
importance, but that does not mean that these national measures would disappear 
altogether. The newer MSs have brought with them another array of GSs stemming 
from legacy of widespread privatisations. Many of these GSs are there to remain and 
they are yet to be challenged. Privatisation is still continuing, as previously closed 
sectors such as postal services are being opened to competition. Consequently, 
unjustified GSs represent a serious hindrance to free movement of capital and a 
genuine free market is not a reality since some GSs are maintained and applied. 
Non-compliance with GS judgments furthers differentiation within the Union, 
and too much differentiation could prove to be disastrous for the whole EU project 
that aims for more unity. Non-compliance with GS judgments is what market 
participants see, and this could further undermine the credibility of the MSs’ 
commitments under the Treaty and the credibility of the single market as a whole. 
By resisting to remove GSs following condemning judgment, the MS in question 
could be seen as to be not striving to protect legitimate interests, but simply to be 
defying the single market project. If the protection of social policy was the true 
reason to implement GSs, why would the MS withdraw from minority stake 
ownership in the first place and why would it subsequently refrain from regaining 
control by acquiring a 25% blocking minority stake, for instance? In this light, non-
compliance could be a dangerous path to take – if MSs themselves question the 
desirability of the single market, how could companies and citizens believe in it? 
Non-compliance with GS judgments is ever more revealing at the time of the 
recent financial and sovereign debt crisis. The MSs’ desire to protect public policy 
interests by means of GSs and subsequent non-compliance post-judgment (dressed 
                                                 
574
 European Commission, SWD (2005), supra note 25. 
267 
 
up as a means to uphold protection of public interests and values) appears to be little 
more than an alibi. When the crisis struck, GSs showed themselves as a true double-
edged sword, since with control also comes liability. It could be argued that when a 
company is protected by GSs and when such a company is in financial difficulties, 
rescue in the form of a potential M&A deal would not be an option, as potential 
investors would be significantly discouraged, knowing that the government’s GS 
would prevent them from taking full control of the company in question. The 
Portuguese government has been eager to sell EdP, Cimpor and Portugal Telecom, 
which, following the crisis, have been heading for decline. In this light, it seems that 
all the non-compliance with GS rulings has not been the result of the MSs’ sincere 
willingness to protect public interests, but pure national protectionism rooted in 
deliberate political choice which, as Rickford (2010: 54) puts it, could be seen as an 
‘assertion of selfish interests in defiance of market forces’ which aims to ‘insulate 
national markets from foreign competition, mainly in markets for capital and 
corporate control (often dressed up as social policy)’. 
Several solutions are given below which could diminish the negative impact of 
GSs on FDI following a condemning judgment. Firstly, one of the obvious solutions 
to preclude and limit GSs’ negative impact on the free market is to monitor 
compliance process more closely, scrutinising national compliance initiatives at the 
early stages of their drafting. Additionally, the infringement proceedings could be 
streamlined solely for GS jurisprudence, which would encourage MSs to comply 
faster. MSs must also be constantly reminded of their duty to cooperate in good faith 
under Article 4(3) TEU. Secondly, in cases when GSs directly impede cross-border 
deals the Commission could introduce special automatic injunctions which would 
allow for the precluded FDI deals to go through despite the existing GSs barriers. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, another possible solution to promote compliance 
with GS judgments is to promote the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism of 
Article 260 TFEU by imposing automatic penalties for this body of case-law. For 
this purpose, the instance of Portugal’s compliance with GS rulings, which came as 
a result of a bail-out deal, could be particularly revealing. It clearly demonstrates 
that in the case of significant distress and utmost necessity, all the allegedly 
justifiable defences for non-compliance with CJEU judgments (such as the 
obligation to protect social values and public policy interests) could be set aside and 
compliance would be achieved swiftly with no unnecessary delays. In addition, 
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given that the compliance ‘by amendment’ strategy is unlikely to facilitate effective 
compliance with GS judgments (otherwise the breach would be remedied before the 
judgment) and that the stated public policy objectives could be legally facilitated by 
regaining the 25% minority shareholding, penalties under Article 260 TFEU could 
be automatically applied following the GS judgment. Such a radical suggestion for 
automatic penalties stems from the findings of this study, which reveal that non-
compliance with GS rulings is a policy choice that could be seen as crossing the red 
line. 
In the conclusion it must be emphasised that at the time of the writing some of 
the most obstructionist GSs continued to shine. A large number of significant 
corporate M&As in the EU could not materialise due to various GS arrangements 
being in force – E.ON/Endesa, Porsche/Volkswagen among them. The fact that these 
transactions have failed for non-economic reasons and against the will of 
shareholders clearly goes against the very spirit of the single market. The decisive 
point is that European Union depends upon sincere cooperation and compliance of 
MSs with judgments of the CJEU, but in today’s times of increased nationalism and 
economic instability, questions of national loyalty to the EU are being voiced from 
different sides. The cases analysed during this study might represent just a tip of an 
iceberg. The overall conclusion is that given the continuous existence of GSs, the 
fact that these measures are still on the CJEU’s agenda575 and in light of current 
‘protectionist climate’, it is too early to say goodbye to GSs and this is still not the 
‘end of an era’ (Bropthy 15/07/3003) nor the end of a ‘golden age’ (Bropthy 
19/06/2003; Camara 2002).  
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Provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) 
 
THE INTERNAL MARKET 
Article 26 
1. The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaties. 
2. The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties. 
 
RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT 
Article 49 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on 
the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member 
State established in the territory of any Member State. 
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in 
particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 
48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country 




Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and 
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business 
within the Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way 
as natural persons who are nationals of Member States. 
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“Companies or firms” means companies or firms constituted under civil or 
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed 
by public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making. 
 
Article 55 
Member States shall accord nationals of the other Member States the same 
treatment as their own nationals as regards participation in the capital of companies 
or firms within the meaning of Article 54, without prejudice to the application of the 
other provisions of the Treaties. 
 
CAPITAL AND PAYMENTS 
Article 63 
1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this chapter, all 
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. 
2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this chapter, all 
restrictions on payments between Member States and between Member States and 
third countries shall be prohibited. 
 
Article 65 
1. The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to the right of 
Member States: 
(a) to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between 
taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or 
with regard to the place where their capital is invested; 
(b) to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national 
provisions laid down by law or regulation, in particular in the field of taxation and 
the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the 
declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical 
information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or 
public security. 
 




1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the 
following rules: 
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; 
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not 
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding 





Provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) – as amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon in its EU Offical Journal version dated 17 December 2007 
 
Article 4 TEU 
1. In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in 
the Treaties remain with the MSs. 
2. The Union shall respect the equality of MSs before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their 
essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each MS. 
3. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the MSs 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the Treaties. 
The MSs shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of 
the institutions of the Union. The MSs shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment 




Provisions of national legislation 
Italy 
Constitution of the Italian Constitution 
Article 43 
‘For the purposes of the common good, the law may establish that an 
enterprise or a category thereof be, through a pre-emptive decision or compulsory 
purchase authority with provision of compensation, reserved to the Government, a 
public agency, a workers' or users' association, provided that such enterprise 
operates in the field of essential public services, energy sources or monopolies and 





Royal-Decree Law No.4/2006 of 24/02/2006 (BOE No.50 of 28/02/2006, 
p.8016) 
1.º The safety and quality of the supply understood as 
constant physical availability of market products and services at 
reasonable prices in the short and long term for every user, 
independently of their geographic location; as well as: 
2.º The safety against a risk of investment or an inadequate 
maintenance of the structure that does not allow to ensure, on a 
continuous basis, a minimum set of services required to ensure the 
supply.» 
‘The Draft Law Creating the National Commission on Markets and 
Competition’ No.121/000028 of 19/10/2012 (BOCG-10-A-28-1, X Leg., No.28-4, 
Series A of 4/04/2013).Transposed into Law No.3/2013 of 4/06/2013 (BOE 
No.134 of 5/06/2013)  
274 
 
Additional provision ninth. Functions assumed by the Ministry of Industry, 
Energy and Tourism energy. 
The Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism will undertake the following 
functions: 
1. In the electricity sector. 
a) To inspect, within its scope of competence, the fulfilment of the technical 
conditions of the facilities, the fulfilment of the requirements established in the 
authorizations, the correct and effective use of indigenous coal at power plants with 
the right to charge the fee for indigenous coal consumption, the economic situation 
and actions of the individuals as long as they affect the application of fees, prices 
and payment criteria of power activities, the effective availability of the generation 
facilities under the ordinary regime, the correct invoicing and selling conditions of 
trading and distributing companies and qualified clients, the continuous supply of 
power, the services quality, as well as the effective division of the abovementioned 
activities when required. 
b) To agree to the submission of penalizing files and prepare their instruction 
procedure, when it is under the jurisdiction of the General Administration of the 
State and their filing suit or instruction are not under the jurisdiction of the CNMC 
(National Commission for Markets and Competition); and to report, when requested, 
on any penalizing file submitted by the different Public Administrations. 
c) To report, assist and proceed, in coordination with jurisdictional 
administrations, through protocols for implementation, with the claims submitted by 
power consumers, and to provide the latter with all the necessary information related 
to their rights, the enforceable legislation and the ways available to solve their 
conflicts in case of litigation. 
The Ministry shall report to the CNMC, at least once a semester, on any action 
submitted, including the data of the number of claims reported, assisted and 
processed, for the purpose of facilitating its monitoring tasks on the operations of 
retail markets. 
d) To estimate the liquidations of power transportation and distribution costs, 
the system constant costs and any other cost established for the whole system – 
when these liquidations are specifically ordered, and send to the CNMC all the 
necessary information to create toll methods. 
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e) To monitor the activity of the Office of Supplier Changes. 
… 
2. In the hydrocarbon sector. 
a)To inspect, within its scope of competence, the fulfilment of the technical 
conditions of the facilities, the fulfilment of the requirements established in the 
authorizations, the economic situation and actions of the individuals while they 
affect the application of fees, prices and payment criteria of hydrocarbons, the 
effective availability of gas facilities, the correct invoicing and selling conditions to 
the consumers of distributing companies – as regards access to networks – and 
trading companies, the continuous supply of natural gas, the services quality, as well 
as the effective division of the abovementioned activities when required. 
b) To agree, within the scope of the enforceable Law, to the submission of 
penalizing files and prepare their instruction procedure, when it is under the 
jurisdiction of the General Administration of the State; and to report, when 
requested, on those penalizing files submitted by the different Public 
Administrations, without prejudice of the jurisdiction conferred to the Corporation 
of Strategic Reserves of Oil Products in Section 52.4 of the abovementioned Law, or 
the exclusive jurisdictions of other Public Administrations bodies. 
c) To estimate the liquidations regarding the profits obtained from tolls and 
fees related to the use of the Basic Network facilities, secondary transport and 
distribution referred in Section 96, and to notify the interested party/parties about 
them. 
d) To report, assist and proceed, in coordination with jurisdictional 
administrations, through protocols for implementation, with the claims submitted by 
natural gas consumers, and to provide them with all the necessary information 
related to their rights, the enforceable legislation and the ways available to solve 
their conflicts in case of litigation 
The Ministry shall report to the CNMC, at least once a semester, on the 
actions submitted, including the data of the number of claims reported, assisted and 
processed, for the purpose of facilitating its monitoring tasks on the operations of 
retail markets. 
e) To issue certificates and to manage the certification methodology of biofuel 
consumption and selling. 
f) To monitor the activity of the Office of Supplier Changes. 
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g) The jurisdictions granted by the enforceable regulations to the National 
Energy Commission as regards liquid hydrocarbons. 
3. As regards the power and hydrocarbon sectors: to have knowledge about 
partitions taking within the power sector. 
 
Law No.62/2003 (BOE No.313 of 31/12/2003  
4(4) The administrative procedure referred in the previous paragraph may end 
by the submission of an agreement with the features of the understanding or social 
action subject to approval, which may be proposed by the current Administration or 
the interested party/parties. 
4(5) The following interrupt, in any case, the estimation of the period of time 
established in the first paragraph of this Section: 
a) The requirement of a remedy for the deficiencies or insufficiencies of the 
notice, especially regarding the data about the concerned social actions or 
agreements features, until they are duly fulfilled. This requirement shall only be 
practised once. 
b) The submission of an agreement proposal by the Administration and until it 
is accepted or denied by the interested party/parties. 
c) The intervention of the European Union body competent as regards the 
assumptions included in the scope of the application of Rule CEE 4064/89, amended 
by Rule CEE 2367/90, and for the adoption of any of the decisions disposed in these 
rules. 
d) The submission of an inquiry to the competent European Union body by the 
respective state body in the case of merging, division or transfer of a property or the 
use of company assets, and applying the European Union rules previously 
mentioned in paragraph c). 
4(6) The competent body shall be deemed not to be opposed to the operation 
or decision notified if, once finished the period established in paragraph 1 of this 
Section, a decision has not been notified. 
5(e) The risk of the financial structure of the operation that may lie upon the 
activities of the entity subject to these rules and upon the resources obtained by these 
activities, especially about regulated profits transferred to activities different from 
the ones originating them.  
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